insisting all the petitioners to sell only Bisleri water bottles and that too from the distributor of Bisleri company only as being illegal, arbitrary, malafide and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, these writ petitions came to be filed.= Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion Under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said made of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.- Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. - Matters relating to economic issues, have always an element of trial and error, so long as a trial and error are bona fide and with best intentions, such decisions cannot be questioned as arbitrary, capricious or illegal. - In view of the express clauses in the tender notifications and the deeds of licenses, specifying the respective businesses to be carried on by the licensees, the contention that the tender notification did not mention that the Corporation would not permit every stall owner to sell the water bottles, as such, there cannot be any restriction, does not have any merit.- writ petitions are dismissed. However, having regard to the nature of controversy, one months time is granted to the licensees of the shops, other than the licensees authorised to sell the water bottles, to clear the stock of the water bottles. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI      

W.P.Nos.4603 of 2017 and batch

06-04-2017

D.Jahed Basha & others ...Petitioners

The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation  and another. ...Respondents


Counsel for Petitioners: Sri C.Ramchander Raju

Counsel for Respondents: Sri G.Vidyasagar, learned Senior Counsel
                                                for Sri A.Ravibabu
                                               Sri N.Vasudeva Reddy
<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred
  (2006) 8 SCC 399
  (2006) 8 SCC 381
  (1997) 7 SCC 592
  (2007) 13 SCC 154
  (2015) 7 SCC 728
  (2013) 7 SCC 1
  2006 (6) ALD 309 (DB)

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI      

WRIT PETITION Nos.4603, 6832, 6861, 6876, 6897, 7453,  
7495 and 9069 of 2017

COMMONN ORDER:      

        Since the cause of action which prompted the petitioners in all these
writ petitions is the same and as the issues raised in these writ petitions are
also the same, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of these writ
petitions by way of this common order.
2.      Petitioners herein are running stalls in various bus stations falling
under the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called
the Corporation ) by obtaining licenses individually from the Corporation on
payment of license fee.  According to the petitioners, they are selling branded
water bottles of various recognised and reputed water bottle companies i.e.,
Kinley, Aquafina, Bisleri, Tataplus etc., at the M.R.P rates for the last so
many
yeas and ever since the commencement of the license period of their
respective stalls.   It is also the case of the petitioners herein that the
previous licensees were also selling branded water bottles of reputed
companies irrespective of the nature of their business.  It is also pleaded that
the same has been the well recognized practice in the erstwhile A.P.S.R.T.C
and the present T.S.R.T.C for the last so many years, permitting the licensees
of all the stalls in the bus stations to sell water bottles of all the
recognized
and reputed companies.
3.      It is the further case of the petitioners herein that the Corporation
entered into unholy business deal with Bisleri Company for unlawful
enrichment of its higher officials at the  cost of the licensees of all the
stalls
by giving monopoly rights to Bisleri company to do their business in all bus
stations of the Corporation by debarring the water bottles of all other
recognized and reputed companies in all the stalls of the bus stations within
the jurisdiction of the Corporation  and by compelling all the licensees of all
the stalls to purchase the Bisleri water bottles from the nominated distributor
of the Bisleri company at a very higher rate than that of the market rate of
Bisleri company and to sell only the Bisleri water bottles at a very lesser
margin of profit.
4.      It is further pleaded that in furtherance of the said unholy agreement
with Bisleri company, the Corporation issued a Circular bearing No.50 of
2016, dated 09.12.2016, compelling all the licensees of all the stalls,
irrespective of their nature of business, in all the bus stations of the State
of
Telangana, to purchase the Bisleri water bottles from the nominated
distributor of Bisleri company at higher rate than that of market rate and to
sell only the Bisleri water bottles.  It is also stated that the petitioners
herein
made representations to the respondents, but the same yielded no result.
5.      In the above background, assailing the action of the respondents in
insisting all the petitioners to sell only Bisleri water bottles and that too
from
the distributor of Bisleri company only as being illegal, arbitrary, malafide
and 
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, these writ
petitions
came to be filed.
6.        A counter affidavit deposed by the Law Officer of the Corporation, is
filed on behalf of the respondents, denying the allegations and averments
made in the writ affidavit and in the direction of justifying the impugned
action.  A reply is also filed by the writ petitioners.  Learned counsel for the
petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation
have filed their written arguments.
7.      Heard Sri C.Ramchander Raju, learned counsel for the petitioners and
Sri G.Vidyasagar, learned Senior Counsel for Sri A.Ravibabu and
Sri N.Vasudeva Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation apart
from perusing the material available before the Court.
8.      Submissions/contentions of Sri C.Ramchander Raju, learned counsel
for the petitioenrs:
8.1.    The impugned action is highly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable
and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India,
malafide and in the direction of creating monopoly to the Bisleri
Company.
8.2.    Directing the petitioners to purchase only from the Distributor of
Bisleri Company and to sell the same is untenable and unsustainable
and cannot stand for judicial scrutiny.
8.3.    Having allowed all the licensees of the stalls to sell water bottles
all these years, irrespective of their business as per the individual
licenses, it is absolutely not open for the respondent Corporation to
impose fetters on the business activities of the petitioners and the
action of the respondents in the said direction is contrary to the
Doctrine of Legitimate expectation.
8.4.    The previous licensees of the stalls were also selling the
branded water bottles of the reputed companies irrespective of their
nature of business and having allowed so, earlier, there is no
justification for the respondents to restrain the present licensees from
doing so and the said action is discriminatory and the impugned action
is also prejudicial to the public interest.
8.5.    There has never been any insistence by the respondent
Corporation to pay additional amount of license fee in terms of Circular
dated 24.09.2013 for selling the water bottles as the practise of
permitting all the licensees to sell the water bottles is a long standing
and recognized practise.
8.6.    In the tender notification, responding to which the petitioners
submitted the tenders, the respondent Corporation did not mention
that the Corporation would not permit every stall owner to sell the
water bottles.
8.7.    It is within the knowledge of the Corporation that the
Corporation would not get huge amounts of license fee unless
permission is accorded to every licensee to sell water bottles and that
the substantial part of business of every stall relates to sale of water
bottles only and the licensees cannot survive without selling the water
bottles.
8.8.    The petitioners would not have offered huge amount of license
fee, but for the recognized practise of the respondent Corporation
permitting all the licensees to sell the water bottles irrespective of the
nature of business covered by the licenses.
8.9.    The respondent Corporation never treated the water bottles as
unauthorised item and despite the clause in the agreement that the
licensees have to run their business in accordance with the
specifications in the tender notification, the same was never acted
upon by the Corporation authorities and the said clause cannot be
acted upon which was given go-bye by the authorities of the
respondent Corporation.
8.10.   By the impugned action, the consumers would be compelled to
purchase the water bottles @ Rs.18/- per bottle i.e., more than the
market price.  The contention as regards the prevalence of the practise
of permitting all the licensees to sell the water bottles for a
considerable time is not denied by the respondents, as such, the same
is deemed to have been admitted under the provisions of Order VIII
Rules 3 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
8.11.   Petitioners herein are not praying for enforcement of any
contractual obligation, as such, the relief sought would not fall within
the realm of contract, as such, the contention touching the
non-maintainability of the writ petitions advanced on behalf of the
respondent Corporation cannot be sustained.
8.12.   The claim of the petitioners is saved by the Doctrine of
Legitimate Expectation created by the Corporation in the minds of the
petitioners basing on the established long standing practice in the
Corporation.
8.13.   There is a threat of more number of bottles being sold on one
invoice if the impugned action is permitted and the same would be
prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation.
        To bolster his submissions and contentions, learned counsel for
the petitioners places reliance on the judgments of the Honble Apex
Court in CONFEDERATION OF EX-SERVICEMEN ASSOCIATIONS            
AND ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS. , RAM      
PRAVESH SINGH AND ORS. VS. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. ,          
M.P. OIL EXTRACTION AND ANR. VS. STATE OF M.P. AND        
ORS. ,  POONAM VERMA AND ORS. VS. DELHI DEVELOPMENT              
AUTHORITY .
9.      Submissions/contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/Corporation:
9.1.    There is no illegality nor there is any infirmity in the questioned
action and in the absence of the same the action impugned is not
amenable for any judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
9.2.    Since the cause of action arises out of a contract, writ petitions
are not maintainable and various issues raised in the writ petitions
cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9.3.    The petitioners herein are required to run their respective
businesses by selling the items specified in the tender notification and
the agreements strictly and only the petitioners 4 and 17 in
W.P.No.4603 of 2017 are authorised to sell water bottles, but not
other petitioners.
9.4.    In view of several complaints received from the passengers
regarding the quality of water and as regards charging of higher rates,
the Corporation decided to enter into business partnership with a
reputed firm and in the said direction the Corporation invited open
tenders and Bisleri Firm emerged as successful bidder with BIS and
FSSAI certification and the Corporation entered into partnership
agreement with Bisleri on 07.12.2016.
9.5.    In furtherance of the said agreement with Bisleri Company, the
Corporation issued Circular No.50/2016-OPD(C), dated 09.12.2016. 
9.6.    Based on the representations, the Corporation issued further
instructions on 23.12.2016, keeping it open for the licensees of water
bottles to continue to sell water bottles of reputed brands with BIS
and FSSAI certification in addition to Bisleri bottles with the
Corporation logo and also the licensees of water bottles along with
other products.
9.7.    The issue in these writ petitions is purely a private obligation
and no public interest is involved nor the same involves any statutory
obligation and there is no prohibition of entering into contract with
Bisleri Company under any law.
        In support of their case, the learned Advocates for the
respondents relied on the judgments of the Honble Apex Court in
JOSHI TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. UNION OF          
INDIA (UOI) AND ORS. , ARUN KUMAR AGRAWAL VS. UNION          
OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS. , B. MURALIDHAR REDDY AND        
ORS. VS. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. AND ORS.  and the order dated        
21.12.2016 in W.P.No.39117 of 2016 as confirmed in W.A.No.1495 OF  
2016
10.     In the above backdrop, now the issues that emerge for consideration
of this Court are:
1.      Whether the petitioners are entitled for any relief from this
Court?
2.      Whether the petitioners have made out any case, warranting
interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India?
11.     According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, there had been
practice of permitting all the licensees, notwithstanding the business covered
by their respective licenses, to sell drinking water also and sudden action of
curtailing the petitioners violates the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and
is an attempt to favour Bisleri company which would be prejudicial to
Corporation and the public interest also.  It is also the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the said involvement of
public interest, the present writ petitions are maintainable.
12.     On the other hand, it is the case of the Corporation, as advocated by
the learned Senior counsel Sri G.Vidyasagar and the learned advocates on
record for the respondent Corporation that there is no public interest in the
cases on hand and as such the writ petitions are not maintainable and that in
view of the express clause in the tender notifications  and license deeds
which have been agreed to mutually, the petitioners herein cannot claim
benefit under the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation.
13.     The validity and the legal sustainability of the above contentions are
required to be verified and examined in the light of the material available on
record and the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and
the learned Advocates for the respondent Corporation.
14.     The respondent Corporation issued tender notifications, indicating the
description of the items to be sold/service offered and the particulars of
which are as infra:


