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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Sunday, April 19, 2015

The corporation is a public sector undertaking. When it undertakes direct recruitment, it should be very cautious and careful. If, for any reason, the process of direct recruitment is faulted or vitiated, the candidate who was selected by it and who joined the service will get caught in the cross-fire. A direct recruit candidate cannot be reverted back to any other lower post. He is normally picked up, while competing with the other candidates, from the open market. Therefore, for any reason, the process of direct recruitment is found fault with, then, he will have to be sent out of the service of the Corporation altogther, but cannot be reverted. Same would be the prospect even in case of an internal candidate. An internal candidate offered his candidature only because he satisfied the recruitment criteria in all respects including the upper age limit. He is required to compete with the candidates drawn from the open market. For all practical purposes, he is standing at par with the candidate drawn from the open market. If, for any reason, when the direct recruitment process fails, he will have to be terminated from the employment of the Corporation like any other candidate drawn from the open market. Therefore, keeping this grave consequence in mind, the Corporation would regulate its affairs properly and carefully from now on.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

WRIT PETITION NOs. 8851 OF 2008 and batch    

19-01-2015

N. Satyanarayana Murthy, S/o N. Sri Ram Murthy Occ: Deputy Manager (Marketing)  
        A.P. Oil Federation, Eluru Petitioner

The A.P. Cooperative Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd, Rep by its Vice
Chairman and Managing Director  Parisram Bhavan, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad and 2  
others.. Respondents

Counsel for the petitioners : Sri V. Padmanabha Rao
                                       

Counsel for the respondents : 1. Sri M. Papa Reddy
                               2. G.P. for Cooperation
                               3. Sri V. Raja Manohar
                               4. Mrs. Marie Desai

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred

1.      AIR 1988 SC 959
2.      2010 (3) SCC pg 119
3.      AIR 1974 SC 532

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

WRIT PETITION NOs. 8851, 11944, 16535 OF 2008    
AND
6453 OF 2011

COMMON ORDER:    


        W.P.No.8851 of 2008 was instituted by one
Sri N. Satyanarayana Murthy who was then working as Deputy
Manager (Marketing) with the first respondent-Andhra Pradesh
Cooperative Oil Seeds Growers Federation Limited, challenging the
appointment of respondents 2 & 3 as Managers through
proceedings dated 26.12.2007 without considering his case. The
same individual has instituted W.P.No.11944 of 2008 challenging
the appointment of the third respondent therein as Manager
through proceedings dated 07.05.2008.  W.P.No.16535 of 2008
was instituted by one Sri K.V. Ranga Reddy challenging the
appointment of the fourth respondent as Manager through
proceedings dated 26.12.2007 as bad. The fourth writ petition
W.P.No.6453 of 2011 has been filed by the Employees Association
of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Oil Seeds Growers Federation,
the second respondent therein (henceforth referred to, for short as
Corporation), challenging the appointment of respondents 4, 5, 6
and 7as Managers.  All these four cases substantially deal with the
same question of law and hence, they are heard together and
disposed of by this common order.

        Heard Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of Sri V. Padmanabha Rao, learned Counsel for the
petitioners and Sri P. Sri Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of Ms. Mary Desai, learned counsel for the contesting
unofficial respondents and Sri T. S. Praveen Kumar, learned
counsel on behalf of the Corporation.

        The Corporation is a public sector undertaking which was
established in the year 1981 in collaboration with National Diary
Development Board to increase the oil seeds production. Initially,
the federation used to work at the state level and the cooperative
oil seeds unions used to function at divisional level and
subsequently the primary agricultural societies at each village level
have been added up. Due to the financial crisis, the unions
established at Gadwal in Mahabubnagar District and Piler in
Chittoor District, have been closed down. Thereafterwards, the
cadre strength has been approved by the Registrar of Cooperative
Societies in terms and in accordance with Section 116 (C) of the
Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964.  In pursuance of
earlier round of litigation, common seniority list of all categories of
employees has been published on 15.05.2007.  It is the claim of
the petitioners that there are seven different categories of
Manager/Divisional Officer which are approved in the cadre of the
Corporation. They are:

1.      Manager (Personal & Administration or HRD)
2.      Manager (Finance)
3.      Manager (Marketing)
4.      Manager (Plants & Projects)
5.      Manager (Procurement & Inputs)
6.      Manager (Oil Palm Development) and
7.      Manager (Divisional Officer at Field Level)

        It is contended that the job requirement of each of these
posts being vastly different from one another, though they may
carry identical scale of pay, but each is a separate and isolated
post by itself in the cadre concerned. All the posts cannot be added
together for purposes of applying the principles of reservation
amongst various social sectors such as Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, etcetera. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior
Counsel would submit that, when these posts are isolated posts,
they form into a single post cadre and consequently, the question
of applicability of principles of reservation would not arise. Any
attempt to apply the principles of social reservation amongst
various social sectors would amount to reserving 100%, which is
impermissible. The learned Senior Counsel would therefore submit
that the notification issued by the Corporation on 01.11.2007
inviting applications exclusively from members belonging to
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes treating the vacancies that
have arisen in these isolated cadres as backlog vacancies to be
filled in by candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes, as the case may be, is completely illegal. He, therefore,
challenges the very process of recruitment initiated by the
notification dated 01.11.2007 inviting applications which fructified
ultimately in recruiting the respective unofficial respondents in the
writ petitions.

        On behalf of the Corporation, Sri Praveen Kumar would
contend that the Corporation has framed its own services
regulations which were brought into force from 01.06.1983.  As per
Regulation 9 where the appointments are made by direct
recruitment, the Corporation has a right to reserve certain posts
for specified categories or classes of persons in keeping with the
rules or regulations in force. Therefore, Sri Praveen Kumar would
contend that the Corporation and the employees are bound by this
principle and hence, there is no tenability behind the challenge to
the notification issued by the Corporation on 01.10.2007 inviting
applications exclusively from members belonging to SCs/STs Sri
Praveen Kumar would further contend that, when once educational
qualifications and age criteria is notified, if internal employees of
the Corporation satisfy the said norms, they can also respond to
the notification and file their applications. Since the maximum
upper age limit is fixed as 43 years, the petitioners have crossed
the same, therefore lacked the eligibility to respond to the
notification and hence, the petitioners cannot validly challenge the
notification issued by the Corporation making resort to direct
recruitment.

        Sri P. Sri Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel would submit
that the petitioners have proceeded on the basis of the provisional
cadre strength in contending that the posts in question are isolated
posts, whereas, the finally approved cadre strength is what is
required to be taken into consideration. According to the learned
Senior Counsel, the cadre strength of Managers has been raised
from 7 to 16 and hence, the principle of reservation in favour of
various social sectors is attracted for filling up the posts of
Managers. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the
posts of Manager/Divisional Officer are included in managerial
cadre II services of the Corporation in terms of Regulation 18 of the
service regulations of the Corporation. They carry the same scale of
pay and hence, they occupy the same status in the service
hierarchy of the Corporation and discharge functions and
responsibilities of a comparable nature. In view of their inclusion
in a common cadre, the fact that there were same dissimilarities in
the nature of functions performed by them should not result in
treating all of them as distinct and separate posts. Learned Senior
Counsel would further contend that, as per Regulation 9 of the
service regulations of the Corporation, the reservation amongst
various social sectors is the choice of the Corporation and the said
choice is a reasonable one intended to carry forward the
constitutional mandate of social justice. In this view of the matter,
there is no justification for challenging the notification issued by
the Corporation for taking recourse to direct recruitment. The
learned Senior Counsel would further contend that, when once
Corporation has treated them as common cadre posts and the
Corporation has not treated them as single cadre posts, the
Corporation is justified in taking out the notification for direct
recruitment. Taking recourse to the method of direct recruitment
instead of promotion is again a choice of the Corporation, which
method of recruitment is ideally suited for the efficient functioning
of the Corporation is a matter of value based choice of the
Corporation and any such decision of the Corporation cannot be
ignored. So long as the choice of recruitment is in accordance with
Regulation 11 of the service regulations of the Corporation, the
petitioners cannot challenge the same excepting on grounds of
violation of any of their rights or any fundamental rights
guaranteed to them. The learned Senior Counsel would expand
this idea by submitting that Regulation 11 left a choice in the
hands of the Corporation to fill up the vacancies through any of
the methods specified therein which included inviting applications
through advertisement and then selection of the candidates, which
is the method known popularly as direct recruitment method.
Similarly, the Corporation could have also availed the other
method of selection from among the Corporation employees which
is by the method of promotion. Since, no fundamental rights or no
legal rights are available in favour of the petitioners, the learned
Senior Counsel would contend that the petitioners cannot
maintain the writ petitions. Finally, the learned Senior Counsel
would submit that the petitioners have also earned subsequent
promotions as Managers and hence, the issue raised by them has
reduced to a pure and simple academic issue and such academic
issues are not required to be answered by the Courts. Hence, the
learned Senior Counsel would suggest to dismiss the writ petitions.

