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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Friday, January 16, 2015

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN AND THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M. WRIT PETITION NO.5784 OF 2014 31-12-2014 Dr.P.Harsha Vardhan and others.Petitioner Government of India, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and others.. Respondents

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN AND THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M.                

WRIT PETITION NO.5784 OF 2014    

31-12-2014

Dr.P.Harsha Vardhan and others.Petitioner

Government of India, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and others..
Respondents

Counsel for the petitioner: Sri A. Sanjeev Kumar

Counsel for respondents:  Govt. of India, Ministry of Health;
                           Sri A. Prabhakar Rao; Sri D. Srinivas,
                           Learned Standing Counsel for MCI

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Citations:

1)      AIR 1956 SC 479
2)      (1999) 7 SCC 120
3)      (2003) 8 SCC 69
4)      (1981) 4 SCC 512
5)      AIR 1958 SC 538
6)      (1994) 6 SCC 349
7)      (1974) 1 SCC 19 = AIR 1974 SC 1
8)      AIR 1967 SC 839
9)      AIR 1968 SC 1099
10)     AIR 1955 SC 191
11)     1952 SCR 284
12)     (2002) 3 SCC 302
13)     (2002) 4 SCC 539
14)     (2014) 8 SCC 390
15)     (1974) 4 SCC 428
16)     1989 Suppl. (1) SCC 116
17)     (1994) 3 SCC 569
18)     (2004) 3 SCC 609
19)     (2010) 3 SCC 314
20)     (2011) 2 SCC 575
21)     (2011) 9 SCC 1
22)     (2002) 2 SCC 7
23)     (2002) 8 SCC 715
24)     (2004) 10 SCC 796
25)     (2009) 5 SCC 641
26)     (2011) 4 SCC 606
27)     (1980) 3 SCC 97
28)     (2011) 8 SCC 737
29)     AIR 1965 SC 491
30)     AIR 1990 SC 1402
31)     AIR 2010 SC 1285
32)     (2010) 8 SCC 372
33)     (2011) 6 SCC 597
34)     (1984) 4 SCC 27
35)     AIR 1974 SC 1631



THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN            
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY            

WRIT PETITION No.5784 OF 2014  

ORDER: (per Honble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan)    

        This Writ Petition is filed to declare the action of the Medical
Council of India (MCI for short) in exercising its powers under
Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (hereinafter
called the Act) and amending the Post Graduate Medical
Education Regulations, 2000 (hereinafter called the Regulations)
by notification dated 17.04.2013, and thereby deleting M.D
(Biochemistry) discipline from the eligibility criteria for admission
to the super-specialty course of Doctor of Medicine (DM) in
Endocrinology, as arbitrary, illegal and in violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
        The petitioners have all either completed their post graduate
degree (MD) in Bio-chemistry or are undergoing the said course.
By notification dated 17.04.2013, the MCI amended the
Regulations deleting M.D (Biochemistry) from among the
prescribed eligibility criteria for admission to DM (Endocrinology)
super specialty course.  It is the petitioners case that they opted
for M.D (Bio-chemistry) having regard to their future prospects of
becoming an Endocrinologist by pursuing DM (Endocrinology) as a
super specialty subject; prior to its amendment, the Regulations
prescribed M.D (Biochemistry), M.D (Pediatrics) and M.D (General
Medicine) as the minimum educational qualifications required for
admission to DM (Endocrinology); these Regulations were in
existence for more than 13 years till they were amended in the year
2013; in its 33rd meeting held on 03.10.2013, the Board of
Governors of MCI resolved that MD (Biochemistry) be deleted as
the entry qualification for admission to D.M. (Endocrinology), as
M.D (Biochemistry) was a preclinical discipline wherein candidates
were not exposed to clinical practice; extensive clinical knowledge
was necessary to pursue DM (Endocrinology) which dealt with the
endocrine system of the body; they had retained the other two
disciplines i.e., M.D (General Medicine) and M.D (Pediatrics) on the
ground that these two disciplines were essentially clinical subjects,
which dealt with the clinical aspects of the endocrine system in
adults and children; this finding of the Board of Governors is
incorrect; while clinical practice is necessary for pursuing
endocrinology, it cannot be said that M.D (Biochemistry) course
does not have any clinical subjects or that candidates possessing a
post-graduate degree in Biochemistry are not exposed to clinical
subjects at all; the very fact that the candidates, possessing M.D
(Biochemistry), were allowed to pursue D.M (Endocrinology) for the
past 13 years shows that they were also exposed to clinical
subjects during their MBBS programme; if M.D (Biochemistry) is
deleted as one of the eligible qualifications, for admission into DM
(Endocrinology), Post-Graduates in Biochemistry would be unable
to undergo any other super- specialty course except in
Immunology and Genetics for which no seats are available in the
State of Andhra Pradesh; though these two disciplines are being
taught in other States, candidates belonging to the State of Andhra
Pradesh are not eligible to undergo the said course; consequently,
all candidates who possess the qualification of M.D (Biochemistry)
would be required to stop further education in medicine, and rest
content only with a post graduate degree; candidates are being
eliminated from appearing in the entrance examination, for
admission into D.M (Endocrinology), in the midst of their M.D
(Biochemistry) course; they cannot even stop pursuing the MD
(Biochemistry) course, as they have to lose their Rupees 20 lakhs
bond which they gave at the time of admission; even if they were to
complete MD (Biochemistry), they cannot pursue another Post
Graduation course thereafter to  seek admission into DM
(Endocrinology), as it is not permissible in law to have two Post-
Graduate Degrees/Diplomas; the M.C.I cannot exclude M.D
(Biochemistry) abruptly without prior intimation to the student
community; before taking a decision to delete MD (Biochemistry),
as one of the eligible subjects for admission into DM
(Endocrinology), MCI has not examined the repercussions and the
plight of students who are either pursuing M.D. (Biochemistry) or
have completed the said course; earlier MCI and various
universities had allowed students with M.D (Biochemistry) to seek
admission to D.M (Endocrinology); even during their MBBS and
Post Graduate programme in Biochemistry with rotatory
internship, students are given adequate exposure in clinical
subjects; the student logbook itself substantiates that M.D
(Biochemistry) students are posted in areas where they are given
adequate clinical exposure; while undergoing the post graduate
degree course in Biochemistry, students are required to examine
patients, undertake laboratory diagnosis and treatment etc; the
impugned amendment is an abuse of the power vested in the MCI
under Section 33 of the Act; before amending the regulations, by
deleting M.D (Biochemistry) from the eligible post-graduate courses
necessary for admission into DM (Endocrinology), the M.C.I. has
neither undertaken any scientific study nor has it considered the
adverse impact their decision would have on students pursuing
M.D (Biochemistry); having permitted students with M.D
(Biochemistry) to pursue DM (Endocrinology) for the past 13 years,
M.C.I. has acted arbitrarily in deleting/eliminating them from the
stream of students eligible to appear for the entrance examination
for admission into DM (Endocrinology) course; and this action of
the respondent is arbitrary and illegal.