DESCRIPTIO  
N OF ITEMS
TO BE SOLD  
/ SERVICES
OFFERED.  
SL.
NO.
NATURE OF BUSINESS    
DETAILS OF ITEMS TO  
BE SOLD/SERVICES    
OFFERED.  
01
FAST FOOD CENTER    
Idli, Vada,Upma,
Chapathi, Dosa,
Vegetable biryani, Curd
rice, Mysore Bajji,
Tomoto Bath, Poori,
Pakoda, Dhahi Vada,
Utappa, Tea, Coffee,
Milk, Butter Milk,
Bournvita, Boost,
Maltova & Horlicks.
02
TOYS & LEATHER GOODS      
All kinds of Toys items &
all kinds of leather goods
03
WATER KIOSKS     
Water shall be produced 
from the firms
authorized by BIS to sell
in the stall, sealed
sachets of 100 ML Rs.1/-
, 200 ML Rs.2/-, Filling
of safe drinking water
Rs.3/-, in one liter
bottle, Supply of safe
drinking water Rs.5/-,
along with one liter
bottle (BIS certificate
shall be exhibited in
conspious place).
04
BAKERY STALL  
Bakery : Biscuits, bread,
chips, cakes, Jam,
readymade packed food
items & chocolates.
05
COOL DRINK, ICE  
CREAMS & SWAGRUHA      
FOODS  
Cool Drinks : Already
manufactured and
stored Drinks in
bottles/packs (company
Drinks) such as Limca,
Thumsup, Gold spot,
Pepsi, Coco-Cola,
Maaza,Frooti etc., All
kinds of Swagruha foods.
06
GENERAL STORES &    
FRUIT & FRUIT JUICE  
All kinds of general
stores items & All
kinds of Fruits &
Fruit Juice.
07
WATCHES & CELL    
PHONES  
All kinds of Watches
sales & services and all
kinds of cell phones
sales & services.
08
FRUITS & FRUIT JUICE  
All kinds of Fruits &
Fruit Juice.
09
TEA, COFFEE & SNACKS    
Tea, coffee and any fried
packed eatables which
do not required heating
or warming for sale. They
should be packed in
polythene wrappers or
packets in ready to eat
condition and should not
be loosely stocked in
open type vessels or tins.
The Licensee shall not be
permitted to have a
stove/ heating point in
the stall for preparation
of food items.
10
MEDICAL DISPENSARY,    
PHARMACY &    
DIAGNOSTICS.  
All kinds of Allopathy
prescribed by Medical
counsel of India
medicines and all kinds
of Medical tests
11
CHAPPAL & PLASTICS    
GOODS  
All types of Foot Wear
like Chappals, Sandals,
Shoes and all kinds of
plastic goods.
12
HOMEO DISPENSARY &      
HOMEO PHARMACY      
All kind of Homeo
medicines provided with
medical consultancy.
13
MOBILE SALES &  
SERVICES  
All kinds of mobiles sales
and Services.
14
CLOAK ROOM    
Keeping of luggage of
passengers : a) Brief
cases, Suit cases,
Leather bags & Country
type boxes(Iron), Subject
to ensuring that they are
closed and locked. b) The
licensee should not
collect for each Item as
follows:
For 3 Hrs : Rs.5/-
6 Hrs : Rs.10/-
12 Hrs : Rs.15/-
24 Hrs : Rs.20/-
Above 24 hrs Rs.5/- per
each 3 hours and part
of.
c). The licensee should
not collect more than the
above mentioned rates.
15
Fruits & Fruit Juice &
Chat Bandar
Having a Computer with
internet connection,
Photo Copying, Fax
Machine, DTP & Photo
Studio Equipment.
16
Sweet Stall
All kind of Sweet and
Savoury items.
17
Leather Goods
All kind of leather items.
18
Stationery & General
Stores
All kinds of Stationery
and General items.
19
Chappal & plastic Goods
All kinds of Chappal and
all kinds of plastic goods
20
Fancy & Toys
Plastic/Rubber goods,
Bags, ladies small
mirrors, Decorative
papers items, Photo
frames, Bangles, Trays,
Toys,Cosmetic items,
Detergents, shaving
creams/lotions, combs,
tooth pastes/brushes,
flasks, roll gold items,
photo albums and
shampoos & all kind of
toys.
21
Ice-cream, Dairy Parlour &
Coffee, Soda Shoppe
All kinds of ice creams,
Dairy products and
Coffee and Soda is sealed
ottles, manufactured by
reputed companies like
Bislery, Kinley etc and
local prepared sodas by
health authorities and
purified water.
22
Pharmacy
All kinds of Allopathic
Medicines, prescribed by
Medical Counsel of India.
23
Departmental Stores
1 Snacks, 2 cool Drinks,
3 General  All kinds of
Stationery goods,
General goods, 4 Bakery,
5 Books stall, 6 plastic
goods, 7 Travelling goods
and readymade
garments, 8 Cassette
centre, 9 pan shop, 10
popcorn, 11 Flower stall,
12 Fruit stall, 16 cosmos
tic and bangles, 17
Fancy stores, 18. foot
wear, (Note:- the licensee
should not sale items
other than the above
mentioned items).
24
Drinking Water
Water shall be procured
from the firms
authorized by BIS to sell
in the Stall. Sealed
sachets of 100 ml,
200ml. Filling of safe
drinking water Rs. 3/- in
one liter bottle, supply of
safe drinking water Rs.
5/- along with one liter
bottle (BIS certificate
shall be exhibited in
conspicuous place) 
25
Pan & book stall
All kinds of Pans & all
kinds of books,
Magazines, etc.,.
26
Flower & Coconut
All kinds of Flowers &
Kobbari bondams.
27
Canteen (For B Class Bus
Station Only)

a. Meals  Full Meals
Plate Meals.
b. Tiffin Items  Idli,
Vada, Upma, Chapati,
Dosa, Vegetable Biryani,
Curd Rice, Lemon Rice,
Mysore Bajji, Tomato
Bath, Poori, Pakoda,
Dahi Vada and Utappa.
c. Tea, Coffee, Milk,
Butter Milk, Bournvita,
Boost, Maltova and
Horlicks.

Note: The Tenderer shall
be member of Andhra
Pradesh Hotel
Association (APHA). If
the tenderer is not a
member of the APHA  
his/her tender shall be
treated as invalid duly
refunding the EMD
amount paid by
him/her. The Tenderer
shall furnish the proof of
membership of APHA  
along with the Tender
Form.
28
Two Wheeler Parking
The licensee shall permit
scooter/motor cycle and
two wheelers only. The
licensee shall not collect
more than the specified
rates for Scooter/Two
Wheeler/Cycle for
MGBS, CVL, PRG, TDR    
& SKP Bus Stations.
Scooter/Two Wheelers
Cycles
a) For 0 to 3
hrs..05/-
..02/-    
b) For 0 to 15
hrs..10/-
..05/-    
c) For 0 to 24
hrs..20/-
..10/-    

The licensee shall exhibit
the rates on a board
written in Telugu,
English and Urdu
languages at
conspicuous place. The
licensee shall necessarily
issue a cash bill for the
charges. Other B & C
class Bus Station, as per
the local market rates.
29
Stationery & Xerox
All kinds of Stationery
items and Xerox, DTP,
etc.,
30
Deluxe Lounge
Collection of user
charges:
1. Upto one hour
Rs.10/- per head.
2. Above one hr upto
three hrs. Rs.20/- per
head.
3. Above three hrs-for
every one hr. Rs.10/- per
head.



