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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Sunday, September 21, 2014

Quashing of criminal case - Sec.3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, - complaint given by third party of community - allegation that the petitioners herein denied promotion and thereby insulted and humiliated him as he belongs to Scheduled Caste community. - High court held that Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle laid down in cases cited supra, I am of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to quash the proceedings for two reasons viz., a) the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act; and b) entrustment of investigation to the police in Cr.No.242 of 2011 isnothing short of abuse of process of law. Hence the proceedings in Crime No.242 of 2011 of Nagarampalem P.S deserve to be quashed. = CRIMINAL PETITION NOs.8269 OF 2011 and batch 01-08-2014 1.N.V. Ramana Raju2.B. Venkatesulu...PETITIONERS The State of A.P. rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P, Hyderabad and 3 others.RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11792

 Quashing of criminal case - Sec.3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, - complaint given by third party of community - allegation that the petitioners herein denied promotion and thereby insulted and humiliated him as he belongs to
Scheduled Caste community. - High court held that Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle laid down in cases cited supra, I am of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to quash the proceedings for two reasons viz., a) the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act; and b) entrustment of investigation to the police in Cr.No.242 of 2011 isnothing short of abuse of process of law. Hence the proceedings in Crime No.242 of 2011 of Nagarampalem P.S deserve to be quashed.  =

the petitioners herein denied promotion in time, thereby insulted and humiliated him as he belongs toScheduled Caste community.
The fourth
respondent submitted the complaint shouldering the responsibility of
protecting the interest of the employees belonging to the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe community.
As per the allegations made in
the complaint, the petitioners herein denied promotion to Dr.Y.Kiran
Kumar in time, thereby insulted and humiliated him as he belongs to
Scheduled Caste community.   =
There is no allegation in the complaint that the
petitioners have intentionally insulted or intimidated Dr. Y. Kiran
Kumar in his presence in the name of his caste and in a place within
the public view.  Even if the allegations made in the complaint ex facie
taken to be true and correct, the petitioners never insulted Dr. Y.
Kiran Kumar in the name of his caste so as to attract the alleged act
of the petitioners within the ambit of Section 3 (1)(x) of the Act.=

 1) Registration of Crime No.242 of 2011 against the
petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not legally
sustainable; and 
2) the allegations made in the complaint do not
constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners.  Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
submitted that the allegations made in the complaint constitute the
alleged offence.  =

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and
also the principle laid down in cases cited supra, I am of the
considered opinion that this is a fit case to quash the proceedings
for two reasons viz.,
 a) the allegations made in the complaint do not
constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act; and
b) entrustment of investigation to the police in Cr.No.242 of 2011 is
nothing short of abuse of process of law.
Hence the proceedings in
Crime No.242 of 2011 of Nagarampalem P.S deserve to be quashed.  
24      Accordingly, the criminal petitions are allowed and the
proceedings against the petitioners/A1 to A4 in Crime No.242 of
2011 of Nagarampalem P.S are hereby quashed. Miscellaneous  
petitions, if any, pending in these petitions shall stand closed.

2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11792

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY        

CRIMINAL PETITION NOs.8269  OF 2011 and batch    

01-08-2014

1.N.V. Ramana Raju2.B. Venkatesulu...PETITIONERS    

The State of A.P. rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P, Hyderabad and 3
others.RESPONDENTS    

Counsel for Petitioners : Sri N. Ashwani Kumar

Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3: Addl. Public Prosecutor
 Counsel for Respondent No.4: Sri Ravi Kumar Mathangi

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred

  (2011) 11 SCC 259
2 (2011) 11 SCC 258
3 (2000) 12 SCC 531
4 2012 (1) ALT (Crl.) 240 (A.P)
5 AIR 1960 SC 866
6 AIR 1992 SC 604
7 (1976) 3 SCC 736
8 (2007) 12 SCC 1


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY        
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.8269 and 9066 OF 2011    

