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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Monday, July 20, 2015

Rent Control Appeal - Deposit of arrears of rents is a conditional precedent under A.P.Rent Control Act - payment of rent is a condition precedent for entertaining the appeal;2015 A.P. MSKLAWREPORTS



the appellate
Court was justified in not numbering the appeal unless and until
the rent was deposited; in a case where the jural relationship of
landlord and tenant is denied, the finding given by the Rent
Controller holds good; deposit of arrears of rent, as determined by
the Rent Controller, was indispensable; and it could not be said
that the appellate Court had committed any illegality or
impropriety in rejecting the appeal in limini.  Having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case, this Court considered it fit to
grant time to the petitioners to deposit the rents making it clear
that, in the event of the failure of the petitioners to deposit the
arrears of rent, the order, rejecting the appeal, would stand and
steps could be taken for eviction.
      It is evident from the law declared, in the aforesaid
judgments, that the appellate tribunal, at the stage of entertaining
an appeal and in requiring the appellant-tenant to deposit arrears
of rent, would not cause an enquiry into the finding recorded by
the Rent Controller that the jural relationship of landlord and
tenant exists; the appellate tribunal would depend upon the
finding of the Rent Controller that the jural relationship of landlord
and tenant exists; before passing an order under Section 11 of the
Act, the appellate tribunal need not conduct another full-fledged
enquiry into the jural relationship of landlord and tenant; no
tenant can prefer an appeal under Section 20 of the Act unless he
has paid the landlord, or has deposited in Court, the entire arrears
of rent; payment of rent is a condition precedent for entertaining
an appeal; Section 11 makes it obligatory for the tenant to pay
arrears of rent if he chooses to prefer an appeal under Section 20
of the Act; and the appeal itself would not be maintainable, unless
and until the tenant pays the arrears of rent, or deposits it into
Court.
        The petitioner herein has not paid the arrears of rent as
directed by the Rent Controller and, consequently, the appellate
tribunal has refused to entertain the appeal. I see no reason to
examine the contentions, urged on behalf of the petitioner, on
merits as payment of arrears of rent is a condition precedent for an
appeal to be entertained under the Act.
 As the appellate tribunal
has refused to entertain the appeal solely on the ground that the
petitioner had failed to pay the arrears of rent, it would be wholly
inappropriate for this Court to examine the contentions urged on
merits as these are matters for the appellate tribunal to decide, on
compliance by the petitioner of the requirement of Section 11 of
the Act of paying the entire arrears of rent. The order of the
appellate tribunal, to the extent it held that an appeal would not lie
till the arrears of rent are paid, does not suffer from any infirmity
necessitating interference by this Court.  However, as similar
directions were passed by the Division bench in Khursheed
Sehedur4 and this Court in S. Sathaiah3, the petitioner is granted
three weeks time from today to deposit the arrears of rent upto
date and, on such deposit, the appeal shall be heard by the
appellate tribunal, and be disposed of in accordance with law.  In
case the petitioner fails to deposit the entire arrears of rent within
the time stipulated hereinabove, the Rent Controller may proceed
and take steps for her eviction, from the subject premises, in
accordance with law.
          The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of accordingly.  The
miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.  However, in the circumstances, without costs.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

the press note dated 02-06-2015 issued by the Election Commission of India (for short the EC) proposing to hold biennial elections to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council from Local Authorities Constituencies (for short the Election).

THE HONBLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI DILIP B.BHOSALE AND THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE S.V.BHATT              

W.P.Nos.15921 OF 2015 and batch  

10-06-2015

The Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party & others Petitioners  

The Election Commission of India & others Respondents  

Counsel for Petitioners:Sri S.Srinivas Reddy
                          Sri Ch.Siva Reddy
                          Sri P.Sudhakar Reddy

Counsel for Respondents:Sri Avinash Desai
                         Sri V.V.Prabhakar Rao
                         Learned G.P. for Law &
                         Legislative Affairs (AP)
                         Sri G.Subba Rao
<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred :1)     [ (2000) 8 SCC 216 ]      
                 2)     [ AIR 2002 A.P. 307 ]
                 3)     [ AIR 1952 SC 64 ]
                 4)     [ AIR 1978 SC 851 ]
                 5)     [ (1988) 1 SCC 277 ]
                 6)     [ (2011) 1 SCC 370 ]



THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUUSTICE SRI DILIP B.BHOSALE          
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE S.V.BHATT      

W.P.Nos.15921,16147 and 15928 of 2015  


ORAL JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble The Acting Chief Justice Dilip B.Bhosale)


        The petitioners, in these writ petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, seek similar reliefs, based on the press
note dated 02-06-2015 issued by the Election Commission of
India (for short the EC) proposing to hold biennial elections to
the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council from Local Authorities
Constituencies (for short the Election).

2)              In the first petition (W.P.No.15921 of 2015),
petitioner No.1 is a political party registered under Section 29-A
of the Representation of The People Act, 1951 (for short the
Act), and the second petitioner is its Secretary. They are
challenging the action of the EC in issuing the press note
dated 02-06-2015, declaring to conduct separate elections to the
posts of members of the A.P. Legislative Council (for short the
Council), to fill up two vacancies each from Krishna and
Visakhapatnam Local Authorities Constituencies as arbitrary,
illegal, unjust, discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India.  According to the
petitioners, holding of an election, in the manner in which it is
proposed, is contrary to Article 171 of the Constitution, Section
27 of the Act and the provisions of Delimitation of Council
Constituencies (Andhra Pradesh) Order, 2006, (for short the
delimitation order).  They are also seeking a direction to the EC
to conduct single election to fill up two vacancies each from
Krishna and Visakhapatnam Local Authorities Constituencies.

3)              In the second petition (W.P.No.16147 of 2015) the
petitioner, who desires to contest the said elections, is an
individual and former member of the Legislative Assembly.  He
also seeks the similar relief as prayed for in the first petition.

4)              In the third petition (W.P.No.15928 of 2015) also,
the petitioner is an individual who seeks to challenge the very
same press note stating that the decision of the EC to hold
elections for only one vacancy though there exists two vacancies
in one territorial constituency of Chittoor District i.e. Local
Authorities Constituency as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and
contrary to Article 171 (4) of The Constitution.

5)              The impugned press note was issued by the EC on
02-06-2015.  The writ petitions, though, it appears, were filed
on 05.06.2015, were mentioned before the Court for urgent
hearing on 08-06-2015.  On this date the Court directed learned
counsel for the petitioners to give notice to the EC and other
respondents and kept the petitions for admission on 09-06-2015.
In the meanwhile, a notification was published in the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette on 09-06-2015 declaring the biennial elections
to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council from the Local
Authorities Constituencies stating that the seats of 11 members
of the Legislative Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh elected
by the members of the Local Authorities have fallen vacant on
the retirement of sitting members on the expiration of their term
of the office.  The details, as given in the notification, namely,
name of the retired members, name of the Local Authorities
Constituencies, number of members to be elected and date of
their retirement read thus:-
                              Name of the State  Andhra Pradesh
Sl.
No.
Name of members  
Name of LAC
Number of
Members
to be
elected
Date of
Retirement

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.
Yellareddigari Sivarami Reddy
Anantapur Local Authorities
1
29.03.2013

2.
Yallamanchili Venkata Babu
Rejendra Prasad
Krishna Local Authorities
1
29.03.2013
3.
China Rajappa Nimmakayala  
East Godavari Local
Authorities
1
01.05.2013
4.
5.
Dr.Rayapati Srinivas
Thelukutla Gopala Venkata
Krishna Reddy

Guntur Local Authorities

2

01.05.2013
6.
Vasireddy Varada Rama Rao  
Vizianagaram Local
Authorities
1
01.05.2013
7.
Dadi Veerabhadra Rao
Vishakhapatnam Local
Authorities
1
01.05.2013
8.
K.Jayachandra Naidu
Chittoor Local Authorities
1
01.05.2013
9.
Ilapuram Venkaiah
Krishna Local Authorities
1
29.03.2015
10.
D.V.Suryanarayana Raju
Visakhaparnam Local
Authorities
1
01.05.2015
11.
Pothula Rama Rao
Prakasam Local Authorities
1
01.05.2015


5.1)            The following portion of the notification issued by the
Governor of Andhra Pradesh is also relevant:-
   AND WHEREAS, Biennial election to fill up 8 seats in the year
2013 could not be then conducted as the Constituent Local
Bodies/Electors were not in existence at that time and while in
the year 2014, the Constituent Local Bodies/Electors with their
members came into existence but the State of Andhra Pradesh
was bifurcated into two States, namely, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana by the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 and there
was inconsistency in the Act, regarding the number of seats in respect
of Local Authorities Constituencies allocated to Andhra Pradesh, viz.,
as per Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014, 17
seats were allocated to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council in
respect of Local Authorities Constituencies but under the Third
Schedule to the said Act, 20 members were allocated to these
Constituencies;
        AND WHEREAS, it was decided by the Commission that before    
conducting the elections for filling the above mentioned vacancies
occurred in 2013 as well as in 2015, it was necessary to remove
the above said inconsistency;
        AND WHEREAS, in terms of Section 108 of the said Act, this
inconsistency was referred to the Central Government (Ministry of
Home Affairs) for removing the said inconsistency;
        AND WHEREAS, the said inconsistency has now been removed by    
order of Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 29.04.2015, read with Andhra
Pradesh Reorganization (Amendment) Act, 2015, dated 30.03.2015,
whereby the total number of seats to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative
Council has been increased to 58 from 50 and the seats in respect of
Local Authorities Constituencies has been kept as 20;
        AND WHEREAS, a biennial election has thus, to be held for the
purpose of filling all the above mentioned eleven vacancies so arisen;
        AND WHEREAS, It is clarified that the election to fill the two
vacancies from Guntoor Local Authorities Constituency which
arose on 1.5.2013 will be held as single election, whereas
elections to fill the remaining 9 vacancies will be held as
separate elections to fill one vacancy each;
        NOW, THEREFORE, as recommended by the Election Commission of      
India in pursuance of section 16 read with Section 15A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), the Governor of
the State of Andhra Pradesh is hereby pleased to call upon each of the
Local Authorities Constituencies of the State mentioned in column (2)
of the table given in the Annexure to elect the number of Members as
indicated in column (4) of the table against each of the corresponding
Constituencies, for the purpose of filling the above vacancies, in
accordance with the provisions of the said Act and of the rules and
orders made thereunder.
                                                          E.S.L.NARASIMHAN,  
Governor of Andhra Pradesh