15.     It is not in dispute that all the petitioners herein entered into deeds of
licensees and the same were also signed by the petitioners and a
representative of the respondent Corporation.  Clause 1 of the same shows
the nature of business of the licensee and also mandates, in clear and
unequivocal terms, that the licensees will not be permitted to sell items other
than what is specified in annexure during the subsisting period of contract.
Clause 9 of the licenses which deals with Change of nature of business
obligates the licensees to do the same business which is mentioned in the
tender notification for which the license is granted and the said Clause further
clearly stipulates that if the licensee is found doing business in the
stall/shop
other than that stipulated in the deed of license and if the licensee sells
items
other than those specified in the agreement/tender schedule or as recorded
in the deed of license, the license is liable for termination duly forfeiting
the
security deposit.
16.     Condition No.19 (a) of the Deed of License stipulates that  if the
licensee is found selling unauthorised items not related to his stall or sell
the
items at more than MRP rate, licensor can levy the penalty up to a maximum
amount on each occasion in the following manner:
19. PENALTIES FOR SELLING UN-AUTHORISED ITEMS &          
CHARGING EXVESSIVE RATES:      
a.      If the licensee is found selling un-authorised items/items not
related to his stall or sell the items at more than MRP rates,
licensor can levy penalties upto a maximum amount on each
occasion as follow:

Sl
No.
TYPE OF BUS STATION    
AMOUNT OF PENALTY TO BE      
IMPOSED  
1/
Major and A Class
Rs.1,000/- on each occasion
MGBS/JBS/DSNR    
2.
B Class
Rs.500/- on each occasion
MNDL Bus Station
3.
C Class
Rs.200/- on each occasion
other Bus station


17.     Clause 20 deals with termination of license and as per Clause 20 (iv)
the license is liable for termination with 7 days advance notice if the licensee
performs business other than as specified in tender notification or as
recorded in the deed of license and Clause 20 (vii) attracts termination for
breach of terms and conditions of deed of license. Another clause which is
contextual to be noted is Clause 13 which says that the Corporation
(Licensor) shall have right to grant license to more than one licensee to do
same business which is already in existence in the same bus station/premises
and the licensee shall not raise any objection over this.
18.      Admittedly, in the present cases, the petitioners 4 and 17 in
W.P.No.4603 of 2017 are the licensees  to sell water bottles.  In the
impugned Circular dated 09.12.2016, the Corporation indicated the object
and intention behind the impugned action and the same is as follows:

 TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION              
No.C2/437(3)/2016-OPD(M&C)                                        Corporate office,
                                                                         OPD (M&C) Wing,
                                                                   Mushirabad, Hyd-624,
                                                      Date:08.12.16,
CIRCULAR No.50/2016-OPD. Dt.09.12.2016    
Sub:- Water Bottles:  Sale of Bottled Water (of M/s. Bisleri International
Pvt. Ltx.) with TSRTC logo at the stalls/Canteens in the Bus Stations of the
Corporation-Instructions issued  Reg.
----
Introduction:

Importance of Good Quality Water: 
Poor water quality is the leading cause of health problems.  It is estimated
that eighty percent of all illnesses in developing countries are caused by
polluted water and 2 million people die from these illnesses every year.
Pure water is an essential nutrient, the basis of fluids in all living
organisms, 
and a requirement to sustain life, Water needs to be clean and free of toxins
and microbes in order to prevent disease.

Most people who are interested in health pay attention to the quality of food
that goes into their body.  Our bodies are 70% water and that means that
good quality water is at least twice as important as food for helping our
bodies carry out their normal processes.

Importance of Bottled water:
Bottled water is intended for human consumption, one of the most important
and efficient uses of water.  Purified bottled water is not just tap water in a
bottle.  Once this water enters the bottled water plant, several processes are
employed to ensure that it meets the FDA purified water standard. These
treatments may include one or more of the following: reverse osmosis,
distillation, micro-filtration, carbon filtration, ozonisation and ultraviolet
(UV)
light.  The finished water product is then placed in a bottle under sanitary
conditions and sold to the consumer.

When we pay retail prices for bottled drinking water in liew of water from the
tap, we might think for sure that we are getting a clean, quality product that
will quench our thirst and keep our cells clean and hydrated.  After years of
increased soft drink consumption, growing preference for bottled water has
helped people fina a path back to water as a healthier beverage of choice.
Today people are drinking much more water than soft drinks and bottled
water is growing.

Therefore, with a view to abandon sale of spurious water bottles by
the licensees of Stalls in the Bus Stations and to provide clean and
safe drinking water to the commuters, it is decided to enforce sale
of branded bottled water in the Bus stations of TSRTC.  The
commitment to environmental excellence holds true wherever 
bottled water facilities are located.
Modus operandi:

1.      Corporation has called tenders and appointed M/s Bisleri
International Pvt. Ltd. (BIPL) as business partner to sell branded
bottled water with TSRTC Logo on each Bottle to the
commuters.

2.      BIPL will appoint Distributors/Vendors for establishing Water
Kiosks in the Bus Stations to sell Bisleri Water Bottles with
TSRTC Logo to the commuting passengers.  

3.      The Distributors/Vendors appointed by BIPL also distribute the
branded bottled water with TSRTC Logo to the licensees or
Stalls/Canteens in the Bus Stations.

4.      BIPL will pay a royalty  to the Corporation on the invoice
quantity raised/issued to the Distributors or vendors by BIPL as
mentioned in the MoU.

5.      Exclusive BIPL Wate Kiosks will be installed in the Bus stations
to:

a)      Sell BIPL bottled water to the customers and
b)      Supply bottled Water to the licensees of stalls/Canteens
in the bus stations.

6.      BIPL Distributors/Vendors and the licensees of Stalls/Canteens
will sell the branded bottled water the customers at MRP rates.
However, in case of chilled bottled water, Re.1 extra is
permitted.

Guidelines to Field Managers:

1.      (a) Regional Managers shall allot stall/open space at prominent place in
the Bus stations (initially at major, A&B Class bus stations) to BIPL at free
of cost for operating exclusive water kiosks and also a room at any
available place in the Bus stations for stocking the water bottles.  The
stall shall be branded as TSRTC Bisleri Water Stall.

(b)     Necessary electricity charges only shall be collected from BIPL
appointed Distributors/vendors.
( c)     Any licensee who is intended to sell water bottles in their
stalls/Canteens/fast Food centers has to procure the same from the
Distributor/vendor who runs an exclusive Water Kiosk of TSRTC Bisleri
Water stall at the bus stations.

2.      The Regional Managers shall stop Allotment of stalls/spaces at the Bus
Stations henceforth for the following businesses.
        Exclusive water kiosks
        Water & Combined business (water & cool drinks, Water &
Snacks, Water & Popcorn, Water & Fruits etc.)
3.      The existing Exclusive Water kiosks/Combined business with Water
business in the Bus stations shall be continued till the expiry of their
license period.  However, it shall be ensured that these licensees sell only
RTC logo Bisleri water bottles.  The existing R.O. water plants in the Bus
stations shall also be continued till expiry of their agreement period.

4.      Vide circular dt. 24.09.13, instructions were issued to permit the
licensees
of all the stalls (irrespective of existence of exclusive water stalls/kiosks
at the Bus stations and irrespective of the nature businesses) to sell
packaged drinking water bottles on payment of additional license fee.
In case of major, A and B Class Bus Stations, whereever permission has
been accorded for sale of water bottles (additionally) in the stalls on
payment of additional license fee, the licensees should be informed that
they should sell only the Bisleri Water Bottles with TSRTC Logo and if
they re reluctant for such proposal, they need not pay additional amount
and the permission to sell Water bottles has to be withdrawn.  The
licensees shall sell only the permitted items as per their original business
agreement and henceforth no permission shal be given for licensees of
other stalls to sell water bottles.

However, these licensees are at liberty to procure the branded bottled
water from the Distributor/vendors of BIPL.  Regional managers shall
strictly ensure that only Bisleri Water bottles with RTC logo are sold by
these licensees.

5.      No licensee in the Bus stations shall be permitted to sell the water
bottles
@ more than MRP rates.  However, in case of chilled water bottles,
Re.1/- extra (than the MRP) may be permitted.

6.      Regional Managers shall instruct the Divisional Managers/Depot Managers
to cross check periodically the BIPL operated Kiosks and the licensees in
the Bus stations to ensure that only BIPL Water bottles with RTC Logo on
it are sold in the Bus stations.
Since this is a novel concept, aimed at elimination of spurious
(unhygienic ) water bottles and facilitate supply of reputed branded
bottled water (Hygienic) to our Valuable Commuters, the Field
Managers shall extend necessary cooperation to the Distributor/vendor
of BIPL and also the Stall Licensees in the Bus stations for smooth
execution of the project w.e.f. 10.12.2016.
The above instructions shall be followed scrupulously without giving
scope for criticism.
MANAGING DIRECTOR    
To
All Regional Managers,
T.S.R.T.C.
Copy to All EDS of the Corporation.
Copy to: JD (V&S), All HODs (DVMs/Dy.CTMs & Dy.CAOs/AO).    
Copy to: All DVMs for infn. & necessary action
Copy to: All DMs, ATMs of Bus Stations for infn. & nec. action.

19.     Subsequently based on the representations of licensees, the
Corporation issued a Circular dated 23.12.2016, which reads as follows:
         TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION              
No.C2/437 (3)/2016-OPD(M&C)                          Bus Bhavan,
                                                        OPD (Mktg, Com& CP),  
                                                        Mushirabad, Hyderabad
                                                                  Date:
23.12.2016

To,
All Regional Manager,
T.S.R.T.C,
Sub:- Water bottles:  Sale of Bottled water (of M/s. Misleri
International Pvt. Ltd.) with TSRTC logo in the Bus Stations of
the Corporation  Issue of instructions- reg.
Ref: Circular No.50/2016-OPD (C), Dt.09.12.2016
---

                Vide the circular cited, instructions have been issued advising
the Regional Managers to ensure that the licensees sell only RTC logo
Bisleri Water bottles in the Bus Stations.  However, based on the
representation received from the licensees, the following clarifications
are issued:
1.      The licensees who were granted license through tenders, to operate
exclusive water kiosks can be allowed, till the expiry of their license
period, to continue to sell water bottles of reputed brands with BIS and
FSSAI certification in addition to Bisleri bottles with TSRTC logo.
2.      The licensees who were granted license through Tenders, to sell water
bottles along with other products such as cool drinks etc. Also can be
allowed till the expiry of their license period, to continue to sell water
bottles of reputed brands with BIS and FSSAI certification in addition
to Bisleri bottles with TSRTC logo.
3.      The Licenses who were granted license to sell products other than water
bottles through tenders, but subsequently, granted permission to sell
water bottles on payment of additional license fee, have to be informed
that they should sell only Bisleri bottles with TSRTC logo and if they are
reluctant for such proposal, they need not pay additional license fee and
the permission to sell water bottles will be withdrawn.  They can
continue to operate their stalls by selling the products for which they
have been authorised through Tenders initially.
After expiry of the existing licenses, the Regional Managers shall not call
tenders for allotting any space of stall for operating exclusive water
kiosks for selling water bottles in combination with other products.
            It is therefore advised to take further necessary action, on the
matter, accordingly.

