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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Friday, December 25, 2020

Or.21, rule 58 [1][b] -vs- Or.21 rule 58 [2] - for first count - no equiry is neccessary for dismissing the claim petition in limini but for second count - Trail is complusory when findings was given - execution court committed wrong - remanded for trial by setting aside the order as the execution court found that the sale agreement is a false one.

 Or.21, rule 58 [1][b] -vs- Or.21 rule 58 [2] - for first count - no equiry is neccessary for dismissing the claim petition in limini but for second count - Trail is complusory when findings were given - execution court committed wrong - remanded for trial  by setting aside the order as the execution court found that the sale agreement is a false one.

it does not appear that the executing Court had dismissed the objection under Clause (b) of proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 of Order 21 of the Code, that is to say only on the ground that the claim was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. Because a finding has been recorded that the agreement of sale in question is not genuine, the order passed must be held to have been passed under sub-rule (2) of Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure without holding an enquiry and without giving opportunity to the parties to the objection, but it has straightaway passed the order on merits which, on the face of it, is contrary to the mandatory provisions stated above. Under these circumstances, the impugned order suffers from material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.” 

AP HIGH COURT 

Patcha Subrahmanyam,
Versus

Chenna Krishna Rao,

HON’ABLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

A.S.No.77 of 2017

JUDGMENT:

This appeal is directed against the decree and order dated

07.06.2016, passed in E.A.No.235 of 2016 in E.P.No.249 of 2014 in

O.S.No.319 of 2011, by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Eluru.

2. The facts, which are given raise to this appeal, are that one

Thota Uma Maheswara Rao was the owner of 93 sq. Yards of land in

Rs.No.1936/2002 of Satrampadu village, Vatluru Sub-Division, West

Godavari District (hereinafter referred to as ‘the schedule property’). Sri

Chenna Krishna Rao, the 1st respondent in the appeal filed O.S.No.319 of

2011 before the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Eluru against Sri Thota Uma

Maheswara Rao, who has since passed away and is now represented by

respondents 3 to 5 in the present appeal, for recovery of money. The 1st

respondent/herein had also filed I.A.No.154 of 2011 for obtaining

attachment before judgment in respect of the schedule property and the

same was allowed on 13.09.2011. Subsequently, the suit was decreed on

10.02.2012. Thereafter, E.P.No.249 of 2014 was filed by the 1st

respondent herein for recovery of Rs.7,11,734/- along with costs of

Rs.17,547/- and for sale of the schedule property for recovery of decretal

amount and costs.

3. After the filing of the said E.P., the appellant herein filed

E.A.No.235 of 2016 claiming that he was the owner of the suit schedule

property. The claim of the appellant was that he had advanced a loan of

Rs.2,00,000/- to Sri Thota Uma Maheswara Rao, (the deceased 1st

respondent herein) and Sri Thota Uma Maheswara Rao had created a

mortgage over the schedule property by depositing title deeds on 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

2

11.10.2004. As Sri Thota Uma Maheswara Rao did not repay the loan

taken by him, the appellant claims to have issued a legal notice dated

30.09.2011, despite which no payments were made. Thereupon, the

appellant filed O.S.No.498 of 2011 on 24.10.2011 in the Court of Principal

Senior Civil Judge, Eluru and the same was decreed by way of a

preliminary decree dated 13.06.2012 decreeing the suit for Rs.5,36,000/-

with costs and subsequent interest at 6% per annum with principal

amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from the date of suit till the date of realisation

and time for redemption of four months was granted.

4. It is the case of the appellant herein that in view of the said

preliminary decree Sri Thota Uma Maheswara Rao (the deceased 1st

respondent herein) had executed a registered sale deed dated 26.08.2014

and the appellant had become the owner of the schedule property.

5. The 1st respondent herein resisted the said claim on the

ground that the order of attachment before judgment in favour of the 1st

respondent was issued on 13.09.2011 whereas the sale deed is said to

have been executed only on 28.06.2014 and in view of the same, the sale

deed itself is highly suspect and in any event not binding on the 1st

respondent as such. In view of the said submission, the 1st respondent

sought dismissal of E.A.No.235 of 2016.

6. It appears that the learned executing Judge heard the

arguments on both sides and dismissed the said E.A.No.235 of 2016 on

07.06.2016 only on the basis of the arguments advanced by both sides

and without any enquiry.

7. Aggrieved by the said order dated 07.06.2016, the present

appeal has been filed by the appellant. 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

3

8. The primary contention of the appellant is that in every

claim petition made in execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 58

read with Section 47 of C.P.C.,an enquiry is required. Learned counsel for

the appellant submits that this would mean that the issues raised in the

claim application would require a formal trial including letting in evidence

by way of oral depositions and marking of documents as exhibits.

9. The claim of the appellant is that since this procedure has

not been followed, there is a clear violation of the provisions of Order XXI

Rule 58 C.P.C., and as such, the order dated 07.06.2016 requires to be

set aside and the matter may be remanded to the executing Court for a

proper enquiry in the matter before any decision is taken on the

application.

10. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since

the issues before the executing Court were straight forward in nature and

did not require any elaborate evidence, the procedure adopted by the

learned executing Judge is proper and does not require any interference.

11. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that

the question whether the mortgage of the property by the deceased 1st

respondent is in the year 2004 itself and the subsequent events leading to

the execution of the sale deed would have to be taken into account and

the objection of the 1st respondent herein on the genuineness and validity

of the sale deed dated 26.8.2014, would require to be examined in depth

and such facts can be determined by the executing Court only after a

proper enquiry is conducted, in which the witnesses would be crossexamined and the documents would be examined in a proper manner.

12. The provisions of Order XXI Rule 58 C.P.C would be

applicable to the present case. The said Rule has been considered by this 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

4

Hon’ble Court in the case of Muvvala Ramachandra Rao and anr. V.

Kuricheti Ravi and anr.,

1

. Paras 9 to 12 of the said judgment are

relevant and are extracted hereunder:

“9. The executing Court is competent to dismiss the

objection in limine where it considers that the objection or claim is

designedly or unnecessarily delayed, exercising its powers under

Clause (b) of proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 of Order 21 of the

Code of Civil Procedure and on that count, refuse to investigate

the claim; but if the Court does not exercise the said power, at its

inception, in terms of the above provisions, then, under sub-rule

(2) of Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code, the executing Court is bound

to decide all questions including the questions relating to right,

title or interest in the property attached arising between the

parties to the proceeding and relevant to the adjudication of the

claim or objection after giving opportunity of enquiry to the rival

parties to the objection.

10. In the case of K. Venkarayappa v. Ellen

Industries2

, a learned single Judge of this Court has held that

the Legislature intended that it is a mandatory duty cast on the

Court to hold an enquiry. The enquiry thereby posits that an

opportunity to be given to the parties to adduce all necessary

evidence in support of the claim or to resist such a claim by the

opposite party and thereafter to give finality to the objection by

that court, subject to a right of appeal provided under sub-rule (4)

thereof treating the order thereunder as a decree. The order thus

becomes conclusive. Thereby the Legislature has manifested that

holding an enquiry in adjudicating the right, title and interest of

the objector in dealing with the claim or objection is mandatory

and the order passed thereon shall be conclusive.

11. As noted above, it does not appear that the executing

Court had given opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence in

support of their rival claims. On perusal of Para 5 of the order

passed by the executing Court, it appears that the objection has

been dismissed on the ground that the appellants had not taken

any steps for raising the attachment before the disputed property


1

 1999 (3) ALD 101

2

 AIR 1985 AP 261 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

5

was put to sale though they had notice about the order of

attachment before Judgment before they had instituted the suit in

OS 100 of 1995 against both the respondents on the file of the

Additional Subordinate Judge, Tenali, for the relief of specific

performance, that the agreement of sale in question was not

genuine and no reliance can be placed on it, and that the petition

has been filed only with a view to drag the execution proceedings.

The appellate Court has found in Paras 10 and 11 of its judgment

that the agreement of sale in question is not genuine. Had it been

genuine, the appellants would have definitely obtained stay order

from the concerned Court in the civil suit OS 100 of 1995.”