(emphasis supplied)

5.2)            The election programme was also declared along
with the notification dated 09-06-2015, which reads as follows:-
(A)    appoints, with respect to the said election in each of the
constituencies,-
                        (a)     the 16th June, 2015 (Tuesday), as the last date for
                                making nominations;
(b)     the 17th June, 2015 (Wednesday), as the date for the
                        scrutiny of nominations;
                (c)     the 19th June, 2015 (Friday), as the last date for the
                        withdrawal of candidatures;
(c)     the 3rd July, 2015 (Friday), as the date on which a
                        poll shall, if necessary, be taken; and
                (e)     the 10th July, 2015 (Friday), as the date before which
                        the election shall be completed; and

(B)     fixes the hours from 8.00 A.M. to 4.00 P.M., as the hours
during which the poll shall, if necessary, be taken on the date specified
above for the election.
6)              The election programme was declared by the EC vide
Notification dated 09.06.2015 under the orders of the Principal
Secretary to the Election Commission of India and by the Chief
Electoral Officer, Andhra Pradesh, in pursuance of Sections 30
and 56 of the Act.  The notifications dated 09.06.2015, declaring
the election, could not have been challenged in these petitions,
which were filed before the date of notification, nor the learned
counsel for the parties subsequently sought leave of this Court to
challenge the said notification.

7)              Mr.C.V.Mohan Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioners in the first writ petition, at the
outset, submitted that the EC ought to have declared to conduct
single election to fill up two vacancies each from Krishna and
Visakhapatnam Local Authorities Constituencies as they
proposed to hold single election for two vacancies in Guntur
Local Authorities Constituency.  In other words, he submitted
that it is not only improper and discriminatory but also illegal to
hold separate elections for filling up two vacancies from same
territorial Constituency contrary to the mandate contemplated by
Article 171 of the Constitution.  This Article, he submitted,
contemplates single election in a single territorial constituency in
accordance with the system of proportional representation by
means of the single transferable vote.  He further submitted that
in any case it was wrong on the part of the EC to discriminate
between the election to fill up two vacancies from one territorial
constituency i.e. Guntur Local Authorities Constituency and for
two vacancies each from two territorial constituencies, namely,
Krishna and Visakhapatnam Local Authorities Constituencies. He
submitted that merely because the term of the seats for which
the elections are being held expired in the year 2013 and 2015
in Krishna and Visakhapatnam Local Authorities Constituencies
that cannot be the ground for holding separate elections. He
submitted that there is absolutely no rational in holding separate
elections for two vacancies from one territorial constituency
when the relevant provisions of the Act and Article 171 clearly
mandates single election in accordance with the system of
proportional representation by means of the single transferable
vote. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Election Commission of
India v. Ashok Kumar and others( ).

8)              Mr.Ch.Siva Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner in the second petition (W.P.No.16147 of 2015),
repeated the submissions advanced by Mr.C.V.Mohan Reddy,  
learned Senior Counsel.  We are, therefore, not making specific
reference to his submissions since the challenge in both the
petitions is identical.  Mr.Ch.Siva Reddy, in support of his
submissions, placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Kayathi Jayapal Reddy v. State Election Commission and
another( ).

9)              Mr.Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner in the third petition (W.P.No.15928
of 2015), submitted that it was wrong, illegal, discriminatory and
contrary to Article 171 of the Constitution, apart from it being
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the Election Rules
of 1961, to hold election for only one vacancy when admittedly
there exists two vacancies in the territorial constituency of
Chittoor District.  In short, he submitted that the EC has
committed grave error of law in holding election from Local
Authorities Constituencies for only one vacancy out of two
vacancies in Chittoor District.

10)             On the other hand, Mr.Avinash Desai, learned
counsel appearing for the EC, at the outset, invited our attention
to Article 329 of the Constitution of India and Section 100 of the
Act and submitted that these writ petitions cannot be
entertained since the notification declaring the election has
already been issued.  He submitted that it is not open to the
petitioners to call in question the election except by an election
petition. He submitted that grounds, on which the petitioners
have challenged the press note declaring the instant election,
are available under Section 100 of the Act, to challenge the
election after the process is complete.  On merits, he submitted
that in case of Krishna and Visakhapatnam Local Authorities
Constituencies, the EC has decided to hold separate elections
since the election is for two vacancies which occurred at two
different points of time, i.e. in 2013 and 2015, while in Guntur
Local Authorities Constituency both the vacancies arose in 2013
i.e., on 01-05-2013.  He submitted that the notification is issued
to fill up eight(8) seats since in the year 2013 biennial election
could not be then conducted as the Constituent Local
Bodies/Electors were not in existence at that time and while in
the year 2014, the Constituent Local Bodies/Electors with their
members came into existence but the State of Andhra Pradesh
was bifurcated into two States and since there was inconsistency
in the A.P. Reorganization Act, 2014, regarding the number of
seats in respect of Local Authorities Constituencies.  He
submitted that the vacancies occurred in 2013 as well as in
2015, are though proposed to be filled by holding election on the
same day, those vacancies cannot be conducted by single
election.  In the case of Guntur Local Authorities Constituency,
he submitted, the EC is holding single election since both the
vacancies occurred on the same day in 2013.  He submitted that
in A.K.Walia v. Union of India and others [C.W.132/94
decided by a Division Bench presided over by Justice P.K.Bahri
and Justice Vijender Jain on 14.01.1994] identical challenge was
raised before the Delhi High Court.  It was in respect of three (3)
seats of Rajya Sabha from the Electoral College comprising of
members of the Legislative Assembly of Delhi wherein the Delhi
High Court dismissed the petition.  He also placed notification,
published in The Andhra Pradesh Gazette, Part-V, on record for
our perusal.  Iin support of his submissions, he placed reliance
upon the following Judgments: N.P.Ponnuswami V. The
Returning Officer, Namakhal Constituency and others( );
Mohinder Singh Gill and another V.The Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi and others( ); Election
Commission of India V. Shivaji and others( ) and Election
Commission of India V. Telangana Rastra Samithi and
Another( )

11)             In this back drop, it would be advantageous to
reproduce the relevant portion of Article 171 of the Constitution
for better appreciation of the averments advanced by the
learned counsel for the parties, which reads thus:-
                171.   Composition of the Legislative Councils.- (1)
The total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State
having such a Council shall not exceed [one-third] of the total
number of members in the Legislative Assembly of that State:
        Provided that the total number of members in the
Legislative Council of a State shall in no case be less than forty.
(2)     .
(3)     Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council
of a State-

(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by electorates
consisting of members of municipalities, district boards and such
other local authorities in the State as Parliament may by law
specify;

(b)  as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by
electorates consisting of persons residing in the State who have
been for at least three years graduates of any university in the
territory of India or have been for at least three years in
possession of qualifications prescribed by or under any law made
by Parliament as equivalent to that of a graduate of any such
university;

(c)  as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by
electorates consisting of persons who have been for at least three
years engaged in teaching in such educational institutions within
the State, not lower in standard than that of a secondary school,
as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament;

(d)  as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by the
members of the Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst
persons who are not members of the Assembly;

(e)  the remainder shall be nominated by the Governor in
accordance with the provisions of clause (5).

(4)     The members to be elected under sub-clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of clause (3) shall be chosen in such territorial constituencies
as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament,
and the elections under the said sub-clauses and under sub-clause
(d) of the said clause shall be held in accordance with the system
of proportional representation by means of the single transferable
vote.

11.1)           Similarly, Article 329 of the Constitution of India and
Section 100 of the Act are also relevant.  Article 329 of the
Constitution reads thus:
                329.   Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.-
[Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution]
(a)     the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of
constituencies or the allotment of seats to such
constituencies, made or purporting to be made under
article 327 or 328, shall not be called in question in any
court;
(b)     no election to either House of Parliament or to the House
or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be
called in question except by an elected petition
presented to such authority and in such manner as may
be provided for by or under any law made by the
appropriate Legislature.


11.2)           Section 100 of the Act reads thus:

                100.  Grounds for declaring election to be void:- (1)
Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if [the High Court] is of opinion-
-
(a)    
(b)    
(c)    
(d)     That the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned
candidate, has been materially affected--
(i)     ..
(ii)    ..
(iii)   ..
(iv)    By any non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made
under this Act,

                [the High Court] shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void.
12)             A glance at Article 329 of the Constitution, for our
purpose, would show that no election to either House of the
Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an
Election Petition. Whether a ban under this Article is a blanket
ban and whether Article 226 is also covered by this embargo,
and if so, Section 100 is enough to accommodate every kind of
objection, constitutional, legal or factual which may have the
result of invalidation of election, were the questions considered
by the Supreme Court, among many other issues/questions in
Mohinder Singh Gill (supra).  After having considered several
judgments of the Supreme Court and some English Judgments it
was held that Article 329(b) is a blanket ban on litigative
challenges to electoral steps taken by the Election Commission
and its Officers for carrying forward the process of election to its
culmination in the formal declaration of the result.

13)             Section 100 of the Act provides grounds for declaring
election to be void. It states that subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2), if the High Court is of opinion that the result of
election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate, has been
materially affected by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any Rules or Orders made
under this Act, the High Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void. Thus, from a bare reading of this
Section, it is clear that Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act takes
care of the situation present in the instant writ petition.  Having
regard to the ground of challenge, based on Article 171, as
contended by the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion,
is undoubtedly available to the petitioners after the election to
call in question the election of the returned candidate on the
ground of non-compliance with the said provisions of the
Constitution. In other words, the sole remedy for an aggrieved
party, if he wants to challenge any election, is an Election
Petition, in particular when the ground of challenge can be raised
in election petition under section 100 of the Act.  The exclusion
of all other remedies, including the constitutional remedy like a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, is because of
non abstante clause in Article 329 of the Constitution.  Section
100, as we have already seen, provides for the ground on which
an election may be called in question, one of which is non-
compliance of the provisions of the Constitution.  We are not
expressing any opinion on the question whether, in the present
case, the Election Commission failed to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution including Article 171.  Our
observations are only in respect of grounds raised by the
petitioners for challenging the press note, whereby the EC
declared to hold biennial elections to the A.P. Legislative Council
from the Local Authorities Constituencies.