        The notification issued by the Corporation on 01.11.2007
inviting applications for certain posts notified therein is placed at
page no.18 of the writ petition paper book in W.P.No.6453 of 2011.
It has clearly set out that the vacancies which were existing as on
31.08.2007 in the service of the Corporation which are treated as
backlog vacancies to be filled in with candidates belonging to
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The upper age limit for
the candidates is prescribed as 43 years and the qualifications
required to be possessed by them against each post is specified.
The post of Manager, which is reserved for women candidate of
scheduled castes, required the candidate to possess the following
qualifications namely, B.Sc (Agriculture) with experience in
procurement of edible oil seeds and distribution activities and
experience in oil palm development. The next post of Manager
notified for Scheduled Caste (General Category) (i.e. both men and
women amongst scheduled castes can respond) required the  
candidates to possess qualification of any degree. However, those
who are possessing M.B.A. degree would be given preference. Thus,
in between the two posts of Managers which have been notified, it
becomes clear that they do belong to two different disciplines.
Consequently, they are intended to discharge two distinct and
dissimilar functions, while one is required to take care of consumer
marketing activities, the other is required to perform procurement
activities. While the procurement of the oil seeds deals with pre-
crushing basic input activity of the Corporation, whereas, the
marketing activity of the finished product comes after the
production activity is completed at the plant. The functions which
are required to be performed by these two Managers are vastly
different and they stand at the either end of the rainbow. There is
no meeting ground in between these two stages. Similarly, the
qualifications required also speak of their divergent professional
inputs. Once is required to possess the professional qualification of
B.Sc Agriculture, while the other could be filled in with any
Graduate, not necessarily a Science Graduate such as B.A. or
B.Com., and by giving preference to candidates who have
possessed M.B.A Degree discipline with marketing as the subject
matter of specialized study. Therefore, the contention canvassed by
Sri P. Sri Raghu Ram that all the posts are common cadre posts
which have been included in the same cadre namely Managerial
Grade-II under Regulation 18 of the Employees Regulations does
not hold water. I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that
the posts of Managers and Divisional Officers including in the
common cadre are each one of them distinct and separate one and
consequently, a person recruited as a Manager to discharge one set
of functions cannot be transferred and posted against the other.
Hence, these posts of Managers belong to distinct and separate
disciplines.  They are isolated posts and there is common nature of
duties performed by them.
        For instance, the Manager who has been recruited for
purpose of Oil Palm Development cannot be posted as Manager of
Consumer Marketing or as Manager (Personnel and  
Administration). The converse is also true. A person recruited as
Manager (Personnel and Administration) cannot similarly be posted
as Manager (Plants and Products) or procurement and inputs or
consumer marketing. Each is a distinct and separate post in the
same cadre. Where there is only one post in a cadre, the question
of applying principles of reservation in favour of various social
sectors would not normally arise. If there is only one post and if
that one post is reserved exclusively in favour of any of one
particular social sector, no other post in that cadre would be
available to be filled in by candidates belonging to the other social
segment. In other words, a single post in a cadre if it is filled up
applying the principles of reservation amongst various social
sectors, it would amount to reserving 100%.  Providing 100%
reservation is wholly impermissible and it directly conflicts with
the guarantees held out under Article 14 and 16 of our
Constitution.

        The Supreme Court in Chakradhar Paswan v. State of
Bihar and others  case had occasion to consider the applicability
of the principles of reservation in favour of various social sectors
and the principle has been spelt out as herein below:
        The main contention of Dr. Y.S. Chitale, learned
counsel for the appellant, is that there are four posts in the
Directorate of Indigenous Medicines and all the posts are
Class I posts and therefore according to the 50 point roster,
the post of Director having been treated as unreserved by
the rotational system, the post of Deputy Director
(Homeopathic) was rightly reserved for a scheduled caste
candidate. According to him, the High Court fell into an
error in assuming that the reservation of the post of Deputy
Director (Homeopathic) for a scheduled caste candidate
under Art. 16(4) amounted to 100% reservation and
suffered from the vice of offending against the equality
clause under Art. 16(1) read with Art. 14 of the
Constitution. In answer to the argument Shri L.N. Sinha,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4. submits
that firstly, the posts of Director and Deputy Directors are
not carried in the same cadre and therefore they could not
be grouped for purposes of implementing the policy of
reservation under Art. 16(4). and secondly, the three
systems of indigenous medicines, namely, Homeopathic,
Ayurvedic and Unani are distinct and separate systems of
medicine and thus the 50 point roster could not be applied.
        The questions that fall for our determination are : (1) Is
the post of Deputy Director (Homeopathic) an 'isolated post'
and therefore reservation of the post for a scheduled caste
candidate amounts to 100% reservation and must therefore
be declared to be impermissible under Art. 16(4)? (2)
Whether the posts of the Director and the three Deputy
Directors could be grouped together for purposes of
implementing the policy of reservation, according to the 50
point roster. And (3) Could the posts of the Director and the
three Deputy Directors in the Directorate of Indigenous
Medicines although they are posts carried on different
grades, still be clubbed together for purposes of reservation
merely because they are Class I posts?
        .Admittedly, the post of the Director is    
the highest post in the Directorate of Indigenous Medicines
and is carried in the higher pay scale or grade of Rs. 2225-
75-2675 while the posts of the Deputy Directors are carried
in the pay scale or grade of Rs. 1900-75-2500. In service
jurisprudence, the term 'cadre' has a definite legal
connotation. In the legal sense, the word 'cadre' is not
synonymous with service'. Fundamental R. 9(4) defines the
word 'cadre' to mean the strength of a service or part of a
service sanctioned as a separate unit. THE post of the
Director which is the highest post in the Directorate, is
carried on a higher grade or scale, while the posts of
Deputy Directors are borne in a lower grade or scale and
therefore constitute two distinct cadres or grades. It is open
to the Government to constitute as many cadres in any
particular service as it may choose according to the
administrative convenience and expediency and it cannot
be said that the establishment of the Directorate
constituted the formation of a joint cadre of the Director
and the Deputy Directors because the posts are not
interchangeable and the incumbents do not perform the
same duties, carry the same responsibilities or draw the
same pay. The conclusion is irresistible that the posts of
the Director and those of the Deputy Directors constitute
different cadres of the Service. It is manifest that the post of
the Director of Indigenous Medicines, which is the highest
post in the Directorate carried on a higher grade or scale,
could not possibly be equated with those of the Deputy
Directors on a lower grade or scale. In view of this,
according to the 50 point roster, if in a particular cadre a
single post falls vacant, it should, in the case of first
vacancy, be considered as general. That being so, the State
Government could not have directed reservation of the post
of Deputy Director (Homeopathic) which was the first
vacancy in a particular cadre i.e. that of the Deputy
Directors, for candidates belonging to the scheduled castes.
Such reservation was not in conformity with the principles
laid down in the 50 point roster and was impermissible
under Art. 16(4) of the Constitution and clearly violative of
the, guarantee enshrined in Art. 16(1) of equal opportunity
to all citizens relating to public employment. Clause (4) of
Art. 16 is by way of an exception to the proviso to Art.
16(1). THE High Court rightly held that the reservation of
the post of Deputy Director (Homeopathic) amounted to
100% reservation which was impermissible under Art. 16(4)
as otherwise it would render the guarantee of equal
opportunity in the matter of public employment under Art.
16(l) wholly elusive and meaningless.
        Another serious infirmity in the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellant is that it overlooks, the
basic principle that if there is only one post in the cadre,
there can be no reservation under Art. 16(4) of the
Constitution. The whole concept of reservation for
application of the 50 point roster is that there are more
than one post, and the reservation as laid down by this
Court in M.R. Balaji's case ( AIR 1963 SC 649) can be up to
50%. The Government cannot, for instance, declare that the
post of the Director of Indigenous Medicines shall be
reserved for candidates belonging to scheduled castes. The
Directorate is a paramedical service with Director as its
head and the there Deputy Directors belonging to three
distinct and separate disciplines viz. Homeopathic, Unani
and Ayurvedic under him. In the para-medical system the
three posts of Deputy Directors pertain to three distinct
systems and therefore each of them is an isolated post by
itself. The same principle should, we think, as in the case of
the Director, apply.

        Similarly, the same question has fallen for consideration
before the Supreme Court once again in Jitendra Kumar Singh
and Anr. Vs. Respondent: State of U.P. and Ors. , wherein, the
principle has been enunciated as under clearly:
        From the above it becomes evident that the very
premise on the basis of which Madhav case (1997 AIR SCW  
3113) was decided has been held to be erroneous.
Thereafter it is further observed in paragraph 30 that "it
also appears that the decision in Indra Sawhney case (1992
AIR SCW 3682) has also not been properly appreciated in
Madhav decision." The conclusion of the judgement is given
in paragraph 37 which is as under (Para 38 of 1998 AIR
SCW 1553):-
"37. We, therefore, approve the view taken in Chakradhar
Case (AIR 1988 SC 959) that there cannot be any
reservation in a single post cadre and we do not approve
the reasonings in Madhav Case (1997 AIR SCW 3113), Brij
Lal Thakur case (1997 AIR SCW 1937) and Bageshwari  
Prasad case upholding reservation in a single post cadre
either directly or by device of rotation of roster point.
Accordingly, the impugned decision in the case of Post
Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research,
Chandigarh is, therefore, allowed and the judgment dated
2.5.1997 passed in Civil Appeal No.3175 of 1997 is set
aside."
        In view of the clear principle spelt out by the Supreme Court,
any attempt to apply the principles of reservation to single and
isolated posts of Managers would be wholly impermissible.

        However, Sri P. Sri Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel had
adverted to the aspect that there are more number of posts of
Managers in each cadre. The learned Senior Counsel has also
criticized that the action of the Corporation which has not
specifically adverted to and brought out the final cadre strength
approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, in its
pleadings for the Managers categories. It could be due to the
failure to grasp the significance and distinction between single
cadre and multi member cadre posts in the matter of applicability
of principles of social sector reservations. In the absence of any
such plea or material produced by the Corporation, it would be
hazardous on the part of this Court to record a finding of fact
firmly that there is more than one post available in each cadre
such as Manager (Personal & Administration or HRD), Manager
(Finance), Manager (Marketing), Manager (Plants & Projects),
Manager (Procurement & Inputs), Manager (Oil Palm Development)
and Manager (Divisional Officer at Field Level).  However, on the
last occasion, the Corporation seemed to have addressed a
communication to its standing counsel, a copy of which Sri
Praveen Kumar has circulated for my consideration. It emerges
from the contents thereof that the petitioners have been
subsequently promoted as Managers. This event of promotion of
the petitioners would only leave a hint that there are more number
of posts than one available in the cadre of Managers in the service
of the Corporation. Otherwise, the petitioners could not have been
promoted while the unofficial respondents are still holding the
same posts of Managers. Such a promotion could only become  
possible if only there is one more post of Manager available.
Otherwise, two people could not have been appointed and
promoted against one single post. It is for the Corporation to sort it
out, this factual controversy. However, it is worthy to note that
where there are two or more number of posts available in a cadre
the principle evolved in Chakradhar Paswans case (referred supra)
will not get attracted. Dealing with this very aspect- where there
are two posts of Principals available - the Supreme Court in Arati
Ray Choudhury v. Union of India  case held as under:
        The model roster accompanying the letter of the
Railway Board dated 16/01/1964 is designed to meet the
requirements of the new situation arising out the rules
framed in deference to the judgment in Devadasan's case,
(1964) 4 SCR 680 = ( AIR 1964 SC 179). Both the letter and
the Note appended to the roster state expressly that if
"there are only two vacancies to be filled on a particular
occasion, not more than one may be treated as reserved
and if there by only one vacancy, it should be treated as
unreserved". THE words "on a particular occasion" were
substituted on 2/09/1964 by the words "year of
recruitment". Thus, in the first place each year of
recruitment is directed to be considered separately and by
itself as laid down in Devadasan's case, (1964) 4 SCR 680,
694-695 = ( AIR 1964 SC 1790) so that if there are only two
vacancies to be filled in a particular year of recruitment,
not more than one vacancy can be treated as reserved.
Secondly, and that is directly relevant for our purpose, if
there be only one vacancy to be filled in a given year of
recruitment, it has to be treated as unreserved irrespective
of whether it occurs in the model roster at a reserved point.
THE appointment then is not open to the charge that the
reservation exceeds 50 Per Cent for, if the very first vacancy
in the first year of recruitment is in practice treated as a
reserved vacancy, the system may be open to the objection
that the reservation not only exceeds 50 Per Cent but is in
fact cent per cent. But, if "on this account" that is to say, if
on account of the requirement that the first vacancy must
in practice be treated as unreserved even if it occurs in the
model roster at a reserved point, "a reserved point is treated
as unreserved" the reservation can be carried forward to
not more than two subsequent years of recruitment. Thus,
if two vacancies occur, say, within an initial span of three
years, the first vacancy has to be treated as an unreserved
vacancy and the second as reserved.