12. From what is stated above, it does not appear that the

executing Court had dismissed the objection under Clause (b) of

proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 of Order 21 of the Code, that is

to say only on the ground that the claim was designedly or

unnecessarily delayed. Because a finding has been recorded that

the agreement of sale in question is not genuine, the order

passed must be held to have been passed under sub-rule (2) of

Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure without holding

an enquiry and without giving opportunity to the parties to the

objection, but it has straightaway passed the order on merits

which, on the face of it, is contrary to the mandatory provisions

stated above. Under these circumstances, the impugned order

suffers from material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.”

13. In the present case also there is no finding by the learned

executing Judge that this is a matter which requires to be dismissed in

limini on the ground that the objection or claim is designedly or

unnecessarily delayed. As the executing Court went on the basis of the

claims made before it, the procedure adopted by the Court would not be

in consonance with the provisions of Order XXI Rule 58 (2) C.P.C., as

enunciated by this Hon’ble Court in the above referred judgment.

14. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the order

dated 07.06.2016 passed in E.A.No.235 of 2016 in E.P.No.249 of 2014 in

O.S.No.319 of 2011 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

6

Executing Court with a direction to hold an enquiry and after affording

reasonable opportunity to both the parties to the claim petition, dispose of

the same according to law, expeditiously preferably within three months

from the date of receipt of this order. However, there shall be no order as

to costs.

15. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall

stand closed.

_________________________

R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.

5

th February, 2020

Js. 

 RRR,J

A.S.No.77 of 2017

7

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

A.S.No.77 of 2017

5

th February, 2020

Js. 

Tuesday, December 22, 2020

Covid situation, it is very difficult for any bailiff or Field Assistant to be after the respondent, even if the Executing Court grants relief in favour of the petitioners

  execution sought in both the Execution Petitions is by means of arrest of the respondent in committing into civil prison. 3. Considering the nature of relief sought in the Execution Petitions particularly, having regard to the prevailing Covid situation, it is very difficult for any bailiff or Field Assistant to be after the respondent, even if the Executing Court grants relief in favour of the petitioners accepting their version. Hence, there is no necessity to pass any directions in this civil revision petition exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this civil revision petition has to be dismissed.

AP High Court

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1260 of 2020

Gajula Ramesh,
Versus
Vattiprolu Babu Rajendra Prasad,

ORDER:

 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. The request of the

petitioners is to direct the Executing Court to expedite the Execution

Petitions, which are pending on its file.

2. In the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners

states that mode of execution sought in both the Execution Petitions

is by means of arrest of the respondent in committing into civil

prison.

3. Considering the nature of relief sought in the Execution

Petitions particularly, having regard to the prevailing Covid situation,

it is very difficult for any bailiff or Field Assistant to be after the

respondent, even if the Executing Court grants relief in favour of the

petitioners accepting their version. Hence, there is no necessity to

pass any directions in this civil revision petition exercising its

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, this civil revision petition has to be dismissed.

4. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed at the

admission stage. No costs.

 As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand

closed.

________________________

JUSTICE M. VENKATA RAMANA

Date: 07-12-2020

Pab 

2

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1255 of 2020

DATE: 07-12-2020

Pab 

whether the procedure that is followed in appointing arbitrator is in accordance with law?

whether the procedure that is followed in appointing arbitrator is in accordance with law?

it is very clear

that, if the parties agreed upon a particular procedure for appointment

of an Arbitrator as contemplated under Clause 17 of the Loan

Agreement, the disputes between the parties, more particularly with

regard to appointment of arbitrator, have to be in accordance with the

said procedure. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the

Appellants that, no opportunity was given to the Appellants in

proposing the name of an arbitrator, has no merit.AP HIGH COURT 

1

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

C.M.A. No. 25 of 2020

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice C.Praveen Kumar)

1) Heard both sides and perused the record.

2) Challenging the Order, dated 26.09.2019, passed in A.O.P.

No.124 of 2016, by the I Additional District Judge, Kurnool, wherein,

the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 [the ‘Act’], praying the court to set-aside the

Award, dated 27.02.2016, passed in Arbitration Application [A.A.] No.

122 of 2015 by the Arbitral Tribunal, Kurnool, was dismissed, the

present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal came to be filed under Section 37 of

the Act.

3) As seen from the proceedings, pursuant to an agreement entered

into by both the parties, the sole arbitrator was appointed and a claim

petition came to be filed before him on the ground that the 1st

Petitioner/Appellant availed loan of Rs.4,00,000/- for development of

his business on 26.04.2014 and executed an Agreement vide Ex.A4 to

which the 2nd and 3rd Petitioners/Appellants stood as guarantors. The

parties agreed to repay the same with interest at 20% per annum in 36

equal monthly instalments at Rs.17,778/- each, but paid only an

amount of Rs.1,42,446/- thereby committed default in payment of

money.

4) It is said that, in-spite of issuing legal notice, dated 09.09.2015,

there was no response from the Appellants. The sole Arbitrator came to

be appointed, for which no objection was raised at the initial stage, but, 

2

however, the Appellants/Petitioners did not participate in the

proceedings nor they appeared before the Arbitrator. Thereafter, an

Award came to be passed. Challenging the same, A.O.P. No. 124 of

2016 came to be filed before the learned I Additional District Judge,

Kurnool. The objection raised was that the appointment of sole

arbitrator is illegal and contrary to mandatory procedure contemplated

under law and that the sole arbitrator failed to follow the procedure as

required under law. The counsel for the Appellants/Petitioners further

pleads that, without giving notice, an ex parte award came to be

passed, as such, the same is illegal, improper and incorrect.

5) A counter came to be filed by 1st Respondent denying the

averments made in the application contending that there is an

arbitration clause in the agreement and accordingly Sri. Y. Reddeppa

Reddy, was appointed as sole Arbitrator. It is further urged in the

counter that, in-spite of giving several opportunities, the

Appellants/Petitioners herein did not respond, as such, they were set

ex parte and the 4th Respondent herein i.e., the sole Arbitrator

concluded the proceedings by following the procedure.

6) Taking into consideration the grounds raised, the learned I

Additional District Judge, Kurnool, in the impugned proceedings

dismissed the request of the Appellants/Petitioners herein. Challenging

the same, the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition came to be filed.

7) Reiterating the grounds urged in A.O.P. No. 124 of 2016,

Sri.J.U.M. V. Prasad, learned Counsel for the Petitioners would contend

that the entire procedure that is followed by the sole Arbitrator is

incorrect. In other words, his plea is not giving any option to the 

3

Petitioners in choosing an Arbitrator in adjudicating the matter is

incorrect.

8) On the other hand, Sri. Maheshwara Rao Kuncheam, learned

Counsel for the Respondents would submit that, in view of the law laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in The Iron and Steel Company

Limited v. M/s. Tiwari Road Lines1 case, the order impugned

requires no interference.

9) The short point that arises for consideration is, whether the

procedure that is followed in appointing arbitrator is in

accordance with law?

10) Clause 17 of the Loan Agreement [Ex.A4] states that ‘all the

disputes, differences or claims arising out of the said agreement shall be

settled by an Arbitrator, duly appointed by the 1st Respondent

Company’. Therefore, the argument that there is no arbitration clause

in the agreement entered into by both the parties cannot be accepted.

Further, a reading of the above “clause” clearly indicates that, all the

differences or disputes arising between the parties shall be settled by

an Arbitrator duly appointed by the 1st Respondent Company. It

nowhere indicates any choice being given to the loanees or the

Appellants herein in selecting an Arbitrator. Existence of this clause in

the agreement was never objected to by the Appellant herein at any

point of time.

11) Sub-section 2 of Section 11 of the Act postulates that subject to

sub-section 6, the parties are free to agree on the procedure relating to

appoint of an Arbitrator or Arbitrators.