13.1)           In N.P.Ponnuswami (supra) the Seven Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the appeal from an order
of Madras High Court dismissing the petition of the appellant
praying for a Writ of Certiorari.  The challenge in the writ was to
the rejection of nomination paper for the election to the Madras
Legislative Assembly. While dealing with the question, as
aforementioned, the observations made by the Supreme Court in
paragraph 9 of the report are relevant for our purpose, which
read thus:-
        9.  The question now arises whether the law of elections in this
country contemplates that there should be two attacks on matters
connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on
by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under
Art.226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts
having been expressly excluded), and an other after they have
been completed by means of an election petition.  In my opinion,
to affirm such a position would be contrary to the scheme of Part
XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act,
which as I shall point out later, seems to be that any matter which
has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at
the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special
tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage
before any Court.  It seems to me that under the election law, the
only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has
consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the
election in question Article 392 (b) was apparently enacted to
prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground,
and other grounds which may be raised under the law to call the
election in question, could be urged.  I think it follows by
necessary implication from the language of this provision that
those grounds cannot be urged in any other manner, at any other
stage and before any other Court.  If the grounds on which an
election can be called in question could be raised at an
earlier stage and errors, if any, are rectified, there will be
no meaning in enacting a provision like Art.329 (b) and in
setting up a special tribunal.  Any other meaning ascribed
to the words used in article would lead to anomalies, which
the Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them
being that conflicting views may be expressed by the High
Court at the pre-polling stage and by the election tribunal,
which is to be an independent body, at the stage when the
matter is brought up before it.
(emphasis supplied)

14)             In Shivaji (supra) the Supreme Court while dealing
with the judgment of the Bombay High Court in appeal, wherein
the High Court had interfered with the process of election twice,
observed that even if there was any ground relating to the non-
compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Constitution on
which the validity of any election process could be questioned,
the person interested in questioning the election has to wait till
the election is over and institute a petition in accordance with
Section 81 of the Act calling in question the election of the
successful candidate within 45 days from the date of election of
the returned candidate but not earlier than the date of election.
[Also see Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M.Hassan Uzzaman    
(1985) 4 SCC 689 and Inderjit Barua v. Election
Commission of India (1985) 4 SCC 722].

15)             In Ashok Kumar (supra) an interim order passed by
the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, during the currency of the
process of election, whereby the High Court had stayed the
notification issued by the Election Commission of India, the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in appeal, summed up
its conclusions by partly restating what the Two Constitution
Benches had already said, and then added, by clarifying what
follows therefrom, in view of the analysis made by them,
observed as follows:-
32.    .
                (1)  If an election, (the term election being widely
interpreted so as to include all steps and entire proceedings
commencing from the date of notification of election till the date of
declaration of result is to be called in question and which
questioning may have the effect of interrupting, obstructing or
protracting the election proceedings in any manner, the invoking
of judicial remedy has to be postponed till after the completing of
proceedings in elections.
                (2)  Any decision sought and rendered will not
amount to calling in question an election if it subserves the
progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the
election.  Anything done towards completing or in furtherance of
the election proceedings cannot be described as questioning the
election.
                (3)    
                (4)    
                (5)  The court must be very circumspect and act
with caution while entertaining any election dispute though not hit
by the bar of Article 329 (b) but brought to it during the pendency
of election proceedings.  The court must guard against any
attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the
election proceedings.  Care has to be taken to see that there is no
attempt to utilise the courts indulgence by filing a petition
outwardly innocuous but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for
achieving an ulterior or hidden end.  Needless to say that in the
very nature of the things the court would act with reluctance and
shall not act, except on a clear and strong case for its intervention
having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and
precision and supporting the same by necessary material.

15.1)           We have reproduced only relevant
conclusions/observations made by the Supreme Court.

16)             In the backdrop of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the challenge raised
in these writ petitions must fail mainly on three grounds viz.,
first, the notification has already been issued and the election
process is set in motion; second, Article 329 bars every
challenge to any election including the election process which
commences from the date of notification in the official gazette,
except by way of election petition under the Act; and third, the
grounds of challenge in the instant petitions, as raised by
learned counsel for the parties, are available to call in question
the election of the returned candidate, by way of election
petition under Section 100 of the Act, once the election process
is complete.  The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution, insofar as the grounds of
challenge raised in these petitions are concerned, in view of the
provisions of Article 329 of the Constitution, cannot be invoked
and on this ground alone the instant writ petitions must fail.  The
grounds, as observed earlier, on which an election can be called
in question cannot be raised at an early stage and the errors, if
any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a
provision like Article 329(b) and in setting up a special tribunal.
On this ground alone, the first two writ petitions deserve to be
dismissed.  Order accordingly.  In view thereof, we refrain from
entering into merits of the case and leave it open to the
petitioners, if they so desire, to challenge the election after the
results are declared.  We are keeping all the contentions of the
petitioners on merits open to be raised and considered in the
Election Petition, if instituted, as contemplated by Section 100 of
the Act.

17)             Insofar as the third writ petition is concerned, at the
outset, we would like to refer the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Telangana Rastra Samithi (supra).  In this judgment,
the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal arising from the
order passed by the High Court in a writ petition involving the
holding of bye-elections to casual vacancies in the State
Legislative Assembly.  The writ petition was allowed by the High
Court by applying the literal rule of interpretation. The Supreme
Court in this appeal in paragraph 46 observed thus:
        46.  We are, therefore, of the firm view that the introduction of
Section 151-A in the Constitution did not alter the position as far
as the provisions of Section 84 and consequently Sections 98 (c)
and 101 (b) of the 1951 Act are concerned, since although a
casual vacancy may have occurred within the meaning of
Section 150 of the 1951 Act, those vacancies in which
election petitions had been filed and were pending cannot
be held to have become available for the purposes of being
filled up within the time prescribed under Section 151-A of
the 1951 Act.  Article 190 (3) (b) of the Constitution merely
indicates that if a Member of a House of a Legislature of a
State resigns his seat by writing to the Speaker and such
resignation is accepted, his seat shall become vacant.  It
does not introduce any element of compulsion on the
Election Commission to hold a bye-election ignoring the
provisions of Section 84 of the Act.  In such cases, we have
little hesitation in holding that such casual vacancies are not
available for being filled up and the Commission will have to wait
for holding elections in such constituencies until a decision is
rendered in regard to the latter part of Section 84 of the 1951 Act
during the life of the House.  The view expressed by the High
Court that a case has to be decided in accordance with the laws as
existing on the date of adjudication, while salutary in principle, are
not attracted to the facts of this case in view of the provisions of
Section 84 of the 1951 Act.
(emphasis supplied)

18)             From the above judgment, it is clear that although a
casual vacancy may have occurred within the meaning of
Section 150 of the Act, such vacancies in which election petitions
had been filed and were pending cannot be held to have become
available for the purposes of being filled up within the time
prescribed under Section 151-A of the Act.

19)     In the instant case, it is not in dispute that though sitting
member of the Legislative Council resigned in the year 2014,
before the resignation, his election was challenged by the
defeated candidate in Election Petition No.1 of 2011 in this High
Court with a prayer to declare him as elected by setting aside
the election of 1st respondent therein.  In view of such prayer,
the election petition cannot be stated to have rendered
infructuous in view of the resignation of the 1st respondent in the
said petition.  Thus, we do not find any reason to interfere with
the election process in respect of the territorial Constituency in
Chittoor District, viz., Local Authorities Constituency, whereby
election for only one vacancy is declared.  Thus, the third
petition fails and dismissed as such also on this ground.

20)             Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. No
order as to costs.

21)             Miscellaneous petitions pending in the writ petitions,
if any, also stand disposed of.


_________________  
Dilip B.Bhosale, ACJ
__________
S.V.Bhatt, J
10th June, 2015.

Sec.433(e), 434(1)(a) and sec.439(1)(b) of Companies Act - Company Petition to wind up the company for non-payment of it's Debt - statutory notice was served on the respondent at its administrative office address instead of at its registered office address - Their Lordship held that as the Statutory notice not served at its Registered Office Address as contemplated in Section 433(e) of the Act read with Section 434 (1) (a) of the Act - the company petition is dismissed with liberty to file fresh Company petition after serving notice at Registered Office Address - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports




This company petition is filed under Sections 433(e), 434 (1) (a)
and 439(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short the Act) for an
order to wind up the respondent company for non-payment of the debt
allegedly due to the petitioner.

  It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that the respondent failed to
pay the debt due to it and therefore, the former is liable for non-payment
of the debt.
      Section 433 (e) of the Act reads as under:
       433. A company may be wound up by the Court
       (a)
       (b)
       (c)
       (d)
       (e) if the company is unable to pay its debts;

      Section 434(1)(a) of the Act reads as under:
       434 (1) A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay
its debts-
        (a) if a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the
company is indebted in a sum exceeding five hundred rupees then
due, has served on the company, by causing it to be delivered at
its registered office, by registered post or otherwise, a demand
under his hand requiring the company to pay the sum so due and
the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the
sum, or to secure or compound for it to be reasonable satisfaction
of the creditor;

the
statutory notice was served on the respondent at its administrative office
address instead of at its registered office address, which is shown in the
company petition.

