Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) thereof, will not be applicable beyond 90 days. We are further of the view that once this period is allowed to expire intentionally or unintentionally, then remedy is absolutely barred and no Court of law can entertain the matter. However, the petitioner availed alternative remedy unsuccessfully, so we are not considering this aspect in great detail.

THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND                
Writ Petition No.1409 of 2015

29-1-2015

M/s.Resolute Electronics Private Limited(previously known as QUAD Electronic
Solutions Private Limited), #12-50/4/A
   Next to Industrial Estate, Medchal Hyderabad  501401 R.R. District  Rep. by
its Managing Director----Petitioner
               
Union of India Ministry of Finance North Block, New Delhi Rep. by its Secretary
and others Respondents  

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Sri Vedula Srinivas    

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT :Sri V. Gopalakrishna Gokhaley        

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?CITATIONS:

THE HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA            
 AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        

WRIT PETITION NO.1409 OF 2015    

ORDER: (per the Honble The Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta)

        This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner  assessee
challenging the order dt.17.7.2013 passed by the Additional Commissioner
of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax.
        We have heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Sri V. Gopalakrishna Gokhaley, learned counsel for the
respondents.
      By the impugned order the Commissioner confirmed the demand as
raised under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) and also imposed penalty of Rs.5,00,000/-.  The
aforesaid order was taken to appellate authority by the assessee with an
application for condonation of the delay.  However, the said appellate
authority by order dt.26.2.2014 dismissed the application for condonation
of delay observing that the appeal was presented beyond the condonable
period, namely, the period that could be condonable under Section 35(1)
of the Central Excise Act.  Consequently, the appellate authority dismissed
the appeal.  This order of the appellate authority is not challenged before
us.  Thereafter, the assessee approached the learned Tribunal, namely,
the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench,
Bangalore, by second appeal and the learned Tribunal dismissed the same
as it was time barred holding that the appellant authority had no power to
condone the delay overriding the provision of Section 35(1) of the Act.
So, that appeal was also dismissed.  In the writ petition, the aforesaid two
orders of the two appellate authorities are not challenged.  Thus, it
appears that the petitioner, after exhausting all the remedies, filed this
writ petition.
2.      However, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues that in
essence the petitioner has no remedy as the appeal could not be filed
within the condonable period.  He further submits, with the support of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others , that when there is no
remedy, then the alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain the writ
petition.
3.      We do not find that this judgment cited has any manner of
application in this factual backdrop, as the writ petitioner has approached
all the authorities unsuccessfully and no challenge has been made against
these orders.  Therefore, the writ petition on the factual backdrop is not
entertainable at all.
4.      Now we consider the petitioners second contention that resorting
to alternative remedy by preferring appeals knowingly being fruitless, is of
no legal implication, as virtually the petitioner is now remediless, so much
so it can come to Writ Court.
5.      We think that the petitioner keeping eyes open allowed the period
for preferring the appeal as well as that of for condonation of delay
allowed to expire and thereafter he approached.  In other words, the
petitioner had fitter away its own remedy.  Therefore alleged situation of
remediless is its own creation.  According to us, the provision of Section
35(1) of the Act is absolutely rigid and cannot be extended either directly
or indirectly by the Court of law.  We set out the provision of Section
35(1) of the Act hereunder:
       35. Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals):- (1) Any person aggrieved by
any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer lower in
rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise may appeal to the Commissioner of
Central Excise (Appeals), within sixty days from the date of the communication
to him of such decision or order:
        Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within
the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further
period
of thirty days.

6.      It is clear that it is specific mandate that even Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) thereof, will not be
applicable beyond 90 days.  We are further of the view that once this
period is allowed to expire intentionally or unintentionally, then remedy is
absolutely barred and no Court of law can entertain the matter.  However,
the petitioner availed alternative remedy unsuccessfully, so we are not
considering this aspect in great detail.
7.      Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.
        Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
       

________________________  
K.J. SENGUPTA, CJ  
_______________________  
SANJAY KUMAR, J        
29.1.2015

as per the Resettlement Register of the Village, the land is classified as temple Adyapaka Service and as per the provision of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956, no ryotwari patta can be granted and even if it is already granted, it is null and void and property continues to be vested in the institution. Thus, as per the material on record, the property continues to vest in the 6th respondent temple. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim, merely on the factum of his possession or the earlier inam granted to his ancestors for the service rendered by them, to contend that he is the owner and entitled to alienate. Thus, in the facts of this case, the petitioner is not entitled to relief prayed by him and writ petition is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. However, it is left open to the petitioner to ascertain his title by due process of law and any observations made in the writ petition do not come in the way in adjudicating the claim of the petitioner on the title to the property in issue. No costs.

HONBLE SRI  JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO      

WRIT PETITION NO. 31409 OF 2014    

29-01-2015

Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary, S/o. V.Parthasarathacharyulu, Occu: Advocate, r/o.
3rd Lane, Arundalpet, Guntur, Guntur District. . Petitioner

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep.by its Principal Secretary, Revenue
Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others.. Respondents

Counsel for the petitioner: Smt. T.S.Sridevi,   counsel for
                                  petitioner

Counsel for the respondents: Government Pleader for  Revenue
                             for respondents 1, 2, and 4
                             Sri V.T.M.Prasad, standing counsel
                             for respondent No.6
                             Government Pleader for Endowments
                             For respondents 3 and 5

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1.2013 (1) ALT 345
2.2013 (4) ALT 541

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO      
WRIT PETITION No.31409 of 2014  

ORDER:

        The case of the petitioner is that land to an extent of Ac.4.64
cents in Sy.No.91 of Harischandrapuram Village, Tulluru Mandal,
Guntur District is ancestral property of the petitioner and the
same was in possession and enjoyment of the family members of
the petitioner for more than 90 years.   After demise of the father,
petitioner succeeded to the property.  Pattadar pass books and title
deeds were issued on 20.02.1996.   With an intention to dispose of
the said property, petitioner approached the Sub-Registrar,
Amaravathi (4th respondent) to ascertain the market value and
stamp duty.   The 4th respondent informed the petitioner that
Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps
vide Memo G1/7106/2014 dated 20.08.2014 circulated list of
prohibited lands.  Survey No.91 is also included and the same is
shown as belonging to Sri Venkateswara Swamy Temple (6th  
respondent).   Petitioner was therefore informed that in view of the
letter of Commissioner, he is not entertaining any document with
respect to land situated in Sy.No.91.  Aggrieved thereby, this writ
petition is instituted.
2.      Heard Ms. T.V.Sridevi, learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned Government Pleader for Revenue, Sri V.T.M.Prasad,
standing counsel for respondent No.6 and  learned Government
Pleader for Endowments.        