1

 AIR 2007 SC 2064 

4

12) Referring to Section 11 of the Act, more particularly, sub-section

2 of Section 11, the Hon’ble Apex Court in The Iron and Steel

Company Limited v. M/s. Tiwari Road Lines [supra] held as under:-

“7. In the present case the agreement executed between the parties contains

an arbitration clause and clause 13.1 clearly provides that all disputes and

differences whatsoever arising between the parties out of or relating to the

construction, meaning and operation or effect of the contract or the breach

thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of

Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration and the award made in

pursuance thereof shall be binding on the parties. This clause is in

accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act. There being an

agreed procedure for resolution of disputes by arbitration in accordance with

the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration sub-sections (3),

(4) and (5) of Section 11 can have no application. The stage for invoking subsection (6) of Section 11 had also not arrived. In these circumstances, the

application moved by the respondent before the City Civil Court, Hyderabad,

which was a designated authority in accordance with the scheme framed by

the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, was not maintainable

at all and the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction or authority to appoint an

arbitrator. Thus the order dated 31.03.2004 passed by the Chief Judge, City

Civil Courts, Hyderabad, appointing a retired juridical officer as arbitrator is

clearly without jurisdiction and has to be set aside.

8. The legislative scheme of Section 11 is very clear. If the parties have

agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators as

contemplated by sub-section (2) thereof, then the dispute between the

parties has to be decided in accordance with the said procedure and

recourse to the Chief Justice or his designate cannot be taken straightaway.

A party can approach the Chief Justice or his designate only if the parties

have not agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator as

contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act or the various 

5

contingencies provided for in sub-section (6) have arisen. Since the parties

here had agreed on a procedure for appointing an arbitrator for settling the

dispute by arbitration as contemplated by sub-section (2) and there is no

allegation that anyone of the contingencies enumerated in clauses (a) or (b)

or (c) of sub- section (6) had arisen, the application moved by the respondent

herein to the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, was clearly not maintainable and

the said court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and pass

any order. The order dated 27.12.2004, therefore, is not sustainable”.

13) From a reading of the judgment referred to above, it is very clear

that, if the parties agreed upon a particular procedure for appointment

of an Arbitrator as contemplated under Clause 17 of the Loan

Agreement, the disputes between the parties, more particularly with

regard to appointment of arbitrator, have to be in accordance with the

said procedure. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the

Appellants that, no opportunity was given to the Appellants in

proposing the name of an arbitrator, has no merit.

14) Ergo, we see no merits in the Appeal and the same is accordingly

dismissed. No order as to costs.

15) Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall

stand closed.

________________________________

JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

_______________________

JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

Date: 06.02.2020

SM. 

6

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

C.M.A. No. 25 of 2020

(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice C.Praveen Kumar)

Date: 06.02.2020

SM. 

When exparte interim injunction was obtained by suppressing the material facts, it can be asked to vacate or varied or modified under Or.39 rule 4 of CPC

 

as per Order 39 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 7 CPC, which is as under:- CPK,J & DEV,J CMA_56_ 2020 3 “ORDER XXXIX: Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders: Rule 4:- Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside. Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order: 1 [Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interests of justice: ORDER IX: Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Nonappearance Rule 7. Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous nonappearance. Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit, ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance.” In the light of the above provision of law, the appellants are at liberty to make an application seeking to vacate the order of ad-interim injunction or set aside the same by raising necessary objections, in which event, the trial Court shall consider and pass a detailed order assigning reasons in accordance with law. 


AP HIGH COURT


HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

                              &

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

C.M.A. No. 56 of 2010


CHILLI MALLESH

Versus

SAMITHI PLOT OWNERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION


JUDGMENT:- (per Hon’ble Sri Justice C. Praveen Kumar)

 This appeal is filed under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC assailing

the order dated 10.01.2020 passed in I.A.No. 7 of 2020 in

O.S.No. 9 of 2020 on the file of the Court of the learned XII

Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam.

 Heard Sri R.Siva Sai Swaroop, learned counsel for the

appellants, Smt. Naga Swetha Attili, learned counsel for the

1

st respondent and Sri Reddy Venkata Ramana, learned

counsel for respondent Nos.6 to 8 and perused the material

placed on record.

 A perusal of the record shows that the plaintiff – M/s.

Samishti Plot Owners Welfare Association, which is a

registered society, filed a suit against defendants 1 to 9

(appellants and respondents 2 to 8 herein) for declaration

and consequential relief of injunction. Along with the suit,

the plaintiff filed an Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.No. 7

of 2020 seeking grant of ad-interim injunction against the

defendants, their men and agents from interfering with the

possession and enjoyment of the members of the plaintiffsociety over petition schedule property. The trial Court, by

the impugned order dated 10.01.2020, granted ex parte adinterim injunction as prayed for in favour of the plaintiff. 

 CPK,J & DEV,J

 CMA_56_ 2020 2

 The learned counsel for the appellants – defendants 2

and 3 would contend that the suit schedule property which is

the subject matter of O.S.No. 9 of 2020 is part and parcel of

the suit schedule property in O.S.No. 146 of 2017 wherein

the appellants obtained an order of injunction against the

plaintiff, but the trial Court, without looking into this aspect,

passed ex parte order of ad-interim injunction which is under

challenge. He further urged that any order of stay or

injunction passed by the trial Court without considering

material particulars and the true fact suppressed by the

plaintiff is non-est in the eye of law.

 In all fairness, the impugned order passed by the trial

Court, is bereft of assignment of any cogent reasons and it is

no doubt true that the same is a non-speaking order. Having

regard to the fact that the trial Court, while passing the

impugned order, directed the suit to be listed on 10.02.2020

for hearing, and in view of the fact that the plaintiff

obtained ad-interim injunction suppressing the true facts,

the appellants should have taken recourse to file an

application before the trial Court seeking to vacate the

ad-interim injunction or set aside the same as per Order 39

Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 7 CPC, which is as under:- 

 CPK,J & DEV,J

 CMA_56_ 2020 3

“ORDER XXXIX: Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory

Orders:

Rule 4:- Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set

aside.

 Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set

aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied

with such order:

1

[Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit

supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or

misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction

was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall

vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it

is not necessary so to do in the interests of justice:

ORDER IX: Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Nonappearance

Rule 7. Procedure where defendant appears on day of

adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous nonappearance.

 Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit, ex

parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing appears and assigns

good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as

the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as

if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance.”

 In the light of the above provision of law, the

appellants are at liberty to make an application seeking to

vacate the order of ad-interim injunction or set aside the

same by raising necessary objections, in which event, the

trial Court shall consider and pass a detailed order assigning

reasons in accordance with law.

 With the above observation, the Civil Miscellaneous

Appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs.

 As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending,

shall stand disposed of as infructuous.

 __________________

 C. PRAVEEN KUMAR, J

04.03.2020

 _________________

 BATTU DEVANAND, J

bcj


Saturday, December 19, 2020

OR.39 Rule 1&2 CPCP - trial court can considered the evidence while assessing prima faice allegations as there is no wrong and further at the time of interim stage guniness of registered gift deed can not be decided and as such prima faice it shows that when the property is not in exclusive possession of plaintiff as per his documents, no interim injunction be granted against co owners .

“Whether the appellant – plaintiff is entitled for temporary injunction?” 

OR.39 Rule 1&2 CPCP - trial court can considered the evidence while assessing prima faice allegations as there is no wrong and further at the time of interim stage guniness of registered gift deed can not be decided and as such prima faice it shows that when the property is not in exclusive possession of plaintiff as per his documents, no interim injunction be granted against co owners . 

there is nothing wrong in trial Court looking into the evidence of P.W.1 and deciding the issue without reference to the documents, more particularly, Aadhar card, gas connection, correspondence from Margadarsi finance, renewal of driving licence etc., belonging to the appellant – plaintiff. Probably all these documents were marked only to show that the appellant - plaintiff was residing at the said place. Nonconsideration of these documents, in our view, may not go to the root of the matter, while deciding granting of injunction, in view of the evidence of P.W.1, who is the plaintiff himself. - His own evidence shows that his father is residing in the ground floor portion of the suit property and he also admits that his father gave a report against him in II Town Police Station, Tenali, alleging that the appellant – plaintiff is harassing him. From the above, prima facie, it appears that the plea taken that he is in possession of the property may not be correct. Apart from that it is also elicited in the crossexamination of P.W.1 that, in the first floor of the property, one tenant is residing and the tenant is paying rent to his sister through online banking. The evidence also shows that his sister 9 got mutated her name in municipal records in pursuance of Ex.A1 gift deed. Apart from that, she got mutated her name in electricity service records as well. Therefore, prima facie, the evidence of P.W.1 itself shows that he was not in possession of the property. Even as per recitals of gift deed – Ex.A1, the property stands in the name of the 1st respondent – 1st defendant and the possession of the suit schedule property was delivered to her by Vijaya Lakshmi.Such being the position, the question of granting temporary injunction against co-owners would not arise.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE KONGARA VIJAYA LAKSHMI

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.157 of 2020

Senithangappa Srinivasa Rao
Versus

Vemulapalli Roja Kishore

JUDGMENT : (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice C.Praveen Kumar)

1. Assailing the order dated 13.2.2020 passed in I.A.No.427

of 2017 in O.S.No.24 of 2017 on the file of the

XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tenali, the present

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C.