        In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent
it is stated that M.C.I, constituted under the provisions of Indian
Medical Counsel Act, has been entrusted with the responsibility of
maintaining the highest standards of medical education through
out the country; in the discharge of these statutory obligations,
M.C.I. has been empowered, with the prior approval of the Central
Government, to frame regulations for laying down the minimum
standards of infrastructure, teaching and other requirements for
conducting medical courses; the M.C.I. lays down in detail the
course content, the duration, distribution of teaching and training
on various subjects, and the manner in which examinations
should be conducted etc; the Regulations framed by M.C.I are
statutory in character, and have the force of law; the Post-
Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 were approved by
the Government of India on 22.05.2000, and were published in the
official gazette on 07.10.2000, with the prior approval of the
Central Government; these regulations were amended whereby the
procedure for admission in post graduate courses has been
prescribed in detail; these regulations provide that admission, in
post graduate medical courses, must be on the basis of merit, and
merit alone; the mandatory and binding character of the statutory
regulations have been upheld by Courts; the Courts would not,
normally, interfere with the qualifications prescribed by expert
bodies like the M.C.I, especially for admission into super-specialty
medical courses; the M.C.I was superseded by the Board of
Governors, nominated by the Central Government, in May, 2010;
the entire work of M.C.I was carried out thereafter by the Board of
Governors, who later demitted office in November, 2013; the Board
of Governors, nominated by the Central Government, constituted a
Speciality Board to re-examine the eligibility criteria for admission
into various super-specialty courses including D.M (Endocrinology)
as provided under the Post Graduate Medical Education
Regulations, 2000; the three members of the Speciality Board, who
are eminent specialists in the field of medicine and in the
concerned super-specialty of Endocrinology, were (i) DR. Nalini
Sameer Shah, Professor & Head of the Department of
Endocrinology, Seth G.S. Medical College, K.E.M. Hospital, Parel,
Mumbai; (ii) Dr. Krishna G. Sheshadri, Professor and Head of
Endocrinology and Diabetes at Sri Ramachandra University,
Chennai and (iii) Dr. Nikhil Tandon, Professor & Head of the
Department of Endocrinology, AIIMS, New Delhi; the members of
the Specialty Board, after detailed discussion and due
deliberations with regards the eligibility criteria for admission into
the D.M. (Endocrinology) super specialty course, unanimously
agreed that prior experience as a clinician is required for pursuing
the D.M (Endocrinology) course which is a clinical discipline; the
recommendations of the specialty board was placed before the
Board of Governors, nominated by the Central Government, in
their meeting held on 11.06.2012; after due deliberations, with
regards the eligibility criteria for admission into D.M.
(Endocrinology) course, the Board of Governors agreed with the
recommendations of the Specialty Board; a draft notification was
sent to the Central Government on 29.06.2012 for its approval;
after scrutinizing the proposed amendment in the Schedule to the
Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000, the Central
Government duly approved the same; thereafter the notification
was sent for publication in the gazette; the M.C.I. has amended the
regulations with the prior approval of the Central Government; the
amendment to the regulations dated 17.04.2013 was notified in
the gazette on 15.05.2013; after the amendment, all candidates
desirous of admission in the super-specialty D.M (Endocrinology)
course must have obtained a post-graduate degree, from a
recognized medical college, either in Medicine or in Pediatrics;
candidates possessing the post-graduate medical qualification in
Biochemistry are eligible for admission into other super-specialty
medical course such as D.M (Clinical Hematology), D.M.
(Immunology) and D.M. (Medical Genetics); the petitioners
contention that, after the amendment dated 17.04.2013, they
cannot pursue a super specialty course is misconceived; the
amendment dated 17.04.2013 is not unreasonable, discriminatory
or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; with a view
to discharge its statutory responsibilities under the Act, the M.C.I.
has, from time to time, framed and amended various regulations
with the prior approval of the Central Government for laying the
minimum norms and requirements; and the petitioners are not
entitled to the relief sought for.
      Sri A. Sanjeev Kumar, Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
would submit that, ever since the Regulations were made in the
year 2000 till the year 2013 when the amended Regulations came
into force, M.D. (Biochemistry) was among the prescribed
educational qualifications for admission into the DM
(Endocrinology) super speciality course; the MCI has not assigned
any reasons for deleting M.D. (Biochemistry) from the prescribed
eligibility criteria for admission into D.M. (Endocrinology); the
deletion of M.D. (Biochemistry) is discriminatory, and in violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; the report of the Specialty
Board does not disclose any valid reasons for deletion of the M.D.
(Biochemistry) course; the averment in the counter-affidavit that
students undergoing a post graduate course in Biochemistry are
not exposed to clinical subjects is erroneous; a perusal of the
syllabus, enclosed along with the Writ Petition, shows that
students undergoing M.D. (Biochemistry) course are exposed to
clinical subjects also; students who possess M.D. (Biochemistry)
qualification are similarly situated to those who have completed a
postgraduate degree course in Medicine or Pediatrics; students
who possess postgraduate qualification in these three courses are
similarly situated; retention of M.D. (medicine) and M.D.
(Pediatrics), while deleting M.D. (Biochemistry), as the eligible
qualification for admission into D.M. (Endocrinology) does not
satisfy the test of a valid classification; and it is arbitrary,
discriminatory and illegal.  Learned Counsel would rely on Bidi
Supply Co. v. Union of India  in this regard.
      The Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 were
made by the Medical Council of India in the exercise of its powers
under Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.  In the
Schedule thereto, the eligibility criteria stipulated for admission in
D.M. (Endocrinology) course was that the candidate must possess
a recognised degree (or its recognised equivalent degree) in M.D.
(medicine), M.D. (Pediatrics), and M.D. (Biochemistry).  The
Regulations were amended by the Postgraduate Educational
Amendment Regulation 2012 and, in the schedule to the
Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 under the head
D.M (doctor of medicine) for endocrinology at serial No.4, M.D.
(Biochemistry) was deleted.  Consequent thereto, it is only
students, who possess a Post-graduate degree in Medicine or
Pediatrics, who are eligible to seek admission into D.M
(Endocrinology) super specialty course.  The aforesaid amendment
to the Regulations were made, with the approval of the Central
Government, on 17.04.2013 and were published in the Gazette of
India dated 15.05.2013.  For admission into the D.M
(Endocrinology) course, after the amendment was published in the
gazette on 15.05.2013, candidates, who possess a postgraduate
degree in Biochemistry, are no longer eligible.
      The MCI has been set up as an expert body, under the
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, to control the minimum
standards of medical education and to regulate their observance.
The Act empowers the MCI to prescribe the minimum standards of
postgraduate medical education; and it has implicit power to
supervise the qualifications or eligibility standards for admission to
medical institutions. The universities are guided by the standards
prescribed by the Medical Council.  The Medical Council
Regulations have statutory force and are mandatory.   (Dr.Preeti
Srivastava v. State of M.P. ; Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava ;
State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana ).  The validity of these statutory
regulations can only be impeached on the ground that it falls foul
of the parent Act or it is in violation of the constitutional
provisions, more particularly Part III of the Constitution of India.  It
is not even the case of the petitioners that the amended Regulation
is in violation of the provisions of the Act.  The challenge thereto is
limited to its being discriminatory and ultravires Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
      It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds. There is always a
presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment,
and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has
been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. (Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar ; Gauri Shanker v.
Union of India ).  There is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment/rule/regulation and the burden
is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear
transgression of the constitutional principles.  A rule cannot be
struck down as discriminatory on any a priori reasoning.  Where a
party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent
authority on the ground that the Rules offend Article 14, the
burden is on him to plead and prove the infirmity. The burden is
on the petitioner to set out facts necessary to sustain the plea of
discrimination and to adduce  cogent and convincing evidence to
prove those facts for there is a presumption that every factor
which is relevant or material has been taken into account in
formulating the classification.  Unless the classification is unjust
on the face of it, the onus lies upon the party attacking the
classification to show, by pleading and placing the necessary
material before the Court, that the said classification is
unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.(State
of J & K v. Triloki Nath Khosa ; G.D. Kelkar v. Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports ).  It is no part of the respondents burden
to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality.
(Triloki Nath Khosa7).
      In order to establish that the protection of the equal
opportunity clause has been denied to them, it is not enough for
the petitioners to say that they have been treated differently from
others, not even enough that a differential treatment has been
accorded to them in comparison with others similarly
circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence of classification and
does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only if it
rests on an unreasonable basis. It is, therefore, incumbent on the
petitioners to show that the classification of students into those
who hold a postgraduate medical degree either in Medicine or
Pediatrics, and those who  hold a postgraduate medical degree in
Biochemistry, is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its
purported object. (Triloki Nath Khosa7).  The submission, urged
on behalf of the petitioners in this regard, is only that the MCI had
erred in holding that post graduates in Biochemistry, unlike post
graduates in Medicine and Pediatrics, do not have clinical
experience.
      In examining this contention, it must be borne in mind that
Article 14 forbids discrimination, and its gravamen is equality of
treatment. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal
treatment by the law must establish that, between persons
similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and
the differential treatment has no reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the law.  (Gauri Shanker6; Western U.P.
Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. ).    While
Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to
pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that
the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be
founded on different basis.  What is necessary is that there must
be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the
Act/Regulation under consideration. (Gauri Shanker6; Ram
Krishna Dalmia5; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar ).  The
classification must rest upon a real and substantial distinction
bearing a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect to
which the classification is made; and classification made without
any reasonable basis should be regarded as invalid.  (Bidi Supply
Co.1; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ).
      The complaint, of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution,
cannot be judged by adopting a doctrinaire approach. It is not
prudent or pragmatic to insist on a mathematically accurate
classification covering diverse situations and all possible
contingencies in view of the inherent complexities involved. (State
of Karnataka v. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees
Association ).  The legislature enjoys considerable latitude, and
exercises its power of classification enriched by its experience and
taking into consideration myriad circumstances.  (Ombalika Das
v. Hulisa Shaw ).  Precision and arithmetical accuracy will not
exist in any categorisation, and such precision and accuracy is not
what Article 14 contemplates. As long as the broad features of the
categorisation are identifiable and distinguishable, and the
categorisation is reasonably connected with the object targeted,
Article 14 does not forbid such a course of action. (Subramanian
Swamy v. Raju ; Murthy Match Works v. CCE ; Roop Chand  
Adlakha v. DDA ; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab ; Basheer v.
State of Kerala ; B. Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash
Reddy  and Transport and Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai  
Port Trust ).
      The object sought to be achieved by the classification, in the
amended Regulations, is to further excellence in higher Medical
Education.  The basis of classification of students, between those
who have a post graudate degree in medicine and pediatrics on the
one hand, and those having a post graduate degree in
Biochemistry on the other, for admission in D.M. (Endocrinology) is
their clinical experience.  While the former group are said to have
the requisite clinical experience, the latter are said not to.  As the
classification of post-graduate Medical students, between those
who have the required clinical experience and those who do not,
has a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved i.e.,
maintenance of high standards of Medical Education by restricting
admission to DM (Endocrinology) course only to those students
who have the required clinical exposure, the test of a valid
classification is satisfied, and the petitioners plea of discrimination
must fail.
      The contention, that no reasons are assigned for amending
the regulations, is also devoid of merit.  Delegated legislation
cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the principles of
natural justice, especially in the absence of any such statutory
requirement. Neither the Legislature nor its delegate are legally
obliged to give any reasons for their action while discharging their
legislative function. (K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka ; State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh ; W.B. Electricity
Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd. ; Pune Municipal Corpn.
v. Promoters and Builders Assn.  and Bihar SEB v. Pulak
Enterprises ).  The basis of the classification of persons or things
may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the
surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of
the Court. (Ram Krishna Dalmia5; Gauri Shanker6).
      Relevant material is always admissible to show the reason
and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not
appear on the face of the Rule or the law which effects the
classification. (T.N. Khosa7).  The reasons, which necessitated
amendment of the Regulations, are detailed in the counter-affidavit
filed on behalf of MCI, and are evident from the record placed for
our perusal, which include the report of the speciality board
consisting of three eminent Endocrinologists in the country.  In the
absence of any such requirement, either in the parent Act or in the
Regulations themselves, the reasons which necessitated
amendment of the Regulations need not be reflected in the
Regulations itself and can be gathered from the surrounding
circumstances or, for that matter, can be stated in the counter-
affidavit filed before this Court.
      The mere fact that M.D. (Biochemistry) was among the
prescribed qualifications for admission into D.M. (Endocrinology)
for thirteen years, from when the Regulations were made in the
year 2000 till they were amended in the year 2013, is of no avail.
The eligibility criteria for admissions in super-speciality medical
courses must be periodically reviewed by the MCI keeping in mind
the need to maintain excellence and high standards in higher
medical education. Determination of such standards is part of the
academic policy of the MCI.   (Visveswaraiah Technological
University v. Krishnendu Halder ).  Revision of standards, for
admission into super-speciality courses in Medicine, are matters of
policy.  The Court cannot strike down a policy merely because
there is a variation. Consistency is not always a virtue. What is
important is to know whether irrational and extraneous factor foul.
(Tamil Nadu Education Deptt. Ministerial & General
Subordinate Services Assn. v. State of T.N. ). There can be no
quarrel if a policy is revised. The wisdom of yesterday may
obsolesce into the folly of today, even as the science of old may
sour into the superstition now, and vice versa. (Tamil Nadu
Education Deptt. Ministerial & General Subordinate Services
Assn.27).   Reform must begin somewhere if it has to begin at all
and, therefore, the administrator who has complex problems to
solve must be allowed the freedom to proceed tentatively, step by
step. (T.N. Khosa7).  The petitioners cannot be heard to contend
that qualifications, once prescribed, must continue forever and not
be subjected to change at all.
      The records placed before this Court by Sri D. Srinivas,
Learned Standing Counsel for MCI, reveal that a Board of Experts
was constituted to examine the course content for D.M.
(Endocrinology).  In its report submitted to the Board of Governors
of MCI, the expert committee opined that the goals of the D.M
programme, in Endocrinology, Diabetes and Metabolism, was to
provide comprehensive knowledge, clinical skills, professional
attributes and values to prepare trainees to care for patients
suffering from diseases of the endocrine system; to ensure clinical
care experience to a variety of patients suffering from diverse
endocrine problems, and in diagnosing and managing such
patients; and to provide a diverse learning experience to trainees in
allied areas as they relate to endocrinology, diabetes and
metabolism.  The expert body suggested that the name of the
course be renamed as Doctor of Medicine (D.M) in Endocrinology,
Diabetes and Metabolism and the eligibility therefor be prescribed
as a post-graduate degree in M.D (Internal Medicine) or M.D
(Pediatrics) in three years.
      While recommending the competence standards for
undergoing the DM (Endocrinology) course, the Board of experts
opined that the postgraduate must demonstrate competence in
clinical care including evaluation and management of horomonal
problems, acute life threatening complications of hyper and hypo
glycemia; metabolism in adults and children, and other aspects of
Endocrinology and Metabolism.  The emphasis placed by the
expert body was on competence in clinical care in various
areas/aspects.  As the expert body was of the view that such
clinical exposure is given only to those students who undergo a
post-graduate degree course in internal Medicine or in Pediatrics,
the eligibility criteria for admission into D.M (Endocrinology) was
restricted only to these courses.  On receipt of the
recommendations of the expert body the M.C.I, after complying
with the requirements of Section 33 of the Act, deleted M.D
(Biochemistry) from among the educational qualifications
prescribed as the eligibility criteria for admission into the D.M
(Endocrinology) super specialty course.
      The contention that Medical post-graduates in Biochemistry
have the required clinical exposure cannot be examined in writ
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  The
Court lacks the expertise to examine academic policies and would,
ordinarily, abide by the opinion of experts.   Courts should be slow
to interfere with the opinions expressed by experts, and must leave
such decisions to those who are more familiar with such problems,
than the Courts generally can be. (State of T.N. v. K. Shyam
Sunder ; University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao ; Neelima
Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal ; Victoria Memorial Hall v.
Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity ; Basavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr.
H.L. Ramesh  and State of H.P. v. H.P. Nizi Vyavsayik
Prishikshan Kendra Sangh ).  Whether or not students who have
undergone M.D. (Biochemistry) course have been given clinical
exposure on par with those who have undergone M.D. (Medicine)
or M.D (Pediatrics) courses, are matters of expertise which this
Court lacks, and are technical questions not, ordinarily, amenable
to judicial review.
      The Court would not substitute its opinion for that of the
Legislature or its delegate as to what policy would best serve the
objects and purposes of the Act or sit in judgment over the wisdom
and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the
regulation-making body, and declare a regulation to be ultravires
merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned
provisions will not help to serve the object. As long as the body,
entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations, acts
within the scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that
the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the
object, the court would not concern itself with the wisdom or
efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is exclusively within
the province of the Legislature and its delegate to determine, as a
matter of policy, what measures would have to be incorporated in
the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the
objects.
      It is not for the Court to examine the merits or demerits of a
policy. (Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher
Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth ).   It
may be a wise policy which will effectuate the purpose of its
enactment or it may lack effectiveness calling for its revision and
improvement.  Any drawbacks in the policy, incorporated in a rule
or regulation, will not render it ultra vires and the Court would not
strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or
prudent policy.  The Legislature and its delegate are the sole
repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued
in relation to matters covered by the Act. (Maharashtra State
Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education34).
      Equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical
question based on a proper assessment and evaluation of the
relevant academic standards and practical attainments of such
qualifications, and where the decision is based on the
recommendation of an expert body which possesses the requisite
knowledge, skill and expertise for adequately discharging such
functions, the Court, uninformed of relevant data and unaided by
the technical insights necessary for the purpose of determining
equivalence, would not lightly disturb the decision. It is only where
the decision is shown to be based on extraneous or irrelevant
considerations or is actuated by malafides or is irrational and
perverse or is manifestly wrong that the Court would reach out its
lethal arm and strike down the decision.  (Mohd. Shujat Ali v.
Union of India ).  The Court would not sit in appeal over the
legislative judgment to find out whether, on a comparative
evaluation of the rival theories touching upon the question of
equivalence in educational qualifications, the theory advocated by
the petitioners is not to be preferred. Classification is primarily for
the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty
of framing the eligibility criteria and if, looked at from the
standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to
rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld. (Triloki Nath
Khosa7).  This Court would defer to the wisdom of the Speciality
Board whose members are experts in the field of Endocrinology,
more so as no malafides are attributed to them, and their expertise
in this regard is not in doubt.
        The contention that deletion of M.D. (Biochemistry), from the
list of eligible educational qualifications required for admission into
D.M (Endocrinology) course, would deny the petitioners the
opportunity of undergoing any super speciality course, does not
also merit acceptance.  It is evident, from the counter-affidavit filed
on behalf of the MCI, that M.D (Biochemistry) is among the
prescribed educational qualifications for admission into the super
speciality courses of D.M (clinical Hematology), DM (Immunology)
and D.M (Medical genetics).  The M.C.I. lays down uniform
standards for medical education applicable to all the universities
throughout the country and the petitioners, some of whom are
undergoing their post graduation in Biochemistry in the States of
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, cannot claim to stand on a
different footing.  While the amendment to the Regulations has
resulted in their being denied the opportunity of undergoing the
D.M (Endocrinology) course, that, by itself, would not justify
striking down the statutory regulations, which are otherwise valid.
        Viewed from any angle, the petitioners are not entitled to the
relief sought for.  The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly,
dismissed.  The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also
stand dismissed.  No costs.
_____________________________    
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J      
___________________________________    
M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J      
Date:  31-12-2014.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2008 AND BATCH 03-o2-2014 The State of A.P. represented by the Public Prosecutor....appellant. Shaik Ghouse Mohiuddin...Respondent.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL                    

Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2008 AND BATCH  

03-o2-2014

The State of A.P. represented by the Public Prosecutor....appellant.

Shaik Ghouse Mohiuddin...Respondent.

Counsel for appellant:  Public Prosecutor

Counsel for Respondent : Sri Narasimha Rao

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred
Air 1966 SC 821

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY        

AND

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL      

Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2008 & Crl. A.No.562  of 2009

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice L.Narasimha Reddy)    


 This appeal by the State and revision by the complainant are filed assailing
the judgment, dated 30.06.2008, rendered by the Court of II Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in S.C.No.484 of 2007.  The sole accused
therein was acquitted by the trail Court.

The case of the prosecution was that the deceased, a boy of 11 years, by name,
Somstallone, lost his parents in an accident, some time in October, 2002, and
ever since then, he is residing with the complainant - PW.1 and her other family
members.  PW.1, who claims to be the mother of Samson - the father of the
deceased boy, is said to have employed the accused as driver, on 08.01.2003.  On
the fateful day i.e. on 13.01.2003, the deceased was said to be playing with
kites on the terrace of the third floor, and at 11.30 A.M., the accused has
taken the boy out, and that the same was seen by a maidservant - PW.4, and a
care taker-cum-driver of auto, LW.6.  PW.1 is said to have gone out for a bank
transaction and around noon, she received a phone call from her son - PW.3, that
Somstallone was missing and she returned home by 2.30 P.M.  After arrival of
PW.1, a phone call is said to have been received by PW.3, from a stranger
stating that he has kidnapped Somstallone and if a ransom of Rs.5,00,000/- is
paid, by 5.00 P.M., at Hussainsagar, the boy would be returned, else, his dead
body would float in the Hussainsagar itself.  Soon thereafter, PW.1 filed a
complaint - Ex.P.1, before P.S.Panjagutta.

During the course of investigation, the police is said to have arrested the
accused on 14.01.2003, and on the basis of the information given by him, they
have located the dead body nearby a water tank at Kukatpally.   The
Investigating Officer (IO) - PW.3,  caused the inquest and sent the body for
post-mortem to PW.9, and has taken up further investigation.  The prosecution
has also stated that IO found human hair in the fist of the deceased and the
same was compared with the hair samples taken from the accused.  In the Forensic
Report, marked as Ex.P.14, PW.11, is said to have opined that all the samples of
the hair examined by him are similar in nature.  Another fact pleaded by the
prosecution was that a metal button was found near the dead body of the deceased
and when compared with the buttons on the shirt of the accused, it was found to
be similar.  With these and other related facts, the IO filed a charge-sheet and
the trial Court accordingly framed charges against the accused.

On behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 15 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.15 were
filed.  On behalf of the defence, suggestions were made to PWs.1, 3 and 4 with
reference to their respective statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and
they were marked as Ex.D.1 to 3.  The shirt of the accused was taken as M.O.1, a
button as M.O.2 and CDs., covering the scene of offence, were marked as M.O.3.
The trial Court acquitted the accused, since the prosecution failed to prove its
case.
Learned Public Prosecutor for the State and Sri Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, learned
counsel representing the complainant - PW.1, who filed the revision with the
leave of the Court, submit that the trial Court omitted to take into account the
important features of evidence, though circumstantial in nature.  They submit
that the fact that the accused has taken the deceased with him was spoken to by
PW.4 and since she is not an interested witness, her evidence is trustworthy.
They further submit that a strong circumstance in the case was the presence of
the hair in the fist of the deceased and when the same was compared with the
samples, collected from the head of the accused, they were found to be of
similar nature, and thereby, a fool proof case is made out to link the incident
with the accused.  They also submit that the button (M.O.2), which was present
nearby the dead body, was found to be from the shirt of the accused.  Reliance
is also placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in KANBI KARSAN JADAV V.    
STATE OF GUJARAT1.    

Sri N.Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, submits
that the prosecution has foisted a false case against the accused.  He submits
that even from the evidence on record, it is clear that there was a scramble for
the properties of the parents of the deceased herein, i.e. Somstallone, and PW.1
has gone to the extent of stating that Samson, father of the deceased boy, is
her son, though, in fact, Samson is the son of the sister of the husband of
PW.1.  He submits that it was elicited from PW.1 in the cross-examination that
by the time the complaint - Ex.P.1, was filed, the accused was very much in the
house of PW.1, and no mention thereof was made, either in Ex.P.1, or in chief-
examination of PW.1.  He further submits that though PW.4, stated in her chief-
examination that the accused, has taken the deceased at about 11.30 A.M., in the
cross-examination, she has pleaded ignorance on every aspect spoken to by her in
the chief-examination.  As regards the forensic aspects, learned counsel submits
that though PW.11 is said to have conducted the test of the samples, he has
clearly admitted that he did not record any finding to the effect that the hair
recovered from the fist of the deceased, and the samples collected and furnished
to him, are from the same human being.  It is also pleaded that there was
nothing to indicate that the button said to have been recovered at the scene of
offence was stained with blood, and in such an event, hardly there exists any
forensic dimensions to that aspect.

It is rather unfortunate that a boy of 11 years, who lost his parents and sister
in an accident, was himself murdered few months thereafter.  Still unfortunate
is the manner in which the relations of his deceased parents were quarrelling
for the property left by the deceased parents of the boy - Somstallone.

The investigation into the case started with the submission of Ex.P.1 by PW.1.
The contents of Ex.P.1 are brief, and it is thought fit, to reproduce the same:

"I Mrs.Brigitte Micheal grand mother of Mr.Samstallone, s/o late Somson who lost
his parents and sister on 27th Ocotber, 2002 and this chld was staying with me
then after with me.  Today, date 13.01.2013 at 11.30 the child was playing kite
on third floor and he never goes out of the gate anywhere.  The new driver one
Md.Gouse just join the duty on 10.01.2013 took the child with him at 11.30 and
then after child is missing we get a call at 2.50 p.m. stating of lI have kidnap
your child (Somstallone) pay 5 lakhs and take your child back at 5.00 p.m. come
at Hussan Sagar.  Please sir I request to take immediately action."

PW.1 did not claim that Samson is her son.  Further, there is no mention about
the accused i.e. Md.Ghouse, being present in the house by the time the complaint
was submitted.  In her deposition as PW.1, she however stated that Samson was
his eldest son.  The relevant portion reads:

"...My eldest son by name Samson who is the father of the deceased, his wife-
Houleen and their daughter-Nancy died in an accident that occurred in the month
of October, 2002.  Since then my grand son Stalin had been staying with me."


Normally, one does not suspect the claim of a woman when she says that she is
the mother of a particular individual.   In the cross-examination also, PW.1
stated as under:

"Samson the father of the deceased is my natural son and the suggestion contra
is false."

PW.2, by name, Michael Christoper, is the son of PW.1.  In the cross-
examination, he stated:

"Samson is my natural brother.  It is true I stated in my statement before the
police that the deceased Sam-Stalin is the grand son of elder sister of my
father.  It is true the father of the deceased Stalin, is the son of my father's
elder sister."

Other contradictions in the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were pointed
out.  Even though the plea of PW.1 that Samson, her eldest son, was demolished
through the cross-examination of PW.2,  PW.3, another son of PW.1, stated in his
chief-examination as under:

"The deceased boy Stalin is the son of my elder brother.  Since the parents of
the deceased boy Stalin, died in a road accident, he used to stay with us in our
house."

This witness was also confronted with the statement recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C.  However, he denied the statement made by him.  He said:

"...I did not state before police in my statement that Samson, the father of the
deceased boy is the son of the elder sister of my father, as in Ex.D.2.  It is
not true to suggest that the deceased boy is not the son of my elder brother."


It was few months before the incident, that the parents of Somstallone, the
deceased boy herein, died in an accident and a specific question was put in the
cross-examination of PW.1 as to whether any petition was filed by them claiming
compensation.  She replied that no petition claiming compensation for the death
of her son, his wife and their daughter was filed.  However, uniformly, PW.1 and
her two sons, PWs.2 and 3 and another son - LW.2, who was not examined, stated
that it is they, who arranged, the finances for filing an O.P., claiming
compensation for the death of the parents of the deceased herein and that the
claim petition was filed on behalf of Somstallone through a lady, by name
Violet.  This was confronted to PW.1, as Ex.D.1.  However, she denied it.

The record also discloses that there was a scramble for custody of deceased boy,
Somstallone, and the house of his parents was occupied by the father and mother
of his deceased mother. Disputes are also said to have been taken to the
religious leaders.  It is by keeping this background in view, that the case
needs to be examined further.

There are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence.  The entire case rests upon the
circumstantial evidence.  One circumstance pleaded by the prosecution is the
theory of last seen.  PW.4, maidservant of PW.1, is said to have seen the
accused, taking the deceased with him at 11.30 A.M., from the terrace of the
building.  Though LW.6, a care taker-cum-auto driver of PW.1, is said to have
seen the accused taking the deceased in front of the gate, he was not examined
as a witness.  PW.4 did not withstand the cross-examination.  The relevant
portion reads:

"The police examined and recorded my statement on the next day of the incident
at the house of PWs.1 to 3.  It is true I did not state before police that while
proceeding to the terrace, I noticed the accused taking away the deceased boy
Stallin.  I did not state before police that while I was drying the clothes on
front side after their wash, noticed the accused along with deceased boy as in
Ex.D.3."

Added to this, the failure to examine LW.6 would certainly render that
circumstantial evidence unreliable.

The next circumstantial evidence is in relation to recoveries at the scene of
offence.  In the inquest report, marked as Ex.P.10, it was mentioned that human
hair was found in the left fist of the dead body.  That was preserved as item
No.8, mentioned in Ex.P.13.  Suspecting that the hair may be that of the
accused, the permission of the Court was obtained and the sample of hair was
drawn from the head of the accused.  That is said to be marked as Item No.5.
The record also discloses that cut hair was also taken as a sample, item No.7.
All the three samples were examined by PW.11.  In the report, marked as Ex.P.13,
it was mentioned "hair in item Nos.5, 7 and 8 are possessing similar
morphological characters."

It is only when the hair found at the scene of occurrence and the sample
recovered from the accused are found from the same origin, and from the same
human being, that an inference can be drawn about the involvement of the
concerned person.  In the cross-examination of PW.11, the following was
elicited:

"Biochemical and immunological examinations include microscopic examination.  It
is not true to suggest that microscopic examination is different.  It is true
Ex.P.13 does not disclose the origin of the hair, examined as items 5, 7 & 8.
It is true plucked hair and cut hair are having different characteristics.  It
is true I did not mention whether Item No.5, is cut or plucked hair.
It is not true to suggest that I did not examine Items 5, 7 & 8 thoroughly and
my report is not clear.  It is true in my report, the length and shaft diameters
of Items 5, 7 & 8 are not mentioned.  Witness adds, it is quite common for us
not to furnish the said particulars.  It is true in Ex.P.13, I did not mention
whether the hair in items 5, 7 & 8 is of human origin and the sex.  The colour
of the hair also is not mentioned.
It is not true to suggest that under morphological characters every human hair
is similar.  It is not true to suggest that Items 5, 7 & 8 do not possess
similar morphological characters."


Once the witness has stated that he did not mention that samples 5, 7 and 8 are
of the same human origin and the sex, the whole endeavour in undertaking the
forensic exercise has become futile.

Though it is stated that a button was recovered at the scene of offence and on
comparison of the same with the one on the shirt - M.O.1 of the accused, it was
found to be similar, there are several factors that persuade us to ignore it.
The first is that neither the button recovered from the scene of offence, nor
the shirt of the accused were found to be stained with blood.  The only
conclusion is that the buttons are of the same brand.  The mere fact that the
button of a particular brand is found at the scene of offence cannot lead to any
conclusion.  The reason is that the buttons are manufactured in thousands, and
if the reasoning suggested by the prosecution is accepted, every person, who
wears a shirt with buttons of that brand, is prone to be suspected of committing
the offence.

In Kanbi Karsan Jadav's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the
presence of human hair and a button at the scene of offence can be treated as a
piece of circumstantial evidence.  That, however, is a case, where the forensic
analysis revealed that the two samples of hair were found to be of same origin
and the button was tainted with blood. Hence, that precedent would not be of any
help to the prosecution.

Another weakness, which is found in the case of the prosecution, is that though
the accused was said to have been arrested on 14.01.2013 itself, he was not sent
for any medical examination.  The reason is that in the confession he is said to
have stated that he received injuries, when the deceased hit him with wooden
planks and that his hair was plucked by the deceased when he is being
strangulated by the rope.  No effort whatever was made in that direction.