As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent, a winding up petition under Section 433(e) of the Act read
with Section 434 (1) (a) of the Act can be maintained only if the two
requirements of the latter provision are satisfied, viz.,
 (1) service of
statutory notice on the respondent company at its registered office
address and
(2) non-payment of the alleged debt by the respondent at
least for a period of 21 days after receipt of such notice.
  In view of the
admitted fact that no such notice on the registered office address of the
respondent has been served, the petitioner failed to satisfy the provisions
of Section 434 (1)(a) of the Act.
The company petition is, therefore, liable
to be dismissed without dealing with the merits of the contentions raised
by both the parties.
Held that
      The Company Petition is accordingly dismissed, however, with
liberty to the petitioner to serve a notice on the registered office address
of the respondent company and file a fresh company petition, if the
respondent fails to pay the debt claimed by it, as required under Section
434 (1) (a) of the Act.

Whether under sec.28 (2) of The Provincial Insolvency Act , the money recovery suit is not maintainable pending Insolvency Petition ? - No. Or. VII, rule 1 C.P.C. - Money recovery suit filed after receiving Insolvency Petition Notice - Whether maintainable under sec.28(2) of Provincial Insolvency Act - Trail court dismissed the I.A. - Hence this C.R.P. - Their Lordships held that Pendency of proceedings as referred under Section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act refers to the pendency of proceedings subsequent to adjudication of the application, but not on mere filing of application seeking declaration of applicant as insolvent.- So the suit is maintainable - 2015 Telagana & A.P. msklawreports


Whether in view of pendency of insolvency
proceedings in I.P.No.34 of 2010, the suit filed by the 1st respondent is
barred under Section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.

the petitioner/1st defendant has filed the present application in I.A.No.777
of 2014 under Order 7 Rule 11 r/w.Sec.151 CPC, for rejection of
plaint on the ground that the same is barred under law.  It is the case
of petitioner that he has already filed insolvency petition which is
pending in I.P.No.34 of 2010, seeking to declare him as insolvent and
soon after receipt of summons in the aforesaid I.P., the 1st
respondent/plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of money.
Trail court dismissed the I.A.
Hence this CRP
held that
From a reading of the provision under Section 28(2) of the
said Act, it is clear that, on making of an order of adjudication, the
whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a
receiver as provided in the said Section and shall become divisible
among the creditors, and thereafter, after adjudication, it is not open to
any creditor to commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except
with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court may
impose.  It is clear from the said provision that Section 28(2) comes
into effect only after adjudication of the application filed by the
applicant under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.
Therefore, after adjudication of the application filed by the applicant
seeking to declare him as insolvent and during pendency of further
proceedings for division of properties to the creditors, no creditor can
institute any suit or commence any legal proceedings without the
leave of the Court.  Pendency of proceedings as referred under Section
28(2) of the Act refers to the pendency of proceedings subsequent to
adjudication of the application, but not on mere filing of application
seeking declaration of applicant as insolvent.

Tuesday, June 30, 2015

The Writ Petition is directed against the Award passed by the 1st respondent, the Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Hyderabad on 05.10.2013 in the proceedings initiated before it by the 2nd respondent company.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

W.P. No.13639 of 2014

25-06-2015

State Water and Sanitation Mission,  Erramanzil, Hyderabad rep. by its Project
Director. .Petitioner

The A.P. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Hyderabad &
another..Respondents

Counsel for the petitioner: GP for Panchayat Raj & Rural
                             Development (TG)

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri S. Dwarakanath

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
WRIT PETITION No. 13639 OF 2014  
O R D E R:
      The State Water and Sanitation Mission is the petitioner
herein.  The Writ Petition is directed against the Award passed by
the 1st respondent, the Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small
Enterprises Facilitation Council, Hyderabad on 05.10.2013 in the
proceedings initiated before it by the 2nd respondent company.
      The 2nd respondent company is a small-scale industry.  It
has filed a claim petition before the 1st respondent initially seeking
Rs.47,24,823/-.  It is the case of the 2nd respondent that pursuant
to the e-procurement for work, supply, delivery, installation and
commissioning of stand alone water purification systems at various
government schools in rural areas, its bid was accepted and the
necessary agreement for execution of the work in five districts has
been entered into by and between the parties on 26.02.2010. It is
the case of the 2nd respondent that in spite of the execution of the
works, it has not been paid for the works so turned out.  It is
therefore, claimed by the 2nd respondent that an amount of
Rs.33,29,881/- was, in fact, due and payable by the petitioner
herein and since there was an inordinate delay in settling the
payments, interest of Rs. 13,94,942/- was also claimed thereon,
thus totalling to Rs.47,24,823/-.
      The 1st respondent has been established by the State
Government, in exercise of the power available under Section 20
read with Section 21 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (henceforth referred to as the Act). The
Parliament has noticed that small-scale industry is facing lots of
difficulties to stay put in the competitive industrial environment
and for it to flourish, settlement of its disputes and dues must be
attended to on priority basis, so that the small-scale industrial
entrepreneurs  can be developed duly enhancing their
competitiveness with rest of the entrepreneurs. Chapter IV of this
Act provided for various measures for promotion, development and
enhancement of competitiveness of Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises. Chapter V dealt with the delayed payments to Micro
and Small Enterprises. Section 15 of the Act has thrust that where
any supplier supplies any goods, or renders any services to any
buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date
agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or where
there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed date,
provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the
supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from
the day of acceptance or the day of the deemed acceptance.  The
expression appointed day has been defined in Section 2(b) of the
Act as the day following immediately after the expiry of the period
of 15 days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed
acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a
supplier.  It was explained therein that the day of acceptance
means the day of the actual delivery of goods or rendering of
services.  Thus, Section 15 of the Act has attempted at a tight
time-frame limit within which the payments are required to be
made to small-scale entrepreneurs. Section 16 has thrust a further
liability on the defaulting party making him liable to pay
compound interest with monthly rests at three times of the bank
rate notified by the Reserve Bank of India. Under Section 18,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force, any party to a dispute may make a reference to the
Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council for recovery of the
monies due.  Section 20 of the Act required the State Government
to establish one or more Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation
Councils and Section 21 of the Act dealt with the composition of
such a Council.  The Director of Industries in the Department of
the State Government having administrative control over small-
scale industries is made the Chair-person of the Facilitation
Council.
      The 2nd respondent herein has made a reference under
Section 18 of the Act for recovery of the aforementioned sum of
Rs.47,24,823/-.  It appears, it has filed on 04.10.2013 a revised
claim claiming a sum of Rs.1,46,99,714/-, but however, the 1st
respondent Facilitation Council passed orders the very next day
i.e. on 05.10.2013 directing the petitioner herein to pay a sum of
Rs.68,29,506/- towards principal and Rs.59,93,743/- towards
interest as on 30.09.2013, totalling to Rs.1,28,23,249/-.  Further
interest with monthly rests at three times the bank rate prevailing
as on the date of the Award was also made as payable. It is this
Award, which is challenged in this Writ Petition.
      It is not in dispute that the 2nd respondent has revised its
claim and filed it on 04.10.2013 before the Council and the
Council has passed its Order the very next day, namely
05.10.2013.  It is now urged before me specifically that the
petitioner herein had not been provided with a proper opportunity
to meet the revised claim of the 2nd respondent and bring out as to
how it is not tenable.  Therefore, it is urged that the order of the
Council dated 05.10.2013 is bad for violation of the principles of
natural justice.
      The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent Sri Karthik had
raised two-fold objection for entertaining this Writ Petition; the first
is that Section 19 of the Act sets out that no application for setting
aside any decree, award or other order made by the Council shall
be entertained by any Court unless the appellant has deposited
with it 75% of the amount in terms of the decree, award or the
order in the manner directed by such Court.  Sri Karthik therefore,
would submit that unless this pre-condition is met with, the Court
has no power to entertain this Writ Petition.  The learned counsel
would further submit that the Order of the 1st respondent Council
is liable to be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration  and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and that being an effective alternative
remedy, the petitioner could not have bypassed the same.
      It is important to notice that the provisions contained in
Sections 15 to 23 of the Act have been given overriding effect by
the Parliament, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force.  It is,
undoubtedly, true that by providing for such an overriding effect to
the provisions contained in Sections 15 to 23 of the Act, the
Parliament intended to protect the interests of Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises and promote the competitiveness of theirs, so
that they can stay afloat with other industries.  But these
provisions, in my opinion, cannot be read as excluding the judicial
review power of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.  For the present, I am not pronouncing any final
opinion on such an issue, in view of the conclusion to which I have
arrived, as set out herein below.  Judicial review power vested with
the constitutional Courts springs from the very Constitution.
Therefore, even by a statutory exercise, no Legislature can seek to
curtail or diminish that power totally.  It may be a different aspect
as to when the Court should really be called upon to exercise such
power.  However, where principles of natural justice are breached,
it is only appropriate that the error should be set right
immediately.  Lest, the very exercise of power carried out in
flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice would hold the
field unjustly.  This is one major reason that is weighing with my
mind when I generated a debate in this regard at the Bar.  I have
also suggested that the matter should be sent back to the Council
for a proper consideration duly hearing the petitioner herein.  This
apart, the Award has not assigned any specific reasons.  As is too
well-known, reasons are the live links, which bring out the
application of mind by the decision-maker.  The reasons offer
clarity and fairness of approach adopted while deciding the issue.
It is one thing to say that very exhaustive reasons may not have
been required to be spelt out like a well-trained Court would have
while adjudicating a lis brought before it, but however, the 1st
respondent Council, which has been clothed with the power to
adjudicate and pronounce upon an order relating to payment of
arrears and its recovery, it is essentially required of it to assign
reasons as to why it has reached the conclusion to which it did.
Lest, whole exercise would turn itself into an arbitrary fiat.
Therefore, for sheer violation of the principles of natural justice in
providing a fair and effective opportunity to the petitioner to meet
the case set up by the 2nd respondent in the form of a revised
claim, the Award passed by the 1st respondent on 05.10.2013
deserves to be set aside.
      I must also necessarily place on record my appreciation of
the efforts made by Sri Karthik, learned counsel for the 2nd
respondent.  The Managing Director of the 2nd respondent has filed
a sworn affidavit yesterday.  It is agreed that without prejudice to
the 2nd respondents objections with respect to entertainability or
maintainability of the Writ Petition and also without prejudice to
the merits of the claim of the 2nd respondent, dated 04.10.2013, for
a sum of Rs.1,46,99,714/- before the 1st respondent and interest
thereon, the 2nd respondent is agreeable for the matter to be
remanded to the 1st respondent.  The affidavit of the 2nd
respondent has been taken on record.
      Accordingly, the Order dated 05.10.2013 passed by the 1st
respondent is set aside.  The claim of the 2nd respondent is
restored to the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent shall provide
an opportunity to the petitioner herein to file its statement in
defence of the claim of the 2nd respondent in a time span not
exceeding 15 days to do so and thereafter, provide an opportunity
of hearing to both the petitioner as well as the 2nd respondent
herein who is the claimant and then pass an Award setting out
briefly the reasons why the conclusions have been arrived at by it.
It is made clear that the monies paid to the 2nd respondent,
pursuant to the interlocutory order passed by this Court on
16.12.2014, will abide by the result of the claim now to be decided
by the 1st respondent.  The 1st respondent is further directed to
complete the entire exercise in as quicker time as is possible,
preferably within a maximum period of two months from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.
      With this, the Writ Petition stands allowed. No costs.
          Consequently, the miscellaneous applications, if any shall
stand disposed of.
-----------------------------------------
NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J        
25th June 2015