2. The facts, which lead to filing of the appeal, are as under :

 The appellant herein who is the plaintiff in the suit filed

the suit against respondents – defendants for cancellation of a

registered sale deed said to have been executed by one Vijaya

Lakshmi, who is the mother of both parties. According to the

appellant – plaintiff, his parents gave Rs.50,00,000/-, gold and

silver jewellery worth Rs.70,00,000/- on the occasion of

marriage of the 1st respondent – 1st defendant in the year 1993

towards Sthridhana. According to him, the said Vijaya Lakshmi,

who is also mother of the appellant, refused to give ‘A’ schedule

property to the 1st respondent – 1st defendant. It is stated that

the 1st respondent – 1st defendant and her daughter, who is a

Doctor, provided treatment to their mother at Guntur, as she fell

sick due to cancer. The daughter of the 1st respondent – 1st

defendant is said to have caused mental agony, physical

sufferance and mental loss to Vijaya Lakshmi. On account of

negligence, misconduct etc., she died on 2.3.2017. It is pleaded 

 2

that the 1st respondent – 1st defendant, her husband and

daughter kept quiet till their mother became unsound and

unable to acknowledge the worldly affairs and thereafter, got

executed the alleged gift deed in their favour on 22.2.2017.

Hence, he pleaded that, alleged gift deed is not valid, illegal and

unenforceable and accordingly, the same is liable to be

cancelled. It is further stated that, the appellant – plaintiff is

entitled to 1/3rd share in the plaint ‘A’ schedule property by way

of partition and that they are in possession and enjoyment of the

same. It is urged that the 1st respondent – 1st defendant and her

men are making every effort to dispossess the appellant –

plaintiff from the plaint schedule property and are making

efforts to alienate the said property to third parties. Under those

circumstances, he sought for a temporary injunction restraining

the 1st respondent – 1st defendant and her men from interfering

with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the rights of the

appellant – plaintiff in plaint ‘A’ schedule property.

3. The 2nd respondent – 2nd defendant remained ex parte,

while the 1st respondent – 1st defendant filed counter denying

the averments in the petition. It has been stated that the

1st respondent – 1st defendant took every care of her mother and

got her treated in best of the hospitals in Vijayawada and

Guntur. In fact, it is stated that, she also took her mother to

Hyderabad and got her treated in KIMS in the month of July,

2016 and an operation was performed by Dr.Jagadishwar Goud.

As the appellant – plaintiff was in U.S.A. at that time, he may 

 3

not be knowing these facts. It is also stated that, after the

operation, Dr.Jagadishwar Goud advised chemotherapy

treatment to Vijaya Lakshmi, who is the mother of the appellant

– plaintiff and respondents – defendants. After completing check

up, she was brought back to Guntur, where she took treatment

under the supervision of one Dr.Krishna Reddy at Manipal

Hospital, Vijayawada. The serious condition of the mother was

informed to the appellant – plaintiff and the 2nd respondent – 2nd

defendant over phone on 16.1.2017 itself, but, there was no

response. The averments in the counter also show that the suit

property was gifted to the 1st respondent – 1st defendant by

executing a registered gift deed and the allegation that the same

came to be registered when she was in unsound mind is

absolutely false and incorrect. Counter also denies the appellant

– plaintiff being in possession and enjoyment of the suit

property.

4. In support of the petition, Exs.A1 to A8 were marked, while

on behalf of respondents – defendants, Exs.B1 and B2 were

marked. After considering the rival submissions made and the

judgments cited, the trial Court dismissed the said I.A.

Challenging the same, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal

came to be filed.

5. Sri M.Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the appellant,

mainly submits that, the order under challenge is liable to be set

aside, for the reason that the trial Court did not refer to

documents filed by the appellant, which are placed as Exs.A1 to 

 4

A8. According to him, when the condition of Vijaya Lakshmi

was serious on 16.1.2017 itself, which is evident from the

counter, the question of she executing a registered gift deed on

22.2.2017 is highly improbable. Having regard to the above, he

pleads that, the order under challenge be set aside and the

matter be remanded for fresh consideration.

6. Sri N.Sriram Murthy, learned counsel for the

1st respondent – 1st defendant, would contend that, when suit

properties are in joint possession, as averred in the plaint and

as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the

appellant is not entitled for an equitable relief of temporary

injunction against co-owners. He would further submit that,

suit is of the year 2017 and as such the question of granting

injunction after three years would not arise, more so, when the

trial has commenced and the evidence of P.W.1 is complete. In

any event, he would plead that, the requirements for granting

temporary injunction, in a case of this nature, are not fulfilled.

He took us through the contents of the gift deed, evidence of

P.W.1 and the judgments in support of his plea to show that, the

order of the trial court requires no interference.

7. The point that arises for consideration is, “Whether the

appellant – plaintiff is entitled for temporary injunction?”

8. It is to be noted here that, suit is filed for cancellation of a

registered gift deed and also for partition. The fact that the

appellant and respondents are siblings is not in dispute. It is 

 5

also not in dispute that the said Vijaya Lakshmi died on

2.3.2017. The plea in substance of the appellant is, his mother

Vijaya Lakshmi never executed the gift deed, dated 22.2.2017, in

favour of the 1st respondent – 1st defendant, since her condition

was very serious as on 16.1.2017 itself, which fact was informed

to him over telephone and the same is evident from the counter.

9. But, it is to be noted that, though her condition was not

good in the month of January, 2017, she survived for 40 days

thereafter. The averments in the counter show that on

16.1.2017, the 1st respondent – 1st defendant, took her mother

to Dr.Janardhani and N.Srinivasa Rao, who after verifying the

scanning report found that her condition is very serious and to

avoid urinary problem, advised insertion of stunt. Hence, she

was taken to an Urologist by name Visweswara Rao, who

arranged a stunt and thereafter, she was taken to her house. By

this, prima facie, it does not mean that she was not in a position

to move at all on 16.1.2017. Therefore, at this stage, it may not

be proper for us to give any finding as to whether she was in a

position to execute registered gift deed on 22.2.2017. It is for the

civil court to decide the said issue at the time of trial. But, as

things stand today, there is a registered gift deed executed on

22.2.2017 in favour of the 1st respondent – 1st defendant.

10. It is no doubt true that, there is no specific reference with

regard to Exs.A2 to A8 in the order, but, there is a reference to

Ex.A1, which is C.C. of the registered gift deed, dated 22.2.2017.

But, since the trial has commenced and P.W.1 was examined, 

 6

the trial Court looked into the evidence of P.W.1 and decided the

I.A.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the

judgment of the Apex Court in ‘Seema Arshad Zaheer vs.

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai1’, where in the

Apex Court held as follows:

“Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or

perversely in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court

will interfere. Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary

injunction when there is "no material", or refusing to grant a

temporary injunction by ignoring the relevant documents

produced. When we refer to acting on "no material" (similar to

"no evidence"), we refer not only to cases where there is total

dearth of material, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable

of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, there was

"no material" to make out a prima facie case and therefore, the

High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in

interfering in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction

granted by the trial court.”