3.      Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that land in
Sy.No.91 to an extent of Ac.4.64 cents is a private patta land and
in possession and enjoyment of the family members of the
petitioner for several decades.  Unless notification is issued in
accordance with Section 22-A(1)(c) of the  Registration Act
prohibiting such registration, no authority including Commissioner
and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps can prohibit the
registration of any property.  Thus, order of Commissioner and
Inspector General of Registration and Stamps is ex facie illegal
without competence and jurisdiction.   It is further contended that
registering authority cannot refuse to act on the request of a
person for processing a document for registration based on
executive orders.

4.      In support of the contentions urged, learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions:
        i)  P.Srinivasulu and others v. Sub-Registrar, Renigunta,
Chittoor District and others
        ii) Pasuparthi Jayaram and others v. Government of
Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Commissioner, Endowments  
Department, Hyderabad and others
        iii) Judgment in Writ Appeal No.106 of 2014 dated
14.02.2014

5.      Sri V.T.M.Prasad, entered appearance on behalf of 6th
respondent temple and filed counter-affidavit.    The stand of the
respondent-temple is that the temple owns Ac.528.92 cents of land
in various survey numbers including the land to an extent of
Ac.4.64 cents in Sy.No.91 of Harischandrapuram village.   This
extent of land is classified as Adyapaka Service.  Various extents
of land is earmarked for various services for the temple, such as,
Bhajantri, Kumba Dance, decoration, Chamara Kainkaryam etc.
This piece of land was given in view of rendering of Adyapaka
Service to the ancestors of the petitioner.  If service is not
rendered, the person cannot continue to enjoy the property.   It
being a service inam and as petitioner is not rendering the service,
he cannot be allowed to continue in possession of the property.
Land was never permanently granted to the ancestors of the
petitioner as claimed by the petitioner and the temple is taking
steps for recovery of possession from the encroachers by filing
appropriate application under Section 83 of the Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,
1987 ( for short, the Act, 1987).

6.      Learned standing counsel further contended that
respondent-temple is a public institution as per Section 6(c) of the
Act, 1966.  The property in issue is included in the property
register maintained under Section 38 of the Act 17/66
(corresponding  provision is Section 43 of Act, 1987).    The register
shows that an extent of Ac.11.60 cents in Sy.No.91 was endowed
to Madabhusi Rangamma.   He further contended that once such
an entry is made in the register, the same shall be presumed to be
genuine unless contrary is proved.  The entry made in the
statutory register has not been challenged by any person including
the petitioner.  What is  communicated by the Commissioner and
Inspector General of Registration and Stamps  is reiteration of the
status of the property as endowment property.    Learned standing
counsel further contended that if petitioner disputes the status of
the property as reflected in the statutory register, he has to avail
effective remedy as available under the Act, 1987 and that the writ
petition is not maintainable when the petitioner has effective and
efficacious remedy available under the Act, 1987.  In support of the
said contention, learned standing counsel placed reliance on the
decision of this Court in W.A.NO.500 of 2012, dated 09.10.2012
and W.P.No.26566 of 2011, dated 18.01.2012.

7.      Learned standing counsel further contended that Andhra
Pradesh (A.A.) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1956 was amended by Amendment Act 16/2013 and is    
retrospective in operation.   According to the Amendment, pattas
granted for the service inams burdened with service should be
deemed to have been null and void and no effect can be given to
the pattas in that manner.

8.      In the instant case, no earlier alienation of the property in
issue is brought on record.   Ryotwari patta claimed to have been
granted in favour of the petitioner is not filed.  The claim of the
petitioner rests only on the fact that the property was given to the
ancestors of the petitioner for the services rendered to the temple
and it vested permanently in the family of the petitioner and, thus,
petitioner is entitled  to deal with the property as his private patta
land.    The stand of the respondent temple that the property is
shown in the statutory register as belonging to the temple and as
per Resettlement Register of the village, the property is classified as
temple  Adyapaka Service  is not  controverted.

9.      As per Section 38 of the old Act and Section 43 of the new
Act, it is mandatory to maintain register of any registered
institution/endowment, which contain all the details of movable
and immovable assets of the temple.  The 6th respondent
contended that in terms of the said provision, register is
maintained and in the said register the property in issue is also
included as belonging to the 6th respondent temple. This
contention is not controverted.  As per Section 46(3) of the new
Act, until the contrary is established presumption is that all the
entries made in the register maintained under Section 43 of the
new Act are genuine.   Thus, burden lies on the petitioner to
disprove the stand of the 6th respondent temple that the subject
land is not land belonging to the 6th respondent.  Except filing of
extract of pattadar pass book and title deeds, no material is filed to
disprove the stand of the 6th respondent temple.  As can be
deduced from the narration of the facts in the affidavit filed in
support of the writ petition, pattadar pass books and title deeds
may have been issued by relying on the ryotwari patta granted to
the petitioner.