                                                                S/d
                                                        MANAGIND DIRECTOR    
Copy to: All DVMs, DMs & Pos of the Regions for infn. & n/a.

20.     It is the case of the Corporation in their counter that they are receiving
complaints as regards quality of water  and charge of higher rates i.e., in
excess of MRP which prompted the Corporation to enter into partnership with
Bisleri. The learned counsel for the Corporation seeks to justify the said
action under Clause 13 of the deed of license, which states that the
Corporation shall have right to grant license to more than one licensee to do
the same business which is already in existence in the same bus
stations/premises and the licensee shall not raise any objection.  It is also
the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel, Sri G.Vidyasagar that the
petitioners herein are praying for the reliefs contrary to the agreements
entered into.  This Court finds sufficient force in the said submission of the
learned counsel for the respondent/Corporation.  Having entered into the
agreements, it is not open for the petitioners who are not the licensees of the
water bottles to seek the reliefs contrary to the agreed conditions.  In the
considered opinion of this Court, the affidavits filed by the petitioners 4 and
17 in W.P.No.4603/2017, expressing no-objection for others to sell water
bottles would not enure to the benefit of the other petitioners.
21.     Coming to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, in the case of CONFEDERATION OF EX-SERVICEMEN      
ASSOCIATIONS AND ORS. (supra 1), the Apex Court at paragraphs 33, 34    
and 35, held as follows:
33. We are also not impressed by the argument that all
medical benefits and facilities must be provided to ex-
servicemen under the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation'. The
doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is a 'latest recruit' to a long
list of concepts fashioned by Courts for review of administrative
actions. No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the
development of Administrative Law and particularly law relating
to 'judicial review'. Under the said doctrine, a person may have
reasonable or legitimate expectation of being treated in a
certain way by an administrative authority even though he has
no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a
decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely
affecting his interests, he may have justifiable grievance in the
light of the fact of continuous receipt of the benefit, legitimate
expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has
enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from
the express promise or from consistent practice which the
applicant may reasonably expect to continue.
34. The expression 'legitimate expectation' appears to have
been originated by Lord Denning, M.R. in the leading decision
of Schmidt v. Secretary of State (1969) 1 All ER 904 : (1969) 2
WLR 337 : (1969) 2 Ch D 149. In Attorney General of Hong
Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) 2 All ER 346 : (1983) 2 AC 629
Lord Fraser referring to Schmidt stated;
The expectations may be based on some statement or  
undertaking by, or on behalf of, the public authority
which has the duty of making the decision, if the
authority has, jhthrough its officers, acted in a way
that would make it unfair or inconsistent with good
administration for him to be denied such an inquiry.
(emphasis supplied)
35.     In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an
administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to
act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good
administration demands observance of reasonableness and
where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even
in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such
practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or
privilege exercised.
22.     In the case of RAM PRAVESH SINGH AND ORS. (supra 2),  the    
Honble Apex Court at paragraph 15, held thus:
14. What is legitimate expectation Obviously, it is not a legal
right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that
may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The
term 'established practice' refers to a regular, consistent
predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the
decision-making authority. The expectation should be
legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any
expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random
acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a
legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable
as such. It is a concept fashioned by courts, for judicial review
of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on
the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative
action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice
established. In short, a person can be said to have a 'legitimate
expectation' of a particular treatment, if any representation or
promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly,
or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority
gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a
ground for relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as
its slot is just above 'fairness in action' but far below
'promissory estoppel'. It may only entitle an expectant : (a) to
an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed;
or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In
appropriate cases, courts may grant a direction requiring the
Authority to follow the promised procedure or established
practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does
not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest,
change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or
bonafide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient
to negative the 'legitimate expectation'.  The doctrine of
legitimate expectation based on established practice (as
contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise),
can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or
transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such
established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a
recognized legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger
unconnected with the authority or a person who had no
previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered
into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot
invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the
ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly.
23.     In the case of M.P. OIL EXTRACTION AND ANR. (supra 3), the  
Honble Apex Court at paragraph 44, held as follows:
44. The renewal clause in the impugned agreements executed
in favour of the respondents does not also appear to be unjust
or improper. Whether protection by way of supply of sal seeds
under the terms of agreement requires to be continued for a
further period, is a matter for decision by the State Government
and unless such decision is patently arbitrary, interference by
the Court is not called for. In the facts of the case, the decision
of the State Government to extend the protection for further
period cannot be held to be per se irrational, arbitrary or
capricious warranting judicial review of such policy decis`1``
        ion. Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the
appellant's contention about the invalidity of the renewal
clause. The appellants failed in earlier attempts to challenge the
validity of the agreement including the renewal clause. The
subsequent challenge of the renewal clause, therefore, should
not be entertained unless it can be clearly demonstrated that
the fact situation has undergone such changes that the
discretion in the matter of renewal of agreement should not be
exercised by the State. It has been rightly contended by Dr.
Singhvi that the respondents legitimately expect that the
renewal clause should be given effect to in usual manner and
according to past practice unless there is any special reason not
to adhere to such practice. The doctrine of 'legitimate
expectation' has been judicially recognised by this Court in a
number of decisions. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation"
operates in the domain of public law and in appropriate case,
constitutes a substantive and enforceable right.
24.     In the case of POONAM VERMA AND ORS. (SUPRA 4),  the Honble      
Apex Court at paragraphs 31 and 32, held as follows:
31.    An endeavour has been made to invoke the principles of
Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. The doctrine
of Legitimate Expectation would apply only when a practice is
found to be prevailing. It has a positive concept. But, in a case
of this nature where purported expectation is based on an
illegal and unconstitutional order, the same is wholly
inapplicable, as the same cannot be founded on an order which
is per se illegal and without foundation.
32.     Strong reliance has also been placed on a decision of this
Court in Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.:
(2007)ILLJ202SC wherein a Bench of this Court opined:
15. What is legitimate expectation Obviously, it is not
a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or
remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or
established practice. The term 'established practice'
refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain
conduct, process or activity of the decision-making
authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that
is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which
is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or
which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a
legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not
enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the
courts, for judicial review of administrative action. It is
procedural in character based on the requirement of a
higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a
consequence of the promise made, or practice
established. In short, a person can be said to have a
"legitimate expectation" of a particular treatment, if
any representation or promise is made by an authority,
either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and
consistent past practice of the authority gives room for
such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for
relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its
slot is just above "fairness in action" but far below
"promissory estoppel". It may only entitle an
expectant: ( a ) to an opportunity to show cause
before the expectation is dashed; or ( b ) to an
explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate
cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the
authority to follow the promised procedure or
established practice. A legitimate expectation, even
when made out, does not always entitle the expectant
to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of
the expectant or any other valid or bona fide reason
given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to
negative the 'legitimate expectation'. The doctrine of
legitimate expectation based on established practice
(as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a
promise), can be invoked only by someone who has
dealings or transactions or negotiations with an
authority, on which such established practice has a
bearing, or by someone who has a recognised legal
relationship with the authority.
The said decision, thus, instead of assisting the appellants runs
counter to their contention.
25.     In the considered view of this Court, the principles laid down in the
above referred judgments rendered by the Honble Apex Court on the
principle of Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation would not render any
assistance to the petitioners in view of the express conditions of the written
agreements and the conditions in the tender notification.
26.     Coming to the judgments cited by the learned advocates for the
respondent Corporation,- in the case of JOSHI TECHNOLOGIES  
INTERNATIONAL INC. (supra 5), the Honble Apex Court at paragraphs 69
to 71, held as follows:
69. The position thus summarized in the aforesaid principles
has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded
which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there
is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even
in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of
fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,
discretion lies with the High Court which under certain
circumstances, can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under
the following circumstances, 'normally', the Court would not
exercise such a discretion:
69.1.  The Court may not examine the issue unless the action
has some public law character attached to it.
69.2.  Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is
provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to
exercise its discretion Under Article 226 of the Constitution and
relegate the party to the said made of settlement, particularly
when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the
means of arbitration.
69.3.  If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which
are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their
determination.
69.4.  Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual
obligations are normally not to be entertained except in
exceptional circumstances. 
70. Further legal position which emerges from various
judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects
relating to the contracts entered into by the State/public
Authority with private parties, can be summarized as under:
70.1.  At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts
purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations
of fairness.
70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual
field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practice some
discriminations.
70.3.  Even in cases where question is of choice or
consideration of competing claims before entering into the field
of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the
question of a violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts
are disputed and require assessment of evidence the
correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking
detailed evidence, Involving examination and cross-examination
of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily
decided in proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution. In
such cases court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to
alternate remedy of civil suit etc.
70.4.   Writ jurisdiction of High Court Under Article 226 was not
intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily
incurred.
70.5.  Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual
obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience
or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the
contract can provide no justification in not complying with the
terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open
eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the license
if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the
conditions under which he agreed to take the license, if he finds
it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business.
70.6.  Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of,
the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific
performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being
specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for
damages.
70.7.   Writ can be issued where there is executive action
unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is
denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if can
be shown that action of the public authorities was without
giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice
after holding that action could not have been taken without
observing principles of natural justice.
70.8. If the contract between private party and the
State/instrumentality and/or agency of State is under the realm
of a private law and there is no element of public law, the
normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the
remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than
approaching the High Court Under Article 226 of the
Constitutional of India and invoking its extraordinary
jurisdiction.
70.9. The distinction between public law and private law
element in the contract with State is getting blurred. However,
it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls
purely in private field of contract. This Court has maintained the
position that writ petition is not maintainable. Dichotomy
between public law and private law, rights and remedies would
depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction
between public law remedies and private law, field cannot be
demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be
examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations
between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on
the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the
activity or controversy involves public law element, then the
matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions
Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether
action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State
is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into
consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the
decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.
70.10.  Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen,
in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable
right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may
render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements
of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of
the principle of non-arbitrariness.
70.11.  The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling
within the domain of contractual obligations may be more
limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to
adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for
adjudication of purely contractual disputes.
71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after
considering the arguments of respective parties, we are of the
view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case
where the High Court should have exercised discretionary
jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution. First, the
matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where
any statutory contract is awarded.
27.     In the case of B. MURALIDHAR REDDY AND ORS. (supra 7), a    
Division Bench of this Court, at paragraphs 22 to 25, held as under:
22. The doctrine of legitimate expectation invoked by Sri
S. Ramachandra Rao and other learned Counsel is not available
to the petitioners for seeking a direction to allow them to
operate shops from the present premises because they had
given bids knowing fully well that Rule 27(1) has been amended
by G.O. Ms. No. 598 dated 26-5-2006. The opening note of
notification dated 26-5-2006 which was published in Hyderabad
District Gazette reads as under:
Andhra Pradesh Excise Lease of right of selling by
Shop and conditions of Licence Rules, 2005 (including
amendment) vide G.O. Ms. No. 598, Rev., (Ex.II)
Dept., dated 26-5-2006.
23. It is, thus, evident that each of the tenderer including the
petitioner had been made aware of the amendment carried out
in Rule 27(1) vide G.O. Ms. No. 598, dated 26-5-2006. All of
them gave bid keeping in view the fact that licence will be
granted in accordance with amended Rule 27(1), which
contains restriction of 100 meters on the location of shops and
from the places of public worship, educational institutions and
hospitals. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to contend
that they had legitimate expectation to get licence to operate
the shops as per the unamended Rule 27(1) and the
respondents should be directed not to insist on enforcing
compliance of amended Rule 27(1). The term of the licences
granted to the petitioners for the year 2005-06 was upto 30-6-
2006. Therefore, it is not possible to accept their plea that they
had made huge expenditure for establishing premises for
running the shop in anticipation of grant of licence for future
and the respondents are estopped from applying the distance
criteria contained in the amended Rule 27(1) to their cases.
24. In Union of India v. International Trading Co.'s case (supra)
the Supreme Court negatived the argument based on the
doctrine of legitimate expectation and observed:
Doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation cannot come in the way of public interest.
Indisputably, public interest has to prevail over private
interest. The case at hand shows that a conscious
policy decision has been taken and there is no
statutory compulsion to act contrary. In that context, it
cannot be said that the respondents have acquired any
right for renewal. The High Court was not justified in
observing that the policy decision was contrary to
statute and for that reason direction for consideration
of the application for renewal was necessary. Had the
High Court not recorded any finding on the merits of
respective stands, direction for consideration in
accordance with law would have been proper and
there would not have been any difficulty in accepting
the plea of the learned Counsel for the respondents.
But having practically foreclosed any consideration by
the findings recorded, consideration of the application
would have been a mere formality and grant of
renewal would have been the inevitable result, though
it may be against the policy decision. That renders the
High Court judgment indefensible.
25. In Kuldeep Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi (supra) the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Government of Delhi
to rescind the earlier excise policy and negatived the argument
based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation by recording the
following observations:
It is, however, difficult for us to accept the contention
of the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee that
the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" is attracted in
the instant case. Indisputably, the said doctrine is a
source of procedural or substantive right. See R. v.
North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte
Coughlan 2001 QB 213. But, however, the relevance of
application of the said doctrine is as to whether the
expectation was legitimate. Such legitimate
expectation was also required to be determined
keeping in view the larger public interest. Claimant's
perceptions would not be relevant therefor. The State
actions indisputably must be fair and reasonable. Non-
arbitrariness on its part is a significant facet in the field
of good governance. The discretion conferred upon the
State yet again cannot be exercised whimsically or
capriciously. But where a change in the policy decision
is valid in law, any action taken pursuant thereto or in
furtherance thereof, cannot be invalidated.
The State in its advertisement clearly stated:
The grant of L-52 licence shall be subject to the
acceptance of the application by the specified
competent authority who may accept or reject any
application without assigning any reason. The licensing
authority shall be under no obligation to grant any
licence for which application has been made.
In view of clear stipulation made in the advertisement
therefor, the appellants could not have had any
legitimate expectation that they would invariably be
granted a licence to deal in liquor. A date for grant of
licence, however, was put in the case of Surinder
Katiyal. The said date has been given evidently having
regard to the time-frame made in the advertisement. It
must have been done under a misconception. Such a
clear mistake on the part of the authorities would not
clothe them with any legal right. His application was
received on 10-12-2004. While acknowledging receipt
of the said application, it was stated that the licence
will be issued on 10-1-2005. The same, however,
would not mean that the contents of his application
were not required to be verified in the light of the
statutory requirements. Furthermore, he withdrew his
application so as to enable him to apply for another
vend. He filed such an application only on 8-2-2005
which was acknowledged, as noticed hereinbefore, by
the State in terms of its letter dated 6-5-2005. The
said letter dated 6-5-2005 did not contain any promise
that the licence would be granted by a particular date.
Even otherwise, it was impermissible for the
respondents to specify a date on which the licence
shall be granted keeping in view the fact that it was
required to process a large number of applications. It
is, thus, not a case where the doctrine of legitimate
expectation would be attracted.
28.     In the above judgments, the Honble Apex Court categorically held that
the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily
incurred.
In the instant cases also the parties have entered into agreements to sell only
the items indicated in the deeds of license, as such, they cannot maintain the
writ petitions to seek the relief for avoiding the same.
29.     In the case of  ARUN KUMAR AGRAWAL (supra 6),  the Honble    
Apex Court at paragraphs 41 and 42, held as under:
41. We notice that the ONGC and the Government of
India have considered various commercial and technical
aspects flowing from the PSC and also its advantages that
ONGC would derive if the Cairn and Vedanta deal was
approved. This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in
judgment over the commercial or business decision taken
by parties to the agreement, after evaluating and
Assessing its monetary and financial implications, unless
the decision is in clear violation of any statutory provisions
or perverse or for extraneous considerations or improper
motives. States and its instrumentalities can enter into
various contracts which may involve complex economical
factors. State or the State undertaking being a party to a
contract, have to make various decisions which they deem
just and proper. There is always an element of risk in such
decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be a correct
decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is taken bona
fide and in public interest, the mere fact that decision has
ultimately proved to be a wrong, that itself is not a ground
to hold that the decision was mala fide or done with
ulterior motives.
42. Matters relating to economic issues, have always an
element of trial and error, so long as a trial and error are
bona fide and with best intentions, such decisions cannot
be questioned as arbitrary, capricious or illegal. This Court
in State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and
Ors.: (1986) 4 SCC 566 referring to the judgment of
Frankfurter J. in Morey v. Dond 354 US 457 held that
"34.  we must not forget that in complex
economic matters every decision is necessarily
empiric and it is based on experimentation or
what one may call "trial and error method" and,
therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid
"a priori" considerations or on the application of
any straight jacket formula."