12. In the above judgment the term used is ‘no material’ for

exercise of its discretion for granting a temporary injunction.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also refers to cases, where there is

total dearth of material, but also to cases where there is no

relevant material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not

reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of discretion.

13. In the present case, the appellant relied upon eight

documents i.e., Exs.A.1 to A.8. Ex.A.1 is the certified copy of

registered gift deed dated 22.02.2017; Ex.A.2 is the certified

copy of gift deed dated 18.06.2010; Ex.A.3 is the certified copy of


1

 (2006) 5 SCC 282 

 7

cancellation of gift deed dated 16.03.2012; Ex.A.4 is the aadhar

card of plaintiff; Ex.A.5 is the gas connection obtained by the

plaintiff dated 28.04.2000; Ex.A.6 is the letter from Margadarsi

Finance Corporation to the plaintiff dated 12.09.2017; Ex.A.7 is

the driving licence of the plaintiff dated 18.10.1986 and Ex.A.8

is the renewal driving licence of the plaintiff dated 18.10.1986.

Exs.A.1 to A.3 are only copies of the gift deeds. Ex.A.4 is the

aadhar card of the plaintiff; Exs.A.7 and A.8 are the copies of

driving licences of the year 1986; Ex.A.5 is the gas connection is

of the year 2000 and Ex.A.6, is the letter of Margadarsi Finance

Corporation is of the year 2017. All these documents do not

prima facie establish possession of the petitioner with the

subject property. Even according to the plaint filed by the

appellant, the appellant is an NRI, working as a Software

Engineer in US for the last 16 years. He further averred that he

used to visit India in alternative years to take care of his

parents. As per the averments of the plaint, after admitting her

mother in KIMS Hospital, in March, 2016, got her treated and

then went back to USA. According to the plaint averments,

plaintiff came to India again on 02.03.2017 i.e., four days prior

to the death of his mother which was on 06.03.2017. In view of

the said averments in the plaint, the documents relied upon by

the plaintiff are not relevant material. Even if they are taken into

consideration, they are not supporting the case of the appellant

and hence, the judgment relied upon by the appellant does not

come to the rescue of the appellant. 

 8

14. We feel that there is nothing wrong in trial Court looking

into the evidence of P.W.1 and deciding the issue without

reference to the documents, more particularly, Aadhar card, gas

connection, correspondence from Margadarsi finance, renewal of

driving licence etc., belonging to the appellant – plaintiff.

Probably all these documents were marked only to show that the

appellant - plaintiff was residing at the said place. Nonconsideration of these documents, in our view, may not go to the

root of the matter, while deciding granting of injunction, in view

of the evidence of P.W.1, who is the plaintiff himself.

15. In paragraph 13 of the plaint it has been stated that, the

appellant – plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule

property along with his brother 2nd respondent –

2nd defendant, since the same is a family property. But, in the

evidence of P.W.1, it has been elicited that, in the month of

November, 2019, he came from U.S.A. He stayed in Gowtham

Lodge, Tenali. His own evidence shows that his father is

residing in the ground floor portion of the suit property and he

also admits that his father gave a report against him in II Town

Police Station, Tenali, alleging that the appellant – plaintiff is

harassing him. From the above, prima facie, it appears that the

plea taken that he is in possession of the property may not be

correct. Apart from that it is also elicited in the crossexamination of P.W.1 that, in the first floor of the property, one

tenant is residing and the tenant is paying rent to his sister

through online banking. The evidence also shows that his sister 

 9

got mutated her name in municipal records in pursuance of

Ex.A1 gift deed. Apart from that, she got mutated her name in

electricity service records as well. Therefore, prima facie, the

evidence of P.W.1 itself shows that he was not in possession of

the property. Even as per recitals of gift deed – Ex.A1, the

property stands in the name of the 1st respondent – 1st

defendant and the possession of the suit schedule property was

delivered to her by Vijaya Lakshmi.

16. Apart from all these things it is also to be noted that,

appellant – plaintiff also sought partition of the property and

allotment of share to him and other respondents – defendants.

As per the averments in the plaint, they are in the joint

possession of the property. Such being the position, the

question of granting temporary injunction against co-owners

would not arise.

17. The issue is no more res integra in view of the judgment of

this Court in Ranukanta Mullaiah v. Sircilla Rajamma and

Anr.2 wherein this Court held as under:

 “11. It is not in dispute that the father of the appellant and

father of the 1st respondent are the sons of Rajaram, and both of

them have succeeded to the entire suit schedule property, except

for one item, and almost an equivalent extent of property held by

the appellant herein. For all practical purposes, the appellant

wanted to exclude the succession of the respondents herein, to

the estate of late Durgaiah. For that, he has taken shelter under

the extension of the 1937 Act, to the Hyderabad State, and the

allegation that Durgaiah died before the said date. By its very

nature, a suit for injunction simplicitor does not permit of an


2

 2006 (6) ALD 113 

 10

adjudication of such important questions, involving the

determination of certain jurisdictional facts, interpretation of the

provisions and expression of view upon the operation of the

provisions also. Having regard to the relationship of the parties, a

presumption needs to be drawn that both of them are co-owners,

if not coparceners, vis-a-vis the suit schedule property, even

assuming that the plea of the 1st respondent as to prior partition

has not been proved. That being the case, the 1st respondent

answered the description of a co-owner, and there was no basis,

on which the relief of perpetual injunction could have been

granted in favour of the appellant.”

18. The Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Roop Chand

v. Indradevi and Ors. 3 held as under :

 “16. The result is that, the trial Court simply assumed merely on

the basis of the separate living of the co-sharers that there was a

family settlement between the parties, without any evidence. On

the other hand, the mortgage-deed on record clearly shows that

the house was never partitioned nor there was any family

settlement to give independent portions to the co-sharers for their

independent business and dealing with. Mere separate living did

not raise any presumption for family settlement. As earlier

pointed out, the mortgage-deed is admitted on record and para 8

of the mortgage-deed clearly demolishes the theory of any family

settlement. As such, it is established on record that the house

was never partitioned between the co-sharers. Also there was no

family settlement for independent dealing with the portions given

to the four brothers for living, and therefore, the suit for partition

was maintainable and decree for partition ought to have been

passed by the trial Court. The injunction granted by the trial

Court is also uncalled for in view of the fact that no injunction

could be granted in favour of one of the co-sharers against the

other, unless there was a finding that the share of one of the cosharers was either partitioned or made separate by family

arrangement. In this case, there is no proof for either partition or

family settlement, and therefore, no injunction could be granted

to any of the co-sharers against others.”


3

 AIR 1997 MP 200 

 11

19. In Jail Singh & Ors. v. Gurmej Singh 4 the Apex Court

held as under :

“7. The principles relating to the inter-se rights and liabilities of

co- sharers are as follows:

(l) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also

in every parcel of it.

(2) Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye

of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of

possession.

(3) A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire

joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the

possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all.

(4) The above rule admits of an exception when there is

ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the

presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the

ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not

only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the

other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and

denies, that of the other.

(5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the coowner who has been out of possession of the joint property

except in the event of ouster or abandonment.

(6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a

husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of

other co-owners.

(7) Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels

under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it

is not open to any body to disturb the arrangement without

the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition.

8. It is thus evident that when a co-sharer is in exclusive

possession of some portion of the joint holding he is in possession

thereof as a co-sharer and is entitled to continue in its possession

if it is not more than his share till the joint holding is partitioned.

Vendor cannot sell any property with better rights than himself.

As a necessary corollary when a co-sharer sells his share in the

joint holding or any portion thereof and puts the vendee into

possession of the land in his possession what he transfers is his


4

 2009 (1) SCJ 714 

 12

right as a co-sharer in the said land and the right to remain in its

exclusive possession till the joint holding is partitioned amongst

all co-sharers.”

20. In view of the judgments referred to above and having

regard to answers elicited in the evidence of P.W.1, and the

averments in the plaint, prima facie, this Court is of the opinion

that, the appellant – plaintiff is not in possession of the property,

and as there cannot be an injunction against co-owners,

the question of granting an injunction as sought for would not

arise.

21. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed.