10.     It is specific stand of the 6th respondent temple that this
piece of land was given as service inam and the service inam is not
a permanent grant.  The title of the land continuously  vests in the
temple and such inam is available as long as service is rendered.
As the inam granted in this case was for Adyapaka Service
rendered by the ancestors of the petitioner,  as long as such
service was rendered, such inam  subsisted and once the service
was not rendered, the inam cannot be continued.  Act, 1956 was
amended by way of Act 16/2013, whereby Section 4 was amended  
and sub-section (4) was added.   According to the provision in sub-
section 4, if the inam land is burdened to render service  to an
institution or endowment, no person would be entitled to ryotwari
patta and institution or  endowment alone would be entitled to
ryotwari patta for such inam land.    According to the first proviso
appended to sub-section 4,  even if ryotwari patta is granted, such
patta is deemed to have been null and void and no effect can be
given to such patta granted.

11.     In support of the claim that the land in issue is granted as
Adyapaka Service, the extract of village Resettlement register is
filed.  It would thus show that the inam granted to the ancestors of
the petitioner was service inam.   In accordance with the mandate
of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956, even if ryotwari patta was granted
to the petitioner, the same has no legal validity and thus, pattadar
pass books or title deeds issued in terms thereof have no legal
validity.   Having regard to the mandate of Sections 43 and 46(3) of
Act, 1987 and Section 4(4) of Act, 1956, the title continues to  vest
in the temple and petitioner is not entitled to alienate the said
property.  According to Section 75 of Act, 1987, sale of land
granted as service inam would be null and void unless such
transaction is effected with the prior sanction of the Government.
In fact, the case of the 6th respondent-temple is that even petitioner
is not entitled to be in possession of the said property as petitioner
is not rendering any service to the temple and the temple is
entitled to claim possession of the property.

12.     In view of the statutory mandate as referred to above, even in
the absence of the letter written by the Commissioner and
Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, the petitioner is not
entitled to alienate the property as the property does not belong to
him and continues to be vested in the 6th respondent temple.
What is communicated by Memo dated 20.08.2014 is the list
supplied by Endowment Department.  The said list of  Endowment
Department is not filed, but apparently it reflects the various
extent of land standing in the name of various temples.    This list
would come to the aid of the registering authority while processing
any document for registration presented before him. Unless a
document is presented by an authorized person entitled to
undertake transaction on behalf of the endowment institution,  the
registering authority cannot entertain the document.   As record
would disclose and in view of  the  statutory mandate of provisions
referred to above, the property in issue falls within the domain of
Section 22-A(1)(c) of the Registration Act.   Thus, the memo under
challenge has to be understand in the context of the statutory
provision referred to above.

13.     The facts in P.Srinivasulu are entirely different.  The
Trustees of the temple passed resolution authorizing the Life
Trustee to execute sale deeds in respect of the trust land.
Consequently the lands were transferred by way of execution of
sale deeds during the years 1981, 1983 and 1985.   The concerned
Trust was brought under the provision of the Endowments Act
only with effect from on 13.04.1995.   Thus, the provisions of the
Act would apply only from that date.   In the above factual context,
this Court held that title is validly  passed on to the purchaser and
Government or religious institution cannot claim the subject land
as still owned by them.   The Court also further observed that
without taking steps for nullification of the sale deeds executed by
the Life Trustee in favour of the father of the first petitioner, the
respondents could not prevent transfer of the subject land in
favour of the other petitioners.  The Court also observed that
whenever  there was a bona fide   claim with regard to the title and
possession by any third party,  such  claim cannot be  curtailed
merely on the ground that such land belongs to either Government
or Religious Institutions.   Court also further held that the
complicated questions with regard to title and possession cannot
be gone into by the respondents by preventing transfer of lands in
exercise of power under Section 22-A of the Registration Act.

14.     In Pasuparthi Jayaram, letter addressed by the
Commissioner of Endowment on 19.04.2010  to various authorities
in Chittoor district indicating the particulars of the immovable
properties  allegedly belonging to Sri Hathi Ramji Math, Tirupati
and  Sri Bugga Math, Tirupati, directing the registering authority
not to entertain registration of the documents in connection with
the properties listed out was in issue.

15.     Learned single Judge of this Court observed that Section
22-A of the Registration Act pre-supposes title of the institution
over the land and merely prohibits the registration of the
documents executed  without valid authorisation.   Learned single
Judge further held that unless there is a notification under Section
22-A(2) of the Act,  no prohibition can be enforced and, therefore,
communication dated 19.04.2010 held without jurisdiction  and
unsustainable.

16.     In W.P.No.11635 of 2013, letter dated 21.01.2013 of the
Commissioner of Endowments directing the Sub-Registrar,
Visakhapatnam, not to entertain registrations on properties listed
out in the said letter was challenged.   The writ petition was
allowed setting aside the said letter.

17.     The temple preferred W.A.No.106 of 2014 contending that
Survey number in question was registered in the name of appellant
temple and, therefore, in accordance with the provision contained
in Section 22-A(1)(c), there was a prohibition against the
registration of the properties.  Reliance was placed on the
judgment of single judge in Pasuparthi Jayaram (supra).  The
Division Bench held that for properties covered under Section 22-
A(1)(c), there was no need for notification, but Commissioner of
Endowments has no jurisdiction directing Sub-Registrar not to
register documents without any specific permission.  In the
absence of such power conferred under the Registration Act or the
Rules made thereunder, it was not open for the Commissioner to
address such letter.   The Division Bench noticed that L.G.C.No.5
of 2000 filed by the temple was dismissed for non-prosecution long
ago and application filed after more than 11 years for restoration
was pending consideration.   The Division Bench also noticed that
as early as in the year 1949 lay out was approved by the
competent authority, house plots were carved out, buildings were
constructed and people are living in the colony.    Thus, Division
Bench of this Court held that it is not open for the registering
authority to prohibit registration.  Reiterating the principles laid
down in P.Srinivasulu case, Division Bench held that registering
authority cannot embark on enquiry, with regard to title and
possession when there is bona fide dispute with regard to such
title and possession.