30.     In W.P.No.39117 of 2016, a learned Single Judge of this Court refused
to entertain the writ petition arising out of contractual obligation and the
said
judgment was confirmed by a Division bench of this Court in
W.A.No.1495/2016, dated 06.01.2017.  The contention advanced on behalf of
the petitioners that the petitioners are not seeking any relief in the writ
petitions for enforcement of contractual obligation, as such, the present writ
petitions are maintainable, in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be
sustained in view of the express clauses under the tender notification and the
deeds of licensees and since the cause for filing the writ petitions is
obviously
a cause arising out of a contractual obligation.  In view of the express clauses
in the tender notifications and the deeds of licenses, specifying the respective
businesses to be carried on by the licensees, the contention that the tender
notification did not mention that the Corporation would not permit every stall
owner to sell the water bottles, as such, there cannot be any restriction, does
not have any merit.
31.     For the aforesaid reasons, writ petitions are dismissed.  However,
having regard to the nature of controversy, one months time is granted to
the licensees of the shops, other than the licensees authorised to sell the
water bottles, to clear the stock of the water bottles. As a sequel,
miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as
to costs.
______________
A.V.SESHA SAI, J
Date: 06.04.2017

whether the petitioner had 7 years of standing at the Bar, as on 01-04-2012. = On the basis of the pursuit of L.L.M. in the Distance Education mode, it cannot be concluded that there was a break in the practice of the 5th respondent as a Lawyer. Hence, the writ petition is devoid of merits. Therefore, it is dismissed.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND THE HONBLE MS. JUSTICE J. UMADEVI                  

W.P.No.7705 of 2013

27-04-2017

Md. Sultana Basha. Petitioner


The State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Chief Secretary to Government, Secretariat, Hyderabad and 4 others. Respond

Counsel for petitioner  : Sri Vedula Venkataramana

Counsel for respondent  : Sri G. Vidyasagar

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
2012 (6) ALD 98


HONBLE SRI JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN          
AND
HONBLE MS. JUSTICE J. UMA DEVI    

Writ Petition No.7705 of 2013
ORDER: (V. Ramasubramanian, J)  