Since the suit is of the year 2017, and as the examination of

P.W.1 is over, the trial Court may take steps for disposal of the

suit as early as possible, uninfluenced by the observations,

made if any, in the order. No order as to costs.

_______________________________

JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

________________________________________

JUSTICE KONGARA VIJAYA LAKSHMI

Date : 07.10.2020

skmr  

Suit for specific performance - interim injunction not to construct any building - IA dismissed - Held that in the event the appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondent have to execute a sale deed along with structers.

Suit for specific performance - interim injunction not to construct any building - IA dismissed - Held that in the event the appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondent have to execute a sale deed along with structers.

The case of the appellant / plaintiff is that late Kavuri Venkateswara Rao for the purpose of family needs offered to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20 lakhs and the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.12 lakhs as advance on the same day itself and the balance amount has to be paid on or before 05.07.2013. On 03.07.2013 the petitioner has paid an amount of Rs.6 lakhs, out of Rs.8 lakhs. Later, the father of defendants died on 17.03.2014. Subsequently, when the defendants are evading to receive the balance of sale consideration, the plaintiff filed the suit.

During pendency of the suit, I.A.No.146 of 2020 is filed seeking temporary injunction restraining the 1st respondent from demolishing any part of the plaint schedule building or raising any new construction in the schedule property pending disposal of the suit. The Court below after hearing both parties, dismissed the application on the ground that admittedly as on the date of filing of the petition substantial portion of the construction is completed

held that Even assuming that the entire construction is completed, it will not cause any loss or prejudice to the appellant. As rightly observed by the Court below that in the event the appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondents have to execute a sale deed along with the structures. Moreover, when the respondents have given an undertaking in the counter that they are not going to alienate the schedule property to any third parties and they have no intention to alienate the same, the apprehension of the appellant is absolutely baseless. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the well considered order passed by the Court below. 

AP HIGH COURT 

Thumati Venkata Suresh Babu
Versus
Kavuri Madhava Rao,

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.168 of 2020

ORDER:-

 Challenging the order dated 16.07.2020 passed in I.A.No.146

of 2020 in O.S.No.31 of 2018 on the file of the Court of X

Additional District & Special Sessions Judge, Krishna at

Machilipatnam, this appeal has been filed by the appellant /

plaintiff.

2. The appellant, who is the plaintiff has filed the suit in

O.S.No.31 of 2018 for specific performance of agreement of sale

dated 05.07.2011.

3. The case of the appellant / plaintiff is that late Kavuri

Venkateswara Rao for the purpose of family needs offered to sell

the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20 lakhs

and the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.12 lakhs as advance on the

same day itself and the balance amount has to be paid on or before

05.07.2013. On 03.07.2013 the petitioner has paid an amount of

Rs.6 lakhs, out of Rs.8 lakhs. Later, the father of defendants died

on 17.03.2014. Subsequently, when the defendants are evading to

receive the balance of sale consideration, the plaintiff filed the suit.

4. During pendency of the suit, I.A.No.146 of 2020 is filed

seeking temporary injunction restraining the 1st respondent from

demolishing any part of the plaint schedule building or raising any

new construction in the schedule property pending disposal of the

suit. The Court below after hearing both parties, dismissed the

application on the ground that admittedly as on the date of filing of

the petition substantial portion of the construction is completed, 

2

without expressing any merits of the rival parties in the suit,

considering the conduct of the petitioner in approaching the Court

almost five years from the date of endorsement and seven years

from the date of agreement of sale, there is no balance of

convenience in favour of the petitioner. The Court below has also

observed that if the 1st respondent continues to make construction,

in the event of succeeding in the suit, the petitioner is entitled for a

registered sale deed in respect of suit schedule property with

possession including any constructions which are made pending

disposal of the suit.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that if the

respondents are permitted to raise the construction, it would cause

irreparable loss to the appellant and there is every possibility of

alienating and creating third party interest. Further, it is stated

that the Court below has failed to appreciate that there is prima

facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the appellant.

6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent would submit that

the agreement of sale is of the year 2011 and in fact by the time of

filing the application substantial portion of the construction is

completed. He submit that it is specifically averred in the counter

filed in I.A. before the Court below that the respondents never

made any attempt to alienate the plaint schedule property pending

disposal of the suit and further they undertook that they will not

alienate the schedule property or enter into any agreement with

third parties in future till the disposal of the suit. Learned counsel

for the 1st respondent would submit that the construction is made

after obtaining necessary permission from the Municipality. 

3

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and

learned counsel for the 1st respondent, admittedly by the time the

application was filed, substantial portion of the construction was

completed. Even assuming that the entire construction is

completed, it will not cause any loss or prejudice to the appellant.

As rightly observed by the Court below that in the event the

appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondents have to execute a

sale deed along with the structures. Moreover, when the

respondents have given an undertaking in the counter that they

are not going to alienate the schedule property to any third parties

and they have no intention to alienate the same, the apprehension

of the appellant is absolutely baseless. Therefore, there are no

grounds to interfere with the well considered order passed by the

Court below.

8. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed.

No order as to costs.

 As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall

stand closed.

___________________________________

JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI


21st October, 2020

PVD


 

4

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.168 of 2020

21st October, 2020

PVD 

DADI SANTHAKUMARI Versus SATHVAHANA CO OP H B S LTD- SEC.5 OF LIMITATION ACT -The conduct of the petitioners clearly show that they have been moving from Court to Court and having failed at every stage or now moving this Court by way of an appeal with inordinate delay of 4622 days. In the circumstances, this Court must held that the petitioners are not made out a ground of “sufficient cause” to condone this extraordinary in filing the appeal.

The conduct of the petitioners clearly show that they have been moving from Court to Court and having failed at every stage or now moving this Court by way of an appeal with inordinate delay of 4622 days. In the circumstances, this Court must held that the petitioners are not made out a ground of “sufficient cause” to condone this extraordinary in filing the appeal. 

AP HIGHCOURT

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICER. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

I.A.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2019 & A.S.No.695 of 2019

DADI SANTHAKUMARI
Versus

SATHVAHANA CO OP H B S LTD

COMMON ORDER:

 The present appeal is filed by a third party to the

suit.

2. The facts which give rise to the present appeal and

applications are as follows:

3. The 1st respondent/plaintiff had entered into

agreements of sale dated 19.05.1986 with one Namburi Babu

Rao and his family members, who are arrayed as defendant

Nos.1 to 3 in the suit in relation to Ac.4.51 cents of land in

Sy.No.325/1 and 2 of Sathivanipalem, hamlet of Narava Village

of Pendurthi Mandal, Visakhapatnam District. The plaintiff had

also entered into another agreement of sale dated 19.05.1986 to

an extent of Ac.4.22 cents in Sy.No.325/3 of Sathivanipalem,

hamlet of Narava Village of Pendurthi Mandal, Visakhapatnam

District, where one Sri Namburi Venkata Ratnam and his family

members, who are arrayed as defendants 4 to 8 in the suit.

4. Thereafter, Kararnamas dated 13.07.1989 were

entered into between the parties to the suit in relation to the

aforesaid agreements of sale. After these agreements, a deed of

sale was executed by Sri Namburi Venkata Ratnam on

15.11.1989 to an extent of 6660 sq. yards in favour of the

plaintiff; sale deed dated 02.09.1989 was executed by Sri

Namburi Babu Rao in relation to 1800 sq. yards in favour of the 

 RRR,J

I.A.Nos.1, 2 & 3 of 2019 &

A.S.No.695 of 2019


2

plaintiff; and a sale deed dated 11.09.1989 to an extent of 3000

sq yards in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, it appears that

both branches of the family had executed a General Power of

Attorney dated 27.04.1992 in relation to Ac.8.72 cents of land

for development of the land, in favour of the representatives of

the plaintiff. As some disputes had arisen between the parties,

the plaintiff had filed O.S.No.1136 of 2005 in the Court of the I

Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam for specific

performance of the agreements of sale dated 13.07.1989.

5. This suit was decreed on 24.11.2006 by way of an ex

parte order. After the suit had been decreed E.P.No.34 of 2007

was filed by the plaintiff for execution of the judgment and

decree passed by the trial Court.