        The corporation is a public sector undertaking. When it
undertakes direct recruitment, it should be very cautious and
careful. If, for any reason, the process of direct recruitment is
faulted or vitiated, the candidate who was selected by it and who
joined the service will get caught in the cross-fire. A direct recruit
candidate cannot be reverted back to any other lower post. He is
normally picked up, while competing with the other candidates,
from the open market. Therefore, for any reason, the process of
direct recruitment is found fault with, then, he will have to be sent
out of the service of the Corporation altogther, but cannot be
reverted. Same would be the prospect even in case of an internal
candidate. An internal candidate offered his candidature only
because he satisfied the recruitment criteria in all respects
including the upper age limit. He is required to compete with the
candidates drawn from the open market. For all practical
purposes, he is standing at par with the candidate drawn from the
open market. If, for any reason, when the direct recruitment
process fails, he will have to be terminated from the employment of
the Corporation like any other candidate drawn from the open
market. Therefore, keeping this grave consequence in mind, the
Corporation would regulate its affairs properly and carefully from
now on.

        Accordingly, a declaration is issued that the principle of
reservation in favour of various social sectors segments in so far as
single cadre posts is impermissible and it will be violative of the
concept of equality enshrined under Articles 14 & 16 of our
Constitution. The Corporation would accordingly regulate the
entire exercise.

        The writ petitions stand disposed of with this order.
Miscellaneous applications pending shall stand closed. No costs.


_______________________________________      
JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO          
Date:19-01-2015

the believability of the explanation is important. The believability depends on the nature of explanation offered. In the instant case, the explanation pivots on Ex.D.2 document. Had this vital piece of evidence was not in the custody and reach of AO till it was produced in Court, no inference of manipulation can be drawn against AO, however it was admittedly said to be in his own custody and still it was not produced at the earliest point of time without any plausible reason. In such an event, the genuinity of Ex.D.2 cannot be accepted

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO          

Criminal Appeal No.518 of 2006

19-01-2015

V. Venkataswamy.... Appellant

The State ACB, Warangal Range, Warangal Rep. by Spl. Public Prosecutor for ACB  
cases,High Court of Judicature, Hyderabad.. Respondent

Counsel for Appellant: Sri Badeti Venkata Rathnam

Counsel for Respondent  : Sri R. Ramachandra Reddy
                          Special Public Prosecutor for ACB
<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1)      (2011) 6 SCC 450
2)      (2009) 3 SCC 779
3)      AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1558
4)      (2006) 1 SCC 401
5)      AIR 1976 Supreme Court 294(1)
6)      1972 Crl.L.J. 1293 (SC)
7)      AIR 2002 SC 486
8)      2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 933 (AP)


HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO        
Criminal Appeal No.518 of 2006
JUDGMENT:  
        This Criminal Appeal is preferred by the Accused Officer (AO)
aggrieved by the judgment dated 27.03.2006 in C.C.No.18 of 2002 passed by
learned Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad
convicting him for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short P.C Act) and sentencing him
to undergo R.I for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in
default to suffer S.I for three months on first count and to undergo R.I for a
period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to suffer
S.I for six months on second count with a direction that the substantive
sentences of imprisonment under both counts shall run concurrently.
2)      The factual matrix of the case is thus:
a)      AOV. Venkata Swamy worked as Executive Officer (Endowments),    
in Sri Veerabhadra Swamy Devasthanam Temple, Kuravi Village and  
Mandal, Warangal District. According to prosecution, R.Ravinder Reddy
complainant (PW1) was eking out his livelihood by undertaking small
contracts.  In the month of June, 2000, he was entrusted with repairing work
of Kuravi Sree Veerabhadra Swamy Devasthanam for ensuing Jatara by
PW.3the then Executive Officer, Sri Kumara Swamy, and he had executed  
the work within a month and Deputy Executive EngineerSri D. Prabhakar
Rao, Endowments Department estimated it at Rs.15,847/- and out of it
Rs.4,000/- was already paid to PW.1 by the then Executive Officer in cash.
PW.4 succeeded PW.3 on his transfer as incharge E.O and later AO
succeeded him. On 21.12.2000, the AO has issued cheque for Rs.7,900/-,
leaving a balance of Rs.3,947/- and in that connection, PW.1 used to meet
AO and wander around him.  Atlast on 07.03.2001, during noon time, when
PW.1 met AO and enquired about the cheque for balance amount, AO  
questioned him that he did not pay any percentage earlier when he received
the amount and also despite allotting other Devasthanams contracts and
demanded him to pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- as bribe so as to issue cheque for
the balance amount of Rs.3,947/-, threatening him that in case his demand
was not met, he would delay the payments concerning other works entrusted
to him and that PW.1 would sustain loss and also asked him to get Rs.1,000/-
any day after ensuing Monday, then only he would write the cheque.
b)      Unwilling to pay bribe, PW1 submitted Ex.P.1complaint to DSP,
ACB, Warangal (PW8) on 08.03.2001 at about 11:00am, who registered the  
same as a case in Cr.No.9/ACB-ACB-WRL/2001 on 13.03.2001 at 8:00am    
and successfully laid a trap against AO on 13.03.2001 at his office. On
completion of investigation, charge sheet was laid against AO.
c)      On appearance of AO, charges under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) r/w
13(2) of  P.C. Act were framed against him and trial was conducted.
d)      During trial, PWs.1 to 9 were examined and Exs.P1 to P14 were
marked and MOs.1 to 8 were exhibited on behalf of prosecution. Exs.D.1 to
D.10 and Exs.X.1 to X9 were marked on behalf of defence.
e)      The AO filed written statement on 14.03.2005 contending that he
never demanded bribe amount from PW.1 and that PW.1 lodged a false  
complaint against him. He submitted that after he joined as Executive Officer
of Sri Veerabhadra Swamy Devasthanam, Kuravi, he worked sincerely and
implemented discipline among the staff and he issued memos to staff and
suspended several staff members.  He contended that PW.1 having obtained a
hand loan of Rs.1000/- from him on execution of Ex.D.2receipt dated
16.02.2001, while repaying it, got falsely implicated him in this case at the
instance of some other staff, who bore grudge against him. He lodged a
criminal complaint against some of the staff of Devasthanam and their
relatives for forcibly signing on the Attendance register for the period of
their
suspension and it was registered as Crime No.31/2001 in Mahabubabad Rural
P.S. and they were all arrested and remanded to judicial custody on
07.03.2001 and in reaction to said arrest and remand, the instant complaint
was lodged with the ACB on 08.03.2001 and he was implicated in a false
case and that the sequence of events that preceded the instant trap case
clearly establishes that the complaint lodged by PW.1 is definitely a
motivated complaint to harm him. He further submitted that he already
passed the dues of Rs.7,900/- and ordered to pay balance subject to receipt of
final orders from the Commissioner, Endowments, A.P, Hyderabad and noted
the same on Exs.P.5 and P.6 and further endorsed on note file directing
concerned clerk to put up a letter to the Commissioner for permission.
     He thus claimed that the complaint was motivated and he was
innocent.
f)      The trial Court on appreciation of evidence held that prosecution
proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly
convicted and sentenced the AO, as stated supra.
        Hence, the appeal by AO.
3)      Heard arguments of Sri Badeti Venkat Ratnam, learned counsel for
appellant/AO and Sri R.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Special Public
Prosecutor (Spl.P.P.) for ACB cases.
4)      Criticising the judgment of the trial Court, learned counsel for
appellant/AO argued thus:
a)      Firstly, he argued that no official favour was pending with AO so as to
make any demand.  He submitted that PW.3the earlier E.O entrusted the  
contract work to PW.1 without obtaining permission from the Commissioner,
Endowments and even paid an advance of Rs.4,000/- and after taking the
charge AO came to know this fact and so he endorsed on Ex.P.6note file
ordering payment of 3/4th of the contract amount, withholding the balance
1/4th amount to be paid after receiving orders from the Commissioner of
Endowments.  He also made a side order on the note file to put up a letter to
Commissioner of Endowments for permission.  Learned counsel vehemently  
argued that when the AO emphatically made it clear in writing that balance
amount should be paid to PW.1 only after receiving order from the
Commissioner of Endowments, there was nothing left in his hands to do any
official favour and therefore, absolutely there was no occasion for him to
demand bribe from PW.1.
b)      Secondly, denouncing the demand, learned counsel argued that AO
never demanded bribe as alleged and the theory of demand is only a
concoction made by PW.1 incited by some of the disgruntled staff of AO
who were suspended by him due to their misdeeds.  Learned counsel argued
that when the AO admittedly did not demand bribe while ordering payment
of 3/4th of the present contract amount and other contract amounts, it would
be highly unjust to impute that he demanded bribe for a petty balance amount
of Rs.3,000/- and odd.
c)      Thirdly, regarding further demand and acceptance of bribe on
13.03.2001 learned counsel argued that AO received the amount from PW1
as the loan amount due to him under Ex.D2 but not as bribe and he resonated
this fact twice during post-trap proceedings which was also incorporated in
Ex.P10second mediators report. However, the trial Court without
appreciating facts and evidence properly, rejected his spontaneous
explanation. Learned counsel argued that in the light of PW1 admitting his
handwriting and signature on Ex.D2, the onus of proof will be on prosecution
to establish that Ex.D2 was a fabricated document. He argued that the doubts
expressed by PW1 in his re-examination to the effect that earlier he submitted
a number of applications and letters in EOs office and the contents portion
of one of such letter or application might have been torn and on the space
available above the words itlu mee videyulu, the contents in Ex.D2 must
have been incorporated cannot be accepted for the reason that Ex.D2 contains
not only the admitted signature and handwriting of PW1 but also the date as
16.02.2001 and therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to explain as to
what letter or application dated 16.02.2001 was submitted by PW1 in the
office of EO to enable AO to utilise the same for fabricating Ex.D2. The
prosecution miserably failed to show the nature of application/letter allegedly
submitted by PW1 on 16.02.2001 and therefore, it is not apposite to discard
Ex.D2 on the strength of doubt expressed by PW1. Learned counsel further
argued that mere recovery of money from the person of accused shall not be
taken in isolation to decide the guilt of the AO and on the other hand, if the
other surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration, they would
depict that some of the staff suspended by AO became disgruntled and
gheroaed AO on 16.02.2001 along with Sarpanch and PW1 and they were  
arrested on the compliant lodged by AO and hence they used PW1 to foist a
false case against AO. Learned counsel submitted that these back ground
facts would show that PW1 in collusion with his villagers implicated AO in a
false case and unfortunately the trial Court without proper appreciation of
facts and evidence convicted AO. He relied upon the following decisions to
buttress his argument that mere recovery of money divorced from
circumstances under which it was paid is not sufficient to convict the
accused:
1)      State of Kerala and another vs. C.P. Rao
2)      C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala
3)      Gulam Mahmood A. Malek vs. The State of Gujarat
4)      T. Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu
d)      He further submitted that for the demand and acceptance of bribe
except the sole testimony of PW1 there is no other proof and PW1 being
highly interested since his relative was also one of the suspended employees
and he was amenable to co-villagers, his evidence cannot be accepted for
convicting the accused. He relied upon the following decisions to stress that
the evidence of interested or motivated witness shall not be believed without
corroboration by independent and reliable witnesses:
1)      Sat Paul vs. Delhi Administration
2)      Ram Prakash Arora vs. The State of Punjab
e)      Learned counsel for appellant argued that AO offered spontaneous
explanation and merely because he did not produce Ex.D2receipt
immediately after trap, on the ground alone his explanation shall not be
rejected. He submitted that even if an explanation was not offered
spontaneously, still the same can be considered if it is reliable though offered
at the stage of trial.  On this aspect he relied upon the following decisions:
1)      Punjabrao vs. State of Maharashtra
2)      S.V.S. Kodanda Rao vs. State of A.P
He thus prayed to allow the appeal.
5 a)    Per contra, learned Spl.P.P. while supporting the judgment firstly
argued that PW1 had no motive to implicate accused in a false case as
contended by AO and none of his relations was working in the EOs office
and suspended and hence he had no axe to grind against AO.  Except harping,
AO could not prove the alleged ill-motive for PW1 to foist a false case.  Even
the incident dated 16.02.2001 is concerned, PW1 had nothing to do with the
same and that was why AO did not include his name inEx.D7FIR.  
Moreover, even after incident dated 16.02.2001, AO paid amount to PW1 for
the works undertaken by him and PW1 issued Ex.X3receipt dt.26.02.2001.  
Further, admittedly AO allotted certain other contract works to PW1 as EO of
Kuravi temple. All these would show that there were no ill-feelings between
PW1 and AO. So, attribution of motive to PW1 is only a vain attempt on the
part of AO to wriggle out of genuine compliant given against him by PW1.
b)      Secondly, the pendency of official favour and demand are concerned,
learned Spl.P.P argued that as per PW1 the demand was made not only for
the paltry balance amount relating to present contract but also for passing
bills in other contract works and therefore, merely because AO proposed to
obtain permission from Commissioner of Endowments for releasing balance
amount, it cannot be said that no official favour was pending with him. He
argued that the pendency of official favour and demand are to be viewed in a
holistic manner rather than in isolation to the present contract work alone.
Regarding demand, he argued that since it became clear that PW1 has not
tried to implicate AO, his evidence touching the aspect of AO demanding
him bribe of Rs.1,000/- can be accepted and in fact the trial Court rightly
believed his evidence in that regard.
c)      Thirdly, regarding further demand and acceptance of bribe, he argued
that in this case the bribe amount was admittedly accepted by accused and it
was found with him therefore, presumption under Section 20 of PC Act
would follow. The spontaneous explanation offered by accused is concerned,
he argued that the same cannot be believed because he produced Ex.D2  
receipt only during trial but did not produce the same at the time of post-trap
proceedings or at the time of search of his house. Further, Ex.D2 ex-facie
would show that it is a fabricated document because on all the previous
occasions PW1 used to pass receipts in his own handwritings and as such
there was no need for him to sign on a typed receipt like Ex.D2. Further, he
had enough money because just few days prior to 16.02.2001 he received
amounts from AO towards his contract works and therefore, he had no
necessity to borrow paltry amount of Rs.1,000/-. Considering all these
aspects, the trial Court rightly rejected the defence plea and convicted him.
He thus prayed to dismiss the appeal.
6)      In the light of above rival arguments, the point for determination in this