        The petitioner, who narrowly missed (or perhaps escaped) the
chance of getting selected for appointment to the post of District
Judge (Entry Level), has come up with the present writ petition
challenging the selection and appointment of the 5th respondent.
        2. Heard Mr. Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. G. Vidyasagar, learned senior counsel appearing for the 5th
respondent.
        3. The short ground on which the petitioner challenges the
selection of the 5th respondent is that to be eligible for selection to the
post of District Judge, a candidate should have had at least 7 years of
standing at the Bar. The notification for recruitment in this case was
issued on 15-04-2012 and 7 years of standing at the Bar was required
as on 01-04-2012. The 5th respondent was enrolled as an Advocate in
the Bar Council on 08-07-2004 and hence claimed to have completed 7
years of standing at the Bar as on 01-04-2012.
        4. But it appears that the 5th respondent studied L.L.M. during
the period 2004-2006 and thereafter registered himself for Ph.D. as an
Extra-mural candidate. As per the stipulations of the Standing
Committee of the Academic Senate dated 17-05-2006 of the Acharya  
Nagarjuna University, a person must have had 5 years of service
before he could be allowed to register for a Ph.D. Therefore, the short
contention of the petitioner is that a person, who did Post Graduate
Degree in Law from 2004-2006 and who registered himself for Ph.D. in
2008, could not have practiced as a Lawyer during this period and that
therefore this period cannot be counted for the purpose of reckoning 7
years of standing at the Bar.
        5. But in so far as the pursuit of L.L.M. course is concerned, it
appears that a Division Bench of this Court has already taken a view
in Tirumala Devi Eada v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others  that
the pursuit of Post Graduate qualification in Law, cannot stand in the
way so long as the candidate continued to be on the rolls of the Bar
Council.
        6. In any case, the petitioner claims to have studied a Post
Graduate Degree in Law under the Distance Education mode through
the Centre for Distance Education of the University. Therefore, unless
it is shown that without discontinuing practice a candidate cannot
undergo L.L.M. Course, the 5th respondent cannot be taken to be
disqualified.
        7. It is true that the 5th respondent does not appear to have
indicated in his application form the acquisition of his Post Graduate
Degree in Law. Therefore, it is claimed in the counter affidavit filed by
the Registry of this Court that if the 5th respondent had disclosed this
fact, his application would have been rejected. It is stated in
Paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the Registry that a
Committee of Judges of this Court constituted for the purpose of
recruitment process specifically resolved that the candidates, who
have pursued Post Graduation in Law after enrolment with the Bar
Council, will not be permitted to count the period spent in pursuing
Post Graduation, as part of the qualifying experience at the Bar.
        8. But on the basis of the counter affidavit of the Registry, we
cannot set aside the appointment of the 5th respondent. What is
reflected in Para-7 of the counter affidavit of the Registry, is a policy
decision. The application of the same to the facts of the present case
should be done only by the Registry. It may be open to the Registry,
on the basis of the disclosure made in the present proceedings, to
initiate action against the 5th respondent. But it is not possible to set
aside his appointment, without the High Court going into the issue on
the administrative side, on the basis of documents and after allowing
an opportunity of hearing to the 5th respondent.
        9. In so far as the pursuit of Ph.D. is concerned, the University
has filed a counter affidavit almost supporting the case of the 5th
respondent. The University has stated in Para-4 of the counter
affidavit that the 5th respondent completed Post Graduation in Law
through the Centre for Distance Education. In so far as Ph.D. is
concerned, the University has taken a stand that the 5th respondent
was admitted to the programme as an extra-mural candidate under the
category of practicing advocate having completed 2 years of practice.
The relevant portion of the counter affidavit of the University reads as
follows:
It is further submitted that under the research admission rules that
existed during the academic year 2007-2008, the 5th respondent was
given Ph.D. admission as an extra-mural candidate under the category of
practicing advocate having completed 2 years of practice. His
application was processed as per the rules and procedure that existed
then which permitted advocates with 2 years of practice, Officers etc., to
join Ph.D. in law as extra mural candidates.  Several Advocates, Police
Officers and others joined Ph.D. in law during 2007-2008 as extra-mural
candidates..

        10. It is contended by Mr. Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for
the petitioner that the stand taken by the University in the counter
affidavit runs contrary to the minutes of the meeting of the Academic
Senate of the University, which prescribed 5 years of experience as a
prerequisite for an admission to Ph.D. programme.
        11. But the above contention does not take the petitioner
anywhere. Assuming that the University has taken a contradictory
stand, the only result that could be arrived at is that the admission
granted to the 5th respondent for the Ph.D. programme is unlawful.
We are not concerned in this case with the validity of the admission
granted to the 5th respondent for the Ph.D. programme. We are
concerned in this case only with one question as to whether the
petitioner had 7 years of standing at the Bar, as on 01-04-2012.  On
the basis of the pursuit of L.L.M. in the Distance Education mode, it
cannot be concluded that there was a break in the practice of the 5th
respondent as a Lawyer.  Hence, the writ petition is devoid of merits.
Therefore, it is dismissed.  However, we clarify that this decision will
not preclude the Registry of the High Court from taking any action, if
they so desire, on the ground that the 5th respondent did not disclose
his pursuit of L.L.M.  There will be no order as to costs.
        As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending
shall stand closed.
________________________  
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J    
_____________
J. UMA DEVI, J
Date: 26-04-2017

Service matter - writ - the decision of Andhra Pragathi Grameena Bank (Bank), in restricting the consideration only to candidates sponsored by the District Employment Exchange/ District Sainik Welfare Board/specialised agencies in the process of recruitment to the post of Office Attendants (Multipurpose) and pray to issue directions to consider them without such sponsorship.- in addition, petitioners also seek direction to regularise/ absorb them against the post of Messenger-cum-Sweeper or any other suitable last grade post in preference to the freshers in the recruitment.= Petitioners in all the writ petitions be subjected to selection process in pursuant to the recruitment exercise taken up in the year 2010 to fill vacancies in the post of Office Attendants (Multipurpose) without insisting that their names should be sponsored by Employment Exchange /or any other agency.

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO        

W.P Nos.14457 of 2010 and batch

27-04-2017

Atlur Krishnaiah, S/o. Channaiah,  Aged about 39 years, Occ: Messenger-cum-Sweeper, R/o. Atlur, Kadapa District and eight ot

The Chairman, Andhra Pragathi Grameena Bank, Head Office, Kadapa and others  Respondents    

Counsel for the petitioners: Sri Penjuri Venu Gopal, Sri G. Ramachandra Reddy, Sri Kasa Jaganmohan Reddy, Sri S. Gopal Rao            
               
Counsel for the Respondents : Smt. V. Uma Devi Learned Standing Counsel

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1.  (2006) 4 SCC 1
2.  (2009) 5 SCC 65
3.  2003 3 LLJ 937
4.  2010 (5) ALT 652 (DB)
5.  (1987) 3 SCC 308
6.  (1996) 6 SCC 216
7.  (2006) 8 SCC 111  
8.  (2010) 9 SCC 247
9. (2015) 8 SCC 265
10. (2014) 7 SCC 223


HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO        
      W.P Nos.14457 of 2010; 34753, 35502, 37432, 37521,
37522, 37976, 38457, 39109  & 39685 of 2012 & 12547 of 2013

      Date: 27.04.2017

W.P.No.14457 of 2010
Between :
Atlur Krishnaiah, S/o. Channaiah,
Aged about 39 years, Occ: Messenger-cum-  
Sweeper, R/o. Atlur, Kadapa District
and eight others                         Petitioners

      And
The Chairman, Andhra Pragathi
Grameena Bank, Head Office,
Kadapa and others                                    Respondents









The Court made the following:





      HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO      
      W.P Nos.14457 of 2010; 34753, 35502, 37432,  37521,
37522, 37976, 38457, 39109  & 39685 of 2012 & 12547 of 2013

COMMON ORDER:    
        In all these matters, petitioners are aggrieved by the
decision of Andhra Pragathi Grameena Bank (Bank), in restricting
the consideration only to candidates sponsored by the District
Employment Exchange/ District Sainik Welfare 
Board/specialised agencies in the process of recruitment to the
post of Office Attendants (Multipurpose) and pray to issue
directions to consider them without such sponsorship.
In W.P.No.14457 of 2010, in addition, petitioners also seek
direction to regularise/ absorb them against the post of
Messenger-cum-Sweeper or any other suitable last grade post in
preference to the freshers in the recruitment.

2.      Petitioners in W.P.No.14457 of 2010 are claiming to be
working with the respondent  Bank.  Petitioners in W.P.Nos.
37521, 37522 and 38457  of 2012 claimed to have worked as
temporary sweepers.  Petitioners in W.P.Nos.35502, 37432,
34753, 37976, 39109, 39685 of 2012; 12547 of 2013, are all
unemployees.  In W.P.Nos.35502, 37432, 34753, 39685 of 2012  
and 12547 of 2013, interim orders are granted.  In
W.P.Nos.37521, 37522, 39109 and 38457 of 2012 interim orders
were not granted.  In W.P.No.37976 of 2012, this Court granted
stay of finalisation of selections.  In W.P.No.14457 of 2010, series
of orders are passed, which are noted in the subsequent
paragraphs.

3.      In W.P.No.14457 of 2010, petitioners are nine in number.
Initially they were appointed as Messenger-cum-Sweeper between
1993 and 1994 and have been continuously working in various
branches of the respondent  Bank.  According to the petitioners,
their services were utilised for 12 hours during festival days,
holidays and Sundays in the Bank premises as well as in the
residents of Area Managers, Managers and Executives.  They are
all asked to do all menial works including cleaning of toilets.  In
this Writ Petition, they challenge the letter, dated 01.06.2010,
addressed to District Sainik Welfare Board to sponsor candidates
for the post of Messenger-cum-Sweeper in Kadapa District. The
petitioners challenge this intimation letter primarily on the ground
that they have been working in the respondent  Bank branches
for long time; have rendered satisfactory service; in recognition of
their good service, they were paid bonus also; and therefore their
services ought to have been regularised instead of placing indent
on District Sainik Welfare Board to sponsor candidates.
Petitioners also contend that the terms of indent placed on
District Sainik Welfare Board would also indicate that the
intention of the respondent  Bank is to exclude petitioners
completely and to throw them out from service and induct
freshers instead of granting regularization to them.  Petitioners
placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs.Umadevi (3)  in
support of their contention that their services should be
regularised.