Hence, we do not find any error in the judgment of the trial Court and the
appeal and revision are accordingly dismissed.
____________________  
L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J.    
______________
M.S.K.JAISWAL, J.
Dated:03.02.2014

Or.6, Rule 17 - typographical mistakes can be rectified by way of amendment at any stage - HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1811 of 2014 24-12-2014 P.Durga Reddy and another.Petitioners B.Yadi Reddy . Respondent

HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO          

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1811 of 2014  

24-12-2014

P.Durga Reddy and another.Petitioners

B.Yadi Reddy . Respondent  

Counsel for the Revision Petitioners : Sri V.Ravinder Rao

 Counsel for the Respondent :  Sri P.Venkat Reddy

<Gist :


>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1.      2014(2) ALT 526
2.      2005(5) SCJ 519
3.      2007(2) SCJ 569
4.      2005(3) SCJ 303
5.      AIR 2007 SC 2511
6.      (2007)6 SCC 737
7.      (2008)14 SCC 364
8.      2012(2) SCJ 436
9.      2014(3) ALD 361
10.     (2006)4 SCC 385
11.     2011(5) ALD 445
12.     AIR 2004 SC 4102
13.     AIR 2007 SC 113
14.     2005(5) ALT 429
15.     2008(5) ALD 322
16.     2014(2) ALT 526
17.     AIR 2008 SC 2234
18.     (2009)11 SCC 329
19.     (2005)13 SCC 89
20.     Andh W.R. 1973-2-253
21.     (2010)8 SCC 329
22.     (2013)9 SCC 374


HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO          
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1811 of 2014  

ORDER :
      1) The unsuccessful petitioners filed this revision against the
order dated 28.04.2014 in I.A. No.1866 of 2013 in O.S. No.585 of 2007
on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy.  The
Petitioners who are plaintiffs initially filed the suit in O.S. No.585 of
2007 for specific performance of agreement for sale.  Prior to it one
S.Gopal Reddy filed a suit in O.S.No.417 of 2007 for declaration of
title against the Petitioners and both the suits were clubbed and
evidence was lead in O.S. No.417 of 2007.  After evidence let in by
both sides and before advancing arguments, the Petitioners filed an
application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C seeking permission to
interchange the boundaries on northern and southern side stating that
there was a typographical mistake in the schedule annexed in O.S.
No.585 of 2007.  In the said I.A. the Respondents filed counter
affidavit and contended that on the aspect of boundaries D.Ws 2 to 5
were cross-examined and if the proposed amendment is allowed, by
changing the boundaries of the schedule land which is more
particularly elicited in the cross-examination, there is every
possibility to the Plaintiffs to fill up the lacunae and prayed to dismiss
the application.
      2) After hearing both sides and after perusal of the material on
record, the trial Court dismissed the application holding that the
petitioners could not explain the delay in seeking amendment to get
over the rigidity of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. basing on the
expression of this Court in Veluri Raja Rajeswari V. Veluri
Santhansagar Reddy .
      3) Aggrieved by the said order the Petitioners/Plaintiffs
preferred the present revision contending that the Court below failed
to appreciate that the mistake in the boundaries mentioned in the
suit schedule is an inadvertent one and typographical error and
amendment of which cannot be tested on the ground of due diligence,
that soon after noticing the typographical mistake in the plaint
schedule and in the body of the plaint the application was filed and
hence the concept of due diligence has no application, that the
defendant did not dispute the boundaries as mentioned in the plaint
in the written statement, that the only question was about non-
mention of boundaries in the agreement, that the Court below
erroneously found fault with the Petitioners in not getting the mistake
rectified at the earlier stages of the suit while it is the specific case
of the Petitioners that the mistake is typographical and it was noticed
recently and seeks to allow the revision by setting aside the dismissal
order of trial Court.  The learned counsel during the course of
arguments reiterated the same.  Whereas the learned counsel for the
Respondent contended that there is nothing to interfere in the order
of the lower Court by this Court while sitting in the revision and
prayed to dismiss the revision.
        4) Now, the points for consideration are
(i)     Whether the impugned order requires interference and
if so, with what observations?
(ii)    To what relief?
POINT No.1:
        5) The order VI Rule 17 prior to amendment by Act 46/99 scope
was vividly enlightened by several expressions of the Constitutional
Courts in saying even at the stage of second appeal also amendment
of pleadings can be allowed, provided it does not effect or prejudice
the rights of the opposite party, muchless changes the cause of
action.  However, that liberal approach is curtailed by taking away
the right once trial commenced by Amended Act 46/99. It is no doubt
with a liberal approach to be required as procedural law is the hand
maid and not mistress of justice, there was a further amendment that
was proposed and ultimately came into force by amended Act 22/2002
with effect from 01.07.2002 introducing the proviso to permit
amendment which could not be sought before commencement of trial
despite due diligence.  For more clarity, the order VI Rule 17 is
required to be reproduced which reads as follows:
17. Amendment of Pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the
proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in
such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such
amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of  
determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:
        Provided that no application for amendment shall be
allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to
the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not
have raised the matter before the commencement of trial
        6) From the above, the proviso is an exception to the taking
away the right of amendment once the trial is commenced, to
subserve the ends of justice in saying, where the Court comes to the
conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have
raised the matter before the commencement of trial. This is the
important rider required to be satisfied, no doubt in other respects,
the law existing prior to the amendment by Acts 46/99 and 22/2002
comes to the aid of the Court if that condition is satisfied.  It was the
interpretation initially laid down by the Apex Court in Salem
Advocate Bar Association, T.N V. Union of India  known as Salem
Bar Association case-2. The said scope of order VI Rule 17 after
amendment by Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 01.07.2002 was
enlightened in the said expression of Salem Bar Association Case-2
supra was relied upon in Ajendraprasadji N.Pande V. Swami
Keshavprakeshdasji N.  that under the proviso no application for
amendment shall be allowed after trial has commenced, unless
despite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before
commencement of the trial.  It is to say that once trial of the case has
commenced, no application of pleadings shall be allowed unless the
above requirement in the proviso of due diligence is satisfied.  No
doubt it was held in Kailash V. Nankhu  that trial commences from
hearing and settlement of issues and filing of chief affidavit of
plaintiff.  It is referring to some of the expressions among other in
Andhra Bank V. ABN Amro Bank N.V  it was held that delay itself is
no ground for refusal of prayer for amendment as the only question to
be considered by Court is whether such amendment would be
necessary for decision of the real controversy between the parties in
suit and at that stage the Court cannot go into question of merit of
amendment.  Once trial commenced, amendment sought, to satisfy  
the requirement of due diligence.  It was also held by taking a similar
view in the other expression in Ramachandra Sakharam Mahajan V.
Damodar Trimbak Tanksale  that when the amendment sought for  
would enable the Court to pinpointedly consider the real dispute
between the parties and thereby help to render a decision more
satisfactorily, it ought to be allowed.  In Rajkumar Gurawara (dead)
through LRs V. S.K.Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd.  it was held at Para
No.13 that though pre-trial amendments can be allowed on such
terms where Court finds just, for once trial commenced the showing
of due diligence as per proviso to Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C is the
prerequisite.  These expressions in fact say the basic requirement of
due diligence is to be satisfied, once trial is commenced, though for
the pre-trial amendment it can be liberal made subject to other
riders.  It is in the wake of the above, in J.Samuel V. Gattu mahesh ,
it was held in paras 16 to 22 in nutshell by referring to
Ajendraprasadji supra that the word due diligence is the idea that
reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are
requested.  Due diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking
to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attend an anticipatory relief.
An advocate representing some one must engage in due diligence to
determine that the representations made are factually accurate and
sufficient.  The term due diligence is specifically used in the Code so
as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise the discretion
the situations of requested amendment after the commencement of
trial or not.  The term due diligence determines the scope of a partys
constructive knowledge, claim and is very critical to the outcome of
the suit.  No doubt, typographical errors or mistakes that can be
considered otherwise, however, when plaint is supposed to be singed
by the party and at the advice of the counsel signed and verified the
pleading by showed some attention, this omission could have been
noticed and rectified there itself, that also cannot be construed as
due diligence.  In Veluri Raja Rajeswari supra this Court also held
the pre-requisite where trial commenced to show due diligence for
not seeking the amendment of the pleading earlier.  In the later
expression of this Court in Waheeda Begum V. Md.Yakub  by  
referring to several expressions including the Rajkumar Gurawara
supra particularly at para No.24 that as per the expression, it confers
jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or to amend
the pleadings at any stage of pleadings and on such terms as may be
just, provided such amendment seeks determination of the real
question and controversy between the parties; that pre-trial
amendments are to be allowed more liberally, than those
amendments sought to be made after commencement of the trial.  It
also referred J.Samuel supra particularly in para No.26 in saying that
no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has
commenced, unless the Court has come to the conclusion that in spite
of due diligence, the party could not raise the matter before the
commencement of the trial.  It also referred the expression in Rajesh
Kumar Agarwal V. K.K.Modi  that the Court can take note of events
subsequent to the filing of the suit, where necessary, to shorten the
litigation.  It is by referring to the expressions, it was held on the
facts in Waheeda begum supra that the petitioners could establish
that in spite of due diligence they could not raise the matters before
commencement of trial and the bar laid down under proviso to Order
VI Rule 17 C.P.C thus no way applied and consequently dismissal of
the amendment petition by the trial Court is held unjustified.
        7) Even the decision of Single Judge of this Court in Narne
Estates (P) Ltd V. N.Gopal Naidu  the law laid down in
Ajendraprasadji supra was referred in holding that petition filed five
years later to the plaint adding prayer for declaration of G.P.A
executed in favour of the 1st respondent by various land owners while
he was working as Director of the Company, for amendment of the
same held unsustainable for lack of due diligence, though otherwise
as held in Pankaja V. Yellappa  and State of A.P. V. Pioneer
Builders , the mere delay itself is not a ground to reject the
amendment when it results to multiplicity of proceedings.  The other
decision placed reliance of this Court in Rachabattuni Govinda Rao
V. Jonnadula Sambasiva Rao  on facts held the amendment sought  
in the suit for recovery of amount, to incorporate a statement to the
effect that the consideration was paid through a cheque drawn on
S.B.I, after the facts elicited in the cross-examination of P.W-1 held
cannot be allowed for lack of due diligence.  The decision in another
expression of single Judge of this Court in Siluveru Lakshmamma V.
Siluveru Sankaraiah  on facts held the after thought amendments
after commencement of trial can be disallowed as unexplained delay
and latches are also grounds to negate the amendment. The Court
referred Pioneer Builders supra and also Salem Bar Association case
supra before arriving the conclusion.  The other expression of this
Court in Muthukur Gram Panchayat rep. by its Executive Officer V.
Kakuturu Ramesh Reddy  was in the suit for permanent injunction
filed claiming easementary right to restrain the defendant-panchayat
from making any constructions in the suit site, plaint sought
amendment after commencement of trial and during cross-
examination of plaintiff was dismissed for lack of due diligence.  The
other expression of the Apex Court in Chander Kanta Bansal V.
Rajinder Singh Anand  it was held that in a suit for injunction
restraining the defendant from obstructing the lane in the suit
property, defendant seeking amendment of written statement after
closure of evidence of both sides to file partition agreement that was
not brought in the course of evidence and the same when allowed by
amendment to bring in evidence tantamounts to retracting what as
pleaded in the written statement held amendment cannot be allowed
for lack of due diligence in saying that while exercise of discretion,
care should be taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an
irremediable character are not inflicted upon the opposite party
under pretence of allowing amendment.  It was held that amendment
which appears clearly to be an after thought to be disallowed.
        8) The other decision placed reliance is of the Apex Court in
Peethani Suryanarayana V. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore    
where it was held that Court holds power to allow such amendment,
provided the application is bonafide and does not cause injustice to
either side and does not affect the rights already accrued to the other
side.  It was on facts in the suit for partition amendment of plaint
saying some typographical error is there as to subject matter that
requires correction when it causes no prejudice to the so called
pendentelite purchasers of suit land by correction of survey Nos.462
and 463 from what plaint originally described of Survey No.165, when
that Survey No.165 is re-assigned as 463 and the mentioning is to
correct the typographical mistake.  For that conclusion referred
Sajjan Kumar V. Ram Kishan  para-5 holding the amendment sought  
is for the purpose of bringing to the record the real question in
controversy between the parties and refusal to permit the
amendment would create needless complications at the stage of
execution in the event of the appellant-plaintiff succeed in the suit.
In fact, the boundary description survey number or boundaries if
outcome of bonafide mistakes can be allowed if not come under
Sections 152 or 153 C.P.C atleast under Section 151 C.P.C to subserve
the ends of justice.  In this regard, it was laid down way back in the
expression of this Court in Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah V. Kalkonda
Krishnaih  as follows:
        As a result of the above discussion my conclusions on the
three points formulated above are as follows:-  Where clerical
or arithmetical mistakes occur in copying the plaint schedules
from the documents anterior to the suit the proceedings in
the suit can always be corrected under Section 152 C.P.C.  In
such cases even the documents on the basis of which the suit
was filed may be amended either in a suit under Section 31 of
the Specific Relief Act or in a proper case even by an
application under Section 152 C.P.C provided it is a case of
misdescription and not one of disputed identity.  In such
cases, if Section 152 is invoked it would obviate a suit which
would ultimately bring the same result.  In all cases, where
clerical or arithmetical errors creep-in in the plaint and as a
consequence in the decrees as well, they can be rectified at
any time even after a final decree.  A case of such an
amendment petition under Section 152 C.P.C. filed in a
pending suit even after a preliminary decree is passed therein
is an a fortiori case.
        9) The law succinctly laid down from the expressions is that the
requirement of satisfying the due diligence concept for the trial once
commenced and in particular for post trial amendment is a mandatory
requirement being a pre-requisite, besides the other considerations,
where the amendment is necessary to resolve the real controversy
and where does not cause grave prejudice or injustice to the other
side and where it does not alter the cause of action or inconsistent to
the existing material in the pleadings on record.  It can be allowed
where the amendment is necessary to explain the material on record.
        10) From this undisputedly the trial is at the fag end of both
suits clubbed together and the plaint schedule boundaries are
disputing by the defendants of the suit in the specific performance
suit O.S. No.585 of 2007 and the same is there also in the evidence on
plaintiffs side of O.S. No.417 of 2007 where the suit in O.S. No.585 of
2007 clubbed with for joint trial and the defendants in O.S. No.585 of
2007 let in evidence as D.Ws 1 and 2 and also on their side D.Ws 3, 4
and 5 examined and the plaintiff in O.S. No.585 of 2007 as D.W-1 in
the chief examination not explained the same.  It is no doubt, the
contention of the revision petitioner who is the plaintiff in O.S.
No.585 of 2007 in seeking amendment of the two of the boundaries to
the plaint schedule supra is that it could not be noticed even at that
stage and it is only in the cross-examination page No.36, para No.2 it
was elicited and in page 26, Para No.3 of the written statement of the
defendants in O.S. No.585 of 2007, the defendants did not even
dispute the boundaries.  It is in fact, the proposed amendment sought
for is not for Eastern and Western boundaries, but for North to change
as South and South to change as North and not even to introduce any
new names, but for saying the mistake occurred by inadvertence and
unnoticed.  It is no doubt true in the so called agreement for sale of
which the suit for specific performance of O.S. No.585 of 2007
maintained, the sale agreement does not contain boundaries and it is
only in the plaint it is specified as part of S.No.295 admeasuring Ac.0-
20 guntas within the four boundaries and now sought for amendment
of the boundary name mentioned as North as South and South as
North.  From this, there is nothing to show what grave prejudice being
caused to the defendants in O.S. No.585 of 2007 or plaintiffs in O.S.
No.417 of 2007 when they are disputing the very contract for sale in
favour of plaintiff in O.S. No.585 of 2007 and its enforceability and
not even admitting of sale is only within the boundaries and by change
of the Northern to Southern and Southern to Northern, it is
inconsistent to the stand already taken in the plaint pleadings or
causes thereby any grave prejudice to the opposite party.  When such
is the case, the amendment when required to resolve the real
controversy and to avoid future complications in the event of success
in execution or the like.  It is clearly stated that it could not be
noticed before pre-trial stage, that too when the defendants written
statement in O.S. No.585 of 2007 no way disputed the boundaries and
its correctness.  Thus, it can be said that the plaintiff in O.S. No.585
of 2007 could not seek the amendment before commencement of trial
despite due diligence, as it is noticed from the evidence let in, in the
suits clubbed together after commencement of trial and when it is to
resolve the real controversy as per the plaintiff in O.S. No.585 of 2007
and when delay itself is not a ground to reject the amendment, the
trial Court ought to have allowed the amendment, when it no way
causes withdrawal of any inconsistent admission in the pleadings or
grave prejudice to other side or changes the cause of action or nature
of suit, but for the said delay to compensate.  The lower Courts order
dismissing the amendment application now sought to be intervened in
the revision within its limited scope for saying is improper exercise of
jurisdiction vested and when it causes prejudice to the revision
petitioners/plaintiffs in O.S. No.585 of 2007, this Court has to
interfere to set aside the order impugned in the order vide Shalini
Shyam Shetty V. Rajendra Shankar Patil  that was followed in
Sameer Suresh Gupta V. Rahul Kumar Agarwal .  
        11) Accordingly and in the result, the revision is allowed by
setting aside the dismissal order of amendment sought in I.A. No.1866
of 2014 in O.S. No.585 of 2007 by the trial Court by allowing the
amendment subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/- by the
Petitioner/Plaintiffs in O.S.No.585 of 2007 to the defendant in that
suit within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order and file
proof before the trial Court, failing which the order of the lower
Court holds good.  There is no order as to costs in the revision.
        12) Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this revision shall
stand closed.
________________________  
Dr. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO, J  
Date:   -12-2014

