DVC retrospective - None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case.Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of 2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails. 3. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU            

CRIMINAL PETITION No.5921 of 2012  

13.08.2012

Gundu Chandrasekhar and others

1. The State of A.P., rep by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.,And another

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Gaddam Srinivas

Counsel  for the Respondents:  Additional Public Prosecutor

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

  2009(1) ALT (Cri)-285

ORDER:

       
The petitioners 1 to 3 are husband and parents-in-law of the 2nd
respondent/aggrieved person in D.V.C.No.8 of 2011 of the lower Court.  The 2nd
respondent filed D.V.C. claiming several reliefs including reliefs of protection
order under Section 18, residence order under Section 19, monetary relief under
Section 20 and compensation under Section 22 of the Protection of Women from  
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, the Act).  The petitioners' counsel
contended that even as per allegations in the complaint, disputes for the
aggrieved person with the petitioners were in the year 2002 and there was
separation between the parties in the year 2003 and that since all the said
incidents happened prior to passing of the Act in the year 2005 and coming into
force of the Act in the year 2006, D.V.C. filed in the lower Court in the year
2011 is not maintainable under the Act.  He placed reliance on U.U.Thimmanna v
U.U.Santhya1 of this in this regard.  This Court observed:
        "There is no dispute that the Act came into effect when the Central
Government appoints 26.10.2006 as the date on which the Act was came into force. 
For acts of violence, certain penal provisions are incorporated.  Therefore, it
is a fundamental principle of law that any penal provision has no retrospective
operation, only prospective.  There is no allegation either in the report or in
the statement or in the complaint of the 1st respondent with regard to the acts
of domestic violence that took place on or after 26.10.2006.  Therefore,
continuation of proceedings against the petitioners is nothing but abuse of
process of Court."

2. None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can
be called crimes.  Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the
complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it
incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the
nature of civil reliefs only.  It is only violation of order of the Magistrate
which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty
for breach of protection order by any of the respondents.  Similarly Section 33
of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer.
Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the
reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of
rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be
termed as trial of a criminal case.  Therefore, it is only in respect of
allegations under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which are penal provisions, the
Act has no retrospective operation.  Even if it is held that reliefs under
Sections 18 to 22 of the Act have no retrospective operation, the Magistrate can
grant the reliefs in prospective manner and cannot grant the said reliefs with
reference to a date anterior to the date of commencement of the Act.  The 2nd
respondent/aggrieved person is also not claiming reliefs in retrospective manner
inasmuch as she is claiming all the reliefs prospectively, in the sense,
subsequent to date of filing of the case in the lower Court and not with effect
from any back date retrospectively.  Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra
Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of
2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in
case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force.
Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails.

3.  In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.


_____________________________    
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU,J        
Dt.13th August, 2012

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