4.      Along with the reply affidavit, petitioners filed voluminous
documents in support of their claim that they have been
continuously engaged, paid wages and also paid bonus.
However, instead of regularizing their services directly and only to
avoid the claims of the petitioners for regularization, Bank
invented the method of engagement through an outsourcing
agency and periodically changing the outsourcing agency.
However, they contend that though there are changes in the
outsourcing agency, petitioners continued to work. Petitioners
claim that they belong to Scheduled Caste category and come
from lower strata of society; with a fond hope that their services
would be regularized, have been rendering dedicated service
since 1993-1994.

5.      By order dated 23.06.2010 made in W.P.M.P.No.18181 of  
2010, this Court directed the respondent  Bank to continue the
petitioners on the same terms and conditions on which they were
appointed. However, the Court permitted the process of
recruitment to go on.  Petitioners moved W.P.M.P.No.40273 of
2010 claiming to direct the respondent  Bank to consider the
representations submitted by them on 18.11.2010 and to
proceed with the ongoing recruitment process for the post of
Messenger-cum-Sweeper by relaxing eligibility criteria. This Court
by order dated 31.01.2011 directed the respondent  Bank to
consider the representation dated 18.11.2010 and to dispose of
the same within a period of 30 days.

6.      Alleging violation of the directions dated 23.06.2010 issued
by this Court, petitioners filed C.C.No.821 of 2011.  By order
dated, 20.04.2012, this Court directed the respondent  Bank to
permit the petitioners to participate in the selection process
without insisting that their names should be sponsored by the
Employment Exchanges/District Sainik Welfare Board and other
agencies.  The Court also observed that it is always better if the
past service and experience is given credence.  A reading of the
order would disclose that the respondent  Bank gave an
undertaking and therefore the Court issued orders and directed
to complete the selection process as early as possible.  On
31.08.2012, the Court passed further orders in the Contempt
Case directing the respondents to take all necessary steps and to
see that the selection process would be completed within a period
of four months from that date.

7.      While this Writ Petition is pending and the above directions
were issued from time to time, some other persons intending to
participate in the selections for appointment to the post of Office
Attendants (Multipurpose) instituted several Writ Petitions (which
are all disposed of by this common order) claiming that they
should be considered for employment without reference to their
names being sponsored by the Employment Exchange or District  
Sainik Welfare Board. In W.P.M.P.No.15476 of 2013 in
W.P.No.12547 of 2013, by order dated 24.04.2013, following the
judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Upendra
Narayana Singh , the Court directed to receive the applications
of the petitioners for appointment to the post of Office Attendants
(Multipurpose) and to subject them to selection process along
with others.  The Court also directed to publish a notification in
newspapers calling for applications from all eligible candidates.
Similar directions were also issued in W.P.M.P.No.44203 of 2012
in W.P.No.34753 of 2012, dated 07.11.2012.

8.      W.P.No.37976 of 2012 is filed by three other persons
opposing consideration of only such candidates whose names are
sponsored by the District Employment Exchange alone without
accepting the applications from the qualified candidates. This
Court by order dated 10.12.2012 directed not to finalise the
selections until further orders.

9.1     In the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No.14457 of 2010, the
stout defence of the respondent  Bank is that petitioners were
never engaged by the respondent  Bank as claimed by the
petitioners and therefore question of regularizing their services by
applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Uma
Devi (3) does not arise.

9.2.    By stoutly denying the contentions of the petitioners that
they have been working continuously, it is stated that they are not
entitled to seek regularization of their services.  According to the
respondent  Bank, there are regular Messengers-cum-Sweepers  
and whenever regular employee goes on leave or absents from
duty, temporary arrangement is made locally by the concerned
bank to undertake maintenance work and as and when such  
work is undertaken, the person will be paid daily wage.  In similar
manner, petitioners were engaged as and when there was
requirement, but they never worked continuously. It is further
asserted that the requirement of this nature is also for a limited
period of less than three hours in a day.  Some contingent fund is
provided with the Branch Manager for up keep of the branch and
by utilising this amount such engagement is made. Branch
Manager does not issue appointment orders and no record is
maintained, as they are utilising the services of locally available
persons on a given day where there is requirement.  It is
contended that respondent  Bank has resorted to recruitment to
fill up regular Messenger-cum-Sweeper by strictly following the
Regulations governing the employment in the Regional Rural
Banks and no deviation can be permitted.

10.     The Bank defends its decision to notify through the
Employment Exchange as well as District Sainik Welfare Office by
referring to the provisions of Regional Rural Bank (Appointment
and Promotion of Officers and Other Employees) Rules, 1998,
which are the common Rules notified by the Government of India
and adopted by the respondent  Bank.  These Rules mandate
filling up of post of Messenger-cum-Sweeper only through
Employment Exchange, Sainik Welfare Board or any other agency  
catering to the needs of welfare of various special categories.  It is
therefore the contention of the respondent  Bank that unless the
names of the petitioners are sponsored by the Employment
Exchange, they cannot be considered for selections.
11.     The facts on record would also make it clear that the
respondent  Bank has also notified in daily newspapers on
30.09.2012 calling for applications from eligible candidates for
recruitment.  The notification also indicates that in addition to the
persons, in whose favour orders are granted by the Court, all
others would also be considered.

12.     Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent  Bank made
extensive submissions and placed reliance on several judgments
to contend that the respondent  Bank need not resort to open
recruitment notification and bank can consider only such of those
candidates whose names are sponsored by the Employment  
Exchange or District Sainik Welfare Board or any other
recognized agency.  Learned Standing Counsel further contended
that recruitment regulations contemplate making recruitment by
considering only the candidates sponsored from the agency
mentioned above and there is no requirement to go for public
notification.  Learned Standing Counsel placed heavy reliance on
the decisions of the two Division Benches of this Court in State
Bank of India, Zonal office v.
K. Lakshmamma  and Naveen Kumar v. Chairman and    
Managing Director, Bharath Dynamics Limited.
13.     All the counsel for petitioners placed reliance on the
decision of Supreme Court in Upendra Narayana Singh
(supra).

14.     At this stage, it is necessary and expedient to consider
precedent decisions of Supreme Court on the issue of considering
candidates for employment even if Employment Exchange has not  
sponsored their names.

14.1.1    In Union of India v. N. Hargopal , while repelling the
contention that there need not be sponsorship by the Employment
Exchange and publication of notification should be issued on the
ground that many people do not register with the Employment
Exchange, the Supreme Court at paragraph No.9 held as under:
9. In the absence of a better method of recruitment, we
think that any restriction that employment in government
departments should be through the medium of employment  
exchanges does not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. With this modification of the judgment of the
High Court, the appeals and the special leave petitions are
disposed of. No orders are necessary in the writ petition.
14.1.2  However, it is appropriate to note the observations of
the Supreme Court in paragraph No.6.  It reads as under:
6.     It is, therefore, clear that the object of the Act is
not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that
the employer may choose the best and the most
efficient and to provide an opportunity to the worker to
have his claim for appointment considered without the
worker having to knock at every door for employment.
We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Act does
not oblige any employer to employ those persons only
who have been sponsored by the Employment  
Exchanges.
                                                              (emphasis supplied)
14.2     In Excise Superintendent, Malakpatnam, Krishna
District, Andhra Pradesh v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao , after
considering the earlier judgment of Haragopal (supra), the
Supreme Court held at paragraph No.6 as under:
6. Having regard to the respective contentions, we are of the
view that contention of the respondents is more acceptable
which would be consistent with the principles of fair play,
justice and equal opportunity. It is common knowledge that
many a candidate is unable to have the names sponsored,
though their names are either registered or are waiting to be
registered in the employment exchange, with the result that
the choice of selection is restricted to only such of the
candidates whose names come to be sponsored by the  
employment exchange. Under these circumstances, many a  
deserving candidate is deprived of the right to be considered
for appointment to a post under the State. Better view
appears to be that it should be mandatory for the
requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the
employment exchange, and employment exchange should    
sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning
departments for selection strictly according to seniority and
reservation, as per requisition.  In addition, the
appropriate department or undertaking or
establishment should call for the names by publication
in the newspapers having wider circulation and also
display on their office notice boards or announce on
radio, television and employment news bulletins; and
then consider the cases of all the candidates who have
applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would
be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter
of employment would be available to all eligible
candidates.
(emphasis supplied)
14.3    In Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India , this very
issue was considered and Supreme Court by following the
judgment in Excise Superintendent, Malakpatnam (supra), at
paragraph No.9 held as under:
9. This Court in Visweshwara Rao [(1996) 6 SCC 216 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 1420] , therefore, held that intimation to the
employment exchange about the vacancy and candidates  
sponsored from the employment exchange is mandatory. This  
Court also held that in addition and consistent with the
principle of fair play, justice and equal opportunity, the
appropriate department or establishment should also call for
the names by publication in the newspapers having wider
circulation, announcement on radio, television and
employment news bulletins and consider all the candidates
who have applied. This view was taken to afford equal
opportunity to all the eligible candidates in the matter of
employment. The rationale behind such direction is also
consistent with the sound public policy that wider the
opportunity of the notice of vacancy by wider publication
in the newspapers, radio, television and employment news
bulletin, the better candidates with better qualifications
are attracted, so that adequate choices are made available
and the best candidates would be selected and appointed to
subserve the public interest better.
(emphasis supplied)
14.4    Yet again in State of Bihar (supra) Supreme Court
considered the earlier decisions in Haragopal (supra), Excise
Superintendent, Malakpatnam (supra) and Arun Kumar  
Nayak (supra) and approved the view taken in those three
decisions and held at paragraph No.31 as under:
 31. The ratio of the above noted three judgments is that in
terms of Section 4 of the 1959 Act, every public employer is
duty-bound to notify the vacancies to the employment exchange
concerned so as to enable it to sponsor the names of eligible
candidates and also advertise the same in the newspapers
having wider circulation, employment news bulletins, get
announcement made on radio and television and consider all
eligible candidates whose names may be forwarded by the
employment exchange concerned and/or who may apply  
pursuant to the advertisement published in the newspapers or
announcements made on radio/television.
           (emphasis supplied)
15.     Several other judgments placed on record do not directly
deal with the issue of sponsorship from Employment Exchange as
a solitary requirement.  The principle laid down by the Supreme
Court and the directions issued in the above decisions hold the
field.
16.     In view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
the above decisions, the interim directions issued by this Court in
W.P.No.34753 of 2012 and W.P.No.12547 of 2013 to consider the  
applications submitted by the petitioners therein and also to
issue public notification in the newspapers cannot be faulted.
17.     Though recruitment notification was issued in the year
2010 and interim directions were issued by this Court in the year
2011-2012, the recruitment process is not carried forward on the
ground that there are inconsistent directions issued by the Court.
According to learned Standing Counsel, in the case of petitioners,
Court directed to consider them whereas in the case of other
candidates from the open market, the Court directed to consider
their applications and also directed to issue paper publication
and in W.P.No.37976 of 2012 Court stayed finalization of the
selection process.  She further contended that as the recruitment
regulations do not contemplate publication of notification in the
newspapers and any decision taken to published in the
newspapers would amount to violating the regulations, the
recruitment process is not taken further.
18.     On a reading of the four judgments on the issue i.e.,
Haragopal (supra), Excise Superintendent, Malakpatnam
(supra), Arun Kumar Nayak (supra) and State of Bihar
(supra), as noted by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar
(supra), every employer is duty bound to notify the
vacancies not only through Employment Exchange, but
also through advertisement in the newspapers having
wider circulation, in employment news bulletin and
announcements through radio and television and
consider all eligible candidates.   In view of the
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the Three
Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Excise
Superintendent, Malakpatnam
(supra), the respondent  Bank cannot fall back on decision of
this Court in State Bank of India (supra) and Naveen Kumar
(supra) to contend that the consideration is confined only to
candidates sponsored from Employment Exchange or District
Sainik Welfare Board or Organisations which are
established/formed for the welfare of Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe/disabled persons.  The interim directions issued
by this Court in some of the writ petitions herein commands
acceptance.
19.     Having cleared this issue, it is necessary to consider the
claims of petitioners in W.P.No.14457 of 2010.
20.     On going through the pleadings of petitioners as well as
respondent  Bank, following facts are not disputed.  Petitioners
are engaged from 1993-1994 engaged according to petitioners
continuously, and engaged according to respondent  Bank as
and when work is required on a daily assessment basis whenever
regular employee goes on leave or absent from duty; that there
are vacancies and recruitment process is undertaken; though
notification was issued in the year 2010 so far recruitment
process is not completed and the said vacancies remain unfilled;
it appears atleast from 2011 the petitioners are being engaged
continuously through the outsourcing agency and now
Attendance Register is maintained.