Magistrate is not a Post Office = Magistrate, who is dealing with a complaint under Section 190 read with 200 Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind to find out as to whether the complaint makes out a prima facie case or not. Only, in the event, a prima facie case is made out, the complaint can be forwarded to the police for making investigation and to file a final report under Section 173 of the Code. Reasons are required to be spelt out for that satisfaction arrived at by the Magistrate. Perhaps, those reasons need not be very elaborate. Mechanically, no Magistrate can forward the complaints received to the police for investigation. Such measures would result in reducing the Court to that of a mere post office or to that of a sorting office attached to the Railway Mail Service. That is not the purpose which is sought to be achieved by the Code where provision is made for a genuine complainant to approach the competent Court for securing redressal for his grievance, when the police failed to act in the matter. I am, therefore, convinced that the entire exercise is an illegal one and hence, this petition is allowed. Accordingly, this criminal petition is allowed.-2015 Telangana & A.P.msklawreports

Magistrate is not a Post Office = Magistrate, who is dealing with a complaint under Section 190 read with 200 Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind to find out as to whether the complaint makes out a prima facie case or not.  Only, in the event, a prima facie case is made out, the complaint can be forwarded to the police for making investigation and to file a final report under Section 173 of the Code. Reasons are required to be spelt out for that satisfaction arrived at by the Magistrate.  Perhaps, those reasons need not be very elaborate. Mechanically, no Magistrate can forward the complaints received to the police for investigation.  Such measures would result in reducing the Court to that of a mere post office or to that of a sorting office attached to the Railway Mail Service.  That is not the purpose which is sought to be achieved by the Code where provision is made for a genuine complainant to approach the competent Court for securing redressal for his grievance, when the police failed to act in the matter.       I am, therefore, convinced that the entire exercise is an illegal one and hence, this petition is allowed.       Accordingly, this criminal petition is allowed.-2015 Telangana & A.P.msklawreports

Or. VII, rule 11 of C.P.C.- Suit to set aside Lok Adalat on ground of fraud & collusion - Trial court returned the plaint as not maintainable - only remedy is to file writ - Their Lordship held that Whether or not the appellant is justified in his claim, that the award of the Lok Adalat is vitiated by fraud, are matters to be examined by the Court below. As the power to reject a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) is to be exercised by the civil court only if the suit appears, from the statement in the plaint, to be barred by law, the court below erred in rejecting the plaint on the ground that a civil suit is not maintainable. The order under appeal is set aside. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the truth or otherwise of the appellants claim that the award of the Lok Adalat is vitiated by fraud. The Court below shall adjudicate the suit on its merits, and in accordance with law. - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports



They sought a decree in their favour, and against the
defendants, to declare para 18 of the compromise recorded in O.S.
No.481 of 2007 before the Lok Adalat dated 22.08.2007, in so far
as it related to land admeasuring Ac.9.29 gts of land in Sy.
Nos.271, 272 and 273 shown to have created rights in favour of
defendant No.31 i.e., M/s. Bhargavi Constructions represented by
Sri V. Ramachandra Rao, as nonest in law for having been
obtained by fraud and collusion, by playing fraud upon the
plaintiffs; and for grant of a permanent injunction restraining the
defendants, especially defendant No.31, their agents, servants,
employees etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule A, B and
C properties. =


The Court below had rejected the plaint solely on
the ground that a civil suit cannot be filed, and the plaintiffs
remedy is only to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
Whether or not the appellant is
justified in his claim, that the award of the Lok Adalat is vitiated by
fraud, are matters to be examined by the Court below.  As the
power to reject a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) is to be exercised
by the civil court only if the suit appears, from the statement in the
plaint, to be barred by law, the court below erred in rejecting the
plaint on the ground that a civil suit is not maintainable.  The
order under appeal is set aside.  We make it clear that we have not
expressed any opinion on the truth or otherwise of the appellants
claim that the award of the Lok Adalat is vitiated by fraud.  The
Court below shall adjudicate the suit on its merits, and in
accordance with law.
      The order, under challenge in this appeal, is set aside and
the appeal is allowed with costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending,
if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Or.XV-A of the Code - Suit for eviction and for arrears of rents - interim application for deposit of arrears of rents - before filing written statement ,basing on notices and exchange of notice - court allowed the same - when there is dispute about the arrears of rents - quantum of rent and before filing the written statement - as per sub rule 2 no petition be allowed and as such set aside the order and reopened the I.A.for fresh disposal - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports




The plaintiff / respondent herein filed the suit for eviction of the
defendant petitioner from the suit scheduled property and for delivering
the vacant position thereof to her.  The plaintiff also prayed for a sum of
Rs.54,41,874/- to be paid towards arrears of rent together with the
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the suit till the
same is realized and also sought for future mesne profits.

 The plaintiff has also filed I.A.No.315 of 2014 for a direction to
the respondent to pay her an amount of Rs.52,79,713/- being the arrears
of rent payable.  This I.A.No.315 of 2014 is moved in terms of and in
accordance with Order-XV-A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (for short the Code).  That application is, now, ordered on
16-04-2015.   =

Rule (1) clearly spelt out that the defendant, while filing his
written statement, shall deposit the amount representing the undisputed
arrears calculated up to that date into the Court and shall continue to
deposit such amount, which becomes payable thereafter, within one
week from the date on which it becomes due.

Therefore, it is
contended that till such time the written statement is filed by the
defendant, the question of either depositing the arrears of rents or the
Court directing him to deposit any such arrears of rent would not arise.

It is true that Rule (1) of Order XV-A of the Code, in its content
and terms, speaks of the written statement of the defendant and also
refers to the assertions made therein with regard to the payment /
obligation to pay the agreed rents up to that date,
 but however, Rule
(2) makes it clear that where the defendant pleads in the written
statement that no arrear of rent or licence fee exists, it shall be
competent for the Court to pass an order in that regard after affording
an opportunity to both sides.
Therefore, Rule (2) will have applicability
even in a given case earlier to the date of filing of the written
statement.
Take a case where the plaintiff himself admits that no rents
are due and payable by the defendant, but however, he is seeking
recovery of possession as the period of lease has expired, he is entitled
to recover the possession of the leased out premises.

In such an event,
the Court need not wait for the written statement to be filed by the
defendant formally disclosing that he is not in arrears of rent due at all.

In view of the very claim of the plaintiff that no arrears are payable, the
Court, at the very outset, can direct the defendant to continue to
deposit the agreed rent payable during the pendency of the suit.
In such
cases, as contended , is it really required to wait for
the defendant to file his written statement?

Therefore, I am of the
opinion that Rule (2) of Order XV-A of the Code can have independent
applicability from that of the situation contemplated by Rule (1).
     
However, in the instant case, one glaring feature, which stares at
us, is this; in support of I.A.No.315 of 2014, the plaintiff has filed an
affidavit and in that affidavit, nowhere one will find as to how the
arrears have been calculated.  Further, in para 21 of the affidavit, it is
set out that the respondent in that interlocutory application is liable to
pay to the petitioner an amount of Rs.54,41,874/-, whereas in the
petition filed, the amount payable by the respondent was shown as
Rs.52,79,713/-.

Thus, there was a variance in the amount mentioned in
the prayer portion of the affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory
application and the interlocutory application itself.  The learned Judge
has straightaway proceeded and towards the end of para 6 of his order,
he recorded that the respondent has to pay the arrears of rent
amounting to Rs.54,41,874/- without making any effort to ascertain as
to how this amount has been worked out by the plaintiff in the
interlocutory application.
     
When I confronted  as to how he has worked out, the
learned counsel would fairly submit that arrears of rent have been
calculated for the period commencing from 01-08-2005 onwards and for
the period from 01-09-2006, 5% of enhancement has been calculated.
Firstly, in the absence of any term stipulating such annual hike in rentals
by 5%, any such claim becomes contentious.
This apart, in the
calculation memo filed today by the learned counsel , it is
shown that a sum of Rs.7,36,479/- is received as rent, though the
date(s) on which it was received or for the period for which it was
received is not mentioned.
If this amount of Rs.7,36,479/- was, in fact,
received by the plaintiff / petitioner in the interlocutory application
without any demur, the question of calculating 5% hike for the period
commencing from 01-09-2006 onwards, perhaps, would become further  
more contentious.
This apart, for the post 01-09-2013 period, a sum or
Rs.29,549/- is calculated as monthly rent payable.  How and on what
basis this figure is worked out is not spelt out anywhere.  These are the
questions, which ought to have been adjudicated and without even
adverting to the same, the Court could not have mechanically passed the
order dated 16-04-2015.