18.     The decisions relied upon by the petitioner do not come to
the aid of the petitioner.   In the facts of this case, as successfully
contested by the 6th respondent-temple, as per the Resettlement
Register of the Village, the land is classified as temple Adyapaka
Service and as per the provision of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956,
no ryotwari patta can be granted and even if it is already granted,
it is null and void and property continues to be vested in the
institution.  Thus, as per the material on record, the property
continues to vest in the 6th respondent temple.    Therefore,
petitioner cannot claim, merely on the factum of his possession or
the earlier inam granted to his ancestors for the service rendered
by them, to contend that he is the owner and entitled to alienate.
Thus, in the facts of this case, the petitioner is not entitled to relief
prayed by him and writ petition is liable to be dismissed and it is
accordingly dismissed.   However, it is left open to the petitioner to
ascertain his title by due process of law and any observations
made in the writ petition do not come in the way in adjudicating
the claim of the petitioner on the title to the property in issue.  No
costs.
        Miscellaneous petitions if any pending in this writ petition
shall stand closed.

__________________________  
JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO    
Date : 29.01.2015

Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC are applicable and the same is set out hereunder: Rule 3. Before granting injunction Court to direct notice to opposite party:- The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant - (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with - (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies; and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent. 8. It is thus clear that ordinarily the Court shall not grant any injunction or interim relief as prayed for without issuing notice to the adversary, but the Legislature has carved out an exception when without issuing a notice, an order of injunction can be passed. The word shall, succeeding the word Court in the proviso, clearly denotes that it is mandatory.

THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR                    

Writ Appeal No.111 of 2015

19-2-2015

P.Gayazuddin and others   Appellants
       
The State of Andhra Pradesh  Rep. by its District Collector Y.S.R. District,
Kadapa and others        Respondents  

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS : Sri A. Srinath    

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NOs.1 to 3: Government Pleader for Revenue        
                                    (Andhra Pradesh)
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.4 : Government Pleader for Home          
                             (Andhra Pradesh)
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NOs. 5 to 7 :  None appeared        
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NOs.8 to 16 : Sri P.V.N. Kiran Kumar        


<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?CITATIONS: (1993) 3 SCC 161  

THE HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA            
 AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        

WRIT APPEAL NO.111 OF 2015    

ORDER: (per the Honble The Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta)

        Learned counsel for the writ petitioners  respondents appears and
submits that the appeal may be disposed of finally.
2.      This appeal is directed against the interim order passed by the
Honble Trial Judge in the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners
respondents, namely, Shaik Nasreeen and others.  In the writ petition it
has been alleged that the official respondents, namely, respondent Nos.3
and 4, the Tahsildar and the Circle Inspector of Police concerned, are
disturbing and are interfering with lawful construction of the structure on
the land the patta of which has been granted in favour of the petitioners.
It was contended that the said patta is still valid and subsisting and it has
not been cancelled and hence so long as the patta remaining valid and
subsisting, no one can interfere or obstruct enjoyment of the property in
question by the petitioners.
3.      On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants contended
that selfsame plot of the land has been purchased by the appellants.
Such contention is denied and disputed by the learned Lawyer for the writ
petitioners  respondents.
4.      In any view of the matter, the Honble Trial Judge without
considering the prima facie  case and balance of convenience, passed an
ad interim order without issuing any notice to the appellants.
5.      According to the learned counsel for the appellants the impugned
ad interim order, without complying with the provisions of Order XXXIX
Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been adopted by the Writ
Rules of this Court, is not legally sustainable.  No reasons have been
recorded as to why service of notice as mentioned in the aforesaid Rule
was dispensed with.  Even prima facie  case has not been considered.  It
is a cryptic interim order of stay.
6.      Learned counsel for the writ petitioners - respondents, on the other
hand, says that the land belong to his clients on the strength of a patta
they are constructing dwelling units and the Tahsildar and the Circle
Inspector in collusion with the appellants are disturbing and obstructing
the writ petitioners.
7.      After hearing both the learned counsel, we find force in the
argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that by virtue of the
Writ Rules, the provision of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC are applicable and
the same is set out hereunder:
        Rule 3. Before granting injunction Court to direct
notice to opposite party:- The Court shall in all cases,
except where it appears that the object of granting the
injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an
injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be
given to the opposite party:
       Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction
without giving notice of the application to the opposite party,
the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object
of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and
require the applicant -
       (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by
registered post, immediately after the order granting the
injunction has been made, a copy of the application for
injunction together with -
              (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the
application;
              (ii) a copy of the plaint; and
              (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant
relies; and
         (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted
or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit
stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or
sent.