appeal is:
Whether the judgment of the trial Court is factually and legally
sustainable?
7)      POINT: The precise accusation of prosecution is that AO being the
Executive Officer of Veerabhadra Swamy Devasthanam, Kuravi demanded  
bribe amount of Rs.1,000/- from PW1 who is the contractor for releasing the
balance amount of Rs.3,847/- relating to contract works entrusted to him in
June, 2000 by the then EO (PW3) and also for releasing the amounts
concerning to other contract works, AO refuted the charges and pleaded
innocence. Regarding allegation of further demand and acceptance of
Rs.1,000/- on the date of trap i.e. 13.03.2001, his explanation was that he
accepted the same towards repayment of loan amount taken by PW1 under  
Ex.D2-receipt.
a)      Before adverting to the findings of the trial Court on the aspects of
demand and acceptance of bribe and explanation offered by the AO, I
consider it apt to discuss whether the complaint lodged by PW1 with ACB
police is motivated to implicate him in a false case. According to AO, the
complaint was a motivated one.  As per his written statement, after he joined
as Executive Officer of Veerabhadra Swamy Devastanam, Kuravi he worked
sincerely and tried to implement discipline among the staff who were very
irregular and indisciplined prior to his joining. He issued memos and
suspended four staff members of Devasthanam. Ex.X9 is a memo issued to
PW2. Of the four suspended staff members N.Jagadishwara Rao and M.Somi  
Reddy are related to SarpanchN.Prasad Rao and PW1.  On 16.02.2001 the    
suspended employees along with some villagers and Sarpanch and PW1  
entered the office when AO was attending his work and waiting for arrival of
Regional Joint Commissioner in connection with an enquiry against him and
they gheroaed AO and the suspended employees forcibly signed in the
attendance register for the period of their suspension and further they
demanded to raise the suspension and pay the salaries.  Against their
atrocious acts, AO lodged a compliant in Cr.No.13/2002 in Mahabubabad
Rural Police Station vide Ex.D7FIR and the accused were arrested by the
police and enlarged on bail on 07.03.2001.  Thereafter all of them including
PW1 colluded together and dubbed the date of their release i.e. 07.0.32001 as
the date of first demand allegedly made by AO and PW1 lodged a false
complaint against AO on 08.03.2001. None of the facts in Ex.P1report is
true, since Ex.P1 is a motivated one. It is the further argument of AO that
PW1 in fact borrowed Rs.1,000/- on 16.02.2001 to meet the medical
expenditure of his son who was indisposed and on the date of trap i.e.
13.03.2001 he paid Rs.1,000/- towards repayment of loan and got him
trapped as if the said amount was bribe. In light of this argument, the facts
and evidence are to be scrutinized.
b)      When the contention of AO is scrutinized the motive alleged against
PW1 can be believed if it is established that one of his relations was
suspended by AO causing heart burn to him and the suspended employees  
prevailed upon PW1 to lodge a false complaint against AO to wreak-
vengeance against him. AO though not by strict proof, atleast by
preponderance of probabilities must bring forth the nexus between
suspending employees and PW1.  Atleast he must able to prove the presence
of PW1 along with mob on 16.02.2001 so as to infer that PW1 was one
among the participants. In that context the evidence of PW1 in the cross-
examination is pertinent.  He stated thus:
I know the entire staff of AOs office. I know M.Somi Reddy,
M.Jagadishwara Rao, Sri C.Srinivas and R.Narayana Rao, Jaya
Shanker and Sudhershan. Somi Reddy is not my relative. I have no
acquaintance with Prasad Rao who is Sarpanch of Korvi village. Only I
heard his name. I do not know Jagdishwar Rao is the brother of
Sarpanch. I learnt that Somi Reddy, Jagadishwara Rao, Srinivas and
Narayana Rao were suspended by the AO on 20.12.2000 but I do not
know whether he was suspended by the AO and whether it was on  
20.12.2000.  It is not true to suggest that on 16.02.2001 myself and all 4
of them along with Sarpanch went to the office of the AO and created
nuisance by abusing him and that the suspended officers forcibly signed
in the attendance register from the date of their suspension. I do not
know whether AO has given compliant in that connection against the
suspended clerks and the followers of the Sarpanch and whether the
Crime No.13/2001 of P.S. Mahabubabad Rural was registered and
whether they were sent to judicial remand on 07.03.2001. It is not true
to suggest that on account of that incident from the next day onwards in
collusion with the above staff members and the Sarpanch, I have lodged
Ex.P1 levelling all false allegations.
        So, from the above evidence it is clear that PW1 staunchly denied his
relationship with Somi Reddy one of the suspended employees.  He also
denied his acquaintance with SarpanchPrasad Rao.  Most importantly he
denied his associating with the suspended employees and Sarpanch and
going to the office of AO on 16.02.2001 and creating nuisance and abusing
the AO etc. facts.  Therefore, it must be said that nothing could be extracted
from the evidence of PW1 to substantiate that PW1 bore grudge due to the
suspension of employees and due to AO lodging complaint. Apart from this
denial, the AO in Ex.D7complaint has not at all included the names of
PW1 and Sarpanch as participants and even after investigation also the
police have not shown them as accused in Ex.D9charge sheet. So,  
absolutely PW1 is nothing to do with the suspension of employees and their
attacking AO on 16.02.2001. As rightly observed by the trial Court, from the
mere coincidence of date of demand i.e. 07.03.2001 with the date of arrest
and remand of four suspended employees, it cannot be readily inferred that
PW1 was incited by them to lodge a false complaint particularly when the
nexus between PW1 and accused in Cr.No.13/2001 was not even remotely  
established. Added to above, the record shows that even after 16.02.2001
there were work transactions between PW1 and AO evidenced by X3  
money receipt passed by PW1 in favour of AO on 26.02.2001.  Under Ex.X3
PW1 passed money receipt for Rs.13,000/-. Had PW1 participated in the
attack on 16.02.2001, certainly AO would not have paid money of
Rs.13,000/- on 26.02.2001. So, the motive alleged against PW1 has no legs
to stand.
c)      Then, official favour is concerned, it is the strong argument on behalf
of AO that as the predecessor of AO entrusted contract work to PW1 without
obtaining permission from Commissioner Endowments, the AO wanted to  
straighten the issue and so while ordering on Ex.P6note file for payment
of 3/4th of contract amount, he endorsed that balance amount will be paid
after receiving final order from the Commissioner Endowments and he also
made an order on the side note to put up a letter to the Commissioner for
permission. It is argued that the aforesaid order of AO would show that he
wanted to deal with the matter as per procedure and since he already made
such an order, nothing more was left with him to do official favour and so
the question of his demanding bribe does not arise.
d)      It is true that the order passed on Ex.P6note file would show that
while ordering payment of 3/4th of the contract amount he made it clear that
balance amount will be released on receiving orders from the Endowment
Commissioner. He also directed PW2 to put up a letter to the Commissioner
for permission. So, the point is whether by virtue of the above order, any
official favour was pending with AO. To answer this question, we should
verify the evidence of PW1 and Ex.P1 to know in what context AO
demanded bribe. As per the evidence of PW1 whenever he used to approach
AO for payment of balance amount of Rs.3,947/-, he used to postpone it on
one or other pretext. Thereafter on 07.03.2001 when he met AO he asked
him to give percentage in that amount by saying that he (PW1) had not given
any percentage in the bill amount already received and that he would allot
some more works to him and on that ground he demanded Rs.1,000/- as  
bribe for releasing the balance amount. Then, in Ex.P1 also PW1 mentioned
that when he met AO on 07.03.2001 and asked about his balance amount he  
stated that he did not give any percentage for the amounts already taken and
further he entrusted some more contract works and so if he pay Rs.1,000/-,
he would issue the cheque for the balance amount of Rs.3,947/- or otherwise
he would delay the payment of amounts concerning to other works and
thereby he would suffer loss. Therefore, the pendency of official favour and
demand are concerned, as rightly argued by Spl.P.P. we have to visualise in
holistic manner rather than isolating the present contract. It is no doubt, the
present contract is concerned, AO made an endorsement on Ex.P6 that the
balance amount would be paid after receiving the order from the Endowment
Commissioner.  However, that is not the only point to decide the issue.  PW1
was the contractor attending different contract works in Veerabhadra Swamy
Temple and AO was the Executive Officer. The demand of bribe was not
only for payment of balance amount concerning the present contract work
but also for entrustment of other works for smooth payment of the amounts.
Viewing in that broader view, it can be said that official favour was pending
with AO. Then demand is concerned, as stated supra, as per PW1 when he  
met AO on 07.03.2001 he demanded bribe of Rs.1,000/-. Demand was  
attacked firstly on the ground that when AO admittedly did not demand
bribe on previous occasions, it would be highly improbable to believe that he
would demand bribe for paying a paltry amount of Rs.3,947/-. Further, on
the aspect of demand except the interested and motivated testimony of PW1
there was no independent corroboration. I am unable to accept the argument
of AO. No doubt, AO did not demand bribe while ordering payment of 3/4th
of contract amount and also paying amounts covered by other contract
works.  However, that is not the end of the matter. When the evidence of
PW1 and Ex.P1 are scrutinized, we would know that AO demanded bribe  
for the past bills and also for paying the balance amount covered by present
contract work.  So, merely because he did not demand bribe on previous
occasions, it cannot be concluded that he was not a bribe monger. Then,
demand is concerned, no doubt, PW1 was the sole witness for demand said
to be made by AO and it is natural because nobody would like to make a
demand for bribe in the presence of others. Now, the veracity of the
evidence of PW1 is concerned, we have already discussed that there was no
ill-motive for PW1 to implicate AO in a false case and that AO failed to
establish such motive.  When such a motive is excluded, there can be no
hurdle to believe the evidence of PW1 on the aspect of demand made by
AO. His evidence is corroborated by Ex.P1complaint and also PW6  
mediator.
e)      PW6 deposed that when himself and Sarangam (LW10) approached    
DSP on 13.03.2001, he introduced PW1 to them and gave a copy of FIR and  
they have gone through FIR. They enquired about the contents of Ex.P1 with
PW1. He avouched the contents therein and as a token of going through the
copy of FIR, they attested on Ex.P8copy of FIR.  So, the evidence of PW6
would show that on their enquiry also PW1 narrated about the demand made
by AO and his giving compliant to ACB police. In this regard, the cited
decisions reported in Sat Paul and Ram Prakash Aroras cases (5 and 6
supra) will not help the case of AO.  As laid down in those decisions, there
can be no demur that evidence of interested and motivated witness should be
viewed carefully and if necessary corroboration has to be sought for from
independent reliable witnesses. However, in the instant case, PW1 being not
motivated, his evidence is reliable and further his evidence gets
corroboration from Ex.P1 and PW6.
8)      Then coming to further demand and acceptance of bribe, as per
prosecution on 13.03.2001 PW1 on the instructions of PW8 went to the
office of AO at about 11.30 AM and found AO in his seat talking with
pilgrims and he also found PW2the UDC and Sudharshan (LW3) working    
in their seats and so he sat and waited upto 12.30 PM. Thereafter, he told
AO that he wanted to go away. On that AO stated he was leaving to
Hyderabad and returning on the next day and after return from Hyderabad he
would issue cheque. Then AO enquired whether he brought the proposed
bribe amount and PW1 affirmed and then AO took PW1 inside the anteroom  
and there on further demand of AO, PW1 handed over the tainted amount to
AO which he received and counted and kept in his left side pant pocket.
Then, PW1 came out and gave pre-arranged signal and thereafter trap party
members rushed and caught hold AO and conducted further proceedings.  
This is precisely the prosecution version on further demand and acceptance
of bribe by AO. The prosecution in order to prove the aforesaid aspects
relied upon the evidence of PWs.1, 2, 6 and 8 coupled with Ex.P10second
mediators report.
a)      In this case, AO admits to have accepted the amount from PW1 but of
course, his contention as already narrated earlier is that on 16.02.2001 PW1
approached him at his house and took a hand loan of Rs.1,000/- for meeting
the medical expenditure of his ailing son and on the date of trap PW1
handed over the tainted amount as if he was repaying the loan contracted
under Ex.D2. So, the crucial point is whether the AO accepted the amount as
bribe as contended by prosecution or whether he innocently received the