Section 17 of the Act has conferred a right to reside in a shared household to every woman in a domestic relationship and Section 19 is an enabling provision empowering the Magistrate for passing an appropriate order for residence of the parties. While Section 20 of the Act talks of the monetary relief which can be granted to a party under this Act, clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act makes it very clear that the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other law for the time being in force can be granted by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the fact that the second respondent or respondents 2 and 3 have already approached the Family Court by instituting O.P.Nos.564 of 2007 and 565 of 2007 for restitution of conjugal rights and for securing maintenance respectively, would not come in the way of the Magistrate to exercise the power available under Section 20 of the Act and award appropriate monetary relief, should he consider that grant of Rs.3,000/- as monthly maintenance to the respondents 2 and 3 is hopelessly inadequate for one to lead a life of dignity in a city like Visakhapatnam. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the grounds urged by the petitioner for quashing D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 are not available and since the Domestic Violence Case has made out a prima facie case requiring prompt and immediate attention for securing the reliefs under Section 17 and Section 20 of the Act, it is only appropriate that the stay order passed by this Court on 03.01.2013 be vacated. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition stands dismissed. D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible within a maximum period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand dismissed.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.23 OF 2013    

17-06-2015

1.Bheri Veera Vara Ravindra Prasad, S/o.Laxmi Narayana.2.Bheri Lakshmi
Narayana, S/o.Late Chellarao. ...PETITIONERS

1.State of A.P., Represented by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.,
Hyderabad, and two others....RESPONDENTS    


Counsel for Petitioners: Sri V.Hari Haran

Counsel for Respondent No.1:  Public Prosecutor (AP)
 Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 and 3:   Sri P.Veerraju

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.23 OF 2013    
ORDER:
      This petition has been preferred for quashing D.V.C.No.5 of 2012
on the file of the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Visakhapatnam.
      Respondents 2 and 3 are the petitioners in the said D.V.C. and
the petitioners herein are the respondents in that case.  The first
petitioner in D.V.C is the legally wedded wife of the first respondent
therein and the first petitioner herein.  The second petitioner in D.V.C.
is the daughter of the first respondent/first petitioner herein.
      It is set out that the marriage between the first petitioner herein
and the second respondent took place on 23.02.2003 and at the time
of the marriage, the first petitioner was working with Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited at Visakhapatnam drawing fairly a
handsome salary.  It is alleged against the petitioners herein that cash
in a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- was paid as dowry for the marriage, 50 tulas
of gold, 150 tulas of silver and cash of Rs.2,00,000/- towards other
formalities have all been paid.  But, however, it is alleged that the
second respondent herein has not been properly treated by the first
petitioner-husband and his family members.  The third respondent-
daughter was born on 12.07.2004.  It is asserted that the first
petitioner herein was transferred from Visakhapatnam to Ananthapur in
August 2005.  Therefore, the first petitioner and respondents 2 and 3
moved to Ananthapur, but, however, the first petitioner has sent away
respondents 2 and 3 on 18.12.2005 to Visakhapatnam on some pretext  
and when respondents 2 and 3 were getting ready to return
Ananthapur, the petitioner has got issued a telegram on 14.01.2006
asking respondents 2 and 3 not to return to Ananthapur, as he has
vacated the flat which he had hired at Ananthapur for certain reasons.
However, it is the case of respondent Nos.2 and 3 that the first
petitioner has not made any attempt to take them back to Ananthapur
even after seven (7) months time elapsed.  The place of residence of
the first petitioner, according to the complaint, has become difficult to
be traced.  In the meantime, the second respondent appears to have
lodged a complaint with the police for the alleged offence under
Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.  That was registered as
Crime No.906 of 2006 and ultimately, the I Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, in C.C.No.1131 of 2007,
acquitted the accused persons setting forth in judgment the principal
reason for such acquittal as under:
       Therefore, in the absence of any evidence from
independent witnesses, it is not safe to base conviction basing
upon the above material.  Hence, under the above facts and
circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
any of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and they are
entitled for acquittal

      It appears, the second respondent has filed O.P.No.564 of 2007
on the file of the Family Court, Visakhapatnam, seeking restitution of
her conjugal rights.  She has also filed O.P.No.565 of 2007 along with
her daughter, the third respondent herein, seeking maintenance from
the first petitioner herein.  O.P.No.564 of 2007 was decreed and
O.P.No.565 of 2007 was ordered on 23.06.2009 for payment of
monthly maintenance of Rs.2,000/- to the second respondent and
Rs.1,000/- to the third respondent-daughter.  The first petitioner-
husband has filed O.P.No.621 of 2007 seeking dissolution of marriage.
O.P.No.621 of 2007 was dismissed by the Family Court.  Against the
decree of restitution of conjugal rights passed in O.P.No.564 of 2007,
the first petitioner has preferred F.C.A.No.244 of 2009 before this Court
and this Court passed interlocutory order on 05.10.2009 suspending
the restitution of conjugal rights.  He has also preferred an appeal in
F.C.A.No.257 of 2009 against the dismissal of divorce O.P.No.621 of
2007, which is also pending.
      The main grounds of attack against D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 has
been orchestrated by Sri V.Hari Haran, learned counsel for the
petitioners as under:
      Respondents 2 and 3 lodged the complaint only on 13.03.2012,
i.e., more than 7  years after the alleged desertion of respondents 2
and 3.  This apart, for the very same allegations, prosecution was
already launched against the petitioners herein in C.C.No.1131 of 2007
and the learned I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at
Visakhapatnam has acquitted the petitioners herein by his judgment
dated 15.04.2015 and hence, question of drawing the very same
allegations all over again in the above D.V.C. is impermissible.  This
apart, O.P.No.565 of 2007 is already filed by respondents 2 and 3 and
that was ordered and the first petitioner herein has been complying
with the order passed therein by tendering the monthly maintenance as
ordered by the Court by depositing the same before the Court.  Hence,
question of reconsideration of the entire issue once again would not
arise.
      Per contra, learned counsel Sri P.Veerraju, who appeared today
in the matter, would submit that the present application is moved
under Sections 17, 19 and 20 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (henceforth referred to for short as the
Act) and hence, question of quashing the present D.V.C. against the
petitioners herein would not arise.
      The Parliament has noticed that effective measures are
essentially required for protection of the rights of women guaranteed
under the Constitution, who are getting victimised due to violence
occurring within the family and hence, for putting in place preventive
measures and with a view to protect the rights of women, enacted the
Act.  Therefore, the Act itself has been ushered in for achieving greater
social objectives.  Above all, the Parliament wanted to announce in
clear terms that in this country, the guaranteed rights of women are
not merely confined to the statute book but they are taken adequate
care of.  With a view to give protection to the women essentially from
violence within the family, the present special piece of Legislation has
been brought forth.
      Section 3 of the Act has attempted in very broad and wide
terms, as to what constitutes domestic violence and hence, tried to
cover the various acts, omissions or commissions or even conduct of a
particular person to constitute domestic violence and hence, couched
the language in far and wide terms.  The expression physical abuse is
explained under Section 3 of the Act as to mean any act or conduct
which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to
life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the
aggrieved person.  Similarly, the expression verbal and emotional
abuse is sought to be explained in inclusive terms as insult, ridicule,
humiliation, name calling etc.  I am, therefore, of the opinion that if an
act of a particular person is likely to impair the health or development
of a particular person or if a person is openly put to humiliation, the
expressions physical abuse and verbal and emotional abuse get
attracted in the above context.
      When the contents of the complaint lodged by the second
respondent herein have been carefully studied, the humiliation heaped
upon her by the petitioners is, prima facie, made out.  After the first
petitioner herein, who is the husband of the second respondent herein
and the father of the third respondent, has been transferred from
Visakhapatnam to Ananthapur where respondents 2 and 3 joined him
but he sends them away on some pretext back home at Vizag and in  
the meantime, abruptly vacates the flat hired by him at Ananthapur so
as to prevent respondents 2 and 3 to come back and join him at
Ananthapur to lead a life of dignity along with him, perhaps, towards
such a conduct various expressions found in the sweep of Section 3 of
the Act get attracted.
      This apart, whatever be the differences and their intensity be
between the first petitioner and the second respondent, the third
respondent herein was born to them on 12.07.2004.  The petitioners
herein being the father and the grand father are liable to ensure that
the third respondent makes a steady progress and development in all
respects.  They are liable to ensure that the personality and intellectual
development of the third respondent should not get impaired in the
process in any manner.  The third respondent is not at fault in any
manner for the unresolved differences between the petitioners on one
hand and the second respondent on the other.  If the third respondent
has been unjustly denied what is legitimately due to her, the paternal
care and guidance, while all other children of her age group who
receive it in abundance and lead a normal course of living, the third
respondent, prima facie, appears to have been put to verbal and
emotional abuse, as she has invidiously been made to suffer
humiliation apart from the expression physical abuse itself getting
attracted in her case.
      This apart, the learned counsel for the second respondent is
right in pointing out that Section 17 of the Act has conferred a right to
reside in a shared household to every woman in a domestic
relationship and Section 19 is an enabling provision empowering the
Magistrate for passing an appropriate order for residence of the parties.
While Section 20 of the Act talks of the monetary relief which can be
granted to a party under this Act, clause (d) of sub-section (1) of
Section 20 of the Act makes it very clear that the maintenance for the
aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order
under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other law for the time
being in force can be granted by the learned Magistrate.  Therefore,
the fact that the second respondent or respondents 2 and 3 have
already approached the Family Court by instituting O.P.Nos.564 of 2007
and 565 of 2007 for restitution of conjugal rights and for securing
maintenance respectively, would not come in the way of the Magistrate
to exercise the power available under Section 20 of the Act and award
appropriate monetary relief, should he consider that grant of Rs.3,000/-
as monthly maintenance to the respondents 2 and 3 is hopelessly
inadequate for one to lead a life of dignity in a city like Visakhapatnam.
      I am, therefore, of the opinion that the grounds urged by the
petitioner for quashing D.V.C.No.5 of 2012 are not available and since
the Domestic Violence Case has made out a prima facie case requiring
prompt and immediate attention for securing the reliefs under Section
17 and Section 20 of the Act, it is only appropriate that the stay order
passed by this Court on 03.01.2013 be vacated.
      Accordingly, this Criminal Petition stands dismissed.  D.V.C.No.5
of 2012 shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible within a
maximum period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order.  Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand
dismissed.