8.      It is thus clear that ordinarily the Court shall not grant any
injunction or interim relief as prayed for without issuing notice to the
adversary, but the Legislature has carved out an exception when without
issuing a notice, an order of injunction can be passed.  The word shall,
succeeding the word Court in the proviso, clearly denotes that it is
mandatory.  The Court has to form an opinion with reasons that the
object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, in event prior
notice is served, then in that case, without giving any notice to the
opposite party, an ad interim ex parte order can be passed.  According to
us, it is not a mere legal formality and it is the duty of the Court.  But, we
feel that in which case and under what circumstances, an ad interim order
can be granted is the duty of the Court to examine and take decision.  In
this case, the Honble Trial Judge has not recorded any reasons as a
result, has failed to discharge the duty as mentioned in the proviso.  The
Court has to act on the assistance of the learned Lawyers and we think
that such assistance was not rendered properly as a result mandatory
requirement envisaged in the law has not been fulfilled.  On this ground
alone we would have set aside the order and remanded for fresh hearing.
We think in this case instead of taking recourse to the sort of measure, we
examine this case whether ad interim order was warranted at all.
9.      Going by the materials, it appears to us that if prior notice were
served on the appellants, the writ petitioners - respondents would not
suffer irreparable loss because of alleged stoppage of construction for one
or two days, nor there would have been grave affectation worth
mentioning.  Under these circumstances, we think, in this case, the
Honble Trial Judge was not justified to issue an ad interim order of
injunction without issuing prior notice.  It is not a case where exceptional
provision as explained could be invoked.  The aforesaid legal position has
been explained by the Supreme  Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal
Corporation of Delhi .
10.     Now we examine whether the Honble Writ Court should have
entertained the writ petition or not.  It appears in the garb of alleged over
action of the official respondents protective order is passed by the Writ
Court against private individuals.  The allegations in the writ affidavit, in
our view, in reality directed against the appellants - unofficial
respondents.  There is no material in this case to hold that there has been
over action of the official respondents to show interference has been
made illegally by the official respondents.
11.     We think the order asking the official respondents to act in
accordance with law, in the fact and situation in this case, would suffice
and we order accordingly.  The parties will be free to approach
appropriate forum to get their inter se disputes as regards title and
possession settled before appropriate Civil Court.  It is also open for the
parties to ask for interlocutory orders in the form of injunction or in any
other form before appropriate Court.  In view of this judgment, nothing
remains to be adjudicated in the writ petition.  It would therefore be open
for the writ petitioners, or for that matter the parties concerned, to get
the writ petition disposed of technically.
12.     The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of.  There will be no order
as to costs.

________________________  
K.J. SENGUPTA, CJ  
______________________  
SANJAY KUMAR, J        
19.2.2015

whether the self same order, which has reached its finality can be challanged under writ jurisdiction ? According to us, it is not legally permissible, if it is done the writ court will unsettle a legally settled position.-2015 A.P. msklawreports

whether the self same order,
which has reached its finality can be challanged under writ jurisdiction ? 
According to 
us, it is not legally permissible, if it is done the writ court will unsettle a legally settled position. 
when appellate authority has already decided the matter against the petitioner, the writ Court is
debarred from doing so as the same binds the writ Court applying the principle of res judicata, particularly, when the appellate authoritys orders are not challenged in the writ jurisdiction.  -2015 A.P. msklawreports

Expert Opinion - Vs- Positive Evidence "Finally we may point out that the expert admitted in his evidence that it was only by a chemical test that it could be definitely stated whether a particular writing was of a particular year or period. He also admitted that he applied no chemical tests in this case. So his opinion cannot on his own showing have that value which it might have had if he had applied a chemical test. Besides we may add that Osborn on "Questioned Documents" at p. 464 says even with respect to chemical tests that "the chemical tests to determine age also, as a rule, are a mere excuse to make a guess and furnish no reliable data upon which a definite opinion can be based". In these circumstances the mere opinion of the expert cannot override the positive evidence of the attesting witnesses in a case like this where there are no suspicious circumstances".-2015 S.C. (1963) MSKLAWREPORTS

Expert Opinion - Vs- Positive Evidence 

"Finally we may point out that the expert admitted in his evidence that it was only by a chemical test that it could be definitely stated whether a particular writing was of a particular year or period.
 He also admitted that he applied no chemical tests in this case. 
So his opinion cannot on his own showing have that value which it might have had if he had applied a chemical test. 
Besides we may add that Osborn on "Questioned Documents" at p. 464 says even with respect to chemical tests that "the chemical tests to determine age also, as a rule, are a mere excuse to make a guess and furnish no reliable data upon which a definite opinion can be based". 
In these circumstances the mere opinion of the expert cannot override the positive evidence of the attesting witnesses in a case like this where there are no suspicious circumstances".-2015 S.C. (1963) MSKLAWREPORTS

శ్రీ రామ నవమి శుభాకాంక్షలు

 

రామా 

రావయ్యా

మా ఒంటిమిట్టకు 

మా ఆనంద భాష్పాలు తప్ప 

గోదావరి లేదు నీ కాళ్ళు కడుగ 

మా హృదయ పీటం తప్ప

భద్రాది లేడు నీకు పీట వేయ 

చిరు కానుకలు తప్ప 

చింతాకు పతకం తేలేము 

నీ నామా  సంకీర్తన తప్ప

రామదాసు నగలు చేయించలేము

 ఈ ఒంటి మిట్టనే నీ పంచవటి అనుకోని 

మా హృదయ రాజ్యాన్ని నీ మహాసామ్రాజ్యం అనుకోని 

 రామా 

రావయ్యా

మా ఒంటిమిట్టకు 

మీకు మీ కుటుంబానికి  శ్రీ రామ నవమి శుభాకాంక్షలు

మన్మధనామ వత్సరం

 

మన్మధనామ వత్సరం 

యౌవ్వన శోభ సంబరం 

పచ్చని తోరణాల స్వాగత గీతాలు

కమ్మని కోకిల కుహు కుహు రావాలు 

నిత్య జీవన సత్యప్రమాణాల  ఉగాది పచ్చళ్ళు 

 పంచాంగ శ్రవణ గుణింతాల  జీవన గమన సూచికలు 

మీకు

మీ కుటుంబ సభ్యులకు 

ఇవే   మా  యుగాది శుభాకాంక్షలు 

Sections 12(1)(c) and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'), for annulment of the marriage - Psoriasis is not a contagious disease nor does it constitute a ground for divorce. - The word 'suppression' does not occur in Section 12 of the Act. - The Parliament has employed the words 'force' and 'fraud'. - whether the appellant was under legal obligation to reveal the same and if so, whether there was any omission on his part.- Before a party gives consent for the marriage with the other, there is bound to be exchange of information. - While a part of information may emerge voluntarily, it is not necessary that the parties must present to each other, their entire life history thus far. - If one is curious to know any particular information about the other, certainly the same can be procured directly or from the persons who act as mediators. - There are certain important informations, such as, whether the person was already married earlier, whether he or she suffers from any serious disease which, if known to the other party, would not agree for the match. - Therefore, the respondent cannot be said to have made out a case under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act.-2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