Thursday, October 9, 2014

Or.1, rule 10 and consequential amendment - injunction granted not to alienate - pending suit properties are alienated - petition to implead them as defendants - notice was order to the proposed respondents , they remain exparte - despite of it the trial court dismissed the application - their Lordships held that The manner, in which the lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is in a highly confused state of mind. Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non application of mind on its part as there is no such law and regarding boundaries the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers, the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey numbers.The fact, however, remains that the survey number remains common both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in the sale deed.the lower Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit.=Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013 04-09-2014 K.Yogender Reddy and another.. Petitioners Smt.K.Usha Rani and 2 others. .. Respondents = 2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11971

Or.1, rule 10 and consequential amendment - injunction granted not to alienate - pending suit properties are alienated - petition to implead them as defendants - notice was order to the proposed respondents , they remain exparte - despite of it the trial court dismissed the application - their Lordships held that The manner, in which the lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is in a highly confused state of mind. Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non application of mind on its part as there is no  such law and regarding boundaries the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers, the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers.The fact, however, remains that the survey number remains common   both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in the sale deed.the lower Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit.=

 A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
                (i) that the suit is part heard;
        (ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
        examined;
        (iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
        Court can permit impleadment of a party
        under    Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
        commencement of the trial;
        (iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
        alleged to have been sold to the proposed
        parties and     the person having direct interest
        in subject matter of the suit and who would
        be affected     by the result of the suit should be
        allowed to come on record;
        (v) that there is variation in the names given by
        the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
        support of      the IA and the copy of the sale
        deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
      name of the purchaser was shown as
        Gutta Conventions Services Limited
        represented by  its Director    C.S.Neelkantha
        whereas in Paras       4 and 5, the     name was
        mentioned as Butta Conventions Services
        Limited         represented by its Director
        B.S.Neelkantha;
        (vi) that there is variation in the name of the
        Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
        name of the Company is also shown       as Gutta
        Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3       and
        4, the Companys name is shown as Butta
        conventions.

        I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard.  The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind.  As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
        A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning.  The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
        The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial.  On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
        With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court.  No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit.  The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity.  In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names  
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3.  This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes.  After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.

He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers.  This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason.      The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers.  It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not.  The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common   
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.