amount towards discharge of loan. It should be noted that AO during the
post-trap proceedings twice stated that he received Rs.1,000/- from PW1
towards loan amount due to him and this fact was admitted by PWs.6 and 8
and incorporated in Ex.P10 also. Since PWs.6 and 8 are not the direct
witnesses for what has transpired between PW1 and AO before trap, their
evidence is not useful to clinch whether AO accepted the amount as bribe or
towards discharge of loan. Hence, the prosecution case on the aspect of
further demand and acceptance of bribe mainly pivots on the evidence of
PWs.1 and 2.
b)      PW1 in his evidence clearly stated that AO told him that he was going
to Hyderabad on next day and after returning from Hyderabad he would
issue a cheque and then enquired whether he brought the proposed bribe
amount and PW1 affirmed and thereafter AO took him to the ante-room
attached to his room and there, on his demand PW1 handed over the amount
which he received and counted and kept in his left side pant pocket.  So, as
per PW1 he accepted the amount only as bribe but nothing else.
c)      PW2Ch.Jayashankar who is a Senior Assistant in the EOs office is
concerned, his version is that on 13.03.2001 he and Sudharshan (LW3) and
AO were present in their office and PW1 came to their office at about 11.30
AM and at that time they were talking with the employees of electrical
department with regard to ensuing Jatara and PW1 sitting in front of the seat
of AO for about one hour and talked to AO and thereafter at first PW1 went
into the back room and AO also went inside of the room and 5 or 10 minutes
thereafter, PW1 came out of that room and went outside and AO sat in his
seat and within 5 minutes thereafter ACB officials came their and conducted
trap proceedings. So, the evidence of PW2 is to the effect that he witnessed
AO and PW1 going into the anteroom. This way the prosecution sought
corroboration from PW2. The AO sought to nullify the version of PW1
through loan repayment theory. PW2 is concerned, the contention of AO is
that PW2 and LW3 were not at all present in the office at the crucial time
and prosecution inducted them to give a colour of truth to its story and PW2
was enimically disposed of towards AO, since he issued Ex.X9charge
memo against him.
d)      In the light of above respective stands of both parties, it has to be
examined whether AO accepted the amount as bribe or towards discharge of
loan. Before that, since the demand aspect projected by the prosecution is
believed and since acceptance of the amount was admitted and also
established through the recovery of tainted amount from the pant pocket of
AO and chemical test conducted on his both hands and inner linings of the
pant pocket proved positive, the mandatory presumption under Section 20 of
PC Act shall follow to the effect that AO accepted the amount as motive or
reward for doing an official favour. Hence, it has to be seen whether the AO
could rebut the presumption through the explanation offered by him.  Before
scrutinizing veracity of his explanation it is apt to discuss the evidence of
PWs.1 and 2 regarding the nature of amount offered by PW1.
9)      As stated supra, PW1 emphatically stated that he paid the amount to
AO only as bribe on his further demand.  Further, in his cross-examination
he denied receiving any loan from AO. His evidence on this aspect is thus:
It is not true to suggest that I have received Rs.1,000/- as per the
contents in that typed receipt and signed in it (the witness volunteers)
whenever I received amount I would be passing a receipt in my own
hand.  Ex.D2 is the said receipt (marked for identification purpose and
only to the extent of signature of PW1). It is not true to suggest that on
16.02.2001 in the morning hours I approached AO at his house and
requested him to give a loan of Rs.1,000/- as my son was unwell and the
AO has given that amount and obtained Ex.D2.  On the day I gave 164
Cr.P.C. Statement, before I went to the Court the AO has telephoned me
and threatened me that he has got receipt and I should not give
statement adverse to him. Then only I came to know about Ex.D2. It is
true I have mentioned in 164 Cr.P.C. statement that AO has threatened
me that he got receipt that I have taken loan and that he would get a
case booked against me for getting him falsely implicated and according
to me it is a false receipt which I have mentioned in it.
    x x x x
He further deposed thus:
It is not true to suggest that Ex.D2 is a genuine receipt passed by me
and to overcome it, I have concocted a story and thereby even referred
that story in my 164 Cr.P.C. statement.  It is not true to suggest that
even on the date of trap the AO has received an amount of Rs.1,000/-
and that I told him that I was returning that amount as the amount
borrowed from him and that he asked me to come on that evening to
pass a receipt and thereafter only I came outside the office. It is not true
to suggest that myself and AO did not at all go into ante-room and that
at that time myself and AO alone were present in his office room and
Jayashanker and Sudharshan were not at all present in that room. It is
not true to suggest that the suspended staff and Sarpanch instigated me
having paid me Rs.10,000/- to lodge false complaint and to get the AO
implicated falsely by arranging the instant trap.
a)     So, when the above cross-examination is perused, it is clear that
nothing specific was extracted from PW1 to make him admit that the amount
was paid towards discharge of loan contracted under Ex.D2. What all
extracted was that even after knowing before giving 164 Cr.P.C. statement
that AO was in possession of Ex.D2, PW1 has not taken any steps and ACB  
officials have not investigated in those lines. Merely because they have not
done these acts, the veracity of evidence of PW1 will not be affected and
authencity of Ex.D2 will not be established particularly, when AO failed to
establish any motive for PW1 to foist a false case against him. So, at the
outset there is nothing on record to discard the evidence of PW1.
b)      PW2 is concerned, as stated supra, AO disputes about the very
presence of PW2 and LW3 at the office of AO at the crucial time.  It must be
said that this argument does not have teeth.  The trap took place in the office
of AO on a working day and during working hours.  PW2 and LW3 being
the employees of AO their presence in the office is a natural phenomenon.
Further, Ex.P7attendance register shows that both PW2 and LW3 signed  
on 13.03.2001 indicating their attending the office. Further, as observed by
the trial Court, in Ex.P11-sketch the seats of PW2 and LW3 are mentioned
near the seat of AO in the same room and Ex.P11 is not controverted.
Above all, in Ex.P10 it is mentioned that the TLO examined PW.2 and LW.3
and recorded their statements during post-trap proceedings.  Both of them
signed on Ex.P.10. Therefore, in my view, the presence of PW.2 and LW.3
at the crucial time need not be doubted.  As rightly observed by the trial
Court, if really TLO wanted to project the presence of PW.2 and LW.3 at the
time of trap despite their absence, he can only plan it subsequently but
cannot incorporate their presence instantaneously while preparing Ex.P.10.
It is difficult to get their signatures on Ex.P.10 in their absence.  Further,
if
he falsely mentioned their presence in Ex.P.10, the AO while endorsing
receipt of copy of Ex.P.10 would certainly protest about it.  However, AO
did not make any such protest but simply acknowledged the receipt of copy
of Ex.P.10.  All these would avouch the presence of PW.2 and LW.3.  So the
evidence of PW.2 proves a vital circumstance connecting to the case about
PW.1 and AO going to rear room and after few minutes their coming out and
then PW.1 going out of the office.  Their conduct gives scope for suspicion.
Had PW.1 only to repay the loan amount, there was no need for AO to take
him to the rear room. Here, with regard to the veracity of PW.2, it is
contended that AO issued charge memo against him under Ex.X.9 and  
subsequently placed him under suspension and hence out of spite PW.2
deposed falsehood to help prosecution as if AO and PW.1 went into the rear
room.  In my view, this argument was effectively dealt with by the trial
Court with reference to Ex.X.9file and conduct of AO after trap.  It is true
that AO issued charge memo dated 23.01.2000 directing PW.2 to submit his
explanation within 7 days and PW.2 received the memo on 23.12.2000.
However, record shows that he did not submit his explanation till the date of
trap and AO too, it appears, did not take any further action.  However,
surprisingly on 15.03.2001 i.e, immediately two days after trap, AO issued
another memo dated 15.03.2001 directing him to submit explanation within
7 days and placed him under suspension.  As rightly pointed out by the trial
Court, the very fact that within a couple of days after the trap, AO placing
PW.2 under suspension having kept mum for about 2  months shows that  
merely because of the memo dated 23.12.2000, PW.2 did not entertain any
grudge to speak falsehood against AO but on the other hand due to the
statement of PW.2 in Ex.P.10, AO suspended him within two days after the
trap.  So the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 projects a strong circumstance that the
amount paid by PW.1 to AO was towards bribe but not towards discharge of
loan.
10)     Now coming to the defence explanation, the same is not believable
because of the different reasons cogently cited by the trial Court.
a)      As rightly pointed out by the trial Court, just few days prior to
16.02.2001, AO paid contract bill amounts to PW.1.  On 12.02.2001, PW.1
received Rs.10,000/- (vide Ex.X.1receipt) and on 15.02.2001 i.e, a day
prior to the alleged loan transaction, again PW.1 received Rs.7,000/- (vide
Ex.X.2receipt). In such circumstances, when PW.1 was having money  
with him, it would be highly improbable to believe that he would borrow a
paltry sum of Rs.1,000/- on the morning of 16.02.2001 from AO. Further,
AO is the Executive Officer and PW.1 is a Contractor and it is difficult to
believe they have such intimacy to borrow loan. This is one of the strong
circumstances belying the loan theory.
b)      The next circumstance is that during the trap proceedings though AO
proclaimed that he received amount from PW.1 towards the discharge of
loan, surprisingly he did not whisper about Ex.D.2receipt.  Assuming that
in the charged circumstances he forgot to bring to the notice of trap party
members about Ex.D.2, nothing prevented him to show Ex.D.2 to them
during his house search conducted after trap on the same day.  In my
considered view, that was the proper time to divulge about the Ex.D.2, if it
were really in existence. Instead he belatedly mentioned about Ex.D.2 during
his explanation under Ex.D.4. Be that it may, he divulged about Ex.D.2
before Court only during trial. The conduct of AO concerning Ex.D.2
creates any amount of doubt regarding the genuinity of Ex.D.2.  It is true
that merely because an accused failed to offer a spontaneous explanation
regarding his possession of the bribe amount, the same cannot be rejected on
the ground that it was offered belatedly during trial, provided the
explanation is believable.  Similarly, when an accused offered spontaneous
explanation but failed to produce spontaneous proof in support of his
explanation, the same cannot be rejected when the proof is produced during
trial if the said proof is believable. So the believability of the explanation
is
important. The believability depends on the nature of explanation offered. In
the instant case, the explanation pivots on Ex.D.2 document.  Had this vital
piece of evidence was not in the custody and reach of AO till it was
produced in Court, no inference of manipulation can be drawn against AO,
however it was admittedly said to be in his own custody and still it was not
produced at the earliest point of time without any plausible reason.  In such
an event, the genuinity of Ex.D.2 cannot be accepted.  Further, Ex.D.2
appears on a small piece of paper and contents appear to be typewritten in
English and thereunder it is mentioned in the handwriting of PW.1 as itlu
mee videyulu and beneath it, his signature and date as 16.02.2001 and
within brackets Contractor are written.  When PW.1 is an educated person,
there is no reason why he did not write the contents of the receipt also in his
handwriting.  So the appearance of Ex.D.2 also throws doubt.
11)     So on a conspectus of the facts, circumstances and evidence relating
to Ex.D.2, no reliance can be placed on Ex.D.2.  The cited decisions will not
advance the cause of A.O. Therefore, it must be said that AO failed to rebut
the presumption through the explanation offered by him.  The trial court
rightly convicted and sentenced him for the offences under Section 7 and 13
(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of  P.C. Act and I find no merits in the appeal to set aside
the judgment of the trial Court.
12)     In the result, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed by confirming the
conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in C.C.No.18 of 2002.
Consequently, appellant/AO is directed to surrender before the trial Court on
or before 09.02.2015 and on such surrender, the trial Court shall commit him
to jail for serving sentence.
        As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if ay, shall stand
closed.
_________________________  
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J    
Date: 19.01.2015