21.1    In the light of the submissions of both sides that the
petitioners are being engaged from 1993-1994, perusal of the
voluminous documents filed by the petitioners would also
disclose that it is not in dispute atleast that as and when required,
petitioners are being engaged.  Some of the certificates filed by the
petitioners and the relevant notings by the respondent  Bank
Officers would disclose that petitioners were engaged in the
absence of a regular employee.  However, it is not clear and
respondent  Bank has not explained, even though it is a specific
assertion of the petitioners from the beginning, that petitioners
are also paid bonus.  If what is contended by the respondent -
Bank is correct i.e., petitioners are engaged on a particular day if
the regular employee is absent or on leave by local sourcing of
such persons to undertake menial job and they are paid wages of
that day, the question of payment of bonus would not arise.
Similarly, reflecting their names in the relevant records also
would not arise.  In other words, what emerges from scanning
through the several documents filed by the petitioners along with
the rejoinder in W.V.M.P.No.254 of 2011 is, though petitioners
are engaged as and when regular employee was on leave, their
names are maintained in the musters of respondent  Bank,
though not in writing or with the understanding by the local
Manager and as and when they are required, they are engaged.

21.2    Thus, even though there is no regular assignment or
continuous work, the person is expected to be available to work
as and when called and in that sense he cannot undertake any
other job.  Undertaking any other job may result in losing the
opportunity, even though it may be intermitantly given when a
regular employee goes on leave.  Thus, assuming what is
contended by the respondent  Bank may be true that the
engagement of the petitioners was only when regular employee
goes on leave, their availability has to be continuous and
therefore they cannot take up any other assignment.  As noted
above, it would clearly amount to exploitation of labour and
adopting the principle of hire and fire which was long ago given
up when India became independent and is a democratic country
governed by rule of law.  It also amounts to misusing power to
give false hope to the people coming from lower strata of society
and utilising them whenever and wherever required at their
whims and fancies.  Based on these facts, the issue as addressed
extensively by the respective counsels needs consideration.
22.     In terms of the earlier orders of this Court, undertaking
given by the respondent  Bank in W.P.No.14457 of 2010 as well
as in C.C.No.821 of 2011, the candidates applied directly in
accordance with the interim orders in individual cases and the
claims of the petitioners in all other Writ Petitions should be
considered against existing vacancies without insisting that their
names should be sponsored from Employment Exchange and any    
other agency.
23.     Question for consideration in the facts of W.P.No.14457 of
2010 as noted above is whether petitioners can seek
regularisation of their services without subjecting them to any
selection process.
24.1     In Umadevi (3), Supreme Court while deprecating the practice
of back-door appointments, appointments on daily wage basis and
subsequent regularization, directed formulation of scheme for
regularization, if services of persons are utilized uninterruptedly for
more than 10 years.   Supreme Court held:
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases
where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as
explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR
1967 SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 :
(1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 :
1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in
para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned
vacant posts might have been made and the employees have  
continued to work for ten years or more but without the
intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The
question of regularisation of the services of such employees
may have to be considered on merits in the light of the
principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to
and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union
of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities
should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the
services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for
ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under
cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should
further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to
fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up,
in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are
being now employed. The process must be set in motion
within six months from this date. We also clarify that
regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need
not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should
be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement
and regularising or making permanent, those not duly
appointed as per the constitutional scheme.

24.2    Considering the scope of decision in Umadevi, in State of
Karnataka and others Vs. M.L. Kesari and others  Supreme Court
held:
      11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of
Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] is twofold. First is to ensure
that those who have put in more than ten years of
continuous service without the protection of any interim
orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in
Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] was rendered, are considered
for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to
ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not
perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily-
wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and then
periodically regularise them on the ground that they have
served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the
constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment
and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all
persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-
4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1]
] without the protection of any interim order of any court or
tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite
qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation.
The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise
of regularisation within six months of the decision in
Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] or that such exercise was
undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not
disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for
regularisation in terms of the above directions in Umadevi
(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] as a one-time measure.

24.3.   In Amarkant Rai v. State of Bihar , Supreme Court held that
The objective behind the exception carved out in this case was to
permit regularisation of such appointments, which are irregular but
not illegal, and to ensure security of employment of those persons
who had served the State Government and their instrumentalities for
more than ten years.  In that case, employee was working for 29
years.  This decision approves earlier view expressed in M.L.Kesari
(supra) extracted above.
24.4.   In State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad , similar view was
taken.  Supreme Court held:
41. .In view of the categorical finding of fact on the
relevant contentious issue that the respondent employees
have continued in their service for more than 10 years
continuously therefore, the legal principle laid down by this
Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] at para 53
squarely applies to the present cases. The Division Bench of
the High Court has rightly held that the respondent
employees are entitled for the relief, the same cannot be
interfered with by this Court.
25.1.     Services of petitioners in W.P.No.14457 of 2010 have been
utilised for a long time i.e., from  1993-1994, though not
regularly/ continuing every day in a month and was not paid
wages on monthly basis.  Some of them have proof of their work
and others do not have.  However, they are required to be on
rolls, be allert and at the beck and call of the officials of the bank
to work whenever called and to do whatever task is entrusted to
them, such as to sweep, to clean the floors to clean the toilets to
act as messengers/curriers etc.  They appear to have rendered
satisfactory service, earning bonus also, and at any rate no
adverse action was taken against them.
25.2.     Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, justice and equity requires that the respondent Bank
should evolve some scheme to assign priority in the selection
process while conducting selections to fill existing vacancies of
Office Attendants (Multipurpose); duly taking note of long service
rendered by them; grant relaxation of age if they are found to be
over aged by 2010 and if they were within the age when initially
engaged.
26.     In W.P.Nos.37521, 38457 and 37522 of 2012, petitioners
also claimed to have worked with the respondent - Bank.  The
respondent - Bank is required to verify whether petitioners in
these writ petitions have worked and if so they may be extended
same benefit as extended to petitioners in W.P.No.14457 of 2010.
27.     Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are disposed of as under:
(a)     Petitioners in all the writ petitions be subjected to
selection process in pursuant to the recruitment
exercise taken up in the year 2010 to fill vacancies in
the post of Office Attendants (Multipurpose) without
insisting that their names should be sponsored by
Employment Exchange /or any other agency.  
(b)     While considering for such recruitment, the Bank may
evolve some procedure/scheme to grant weightage to
petitioners in W.P.No.14457 of 2010 having regard to
the service rendered by petitioners, subject to such
service being satisfactory.  They shall also be extended
relaxation in age if they were within the age when they
were initially engaged.
(c)     If petitioners in W.P.Nos. 37521, 37522 and 38457 of
2012 are also similarly situated to petitioners in
W.P.No.14457 of 2010, they may also be extended the
same benefits as extended to those petitioners.
      No costs. Having regard to the same, miscellaneous
petitions, if any pending, are closed.
____________________  
P. NAVEEN RAO, J  
DATE: 27-04-2017