2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11971

The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy

Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013

04-09-2014

K.Yogender Reddy and another..  Petitioners      

Smt.K.Usha Rani and 2 others. .. Respondents

Counsel for the petitioners: Mr.R.Satyanarayana Reddy

Counsel for respondent No.1: Mr.Vivek Chandrasekhar.S
Counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3:       Ms.N.Niyatha

<Gist

>Head Note:

Cases referred :

----

The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy

Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013

Dated 04.09.2014

The Court made the following:


Order:
        This Civil Revision Petition arises out of Order, dated
31.07.2013, in IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on
the file of the Court of the learned IV Additional District
Judge, Ranga Reddy District (for short the lower Court),
whereby the application, filed by the petitioners for
impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein as defendant
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit, was dismissed.
        The petitioners have filed the abovementioned suit
(i) for declaration of their title in respect of plot No.112
admeasuring 1111 square yards in Survey No.13 of Khanamet  
Village, Serilingampalli Municipality, Ranga Reddy District (for
short the suit schedule property); (ii) for ejection of
respondent No.1 from the suit schedule property; (iii) for
putting the petitioners in possession of the suit schedule
property; and (iv) for grant of perpetual injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from interfering with their possession of the
suit schedule property.  The petitioners also sought for a decree
for damages for illegal use and occupation of the suit schedule
property by respondent No.1.
        It is the case of the petitioners that pending the suit, the
lower Court has granted ad interim injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from alienating the suit schedule property.
The petitioners filed IA.No.100 of 2003 under Order I Rule 10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the CPC) with
the allegation that despite subsistence of the said order of
injunction, respondent No.1 has executed a registered sale deed
in favour of respondent No.2 represented by respondent No.3,
conveying certain extent of land in Survey No.13, which
includes the suit schedule property.  The petitioners have,
therefore, sought for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3
in the suit.
        Respondent No.1 filed a counter-affidavit wherein she
has pleaded that an extent of Ac.1-10 guntas in Survey No.13
of Khanamet Village was purchased by her under valid
registered sale deed, dated 19-11-1997, from its previous owner;
that the said property was sold to respondent Nos.2 and 3; that
the said property is no way concerned with the suit schedule
property and that therefore, the question of impleading
respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit would not arise.
        Respondent Nos.2 and 3 did not appear to have either
entered their appearance or filed their counter-affidavits.
Regrettably, the lower Court has not even referred in its order
as to whether notices were ordered on respondent Nos.2 and 3
and if so, whether they have entered their appearance or not.
However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners pleaded that
as per the established convention, notices were sent to
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and despite the same, they have not
entered appearance and contested the application.  The lower
Court, in my opinion, has committed a serious lapse in not
adverting to this aspect at all.  Be that as it may,  IA.No.100 of
2013 filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit remained uncontested by the latter.  By
its order, dated 31-07-2013, the lower Court has dismissed the
said application.
        A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
                (i) that the suit is part heard;
        (ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
        examined; 
        (iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
        Court can permit impleadment of a party
        under    Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
        commencement of the trial;
        (iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
        alleged to have been sold to the proposed
        parties and     the person having direct interest
        in subject matter of the suit and who would
        be affected     by the result of the suit should be
        allowed to come on record;
        (v) that there is variation in the names given by
        the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
        support of      the IA and the copy of the sale
        deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
      name of the purchaser was shown as
        Gutta Conventions Services Limited
        represented by  its Director    C.S.Neelkantha 
        whereas in Paras       4 and 5, the     name was  
        mentioned as Butta Conventions Services 
        Limited         represented by its Director
        B.S.Neelkantha;
        (vi) that there is variation in the name of the
        Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
        name of the Company is also shown       as Gutta
        Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3       and 
        4, the Companys name is shown as Butta  
        conventions.

        I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard.  The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind.  As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
        A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning.  The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
        The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial.  On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
        With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court.  No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit.  The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity.  In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names   
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by 
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3.  This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes.  After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.
        The plea of the petitioners is that, in defiance of the order
of injunction suffered by respondent No.1, she has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3.  Having regard
to the substantive reliefs claimed by the petitioners viz.,
declaration of title, recovery of possession and perpetual
injunction against respondent No.1, it cannot be said that
respondent Nos.2 and 3, who, allegedly, purchased the suit
schedule property pending the suit and during the subsistence
of the injunction order, are not necessary parties.  Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 are proper and necessary parties to the suit, for, if
they are not impleaded as the defendants, the petitioners may
be forced to institute another substantive proceedings for
invalidation of the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 and
recovery of possession from respondent Nos.2 and 3.  Such a
course would only result in multiplicity of proceedings.  The
lower Court, by dismissing the present application on jejune
grounds, has given room for multiplicity of proceedings.
        Mr.S.Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel for
respondent No.1, submitted that the property sold by his client
to respondent Nos.2 and 3, is different from the one in respect
of which the suit is filed.  He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers.  This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason.      The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers.  It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not.  The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common   
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.
        For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court is of the
opinion that the lower Court has committed a serious
jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the
petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the
suit.
        Accordingly, the Order under revision is set aside.
IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on the file of the
Court of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy
District, is allowed.  The lower Court is directed to reopen the
entire case, allow all the parties to amend their pleadings and
adduce additional evidence, if necessary, and dispose of the suit
thereafter.
        As a sequel, CRPMP.Nos.3653 of 2014 in/&  
CRPMP.No.6020 of 2013 are disposed of.        
_____________________  
(C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J)
Dt: 4th September, 2014

Or.7, Rule 11 C.P.C. - for rejection of O.P. for Divorce and for Declaration that the decree given by Arizona is not binding on her and for return of gold , cash and for permanent alimony - husband filed application for rejection of main OP - Trial court dismissed - their lordships held that In the instant case, the petitioner is not able to demonstrate that any ground pleaded by him fits into Rule 11 of Order VII, CPC. Even if the facts pleaded by him are taken as true, he is entitled to rely upon the decree passed by the Court at Arizona as a defence. In other words, he can raise the plea of res judicata as one of the defences. It is fairly well established that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of fact and law. It is only when the relevant facts, namely, that as between the same parties, a Court of competent jurisdiction has decided the issue which falls for consideration in the subsequent set of proceedings, that the Court can refuse to adjudicate the same issue once again. On such facts being proved, it operates as a bar in law. Even when there is no dispute regarding a judgment or decree in a different set of proceedings as operating res judicata, it cannot be a basis for rejection of the plaint. The trial Court has taken the correct view of the matter and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. = CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 5336 OF 2013 02-09-2014 Hareesh Kakarla... PETITIONER E. Sweetha .. RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11940

 Or.7, Rule 11 C.P.C. - for rejection of O.P. for Divorce and for Declaration that the decree given by Arizona is not binding on her and for return of gold , cash and for permanent alimony - husband filed application for rejection of main OP - Trial court dismissed - their lordships held that In the instant case, the petitioner is not able to demonstrate that any ground pleaded by him fits into Rule 11 of Order VII, CPC.  Even if the facts pleaded by him are taken as true, he is
entitled to rely upon the decree passed by the Court at Arizona as a defence.  
In other words, he can raise the plea of res judicata as one of the defences.  It is fairly well established that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of fact and law.  It is only when the relevant facts, namely, that as between the same parties, a Court of competent jurisdiction has decided the issue which falls for consideration in the subsequent set of proceedings, that the Court can refuse to adjudicate the same issue once again.  On such facts being proved, it operates as a bar in law.  Even when there is no dispute regarding a judgment or decree in a different set of proceedings as operating res judicata, it cannot be a basis for rejection of the plaint.  The trial Court has taken the correct view of the matter and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. =

The respondent filed O.P No. 1456 of 2012 in the
Additional Family Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for
divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for
short, the Act) against the petitioner.  Declaration was
sought to the effect that divorce obtained by the petitioner in
the Superior Court of the State of Arizona is not binding on
her.  Other ancillary reliefs in the form of a decree for return
of gold, cash etc., and permanent alimony were also claimed.-

The basis for the petitioner to file an application under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the O.P is a decree
stated to have been obtained from the Court at Arizona,
granting the decree for dissolution of marriage between him
and the respondent.  Even the respondent took note of the
same and claimed the relief by making a specific reference
thereto.

      It is only when the defendant in a suit or a respondent
in the O.P is able to establish the grounds enlisted in Rule 11
of Order VII CPC that the Court can consider the feasibility of
rejecting the plaint or the O.P., as the case may be.  In the
instant case, the petitioner is not able to demonstrate that
any ground pleaded by him fits into Rule 11 of Order VII,
CPC.
Even if the facts pleaded by him are taken as true, he is
entitled to rely upon the decree passed by the Court at
Arizona as a defence.
In other words, he can raise the plea of
res judicata as one of the defences.
It is fairly well established
that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of fact and
law.
It is only when the relevant facts, namely, that as
between the same parties, a Court of competent jurisdiction
has decided the issue which falls for consideration in the
subsequent set of proceedings, that the Court can refuse to
adjudicate the same issue once again.
On such facts being
proved, it operates as a bar in law.  Even when there is no
dispute regarding a judgment or decree in a different set of
proceedings as operating res judicata, it cannot be a basis for
rejection of the plaint.
The trial Court has taken the correct
view of the matter and this Court is not inclined to interfere
with the same.
      The C.R.P is accordingly dismissed.

2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11940

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 5336 OF 2013    
       
02-09-2014

Hareesh Kakarla... PETITIONER

E. Sweetha .. RESPONDENTS    

Counsel for the Petitioner: Smt. K. Lalitha

Counsel for 1st Respondent: Smt. D. Pramada

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 5336 OF 2013    
Dated:02-09-2014
       

ORDER:


      The petitioner is the husband of the respondent.  Their
marriage took place in the year 2003 at Hyderabad and both
of them started living in USA after marriage.  A child was
born in the year 2009.  Disputes appear to have arisen
between the parties.  According to the petitioner, proceedings
were initiated before the Superior Court in the State of
Arizona and a decree of divorce was granted.