 under Sections 12(1)(c) and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'), for annulment of the marriage. She has also prayed for return of a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- said to have been given as dowry and Rs.5,00,000/- towards cost of gold, silver and other articles said to have been presented at the time of the marriage. According to the respondent, she switched on the light during night when the appellant was sleeping and she was shocked to see that his skin was peeling off and that immediately she fainted. She further stated that on being questioned, the appellant replied stating that he is suffering from psoriasis for the past two years and that he is taking treatment from Dr. D.B.N. Murthy. The respondent stated that she left the matrimonial home in December, 2005 and at a meeting of the members of their families, the appellant admitted that he is suffering from psoriasis, but the elders opined that it is not a ground for divorce at all. Ultimately, she pleaded that the marriage is liable to be dissolved, on account of the suppression of the vital information and that had she known about the same, she would not have agreed for the marriage with the appellant. The first is about the nature of ailment. The second is as to whether the appellant was under legal obligation to reveal the same and if so, whether there was any omission on his part. Psoriasis is not a contagious disease nor does it constitute a ground for divorce. The word 'suppression' does not occur in Section 12 of the Act. The Parliament has employed the words 'force' and 'fraud'. Before a party gives consent for the marriage with the other, there is bound to be exchange of information. While a part of information may emerge voluntarily, it is not necessary that the parties must present to each other, their entire life history thus far. If one is curious to know any particular information about the other, certainly the same can be procured directly or from the persons who act as mediators. There are certain important informations, such as, whether the person was already married earlier, whether he or she suffers from any serious disease which, if known to the other party, would not agree for the match. Section 12(1)(c) of the Act gets attracted only when the consent was obtained through force or by playing fraud. The content of these words can be better understood, if one takes into account, the purport of Section 12(2)(a) of the Act. In the relevant clause, the words used are "force has ceased to operate or as the case may be fraud has been discovered". This provision can not at all be operated vis--vis the suppression of information. Therefore, the respondent cannot be said to have made out a case under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act.-2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

Sec.74 of Indian Evidence Act - Presumption of Assignment of Patta infavour of plaintiff in the year 1977- Not Un-Rebuttable -Merely because presumption has to be drawn under Section 74 of the Act that does not prevent the court from taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and to draw conclusions which rebut the initial presumption. - admittedly the father of the plaintiff has got patta lands - admittedly the plaintiff was minor - admittedly no Cists receipt filed from 1977 - admittedly his sister is the village Officer who issued certificates Ex.A1 to A4 - admittedly she was not examined - admittedly the plaintiff is a APSRTC conductor - admittedly obtained all these certificates just before filing of the suit - No Govt. Patta would be assigned to minor, employee and sufficient land holders - Before taking presumption the lower court rightly took all these facts in to consideration and rightly rejected to take the presumption under sec.74 of Evidence Act - 2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS.

Section 74 of the Evidence Act - presumption towards the acts of the officials who
issued Exs.A1 to A4. - It is settled law that presumption has to be drawn under
Section 74 of the Act with regard to the public documents. - does not mean that such presumption is unrebuttable.  -  mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof.   Admittedly, sister of the plaintiff, who issued Exs.A1  to A4 was not examined.  -No person
examined to prove Exs.A1 to A4.  - Admittedly, Exs.A1 to A4 were issued by the sister of the plaintiff who was working as Village Secretary, that too just before filing the suit.   The Courts below observed that the appellant would not have kept quite without paying cist if at all assignment in his favour in 1977 is true  - An entry in Revenue record is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently.   - The Courts have to appreciate the evidence and draw logical conclusions.  - While drawing local conclusions, all the relevant facts have to be taken into consideration. -  All the facts and circumstances, under which the relevant documents came into existence should be considered.   -Whether the case put forth by a party is probable or not has to be carefully examined. -  As far as
appreciation of evidence on record is concerned, the Courts have to draw logical conclusions on the basis of evidence on record i.e., on proper appreciation of evidence. -  The fact that the father of the plaintiff had patta land and the plaintiff was only 15 years old in 1977 makes it clear that there was no possibility of assigning land to the plaintiff who was a minor in 1977. -  The Courts below were also justified in finding that the plaintiff failed to file any documents such as cist receipts or adangals from 1977 till the date of issuing Exs.A1 to A4 which were admittedly obtained by the plaintiff just before filing of the suit. -  It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff has been working as a Conductor in APSRTC and he is not entitled for assignment of land. - All these circumstances go to show that the conclusions reached by the Courts below are justified. -  Merely because presumption has to be drawn under Section 74 of the Act that does not prevent the court from taking into consideration all
the facts and circumstances of the case and to draw conclusions which rebut the initial presumption.  I do not see any reason to hold any substantial question of law, for consideration in this Second Appeal. -2015 A.P.(2014)MSKLAWREPORTS

Sec.10 (1)(vii)(ix) and Sec.19(3) of Divorce Act - Divorce on the Grounds of Lunatic and Idiot - both are different things - Uncertainty - No certificate issued under sec.18 and 19 of filed under Lunacy Act - Evidence of Doctor not helpful - she passed Degree and passed type higher in three languages - A person can be said to be lunatic if he is virtually a mad person and is insane for all practical purposes. It is only when the person exhibits extreme characteristics that he can be categorized or called as lunatic. The word 'idiot' is explained in the Chambers Dictionary as connoting "a foolish or unwise person; a person afflicted with the severest degree of intellectual sub- normality, and having low intelligence quotient" - the husband failed to prove both aspects - Trial court orders are set aside - Appeals are allowed - 2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