_________________________  
(NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J)      
17th June 2015  

the petitioner is deemed to have opted for commutation of only 1/3rd of his pro rata pension as per the rules. Consequently, the respondents would have to redo the exercise of working out his pensionary benefits right from the start. In accordance with such option, the respondents shall work out the commuted pension payable initially and upon revision, the regular pension payable after such commutation initially and upon revision, the amount payable after restoration of the commuted pension and all the arrears. As the petitioner received certain amounts in excess of the amounts due and payable to him, he would necessarily have to refund the same. Such amounts would therefore have to be adjusted against the final amount calculated to be due and payable to the petitioner pursuant to this order. The amounts found due and payable by both sides shall carry simple interest @ 6% per annum. The entire exercise shall be completed and the final amount shall be remitted to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Considering the refractory attitude of the respondents in driving the petitioner from pillar to post for his rightful dues, this Court is constrained to impose exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000/- upon the respondents. The writ petition shall stand disposed of accordingly. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in the light of this inal order.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        

WRIT PETITION NO.23832 OF 2009    
       
24-06-2015

K. Subrahmanyam.. Petitioner

The Border Roads Development Board,  rep. by its Secretary, Government of
India, New Delhi and others .. Respondents


Counsel for petitioner: Sri Siva
                         Smt. K. Rajya Lakshmi

Counsel for respondents:Sri T. Balaji
                         Sri B. Narayana Reddy
               

<Gist:


>Head Note:    

? CASES REFERRED:    

1. (1979) 2 SCC 150 = AIR 1979 SC 1060.
2. (2000) 8 SCC 395 = AIR 2000 SC 3243.
3. AIR 1982 MADRAS 386 (DB)  
4. 2006 Writ LR 705 (DB).
5. 2013(5) ABR 458 = 2013 (6) ALLMR 724 (DB).
6. AIR 1999 AP 335 = 1999 (3) ALD 632.


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        

WRIT PETITION NO.23832 OF 2009    

O R D E R

        The petitioner, an octogenarian, is aggrieved by the rejection of
his claim for certain pensionary benefits by the Director General,
Border Roads, New Delhi, the second respondent, under letter dated
22.05.2009 (wrongly mentioned as 22.05.2008).
        There is no dispute as to the petitioners entitlement to
pensionary benefits from 04.04.1979.  He has been agitating his
grievance in connection therewith since 1985 and this is the third
round of litigation before this Court.  Ergo, a lengthy and tortuous
history precedes the case.  Shorn of needless detail, the facts to the
extent relevant may be summed up thus:
        The petitioner entered the service of the Central Water and
Power Commission, Government of India, in December, 1956.  He
was thereafter appointed to the General Reserve Engineer Force,
Border Roads Development Board, in May 1963.  In March, 1974, he
was promoted as a Superintendent Engineer (Mechanical).  He was
deputed to work in M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Limited, a
public sector undertaking, in April, 1975 and continued as such till
April, 1979.  He was permanently absorbed in M/s. Singareni
Collieries Company Limited with effect from 04.04.1979.  The
permanent absorption order was issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Boarder Roads Development
Board, New Delhi, under proceedings dated 28.02.1985.  These
proceedings record that the petitioners permanent absorption would
have effect from 04.04.1979 but no arrears on account of pension
and death-cum-retirement gratuity would be paid to him from
04.04.1979 till 28.02.1985.  It was further stated therein that the
petitioner would be eligible for pro-rata pension and gratuity based
on the length of his qualifying service under the Government of India
till the date of his permanent absorption, as admissible under the
rules.  Admittedly, his qualifying service was from his initial
appointment in December, 1956, till his absorption in M/s. Singareni
Collieries Company Limited in April, 1979. Clauses (v) and (vi) of the
proceedings dated 28.02.1985 are germane and read thus:
(v) Option:
The officer will exercise an option, within six months of the
date of issue of this letter, for either of the alternatives
indicated below:-
a)      Receiving the pro-rata monthly pension and death-cum-
retirement gratuity as admissible under clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv)
above under the Government of India Rules.
OR
b)      Receiving the pro-rata gratuity and a lump sum amount in lieu
of pension worked out with reference to the Commutation
Tables obtaining on the date from which the commuted value
becomes payable.
(vi) Commutation:
In case Shri K. Subrahmanyam opts to receive pension as in
para (v) (a) above but wishes to commute a portion of his
pension, such commutation will be regulated in accordance
with the Government of India Rules in force at the time of his
permanent absorption in Singareni Collieries Limited.