6. In a parallel development the appellants herein

claimed that Ac.12.33 cents of land in Sy.No.325/1, 2 and 3

were alienated to the appellants herein by way of deeds of sale

dated 29.11.1994, 21.12.1994, 22.12.1994 and 29.12.1994.

These deeds of sale are said to have been executed by the

General Power of Attorney holder of the defendants in the suit. It

is now the case of the appellants herein that in the course of the

proceedings in E.P.No.34 of 2007, the appellants became aware

of the ex parte order and the pendency of E.P.No.34 of 2007 and

had filed E.A.No.102 of 2014 under Section 47 C.P.C., praying

the Executing Court to declare that the judgment and decree

under execution is not executable and to close E.P.No.34 of

2007. This application was dismissed by the Executing Court on 

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3

01.08.2018. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein

had filed C.R.P.No.6858 of 2018, which came to be dismissed on

28.08.2019. Thereafter, the appellants herein filed a suit

bearing RG.R.No.3495 of 2019 for the relief of cancellation of the

decree and judgment passed by the learned I Additional Senior

Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam in O.S.No.1136 of 2005 dated

24.11.2006 and consequent permanent injunction.

7. The plaintiff in O.S.No.1136 of 2005 had filed

I.A.No.549 of 2019 under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., for rejection

of plaint. This I.A. was allowed by order dated 12.07.2019 by the

Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam and the plaint was

rejected. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants herein had filed

C.R.P.No.2782 of 2019. This C.R.P. was dismissed with liberty

to the petitioners to avail the remedy in accordance with law.

8. At this stage, the present appeal has been filed by

the appellants against the judgment and decree of the trail

Court dated 24.11.2006 in O.S.No.1136 of 2005.

9. I.A.No.1 of 2019 has been filed to condone the delay

of 4622 days in filing the above appeal; I.A.No.2 of 2019 has

been filed to grant leave to file the appeal; and I.A.No.3 of 2019

has been filed to grant stay of execution of the decree in

E.P.No.128 of 2019 in O.S.No.1136 of 2005 (E.P.No.34 of 2007)

on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam.

10. The plaintiff in O.S.No.1136 of 2005, who is arrayed

as respondent No.1 in the present appeal has come on record 

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and filed a counter affidavit and an additional counter affidavit

opposing all the three interlocutory applications.

11. The 1st Respondent herein submits that:

A. The suit schedule and other lands in Survey No. 325,

admeasuring Ac 21.06 cents, belonged to one Sri

Namburi Sitapathi Rao. After his demise, a suit of

Partition, bearing O.S. No. 83 of 1994, was filed on

account of the dispute between the two branches of his

family consisting of Sri Namburi Babu Rao and Sri

Namburi Venkataratnam on one hand ( the vendors of

both the Appellants and the 1st Respondent herein) and

the branch of Sri N.V.V.L. Narasimha Rao on the other

hand. A compromise was arrived at between the parties

and the suit was disposed off in terms of the said

compromise by order dated 5.8.1994, wherein the

vendors of the Appellant and the 1st Respondent herein

were allotted Ac.10.53 cents in Survey No. 325/1,2 and

3. As these vendors were not coming forward to complete

the sale transaction, the 1st Respondent herein had filed

the above suit for specific performance of the agreements

of sale which was decreed.

B. After the filing of E.P. No. 34 of 2007, the Appellant

herein approached the executing court , by way of E.A.

No. 102 of 2014, wherein the Appellants had stated that

they had knowledge of the proceedings from 2012 and

their application was dismissed by the executing court on

the basis of findings of fact that the GPA under which the

land is said to have been purchased by the Appellants

relates to some other land and the land in dispute was

shown as a boundary to the land mentioned in the GPA;

the compromise deed allotted only Ac.10.22 cents and the

Appellants could not have been sold Ac. 12.33 cents; the 

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1st Respondent herein is in possession of the suit

schedule property.

C. The Appellants had filed a suit bearing GR. No. 194 of

2019 suppressing the fact that CRP 6858 of 2018 filed

against the order of dismissal of E. A . 102 of 2014 was

pending. This Plaint was also rejected by the Trial

Court, by way of order dated 12.7.2019, holding that all

the questions raised in the suit were already adjudicated

in E.A.No. 102 of 2014. This order was challenged by way

of CRP No. 2782 of 2019 which was dismissed on the

ground that an appeal would lie against an order passed

under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

D. The 1st Respondent has been put in possession of the suit

schedule property by virtue of the Kararnamas in the

year 1989 itself.

E. In the Additional Counter the 1st Respondent contended

that the 4th Appellant is not a bonafide appellant and is

involved in may criminal cases and as such does not

require the indulgence of this Court.

 12. On the basis of these pleadings , the 1st Respondent

contended that the Appellants have been filing one litigation or

the other to ensure that the 1st Respondent is denied the fruits

of the decree and no grounds have been made out to condone

the delay of 4622 days on the ground of having pursued their

remedies before the wrong forum; there are no grounds to grant

leave and that grant of stay of proceedings in the execution

petition would put the members of the 1st Respondent society to

grave loss and suffering. 

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13. Sri S. Subba Reddy appearing for the appellants

submits that a perusal of the agreements of sale dated

19.05.1986 and kararnama dated 13.07.1989, which is the

basis for the claim of the 1st respondent, would go to show that

only the land in Sy.No.325/1 and 2 had been made the subject

matter of the agreements and as such the suit could not have

been filed in relation to the land in Sy.No.325/3 also. He further

submits that the trial Court without going into this aspect had

passed an ex parte judgment and decree directing sale of the

land in Sy.No.325/3 also. He also submits that the judgment

and decree would have to be satisfied on that short ground

alone and as such leave to file the appeal should be granted.

14. As far as the question of condonation of delay is

concerned, Sri S. Subba Reddy submits that the appellants

came to know of the judgment and decree and the pendency of

the execution petition only in the year 2014 and had been

pursuing their remedies at every stage, because of which, an

appeal had not been filed earlier and the present delay of 4622

days had arisen. He submits that the said delay is clearly

explained by the conduct of the various proceedings to defend

the rights of the appellants and in any event the application is

only filed by way of abundant caution and not because of any

delay on the part of the appellants.

15. Sri V.V. Satish appearing for the respondents

submits that all the issues raised in the present appeal have

already been raised in E.A.No.102 of 2014 and all the said 

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issues have already been decided against the appellants. Sri

V.V. Satish also contended that even though the application was

filed section 47 of CPC, the grounds raised in the application

and the findings given by the executing court would mean that

the application was treated as an application under Order XXI

Rule 97 of CPC and as such the appeal itself would be hit by

the principle of res judicata and relied upon the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan1. Sri

V.V. Satish pointed to paragraphs 15 to 17, 19, 21 and 31 to

submit that the said findings of the Executing Court would be

binding on the appellants herein and as such they cannot reagitate these issues in the present appeal.

16. In reply, Sri Subba Reddy submitted that E.A. 102

of 2014 was filed only under section 47 of CPC and an order

passed in an application under that provision of law has very

limited scope and would not amount to Res Judicata. He relied

upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balraj

Taneja’s case for this proposition.

17. Heard both parties. Before going into the merits of

the case, a preliminary objection raised by Sri V. V. Satish

would have to be dealt with. Sri V.V. Satish took the plea that

the threshold for filing appeal before the High court was

increased to Rs.10 lakhs by virtue of an amendment to the Civil

Courts Act and as this appeal has been filed after the said date,


1

 AIR 1999 SC 3381 

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the appeal which is valued at R.9,96,575/- would not be

maintainable before the high Court.