Sec.10(1)(vii)(ix) and 19(3) of Divorce Act (for short 'the Act') for declaring his marriage with the appellant as null and void.-Their marriage took place , according to the Christian customs and rites.-the parents of the appellant concealed the fact that the appellant is a lunatic - every effort was made by him to save the marriage, proved to be futile. -though they lived together for sometime, their marriage itself deserved to be declared as null and void.-According to her, she studied up to Degree and she completed typewriting courses in English, Hindi and Telugu.  She pleaded that her conduct was never abnormal, much less she is a lunatic or an idiot.  She alleged that the O.P., was filed by the respondent against the wishes, even of his mother and the same is liable to be dismissed.-filed O.P.No.98 of 2009 for restitution of conjugal rights.-The only ground pleaded by the respondent against the appellant is that she is of extraordinary behaviour and conduct, leading to an inference that she is a lunatic or an idiot.-The trial Court decreed the O.P., filed by the respondent under Sec.10 of the Act, and dismissed the one filed by the appellant for restitution of conjugal rights.-It is the expectation of everyone to interact with the persons with ordinary tendency and behaviour.  It is particularly so in the context of marriage.  No one would wish to have a life-partner, whose conduct or behaviour is different from the one expected from ordinary human beings.  Obviously, for that reason, law recognizes the extraordinary conduct or behaviour of a party to the marriage, as a ground for the other, to seek divorce or nullification.-Section 10(1)(iii) of the Indian Divorce Act enables a party to the marriage to seek a decree of nullity against the other spouse, if the latter was a lunatic or idiot 'as on the date of marriage'.- "Sec.10.Grounds for dissolution of marriage: (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 
2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent -
(i)   ...
(ii)  ...
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less
than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or
... ...
... ...
(vii) has willfully refused to consummate the marriage and the marriage has not
therefore been consummated; or 
... ...
(ix) has deserted the petitioner for at least two years immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition;"
The expression used in the Indian Divorce Act, the 'lunacy or other mental
disorder' is dealt with under two separate provisions.  In case a party to the
marriage was lunatic or idiot as on the date of the marriage, Section 19 read
with Sec.18 of the Act enables the other spouse to seek a decree of nullity of
marriage.  Section 19 (3) reads as under:
"19. Grounds of decree - Such decree may be made on any of the following grounds 
: -
(1) ...
(2) ...
(3)  that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage"      

  If, on the other hand, such disability or disorder has occurred at a later
point of time and remained for a period of not less than two years, the
aggrieved party can file a petition under Section 10 of the Act for dissolution
of the marriage.   -   In the instant case, the respondent invoked both the provisions.  It only means that he was not clear as to whether the appellant was a lunatic or an idiot, as on the date of marriage, or that the same has occurred to the appellant immediately two years preceding to filing of the O.P.  This uncertainty would certainly have its own impact upon the merits of the O.P  -  A person can be said to be lunatic if he is virtually a mad person and is insane for all practical purposes.  It is only when the person exhibits extreme characteristics that he can be categorized or called as lunatic.  The word 'idiot' is explained in the Chambers Dictionary as connoting "a foolish or unwise person; a person afflicted with the severest degree of intellectual sub- normality, and having low intelligence quotient"-The trial Court passed an order directing that the appellant be examined by a qualified Doctor in the Government Medical College, Guntur.  Accordingly, PW-3, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Guntur Medical College, examined the appellant.  His evidence is to the effect that though he found some abnormalities in the behaviour of the appellant, his observation is not sufficient to conclude that she was suffering from psychosis.  This witness was not cross-examined by the appellant. PW-4 is the Superintendent of Government Hospital, Guntur.  It is important to
note that the alleged examination of the appellant by this witness was not on the basis of any order passed by the Court.- Sections 18 & 19 of the Indian Lunacy Act prescribes detailed procedure to be followed in the context of issuing medical certificates in respect of persons, who are said to be suffering from lunacy.  The certificate is required to be issued in Form-3 appended to the
said Act.  The two sections referred to above stipulate the manner in which the medical practitioner must examine and the nature of precautions to be taken by him before issuing certificate.  The provisions read as under:  "Sec.18.Medical Certificates.- (1) Every medical certificate under this
Act shall be made and signed by a medical practitioner or a medical officer, as
the case may be, and shall be in the form prescribed.
(2)  Every medical certificate shall state the facts upon which the persons
certifying has formed his opinion that the alleged lunatic is a lunatic,
distinguishing facts observed by himself from facts communicated by others, and
no reception order on petition shall be made upon a certificate founded only
upon facts communicated by others. 
(3)  Every medical certificate made under this Act shall be evidence of the
facts therein appearing and of the judgment therein stated to have been formed
by the persons certifying on such facts, as if the matters therein appearing had
been verified on oath. - Sec.19. Time and manner of medical examination of lunatic.- (1) A reception
order required to be founded on a medical certificate shall not be made unless the persons who signs the medical certificate, or, whether two certificates are required, each person who signs a certificate has personally examined the alleged lunatic, in the case of an order upon petition, not more that seven
clear days before the date of the presentation of the petition, and, in all other cases not more than seven clear days before the date of the order.
(2)  Where two medical certificates are required, a reception order shall not be
made unless each person signing a certificate has examined the alleged lunatic
separately from the other.- Admittedly, no precautions as provided under Sections 18 & 19
of Indian Lunacy Act were taken by PW-4, nor any certificate was issued by himin Form-3 appended to the said Act.- Once a person is branded as a lunatic, he would virtually forego several civil rights, such as capacity to contract, right to take independent decisions.  He loses respect in the society, which, a man with the ordinary traits can expect.- Another aspect is that if a person is declared as lunatic, he cannot figure as an independent person in any proceedings before a Court.  He is required to be assisted by a person that may be appointed by the concerned Court, that too under a specific legal regime.- The case on hand presents a typical contradiction.  If the appellant is, in fact, a lunatic, the question of her being shown as independent party in the O.P., does not arise.  It was only through a guardian or other representative as provided for in law, that she could have been shown as a party.  Hence, there is a serious defect in the very form of framing the O.P., instituted by the
respondent.-  On merits also, we find that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court
cannot be sustained. - If at all there is something extraordinary with her, it is in the context of passing typewriting examinations in three different languages, namely Telugu, Hindu and English. Even for ordinary persons, it is difficult to pass the typewriting examinations in two languages.  When such is the brilliance and sharpness of the appellant, it is nave to plead that she is a lunatic or for that matter 'idiot'. - Something should be seriously wrong with a person, who calls the appellant an idiot or lunatic.- It may be true that some typical characteristics may have been noticed on the part of the appellant.  One has to recognize the fact that no two citizens are endowed with the same kind of intelligence to such a degree that both react to the situation in the same manner.   It is only when the extraordinary behaviour of a person is such that his or her spouse just cannot lead normal life; that it can constitute a ground for divorce.  The likes or dislikes of a party hardly matter.-We therefore allow both the appeals and set aside the decree of divorce passed by the trial Court. -2015 A.P.(2014)MSKLAWREPORTS