      According to the respondents, the petitioner furnished Option
Certificate dated 24.03.1985 opting to receive pro-rata gratuity and a
lump sum amount in lieu of pension.  The petitioner would however
contest this claim.  According to him, the sequence of events
demonstrates that he had not opted for 100% commutation and, in
fact, he could not have done so under the prevailing legal regime.
        In the first instance, the petitioner approached this Court by
way of W.P.No.16779 of 1997 aggrieved by the denial of pensionary
benefits from 04.04.1979 to 28.02.1985.  Therein, he sought a
direction to the respondents to restore his pension from the date of
his retirement from Government service and to regulate the same in
accordance with the orders extant.  It appears that prior to filing this
case, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal.
The Tribunal however refused to entertain his case on the ground of
delay.  He thereupon filed the writ petition.  Initially, a learned Judge
of this Court dismissed the writ petition by order dated 08.07.1998.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed W.A.No.1407 of 1998.  The said
appeal was allowed by order dated 19.12.2000 and the writ petition
was remitted for consideration afresh.  It was then disposed of by a
Division Bench of this Court on 26.02.2004.  Observing that the
petitioner was 75 years of age at that time and requiring him to
approach the Tribunal again would be a long drawn exercise, the
Division Bench considered the matter on merits.
        Similar considerations would therefore weigh with this Court
now, as the petitioner has advanced in age by another decade.
      The Division Bench took note of the fact that the petitioner had
received lump sum pensionary benefits in 1986 and that the
commuted portion of his pension was restored after 15 years, i.e., in
2001, and observed that till the commutation of the pension was
effected the petitioner was eligible for pension.  He was accordingly
held entitled to the arrears of pension for the said period.  The
operative portion of the order dated 26.02.2004 reads thus:
      (1) The petitioner is entitled for pension in accordance
with the Rules either pro rata or otherwise from 04.04.1979 till
the date of 100% commutation of pension.
                (2)    
        (3) The arrears and also the amount which became
payable to the petitioner shall be paid within a period of three
(03) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
      It appears that the respondents, in purported compliance with
the above order, granted pension to the petitioner from 04.04.1979
till the date of commutation in 1986. Earlier, the letter dated
29.10.1986 issued to the petitioner had stated that his pro-rata
pension was calculated as Rs.614/- per month and the commuted
value of 1/3rd of the pension, i.e. @ Rs.204/-, was arrived at
Rs.27,172.80 ps.  The terminal benefit, being twice the commuted
value, was calculated at Rs.54,345.60 ps. and the total amount of
Rs.81,518.40 ps. was remitted.  This letter clearly demonstrated that
only 1/3rd of the petitioners pension was commuted. The revision of
his pension with effect from 01.01.1986 was extended to him
pursuant to the order dated 26.02.2004 and he was granted certain
arrears along with interest.  However, dissatisfied with the manner in
which the issue was dealt with, the petitioner again approached this
Court by way of W.P.No.6975 of 2005.  His prayer therein was as
under:
      .a) to declare the action of the respondents in not granting
the arrears of pension payable to the petitioner from 17-10-1986 as
per the revised pension of Rs.1277/- p.m. after deducting the
commutation portion of Rs.614/- and the pension revisions that took
place from time to time; b) to declare the action of the respondents in
not granting the benefits of Central Government Health Scheme to
the petitioner and his family from the date of retirement is arbitrary,
discriminatory and unconstitutional; c) and the respondents be
directed to release all the arrears of amounts due to the petitioner on
account of monthly pension of Rs.663/- p.m. payable to him since
17-10-1986 and the arrears of amounts of expenditure incurred by
the petitioner towards himself and to his wife for medical treatment
and operations undergone by them from 1-11-1987 with interest on
arrears compounding at 18% p.a. by allowing the writ petition with
exemplary costs and compensation for the loss suffering and
hardship caused to the petitioner and his family and pass such other
order or orders as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.
        This writ petition was disposed of by order dated 05.11.2008
directing the respondents to consider the representations of the
petitioner canvassing his grievance in accordance with law and to
pass appropriate orders thereon within a time frame.  It was
pursuant to this order that the present impugned letter dated
22.05.2009 has been issued.
        At the core of the controversy lies the question as to whether
the petitioner commuted 100% of the pension payable to him as per
rules and whether the respondents acted upon the same?
        It is no doubt true that Section 10 of the Pension Act, 1871,
provides that the appropriate Government may, with the consent of
the holder, order the whole or any part of his pension to be
commuted for a lump sum on such terms as it may deem fit.
However, the question, as stated earlier, is whether the petitioner
consented to 100% commutation of his pension.
        The record reflects that there was no clarity on this issue on
the part of the petitioner and more so, unfortunately, on the part of
the respondents.   In the proceedings dated 28.02.1985, there was no
reference to any rule in connection with the choice offered to the
petitioner to opt for a lump sum amount in lieu of pension.  However,
the respondents stated in their counter-affidavit that the grant of pro-
rata retirement benefits under the proceedings dated 28.02.1985 was
relatable to Rule 37-A of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,
1972 (for brevity, the Rules of 1972).
        Significantly, Rule 37-A of the Rules of 1972 pertains to
payment of pension on absorption consequent upon conversion of a
Government department into a central autonomous body or a public
sector undertaking.  In the present case, the petitioner alone was
absorbed in M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Limited and there
was no conversion of his parent department into a public sector
undertaking.  This rule therefore had no application to the petitioner.
On the other hand, Rule 37 of the Rules of 1972 deals with pension
payable on absorption in or under a corporation, company or body.
This rule reads to the effect that a Government servant, who has
been permitted to be absorbed in a corporation, wholly or
substantially owned or controlled by the Government, shall be
deemed to have retired from service from the date of such absorption
and shall be eligible to receive retirement benefits. The Explanation
thereto makes it clear that the date of absorption shall, in case the
Government employee joins a corporation on absorption basis, be the
date on which he actually joins that corporation.  It is clear that Rule
37 of the Rules of 1972 alone governs the petitioner.
        Further, it may be noticed that the impugned letter dated
22.05.2009 relies heavily upon the Office Memorandum dated
08.04.1976 of the Department of Expenditure, Government of India.
A copy of the said Office Memorandum was produced by the learned
Assistant Solicitor General.  Though a reference was made to this
Office Memorandum in the proceedings dated 28.02.1985, the clause
as to the exercise of option was materially different therein.  In the
Office Memorandum dated 08.04.1976, the clause reads as under:
   (iii) Every Government servant is to exercise an option, within
six months of his absorption, for either of the alternatives
indicated below:
(a)     Receiving the monthly pension and DCR Gratuity already
worked out, under the usual Government arrangements.
(b)     Receiving the gratuity and a lump sum amount in lieu of
pension worked out with reference to commutation tables
obtaining on the date from which the pro-rata pension, gratuity
etc. would be disbursable.
   Where no option is exercised within the prescribed period, the
officer will automatically be governed by alternative (b) above.
Option once exercised shall be final.  The option shall be exercised
in writing and communicated by the Government servant
concerned to the undertaking/autonomous body.
                                                              (emphasis added)
      Significantly, the proceedings dated 28.02.1985 did not
disclose that the option once exercised would be final and that it had
to be exercised in writing and communicated by the petitioner  to
M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Limited.  There is no proof of due
compliance in this regard by the petitioner even at this late stage.
      To complicate matters further, the learned Assistant Solicitor
General produced a form dated sometime in August, 1985, duly
signed by the petitioner, relating to commutation of his pension
without medical examination.  This form tallies with Form 1 of the
Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 (for
brevity, the Rules of 1981), which relates to an application for
commutation of a fraction of pension without medical examination. In
this form, there is no indication that the petitioner commuted 100%
of the pension payable to him and going by the format of the
application, he could not have done so.  On the other hand, he stated
therein that the amount of pension had not yet been settled and the
pension proposed to be commuted was as per the Rules of 1972.
This form was obtained by the respondents in August, 1985, and it
contradicted the earlier certificate obtained from the petitioner in
March, 1985. To add to the confusion, the letter dated 29.10.1986
issued by the respondents, referred to supra, indicated that the
petitioner underwent a medical examination on 30.06.1986!
      There is no explanation forthcoming even now as to these
discrepancies and contradictions.
      Further, the letter dated 29.10.1986 demonstrated that only
1/3rd of the petitioners pension was commuted.  This was in keeping
with Rule 5 of the Rules of 1981, which decrees that a Government
servant can commute for a lump sum payment only a fraction, not
exceeding 1/3rd, of his pension. The Rules of 1981 would have
application as they apply to classes of pension referred to in Chapter
V of the Rules of 1972, which includes Rule 37.  It is relevant to note
that Rule 9 of the Rules of 1981 provides that a Government servant
to whom, pending assessment of final pension, provisional pension
has been sanctioned, would be eligible to commute only a fraction of
such provisional pension subject to the limit specified in Rule 5.
      At the point of time when the option certificate was obtained
from the petitioner in March, 1985, the petitioners final pension had
not even been calculated, much less sanctioned.  He could not
therefore have acted in violation of the rules and sought 100%
commutation.  It is not the contention of the learned Assistant
Solicitor General that the Rules of 1981 do not apply to the
petitioner.  The Office Memorandum dated 08.04.1976 cannot
therefore override the statutory rule, viz., Rule 5 of the Rules of 1981.
Further, as indicated supra, the intimation given to the petitioner
under the proceedings dated 28.02.1985 was not even in consonance
with the Office Memorandum dated 08.04.1976 and the petitioner
was never put on notice that the option exercised by him would be
final.  The respondents themselves did not treat the option exercised
by him in March, 1985 as final, as is clear from the subsequent
option form obtained from him in August, 1985, which was quite
contrary to the earlier option.  At the time the petitioner purportedly
opted for 100% commutation in March, 1985, his provisional pension
had not even been calculated or sanctioned.
      It is therefore not open to the respondents to claim that the
petitioner opted for 100% commutation and that it is final and
binding on him.  Their own conduct speaks against such a
conclusion.  Except for banking upon the clause extracted from the
Office Memorandum dated 08.04.1976, the impugned letter dated
22.05.2009 does not demonstrate as to why the petitioners main
grievance has not been considered.  It was his case that he had only
asked for commutation of a fraction of his pension.  It appears that
the fraction initially permitted to be commuted was 1/3rd of his pro-
rata pension in accordance with the rules but thereafter, confusion
abounded and amounts in excess of the permissible limit were paid
to the petitioner.  However, it was for the respondents to be more
mindful of the legal regime while dealing with the petitioners pension
payments and they ought to have acted in accordance with law.
Ignorance or carelessness on the part of the petitioner cannot be
taken advantage of by the respondents in this regard.
      It may also be noticed that pursuant to the order passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.16779 of 1997, the petitioner
was paid arrears of pension from 04.04.1979 till the date of the so
called commutation.  If it was the stand of the respondents that the
petitioners option to receive 100% commutation is final and binding,
there was no question of his being allowed pension payment on
regular basis from 04.04.1979 till the date of the so called
commutation in 1986.  The respondents therefore cannot approbate
and reprobate. If it was their contention that he was entitled to only a
lump sum payment in lieu of pension, he should have been paid, at
best, an additional lump sum for the period in question and not the
arrears of regular pension, as has been done.  It is also significant to
note that the Division Bench had left it open to the respondents to
pay pension to the petitioner in accordance with law either pro-rata
or otherwise.  The respondents opted to pay him arrears of pension
for that period.  Once they chose to do so, it is not open to them at
this late stage to say that the petitioner opted for a one-time lump
sum commutation whereby he stood disentitled to receive regular
pension.
      Significantly, it was only in September, 2004, that the
respondents applied this so called 100% commutation to the revised
pension of Rs.1,277/- and paid him a further lump sum amount.
This unilateral action on their part, after a lapse of nearly 18 to 19
years, is in clear violation of the rules and cannot be countenanced.
This also speaks volumes about the utter lassitude and negligence of
the respondents in dealing with a pensioner who rendered loyal
service to the organization.
        Reference in the counter affidavit to Rule 10 of the Rules of
1981, as to an applicant who commutes a fraction of his final
pension not being required to apply afresh for commutation after
revision of such pension, indicates clear lack of application of mind.
The rule applies, as is self-evident, in the case of an application for
commutation of part of the final pension.  It has no application to a
case of 100% commutation.  Despite the same, the respondents now  
seek to justify their action in the year 2004 by relying on this rule.
This lack of clarity and understanding on the part of the respondents
in discharging their statutory obligation towards the petitioner has
resulted in this long drawn battle stretching over several decades
causing great injustice to the petitioner in his twilight years.
      To sum up, it is manifest that both parties were completely at
sea as to the implementation of the rules and the benefit of this lack
of clarity on the part of the implementing authority must necessarily
go to the petitioner.  Needless to state, there can be no estoppel
against the statute. Further, there is no possibility of applying the
principle of constructive res judicata to the petitioner on the ground
that this is the third case filed by him. The issue was kept alive since
the very first round of litigation and never attained a quietus. The
petitioner is therefore not estopped from raising this grievance even
at this stage.
      Finally, the relief to be granted. The confidence reposed by this
Court in the respondents while disposing of W.P. No. 6975 of 2005
has not been honoured by them as is apparent from the cursory
handling of the petitioners representations under the impugned
letter dated 22.05.2009. A direction to again consider the issue would
therefore not suffice; all the more so, keeping in mind the advanced
age of the petitioner. Having fought this battle relentlessly, he is
justly entitled to enjoy the benefits thereof during his lifetime.
      The respondents have made enough of a muddle and a parody
while dealing with the petitioners case and cannot be trusted to set
right their mistakes by applying the rules correctly at this stage, even
if this Court directs them to do so. It is a settled proposition of law
that in a fit and deserving case, this Court would have the power to
issue positive directions. (DISTRICT REGISTRAR V/s.
M.B.KOYAKUTTY , BADRINATH V/s. GOVERNMENT OF          
TAMILNADU , STATE OF TAMILNADU V/s. C.VADIAPPAN ,        
GOVERNMENT OF TAMILNADU V/s. G.B.TRUST , NARENDRA            
BARDE V/s. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BRIHAN MUMBAI  and            
LAVU EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY V/s. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA              
PRADESH ). This Court has no hesitation in holding that the case on
hand falls within the exceptional category warranting exercise of such
power.
      Viewed thus, this Court holds that the petitioner is deemed to
have opted for commutation of only 1/3rd of his pro rata pension as
per the rules. Consequently, the respondents would have to redo the
exercise of working out his pensionary benefits right from the start.
In accordance with such option, the respondents shall work out the
commuted pension payable initially and upon revision, the regular
pension payable after such commutation initially and upon revision,
the amount payable after restoration of the commuted pension and
all the arrears. As the petitioner received certain amounts in excess
of the amounts due and payable to him, he would necessarily have to
refund the same. Such amounts would therefore have to be adjusted
against the final amount calculated to be due and payable to the
petitioner pursuant to this order. The amounts found due and
payable by both sides shall carry simple interest @ 6% per annum.
The entire exercise shall be completed and the final amount shall be
remitted to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order. Considering the refractory attitude of the
respondents in driving the petitioner from pillar to post for his
rightful dues, this Court is constrained to impose exemplary costs of
Rs. 10,000/- upon the respondents.
        The writ petition shall stand disposed of accordingly.  Pending
miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in the light of this
inal order.
_________________  
SANJAY KUMAR,J    
24th JUNE, 2015