18. This objection would not be tenable in view of the

Judgment of a Larger Bench of the erstwhile High Court of

Andhra Pradesh in the case of Vallabhaneni Lakshmana

Swamy v. Valluru Basavaiah and others2 wherein it was held

that the forum for appeal available at the stage of the filing of

the suit would continue to be the appellant forum even if the

pecuniary jurisdiction is changed subsequently

I.A.No:- 1

19. The case of the petitioners is that they came to know

of the filing of O.S.No.1136 of 2005 and subsequent Judgment

and Decree dated 24.11.2006 in the year 2014. Thereafter, the

petitioners are said to have initiated proceedings in E.P.No.128

of 2019 by way of E.A.No.102 of 2014 filed under Section 47 of

CPC which was dismissed on 01.08.2018. Thereafter, appellant

filed C.R.P.No.6858 of 2018 which came to be dismissed on

28.08.2019. While, the matter was pending the petitioners also

filed a suit bearing No.RGR.No.3485 of 2019 for the relief of

cancellation of Decree and Judgment in O.S.No.1136 of 2005

which came to be rejected on 12.07.2019 on account of the

defendants herein filing I.A.No.549 of 2019 for rejection of

plaint. Thereafter, the petitioners filed C.R.P.No.2728 of 2019


2

 2004 (5) ALD 807 : 2004 (5) ALT 755 

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9

which also came to be dismissed to permit the petitioner to avail

the remedy in accordance with law.

 20. It is the case of the petitioner that in view of all

these proceedings it can be seen that the petitioners had been

diligently pursuing its remedy and trying to protect its right over

the property by approaching the Courts under the above

proceedings.

 21. Sri S.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the

petitioners herein relied upon the Judgments of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of O.P.Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh

(Dead) and others3, State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao &

others4, N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishna Murthy5 and Maniben

Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai6.

22. Sri S.Subba Reddy relies upon these Judgments for

the proposition that applications under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act have to be dealt with liberally and refusal to

condone the delay could lead to failure of justice.

 23. Sri V.V.Satish, learned counsel for the respondents

opposes the application to condone the delay on the ground that

the delay of 4,622 days cannot be condoned as the delay was

caused more on account of the refusal of the petitioners to

approach this Court by way of an appeal and the appellants

cannot now turn around to seek condonation of delay.


3

 AIR 1984 SC 1744

4

 AIR 2005 SC 2191 equivalent (2005) 3 SCC 752

5

 AIR 1998 SC 3222 equivalent (1998) 7 SCC 123

6

 AIR 2012 SC 1629 equivalent (2012) 5 SCC page 157 

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24. Sri V.V.Satish contended that the petitioners had

admitted in the affidavit filed in support of their application in

E.A.No.102 of 2014 that they were aware of the Judgment and

Decree dated 24.11.2006 in the year 2012 itself. However, the

said affidavit has not been placed before this Court. A perusal

of the facts set out in the order of the Executing Court in

E.A.No.102 of 2014 only states that public news paper was done

in May, 2012 by the respondent No.1 herein against the

petitioners and that one of the petitioner got issued a reply

stating that the petitioners are the owners of the property

covered by the schedule. This statement does not show that the

petitioners were aware of the decree under appeal in the year

2012 itself. Further, no such pleading is available either in the

counter-affidavit or in the additional counter-affidavit filed by

the respondents in this application. It would therefore have to

be taken that the respondents herein is not disputing the

contentions of the petitioners that the petitioners got knowledge

of the filing of the suit and the consequential decree in the year

2014.

CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT:-

 25. It is true that applications under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act ought to be dealt with liberally to ensure that

complete justice is done and such refusal does not lead to

multiplicity of proceedings. However, the Judgments cited by

Sri S.Subba Reddy may not be of any avail as these are

Judgments dealing with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the 

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11

present case, the justification or explanation given for delay is

the pendency of proceedings before various courts. In such

circumstances, the application should be treated as an

application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and cannot

be treated as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act. Sri V.V.Satish contends that since the application was

moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would have to be

dealt with in accordance with the parameters of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act and cannot be treated as an application under

Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

 26. I must reject this contention in as much as it is

settled law that an application will not be dealt with by the

Court on the basis of the provision under which the application

is said to have been filed. The Court would look into the

pleadings in the application and apply the correct provision of

law in accordance with the said pleadings. The Court is not

bound to consider an application filed only under the provision

of law mentioned in the said application.

27. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:

 14 Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in

court without jurisdiction;

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit

the time during which the plaintiff has been

prosecuting with due diligence another civil

proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of

appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be

excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same

matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a 

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12

court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other

cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any

application, the time during which the applicant has

been prosecuting with due diligence another civil

proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of

appeal or revision, against the same party for the

same relief shall be excluded, where such

proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court

which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a

like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of

Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply

in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission

granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order

where such permission is granted on the ground

that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in

the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like

nature. Explanation. For the purposes of this

section,

(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil

proceeding was pending, the day on which that

proceeding was instituted and the day on which it

ended shall both be counted;

(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal

shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;

(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall

be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect

of jurisdiction.

28. In the present case, the application under Section

47 of C.P.C. was disposed of on merits. The C.R.P.No.6858 of 

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13

2018 filed against the said order was disposed of with the

following observations:

a) In the course of hearing, having regard to the

nature of contentions put-forth by the petitioners

when it is open for the petitioners to raise all such

objections, if they are so advised, in terms of Order

XXI Rules 97 and 99 C.P.C. in the Executing Court

and when the same is brought to the notice of

learned counsel for the petitioners by this Court,

learned counsel for the petitioners sought leave to

withdraw the revision petition, to pursue their

remedies in the Execution Petition in terms thereof.

b) Learned counsel for the DHR wanted a rider to

be attached in this process that it shall be subject to

the question as to limitation.

c) In view of what is stated above, the learned

counsel for the petitioners is permitted to withdraw

this civil revision petition and leave is granted to the

revision petitioners to pursue their remedies in terms

of Order XXI Rules 97 and 99 C.P.C., in the

Executing Court shall be subject to any legal and

tenable objections of DHR and JDRs. There shall be

no order as to costs.

 29. Thereupon, the petitioner had filed RGR.No.3485 of

2019 which was rejected by an order dated 12.07.2019 on the

ground that the cause of action in the suit is the same as the

cause of action which has already been decided in E.A.No.102 of

2014 and a second round of litigation is not maintainable. The

Civil Revision Petition No.2782 of 2019 filed by the petitioners

herein was dismissed with liberty to petitioners to avail remedy 

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14

in accordance with law as rejection of plaint can be challenged

only by way of an appeal.

 30. E.A.No.102 of 2014 was decided on merits and not

rejected on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of

a light nature. The C.R.P.No.6858 of 2018 filed against the said

order also disposed off in view of the nature of contentions put

forth by the petitioners and was withdrawn with leave to seek an

appropriate remedy. Thereafter, R.G.R.No.3485 of 2019 was

filed and the same was rejected on the ground that the cause of

action in the suit and the cause of action in E.A.No.102 of 2014

are same. This proceeding also not disposed of on the ground

that there is inherent defect off jurisdiction or other cause of a

light nature. The petitioners instead of filing an appeal against

the rejection of plaint had filed a C.R.P.No.2782 of 2019 which

was dismissed on the ground that the remedy was by way of

appeal and not a revision.

 31. In these circumstances, the petitioners have not

been able to demonstrate that they would come within the

exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without

jurisdiction.

 Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as follows.

Extension of prescribed period in certain cases - Any appeal

or any application, other than an application under any of

the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed

period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court

that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or

making the application within such period. Explanation - The 

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15

fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any

order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining

or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause

within the meaning of this section.

 32. As held above, this is not a case which falls within

the ambit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Even if, Section 5

of the Limitation Act is applicable to the facts of the case, the

applicant has not satisfied the requirement of “sufficient cause”

for not preferring this appeal. The conduct of the petitioners

clearly show that they have been moving from Court to Court

and having failed at every stage or now moving this Court by

way of an appeal with inordinate delay of 4622 days. In the

circumstances, this Court must held that the petitioners are not

made out a ground of “sufficient cause” to condone this

extraordinary in filing the appeal.

 33. As the delay in filing the appeal is not being

condoned. I am not going into the question of whether leave

should be granted or not.

 34. Consequently, I.A.Nos.2 and 3 would also stand fail

and dismissed, A.S.No.695 of 2019 also stand dismissed.

 As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any,

shall stand closed.

____________________________

R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.

 _____-11-2020.

JS/SDP. 

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16

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2019 in A.S.No.695 of 2019

___-11-2020

sdp.