Divorce - Sec. 13(1) (ia) (ib) and (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 - conversion to Christianity after birth of fourth child - Desertion after that - admitted faith in Jesus from child hood - Burden lies on her whether she converted before the marriage or after the marriage when Marriage was taken place as per Hindu rites and customs and in the absence of objection about the filing of Divorce OP under Hindu Marriage Act - Non- Production of Church Roll by Steward of Church - Presumption under sec.114 of Evidence Act - Husband proved his case that the wife converted to Christianity - is a valid Ground available under Hindu Marriage Act for Divorce and further more proved that she deserted thereafter for more than two years - Trial court order set aside - Appeal was allowed - Divorce Granted - 2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS.

for divorce, under Section 13(1) (ia) (ib) and (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 (for short 'the Act').-after the birth of the fourth child, the respondent got herself converted into Christianity. -she had faith in Jesus Christ, and the allegation against her is not true.- trial Court dismissed the OP -1) Whether the appellant established that the respondent was cruel towards him? 2) Whether the respondent deserted the company of the appellant on her own accord since December, 1997?  3) Whether the respondent converted into Christianity about two years prior to
filing of the petition?-A valid Hindu marriage can take place only between a man and a woman professing that religion, as on the date of marriage.  The first sentence in Section 5 of
the Act made this aspect clear.  It reads:"A marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely, ......." -The equivocal statement made by her is that she had faith in Jesus Christ.  The burden of proof of conversion into Christianity naturally rests upon the
respondent. -R.W.3, a person who acted as  Steward in the Church at Armoor. -  "It is true that if any person adopts Baptism, we will enter the name of such person in a particular register.  The said register is called as 'Church roll'.The said register will be maintained in all the Churches.  It is true that the names of R.W.2 and his family members entered in the Church roll.  I did not produce any register to show that R.W.2 and his family members converted into Christianity in the year 1978." The failure on the part of R.W.3 to produce the register would naturally lead to an inference to be drawn, as provided for, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.-From the above, it becomes clear that the respondent got herself converted into Christianity, after her marriage with the appellant.  The Act recognizes conversion of a spouse into another religion as a valid ground for the other to seek divorce. -It is not in dispute that the respondent left the company of the appellant, soon after the fourth child was born.  After that, a complaint was filed against the appellant, alleging the offences under Sections 498-A and 307 of IPC, at the instance of the respondent, though by R.W.2.-We, therefore, allow the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the order and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside. - 2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC for permission to withdraw the present suit with liberty to file a fresh comprehensive suit. - the plaintiff has to satisfy atleast one of the two requirements mentioned in Rule 1(3) of Order XXIII CPC. The petitioner has failed much less proved that the suit has suffered from formal defect. Hence, the requirement under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(a) is not satisfied. -2015 A.P. msklawreports

 Under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC, where the Court is satisfied that
by reason of some formal defect or that there are sufficient grounds
for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of
a suit or part of a claim, it may permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit
with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of
such suit or such part of the claim.
      In order to succeed in an application filed for withdrawal of the
suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, the plaintiff has to satisfy atleast one
of the two requirements mentioned in Rule 1(3) of Order XXIII CPC.
The petitioner has failed much less proved that the suit has suffered
from formal defect.  Hence, the requirement under Order XXIII Rule
1(3)(a) is not satisfied.  As regards Clause-(b) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1,
except raising a vague plea that the defendants have invented new
concepts, the petitioner has not explained as to what those concepts
were and whether they constitute sufficient ground to allow them to
withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the vague pleadings
as put forth by the petitioner.  The lower Court is therefore justified in
dismissing the application filed by the petitioner.-2015 A.P. msklawreports

No Exparte interim Injunction order can be given till disposal of main O.P./SUIT with out hearing the parties - order is liable to be set aside as it is gross miscarriage of justice -2015 A.P.[2013]MSKLAWREPORTS

It cannot therefore be doubted that the Principal District Judge, Ongole, had the power to grant interim relief pending the OP. However, such interim relief could be made absolute so as to be continued till the final disposal of the OP only after hearing all the parties concerned. In the present case, though the learned Principal District Judge, Ongole, captioned the order as an ad-interim injunction, he directed that it should continue till the disposal and final result of the main SROP. The hearing date given thereafter merely indicated that the SROP was to be heard on that date. The interim relief granted was declared to be of a final and enduring nature till the conclusion of the OP. Though it is contended on behalf of the first respondent that this was merely a mistake in the order, this Court is not impressed. The words used in the order undeniably indicate its final nature though it was stated to be an ad-interim injunction. In any event, such lapses are not expected of the Principal Civil Court of the district. Thus, the learned Principal District Judge, Ongole, clearly committed a gross error of jurisdiction by overstepping the limits prescribed by law for granting interim relief and acted in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure and the principles of natural justice. Given these circumstances, this Court would be justified in entertaining this writ petition to prevent a miscarriage of justice.-2015 A.P.[2013]MSKLAWREPORTS