Whether the sister can claim compensation under M.V.Act ? - Yes. Whether the Insurance company can be exonerated as difference in the type of licence held by the driver ? - No. - 2015 TELANGANA &A.P. MSKLAWREPORTS



In view of the above precedential jurisprudence, the Insurance
Company cannot be automatically exonerated merely because of the  
difference in the type of licence held by the driver.  the Insurance Company
shall establish that the owner has willfully committed breach of the terms of
the policy and further the defect in the driving licence is the fundamental
cause for the accident.  Inspite of establishing this fact, still the Tribunal
can 
direct the Insurance Company to pay compensation and recover from the 
owner.  In the instant case, the Insurance Company could not establish that
the owner willfully committed breach of the terms of the policy and non-
possession of transport driving licence was the fundamental cause for the
accident. It must be noted that driver was not altogether disqualified from
holding the licence. So in these circumstances, the Tribunal instead of
exempting the Insurance Company ought to have ordered pay and recover. 
Hence, such a direction is required in this appeal. This point is answered
accordingly.

 the claimant being
the sister of the deceased is not his dependant and hence does not deserve
compensation. It must be said that this argument does not hold water either
on facts or on law. On factual side, it is the case of claimant that she is the
own sister of the deceased and that the deceased had no wife and children
and he was a dumb person and similarly the claimant is also not having
husband and children and therefore, both of them were interdependent on
each other. This fact is not controverted by the respondent in the O.P. As
such, it is clear that the claimant is dependant as well as legal representative
of the deceased and hence she deserves compensation. Even the decision  
cited by the appellant in Manjuri Beras case (3 supra) reveals that the
liability under Section 140 of M.V. Act does not seize because of lack of
dependency. In that case, a claim petition was filed under Section 140 of
M.V. Act by the married daughter of the deceased. Thus it is clear that
dependency is not a sole factor for awarding compensation under M.V. Act.
In the instant case, the claimant besides being the legal representative of the
deceased, his dependant too.  - 2015 TELANGANA &A.P. MSKLAWREPORTS

Saturday, April 18, 2015

No Relatives who does not come under the defination of sec.2(f) Act - can be made as respondents in DVC case -No cognizance be taken ? -only allegations made against the relatives that under the influence of his parents and others and being instigated by them he had continued the harassment and subjected the complainant to both mental and physical torture. - which are emphasised supra, are omnibus and vague allegations without any details.- DVC against petitioner quashed - 2015 Telangana MSKLAWREPORTS 2 (f) domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family



2 (f)   domestic relationship means 
a relationship between two persons
 who live or
 have, at any point of time, lived together  in a
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or 
through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or 
are family members living together as a joint family

Whether the petitioners have made out valid and
sufficient grounds for quashing the proceedings
against them in D.V. Case No.11 of 2012 on the file of
learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at
Hayathnagar, Hyderabad?

No Relatives who does not come under the defination of sec.2(f) Act, can be made as respondents in  DVC case ?

2 (f)   domestic relationship means a relationship between two
persons
 who live or
 have, at any point of time, lived together  in a
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity,
marriage, or 
through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption or 
are family members living together as a joint family

The petitioners do not come within the definition of domestic
relationship as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act.  
They are not related by
consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of
marriage.  
They are also not the family members living together as joint
family.  
The contents of the petition of the 2nd respondent do not disclose
any acts of so called domestic violence committed by the petitioners
herein.  

 Apart from the
allegations against the husband, parents-in-law and the brother-in-law the
only allegations made against the relatives are as follows: 
However, being
under the influence of his parents and others and being instigated by them
he had continued the harassment and subjected the complainant to both 
mental and physical torture.  
Thus, suppressing the said fact, he had
married the 2nd respondent and had continued the torture for brining
dowry being instigated by his parents and relatives, whose names are
mentioned at the foot of said complaint.   
The said averments are omnibus in nature.  
In one of the said averments the words employed are -
under the influence of his parents and others and being instigated by
them.  
Who are the said others mentioned in the above statement is not
stated in the petition
The averments, which are
emphasised supra, are omnibus and vague allegations without any details.

Therefore, even on a plain consideration of all the uncontroverted
averments made in the petition of the 2nd respondent, it is obvious that the
same do not disclose a prima facie case against the present petitioners.  
On
this ground alone, the DV Case against the petitioners is liable to be
quashed. 

Whether the Magistrate ought not to have taken the case on file against the present
petitioners for the reason that the petitioners have no domestic
relationship and that they have never shared the household or lived
together in a shared household with the 2nd respondent and her husband?

it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions.
A person can be
arraigned as a respondent in a DV case provided he is or has been in a
domestic relationship with the aggrieved person.   
The proviso to Section
2(q) says that an aggrieved wife may also file a complaint against the relation of a husband.  

A plain reading of the said definition would make it
manifest that any person who can be arraigned as a respondent must be a 
person who is or has been in domestic relationship with the aggrieved
person and must have subjected the aggrieved person to any act of
domestic violence.   

Unless the said requirements are fulfilled a person cannot be arraigned as a respondent in a DV Case. 

 Coming to the aspect of
domestic relationship, the domestic relationship means a relationship
between two persons who either are living together or had at any point of
time lived together in a shared household when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.
The definition of shared household is already extracted supra.

Therefore, in the well-considered view of this Court, for
a person to be made a respondent in a DV case filed by an aggrieved
woman, such respondent, must have a domestic relationship with the 
aggrieved person and must have been living or must have lived together
in a shared household along with the aggrieved person when they are
related by consanguinity marriage or through a relationship in the nature
of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint
family.  
Therefore, when any person who is so related who has been not
living or had not lived together at any point of time with the aggrieved
person in a shared household and who has/had no domestic relationship 
cannot be made a respondent to a case filed by the woman under the 
provisions of the Act.
  To put it in other words, in order to make a person as a
respondent in a DV case filed under section 12 of the Act, there must be a
domestic relationship either in present or in the past between the
aggrieved person and the respondent.  In any case the domestic
relationship must be in existence at the relevant time when aggrieved
person has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent. 
 It is noticeable from the provisions that a domestic
relationship arises between the aggrieved person and another in case
when either they are living together or have at any point of time lived
together in a shared house hold and when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.
The aggrieved person and the respondent need not be living together in a
shared household at the time of the filing of the case/petition and it would
be sufficient if they had lived together at any point of time in the past,
when the alleged acts/omissions/conduct complained of had taken place. 

  Reverting to the facts of the case, all the petitioners are
residents of Prakasam District whereas the 2nd respondent is a resident of
Hyderabad.  Her husband, parents in law and brother-in-law are stated to
be residents of Secunderabad. 
 There is no averment in the petition of the
2nd respondent and no material is also placed on record to show that the
petitioners are having or had any domestic relationship with the 2nd
respondent.  It is not pleaded or shown by any material brought on record
that the petitioners and the 2nd respondent are living together or had lived
together at any point of time in a shared household and are having or had
a domestic relationship with the 2nd respondent. 
 Further, after the
proceedings in Crime No.204 of 2010 were quashed by this Court, by
orders dated 04.10.2012, the present DV case was filed by the 2nd
respondent.  
The law is well settled that in a matrimonial case like the
present case, when only a casual reference is made to the relatives of the
husband and there is absence of specific allegations of active involvement
in the matter and when the allegations made are omnibus and vague in
nature and when the un-controverted allegations made in the
complaint/DV case do not disclose even a prima facie case, the continuation
of the proceedings against such relatives of the husband would be an
abuse of judicial process.  
The above view of this Court finds support from
the ratio in the decision in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P .  Therefore, this
case is an evidently fit case to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of
process of court and secure the ends of justice. - 2015 Telangana msklawreports

the maximum speed of the vehicle like tractor trailer is a very low speed when compared to other heavy vehicles and that the cycle was not damaged and PW1 did not sustain injuries in the accident are no circumstances to brush aside the direct evidence showing the rashness and negligence on the part of the accused while driving the tractor trailer at the time of accident. PW1s evidence is very clear that after the tractor hit the cycle from behind he fell to the left side and that the deceased fell to the right side and that therefore, the deceased came under the wheels of the vehicle. Therefore, there is explanation for the cycle not getting damaged and PW1 not sustaining injuries in the subject accident. It is not the case of the accused that he has rendered necessary assistance to the victims after the accident in due discharge of his legal obligation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. His case is one of total denial. Therefore, it follows that he is liable to be punished for the offences with which he was charged.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE  M. SEETHARAMA MURTI        

Criminal Revision Case No.1100 of 2007

30-01-2015

Rajula Pothu Raju. Petitioner
                       
The State of Andhra Pradesh rep., by its Public Prosecutor... Respondent

Counsel for the petitioner:  Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana

Counsel for Respondent  : STATE


<Gist :


>Head Note:
? Cases referred:


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M.SEETHARAMA MURTI          

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1100 OF 2007      

ORDER:
                This Criminal Revision Case under Sections 397 and 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the CrPC) by the petitioner/sole
accused is directed against the judgment dated 23.07.2007 of the learned V
Additional Sessions Judge (Judge, Fast Track Court), Eluru of West Godavari
District passed in Criminal Appeal No.223/2006.
1.              (a)     By the judgment dated 02.11.2006 in C.C.No.283/2004 the
learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru had found the
accused guilty of the offences punishable under Section 304A of the Indian Penal
Code (for short, the IPC) and Sections 134(a) & (b) read with Section 187 of
the
Motor Vehicles Act and had convicted the accused of the said offences and
sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay
a fine of Rs.1000/- and suffer simple imprisonment for three months in default
in
payment of fine amount under the first count and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and
Rs.100/- respectively and to suffer simple imprisonment for three moths and one
week respectively in default of payments of the said fine amounts for the
offences under the other two counts.  The learned Additional Sessions Judge
while dismissing the appeal of the accused had confirmed the judgment of the
trial Court in all respects.
2.              I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused and also of the learned Public Prosecutor.  I have carefully
perused the material record.
2.              (a)     The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused would
submit as follows: - The trial Court misread and misinterpreted the facts as
well
as the evidence and mis-applied the law.  The trial court failed to appreciate
discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses with reference to their earlier
statements recorded by the police under Section 161(3) of the CrPC.  The cycle
was not damaged in the accident and the pillion rider on the cycle also did not
sustain even a simple injury.  Had the vehicle like a tractor trailer dashed the
cycle, PW1 would have also sustained injuries and the cycle would have been
damaged.  Therefore, there is reason to accept that no accident as alleged in
the
prosecution had taken place and that at any rate PW1 did not accompany the
deceased on the cycle at the time of the accident and that therefore, PW1 is not
present at the scene of offence at the time of accident.  The witnesses stated
that
the trailer ran over the deceased, whereas the investigation disclosed that the
rear tyre of the tractor had run over the deceased.  The evidence does not show
that there is rashness and negligence on the part of the accused.  The maximum
speed limit of a tractor is very low when compared to other heavy motor
vehicles; therefore, it cannot be said that the tractor was driven rashly or at
a
high speed.  The court below was unduly harsh in awarding the sentence.
2.              (b)     Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor had
submitted that the accused was rash and grossly negligent in driving the crime
vehicle; and, that his rash and negligent driving had resulted in the vehicle
dashing against the deceased who was peddling the cycle; and, that the Courts
below had appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in the right
perspective; and, that there is no merit in any one of the contentions raised by
the
revision petitioner/accused and that the revision is devoid of merit and is
liable
to be dismissed.
3.              Now the points for determination are: -
1.      Whether the prosecution had successfully
brought home the guilt of the accused, beyond
all reasonable doubt, for the offences
punishable under Sections 304A of the IPC and
under Sections 134(a) read with Section 187 and
134(b) read with Section 187 of the Motor
Vehicles Act?
2.      Whether the accused had made out valid and
sufficient grounds for his acquittal of the said
offences? And, if so, whether the judgment
impugned is liable to be set aside?