      The respondent filed O.P No. 1456 of 2012 in the
Additional Family Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for
divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for
short, the Act) against the petitioner.  Declaration was
sought to the effect that divorce obtained by the petitioner in
the Superior Court of the State of Arizona is not binding on
her.  Other ancillary reliefs in the form of a decree for return
of gold, cash etc., and permanent alimony were also claimed.
After receipt of notice in the O.P., the petitioner filed I.A No.
355 of 2013 under Section 7of the Act read with Section 13
and Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, with a prayer to reject the O.P.
According to him, the O.P is not maintainable once the
marriage between the parties has been dissolved by a Court of
competent jurisdiction in USA and where there is no
subsistence of marriage at all, the question of granting
divorce does not arise.

      The respondent opposed the I.A by filing a counter
affidavit.  She pleaded that the decree from the Superior
Court at Arizona was obtained fraudulently and that it is not
binding upon her.  It was also pleaded that even if there
existed a decree, it would constitute the basis for the plea of
res judicata and the O.P cannot be rejected.

      The trial Court dismissed the I.A., through order dated
26-11-2003. Hence this revision.

      Heard Smt. K. Lalitha, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Smt.D. Pramada, learned counsel for the respondent.

      The basis for the petitioner to file an application under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the O.P is a decree
stated to have been obtained from the Court at Arizona,
granting the decree for dissolution of marriage between him
and the respondent.  Even the respondent took note of the
same and claimed the relief by making a specific reference
thereto.

      It is only when the defendant in a suit or a respondent
in the O.P is able to establish the grounds enlisted in Rule 11
of Order VII CPC that the Court can consider the feasibility of
rejecting the plaint or the O.P., as the case may be.  In the
instant case, the petitioner is not able to demonstrate that
any ground pleaded by him fits into Rule 11 of Order VII,
CPC.  Even if the facts pleaded by him are taken as true, he is
entitled to rely upon the decree passed by the Court at
Arizona as a defence.  In other words, he can raise the plea of
res judicata as one of the defences.  It is fairly well established
that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of fact and
law.  It is only when the relevant facts, namely, that as
between the same parties, a Court of competent jurisdiction
has decided the issue which falls for consideration in the
subsequent set of proceedings, that the Court can refuse to
adjudicate the same issue once again.  On such facts being
proved, it operates as a bar in law.  Even when there is no
dispute regarding a judgment or decree in a different set of
proceedings as operating res judicata, it cannot be a basis for
rejection of the plaint.  The trial Court has taken the correct
view of the matter and this Court is not inclined to interfere
with the same.
      The C.R.P is accordingly dismissed.


      The miscellaneous petitions filed in this revision shall
also stand disposed of.  There shall be no order as to costs.

___________________________    
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
02-09-2014

Order 39 Rule 1 CPC - suit for permanent injunction along with interim injunction filed on 23-6-2014 - I. A. was heard on 22-8-2014 urgent notice was order and adjourn the case for 23-9-2014 - their Lordships held that When a prima facie case is made out, the Courts must grant temporary injunction and see that the plaintiff is not dispossessed in the meanwhile. The urgency of passing of orders under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC should be kept in mind. Even where the Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction or decides to issue urgent notice in that case also the Court should issue urgent notice and post the matter to a shortest date. When there is urgency in the matter the attitude of the Courts in posting the matter to a longer date, in fact defeat the purpose of Order 39 Rule 1 CPC.= C.R.P. No. 2950 of 2014 03-09-2014 Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi.. Petitioner G. Nageshwara Reddy and others .. Respondents = 2014 Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11898

Order 39 Rule 1 CPC - suit for permanent injunction along with interim injunction filed on 23-6-2014 - I. A. was heard on 22-8-2014 urgent notice was order and adjourn the case for 23-9-2014 - their Lordships held that When a prima facie case is made out, the Courts must grant temporary injunction and see that the plaintiff is not dispossessed in the meanwhile.  The urgency of passing of orders under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC should be kept in mind. Even where the Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction or decides to issue urgent notice in that case also the Court should issue urgent notice and post the matter to a shortest date.   When there is urgency in the matter the attitude of the Courts in posting the matter to a longer date, in fact defeat the purpose of Order 39 Rule 1 CPC.=

Order 39 Rule 1 CPC is as follows.
       1.Cases in which temporary injunction may be
granted.-Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise-
       (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being
wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully
sold in execution of a decree, or
       (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or
dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors,
       (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or
otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in
dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary
injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the
purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging,
alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or
dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the
plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court
thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.

When any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted,
damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or where the defendant
threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to
defrauding his creditors or where the defendant threatens to dispossess
the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any
property in dispute in the suit, the Court may grant a temporary
injunction.  Of course, the plaintiff has to establish prima facie case.  It
becomes the duty of the Courts to examine whether there is any urgency
in the matter or not.  The Courts should go through the averments made
by the party in the supporting affidavit and also the pleadings and
documents filed in support of the case of the plaintiff.  When a prima facie
case is made out, the Courts must grant temporary injunction and see
that the plaintiff is not dispossessed in the meanwhile.  The urgency of
passing of orders under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC should be kept in mind.
Even where the Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction or
decides to issue urgent notice in that case also the Court should issue
urgent notice and post the matter to a shortest date.  The Court should
examine what is the reasonable time required to serve the notice upon
the respondents.  Where the plaintiff undertakes to serve the notice within
two or three days, the matter need not be adjourned to a longer date.  It
can be posted within four days or a week.  When there is urgency in the
matter the attitude of the Courts in posting the matter to a longer date, in
fact defeat the purpose of Order 39 Rule 1 CPC.

2014 Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11898

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE B. CHANDRA KUMAR        

C.R.P. No. 2950 of 2014

03-09-2014

Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi.. Petitioner

 G. Nageshwara Reddy and others .. Respondents  

Counsel for Petitioner:  Sri C. Hanumantha Rayudu

Counsel for respondents:     ---

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  


?CASES REFERRED :    

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE B. CHANDRA KUMAR        

C.R.P. No. 2950 of 2014

Order:

      This CRP is filed against the docket order dated 22.08.2014 passed
in IA No.1122 of 2014 in OS No.361 of 2014 on the file of the Principal
Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool.
       The petitioner in this revision is the plaintiff in the suit.  She filed
the suit against the respondents herein for permanent injunction in
respect of the suit schedule property i.e., the land admeasuring 561.11
sq. yards bearing plot No.2 in Survey No.920/1, situated at Kallur village
and Mandal, Kurnool District, within Kurnool Municipal Corporation limits,
69th Ward with specific boundaries.  As seen from the stamps of the Court
below the said suit was filed on 23.06.2014.  Along with that suit the
petitioner herein filed IA No.1122 of 2014 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2
read with Section 151 CPC praying the Court to grant ad interim injunction
restraining the respondents, their men etc., from interfering with her
peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property
pending disposal of the suit.  The petitioner in her affidavit specifically
alleged that the defendants without having any right tried to dispossess
her from the suit schedule property on 20.05.2014.  It is also her case
that when the Government officials tried to interfere with her possession
she filed WP No.15041 of 2014 and obtained interim direction in WPMP
No.18639 of 2014 on 03.06.2014.  It is submitted that the said writ
petition is still pending.  IA No.1122 of 2014 was heard on 22.08.2014 and
the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, passed orders as follows.
       Heard.  Issue urgent notice to the respondents.  Call on
23.09.2014.
      When the suit was filed on 23.06.2014 it is not clear under what
circumstances the matter was heard on 22.08.2014.  Now this revision is
filed challenging the order dated 22.08.2014 in ordering urgent notice to
the respondents.
      Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the lower Court
ought to have considered the urgency in the matter and that there is
threat of dispossession of the petitioner from the suit schedule property.
      Order 39 Rule 1 CPC is as follows.
       1.Cases in which temporary injunction may be
granted.-Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise-
       (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being
wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully
sold in execution of a decree, or
       (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or
dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors,
       (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or
otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in
dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary
injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the
purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging,
alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or
dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the
plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court
thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.

      The above referred provision enables the Court to grant temporary
injunction even without issuing notice to the respondents.  The above
provision has been made with an intention to preserve the property as it
is.  When any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted,
damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or where the defendant
threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to
defrauding his creditors or where the defendant threatens to dispossess
the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any
property in dispute in the suit, the Court may grant a temporary
injunction.  Of course, the plaintiff has to establish prima facie case.  It
becomes the duty of the Courts to examine whether there is any urgency
in the matter or not.  The Courts should go through the averments made
by the party in the supporting affidavit and also the pleadings and
documents filed in support of the case of the plaintiff.  When a prima facie
case is made out, the Courts must grant temporary injunction and see
that the plaintiff is not dispossessed in the meanwhile.  The urgency of
passing of orders under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC should be kept in mind.
Even where the Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction or
decides to issue urgent notice in that case also the Court should issue
urgent notice and post the matter to a shortest date.  The Court should
examine what is the reasonable time required to serve the notice upon
the respondents.  Where the plaintiff undertakes to serve the notice within
two or three days, the matter need not be adjourned to a longer date.  It
can be posted within four days or a week.  When there is urgency in the
matter the attitude of the Courts in posting the matter to a longer date, in
fact defeat the purpose of Order 39 Rule 1 CPC.  In the above
circumstances, I am of the view that there is no need to issue notice to
the respondents in this revision.  The revision can be disposed of at the
admission stage giving following directions to the lower Court.
      The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge is directed to issue notice to
the respondents or their counsel and advance the matter to any date
within a period of seven (7) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order and hear the matter within a period of seven (7) days thereafter
and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.  However, in the
meanwhile, both the parties are directed to main status quo obtaining as
on today with regard to possession.
      Accordingly, the CRP is disposed of.  However, in the
circumstances, no costs.
      As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this
revision shall stand closed.

______________________  
B. CHANDRA KUMAR, J.    
Date: 03.09.2014