4.              POINTS:
4.              (a)     The case of the prosecution including the gravemen of the
charge, in brief, is as follows: On 20.02.2004 at about 10.00 AM, the accused
was
driving the tractor trailer bearing registration No.AP 37T 7585 and No.APW 9112
respectively.  While the said tractor, being driven by the accused, was
proceeding
from Pedapadu bridge road to Municipal Office, Eluru, the accused drove the
said vehicle at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the
cycle of Bobbadhi Venkateswararao (the deceased) from behind.  As a result,
S.Durgarao-PW1 who was traveling on the said bicycle fell on the left side and
the deceased, who was peddling the cycle, fell on the right side.  On that, the
rear
wheel of the tractor ran over the said deceased and the deceased had succumbed
to severe head injuries while undergoing treatment in the hospital.  Basing on
the
hospital intimation and the statement of PW1, the subject crime was registered
by the Station House Officer, Eluru Traffic Police Station.  On completion of
investigation, a charge sheet was laid against the accused.
4.              (b)     Before the trial Court, PWs 1 to 11 were examined and
exhibits P1 to P11 were marked.  No evidence was adduced on the side of the
accused.
4.              (c)     Now it is necessary to examine the evidence on record to
find out whether the prosecution was successful in bringing home the guilt of
the
accused for the charges levelled against him.
4.              (d)     PW1, who had traveled on the cycle of the deceased at the
time of the accident had testified as follows: - On 20.02.2004 at about
10.00 AM while he and the deceased were going on the cycle from Hai Hotel
centre, Eluru, the tractor came from behind at a high speed and dashed the cycle
and that the deceased fell to the right side and he [PW1] fell to the left side
and
that the rear wheel of the tractor ran over the head of the deceased; and that
the
accused was the driver of the said tractor at the time of the accident.  After
the
accident, the crime vehicle was stopped at a distance.  A traffic constable came
to
the spot.  He and the traffic constable-PW2 had shifted the deceased to the
hospital.  The deceased had died after he was admitted in the hospital.  In his
evidence, his statement which was recorded by the police was exhibited as P1.
In
his cross examination, he had stated that the tractor dashed the cycle, but not
the
trailer of the tractor and that the Centre at which the accident had taken place
is a
busy locality.  When it was suggested to him that the tractor had not dashed the
cycle and that the deceased had not died due to the fall from the cycle and on
account of the injuries sustained in the accident, he had denied the said
suggestions.  He had further denied the suggestions that he, being the pillion
rider on the cycle, moved while sitting on the cycle and that due to the
imbalance
caused, the cycle had fallen down under the trailer of the tractor and that
therefore, the deceased died and that there is no negligence on the part of the
accused, the driver.
4.              (e)     PW2, who was a Home Guard and who was on duty on that    
day at Hai Centre from 08.00 AM to 12.00 noon and who was regulating the
traffic had testified in his evidence as follows: At about 10.00 AM the
deceased
and PW1 were coming from Pedapadu to Hai Centre.  While so, the crime
vehicle coming from behind at a high speed dashed the cycle and that on that the
deceased fell to the right side and that PW1 fell to the left side and that the
rear
wheel of the tractor ran over the head of the deceased and that immediately he
and PW1 had shifted the deceased to the Hospital.  The accused was the driver of
the crime vehicle at the time of the accident.   He being on traffic duty on
that
day was controlling the traffic on the new bridge and the old bridge and that
the
scene of offence is a very busy locality with traffic and that it is difficult
at that
centre for one person to control the traffic. The accident had occurred opposite
to
Balaji Car travels. The road is a canal bund road and that the Cars of the
travel
office were parked on the tank bund road which is a single road. There is a
bridge between Vasantha Mahal Centre and the car travels area.  When it was
suggested to him that he has not witnessed the accident and that he came to the
spot after the accident and after people had gathered and that he does not know
about the accident, he had denied the said suggestions.  He had denied the
further suggestion that the driver did not drive the tractor at a high speed.
4.              (f)     PW3 is another eye witness to the accident.  He had also
deposed about the manner of the accident. But, he had stated that he cannot say
the number of the crime vehicle and he cannot identify the accused.  However,
his evidence would show that in the accident he had witnessed, two persons who
were traveling on a cycle were hit by a tractor which was coming behind the
cycle from Pedapadu side and that out of the two cyclists one has received
injuries.
4.              (g)     PW4 who is said to be another eye witness had not
supported the case of the prosecution.
4.              (h)     PW5 is the photographer who had taken photographs of the
scene of offence.
4.              (i)     PW6 is the Investigating Officer who had observed the scene
of accident and prepared exhibit P5-scene of offence observation report in the
presence of a mediator.  He had also conducted inquest over the dead body of
the deceased at the hospital and examined the witnesses including the relations
of the deceased present at the time of the inquest.  In his evidence, exhibit
P6-
Inquest report was marked.
4.              (j)     PW7 is the Motor Vehicle Inspector who had inspected the
crime vehicle on the requisition of the Police.  He had testified that on the
same
day he had gone to the police station and had inspected the tractor trailer and
found that there is no mechanical defect to the vehicle.  His report is
exhibited as
P7.  In his cross examination, it was elicited that he had examined the vehicle
at 2
PM in the police station and he had deposed to the effect that the maximum
speed of a tractor is 26 KM per hour even with load.
4.              (k)     PW8 is an Auto-driver and a cousin of the accused.  He
testified that the accused is a tractor driver on a tractor of Jayapuram village
and
that one Arjunaraju is the owner of the said tractor on which the accused is a
driver.  According to him, the accused had disclosed to him that he had caused
an accident with his tractor and that, therefore, he took him to the police and
produced before the Police.  When it was suggested to him that he does not
know anything about the accident, and that he did not produce the accused
before the Police, he had denied the said suggestions.
4.              (l)     PW9 is an Inquest Panch witness.
4.              (m)     PW10 is the Doctor who had conducted Post Mortem over  
the dead body of the deceased.  He gave exhibit P8-Post Mortem certificate; and
in his evidence he had stated that he had opined that the deceased would appear
to have died of shock due to head injury and skull fracture.
4.              (n)     PW11 is the Investigating Officer who had registered the
subject crime on receipt of exhibit P9-the hospital intimation and on recording
of
the exhibit P1-statement of PW1.  He had also issued exhibit P10-FIR.
According
to him, he had conducted the investigation and filed the charge sheet.
5.              Thus, I have carefully gone through the entire evidence.  A plain
reading of the evidence would show that the accused was driving the tractor
trailer at the time of accident and that the accident had occurred due to his
rash
and negligent driving resulting in the death of the deceased who was peddling
the cycle at the time of accident.  The contentions like the trial court did not
bestow its attention to the facts, evidence and the law and that the maximum
speed of the vehicle like tractor trailer is a very low speed when compared to
other heavy vehicles and that the cycle was not damaged and PW1 did not
sustain injuries in the accident are no circumstances to brush aside the direct
evidence showing the rashness and negligence on the part of the accused while
driving the tractor trailer at the time of accident.  PW1s evidence is very
clear
that after the tractor hit the cycle from behind he fell to the left side and
that the
deceased fell to the right side and that therefore, the deceased came under the
wheels of the vehicle.  Therefore, there is explanation for the cycle not
getting
damaged and PW1 not sustaining injuries in the subject accident. It is not the
case of the accused that he has rendered necessary assistance to the victims
after
the accident in due discharge of his legal obligation under the provisions of
the
Motor Vehicles Act.  His case is one of total denial.  Therefore, it follows
that he
is liable to be punished for the offences with which he was charged.
6.              Viewed thus, this court finds that there is no merit in any one of
the
contentions urged before this court on behalf of the petitioner/accused and
hence, this court finds that there is no merit in the revision and the revision
is
devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
7.              On the measure of sentence, the learned counsel for the accused
alternately contended that while imposing fines for the offences under Sections
134(a) and 134(b) read with Section 187 of the Act coupled with in default
simple
imprisonments, the trial court was harsh in imposing a sentence of one year RI
so
far as the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC is concerned and
that
the said sentence is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and that the
accused is having wife and children and that the trial court did not consider
his
plea of mercy and that the accused in the facts and circumstances of the case
may
be shown some mercy and considering the mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, the sentence may be reduced to one already undergone.
8.              Considering the peculiar facts of the case this court is not
inclined
to accept the submission that the sentence can be reduced to one already
undergone which is a bare minimum period.  However, in view of the
explanatory statement offered on behalf of the accused, this court finds that
the
sentence can be reduced to RI for two months while maintaining the fine amount
imposed for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC and the other
sentences of fine for other offences under Sections 134(a) and 134(b) read with
Section 187 of the MV Act.
9.              In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.  However,
the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section
304A of the IPC is reduced from one year to two months while maintaining the
fine amount and the sentences of fine imposed by the trial Court for the other
two offences.   The accused shall be entitled to the benefit of set-off.  It is
stated
that the accused is at large being on bail; therefore, the accused is directed
to
surrender before the trial Court within two weeks from the date of the receipt
of
a copy of this order.  On failure of the accused to do so, the trial Court shall
take
steps for his apprehension and send him to prison for serving the remaining
period of sentence.
        Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this CrlRC shall also stand
dismissed.
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M. SEETHARAMA MURTI, J    
30th  January 2015