COMMON ORDER:    
1       These two criminal petitions are filed (Crl.P.No.8269 of 2011 by
A1 and A2, and Crl.P.No.9066 of 2011 by A3 and A4) under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings Cr.No.242 of 2011 of
Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur District.
2       Since the point involved in both the petitions is one and the
same, I am inclined to dispose of these two petitions by this common
order.
3       The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is two
fold, viz., 1) Registration of Crime No.242 of 2011 against the
petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not legally
sustainable; and 2) the allegations made in the complaint do not
constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners.  Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
submitted that the allegations made in the complaint constitute the
alleged offence.  The contention of learned counsel for fourth
respondent is that the petitioners have intentionally insulted and
humiliated Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar by delaying promotion to him as he
belongs to Scheduled Caste community.
4       On 22.08.2011, the fourth respondent submitted a complaint to
the Station House Officer, Nagarampalem Police Station who in turn
registered a case in Cr.No.242 of 2011 under section 3 (1) (x) of S.C. &
S.T (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the petitioners.  The fourth
respondent submitted the complaint shouldering the responsibility of
protecting the interest of the employees belonging to the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe community. As per the allegations made in 
the complaint, the petitioners herein denied promotion to Dr.Y.Kiran
Kumar in time, thereby insulted and humiliated him as he belongs to
Scheduled Caste community.   
5       Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar joined as Assistant Civil Surgeon in
Government General Hospital, Guntur on 26.12.1991.  He was
promoted as Assistant Professor and joined as such on 06.04.1994 in
the same college. On 15.09.2003, the screening committee approved
and recommended the name of Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar to the post of
Associate Professor and accordingly he was promoted on 06.8.2004.
While he was working as Associate Professor, he was reverted to the
post of Assistant Professor, as per Proc.Rc.No.34388/E1.A/04, dated
9.6.2005 issued by the then Director of Medical Education.  Aggrieved
by his reversion, Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar filed O.A.No.7037 of 2007 on the
file of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (hereafter,
APAT), challenging the proceedings dated 09.06.2005.  The said O.A.
was allowed by APAT by its order dated 25.04.2006 by setting aside
the Proc. Rc.No.34388/E1.A/04, dated 09.06.2005. Accordingly,
Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar was again promoted as Associate Professor on
05.9.2006.  Alleging that he was not properly placed in the seniority
list, Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar filed O.A.No.1777 of 2009 questioning the
proceedings in Rc.No.22163/E-1-A/2006, dated 05.9.2006
whereunder he was promoted.  The APAT partly allowed O.A.No.1777  
of 2009 by its order dated 13.12.2009 and further held that
promotion of Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar shall be deemed to be from 06.8.2004
i.e., the date on which he was reverted from the post of Associate
Professor.  In the order, the respondents therein were directed to
prepare seniority list and finalise the same by circulation, and even
thereafter if Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar had any grievance, he can approach
the respondents.
6               In the above factual background, let me consider the allegations
made in the complaint.  It should be remembered that the complaint
was given to the Police by the president of Indian Dalith Employees
Association.  It is alleged in the complaint that Accused Nos.1, 3 and
4 were responsible for injustice caused to Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar for
getting promotion in 2004.  Accused No.2 harassed Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar
without considering his representations for about eight (8) years i.e.
till his (A2s) retirement on 31.07.2011.  The substance of the
complaint is that Dr. Y. Kiran Kumar could not get promotion in time
because the petitioners intentionally delayed the promotion to Dr.Y.
Kiran Kumar as he belongs to Scheduled Caste community.  
7               As per Section 2(a) of the Act, atrocity means an offence
punishable under Section 3.  According to Oxford English Reference
Dictionary, atrocity means an extremely wicked cruel act especially
one involved physical violence or injury. As per the provisions of the
Act, an act or omission on the part of a person, who does not belong
to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, will fall within the definition
of atrocity if the same is punishable under Section 3.
8       In the instant case, the crime has been registered under Section
3 (1) (x) of S.C. & S.T (PoA) Act. The crucial question that falls for
consideration is whether the alleged act of the petitioners will fall
within the ambit of Section 3 of the said Act. Section 3 of the Act
reads as under:

Section 3 - Punishments for offences of atrocities

(1) Whoever, not being a member or a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, --
(i) forces a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe to drink or eat any inedible or obnoxious
substance;
(ii) acts with intent to cause injury, insult or annoyance
to any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or
any other obnoxious substance in his premises or
neighbourhood;
(iii) forcibly removes clothes from the person of
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or
parades him naked or with painted face or body or
commits any similar act which is derogatory to human
dignity;
(iv) wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by,
or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to
be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or gets the land allotted to him
transferred;
(v) wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or
interferes with the enjoyment of his rights over any land,
premises or water;
(vi) compels or entices a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe to do 'begar' or other similar forms
of forced or bonded labour other than any compulsory
service for public purposes imposed by Government;
(vii) forces or intimidates a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe not to vote or to vote to a
particular candidate or to vote in a manner other than
that provided by law;
(viii) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or
criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;
(ix) gives any false or frivolous information to any public
servant, and thereby causes such public servant to
use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(xi) assaults or uses force to any woman belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to
dishonour or outrage her modesty;
(xii) being in a position to dominate the will of a woman
belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe
and uses that position to exploit her sexually to which
she would not have otherwise agreed;
(xiii) corrupts or fouls the water of any spring, reservoir
or any other source ordinarily used by members of the
Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribes so as to render
it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used;
(xiv) denies a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe any customary right of passage to a
place of public resort or obstructs such member so as to
prevent him from using or having access to a place of
public resort to which other members of public or
any section thereof have a right to use or access to;
(xv) forces or causes a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe to leave his house, village or other
place of residence,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than six months but which may extend to five years and
with fine.
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,--
(i) gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to
cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
cause, any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled  
Tribe to be convicted of an offence which is capital by
the law for the time being in force shall be punished
with imprisonment for life and with fine; and if an
innocent member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe be convicted and executed in consequence of such
false or fabricated evidence, the person who gives
or fabricates such false evidence, shall be punished with
death;
(ii) gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to
cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
cause, any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled  
Tribe to be convicted of an offence which is not capital
but punishable with imprisonment for a term of seven
years or upwards, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months but which may extend to seven years or
upwards and with fine;
(iii) commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance
intending to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause damage to any property belonging to
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than six months but which may extend
to seven years and with fine;
(iv) commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance
intending to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause destruction of any building which is
ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a place for
human dwelling or as a place for custody of the property
by a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with
fine;
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of
ten years or more against a person or property on the
ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to
such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment
for life and with fine;
(vi) knowingly or having reason to believe that an offence
has been committed under this Chapter, causes any
evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear
with the intention of screening the offender from legal
punishment, or with that intention gives any
information respecting the offence which he knows or
believes to be false, shall be punishable with the
punishment provided for that offence; or
(vii) being a public servant, commits any offence under
this section, shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than one year but which
may extend to the punishment provided for that offence.
9       A careful scanning of the provisions of Section 3 clearly
demonstrates that the disputes pertain to service matters do not fall
within the purview of Section 3.  Promotion to a Government
employee depends upon service conditions and relevant Rules and
Regulations issued from time to time besides his eligibility, seniority
coupled with entries made in Annual Confidential Records.  The
promotions from Assistant Civil Surgeon to Assistant Professor and
from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor are governed by
G.O.Ms.Nos.502 HM&FW (A1) Department, dated 13.9.2003 and    
G.O.Ms.No.154, HM&FW (A2) Department, dated 04.5.2002.  When    
promotions were given basing on the assessment made by the
screening committee, prima facie, the petitioners cannot be found
fault with.  Even assuming that the entire screening committee has
violated or deviated from the Rules in order to deny promotion to
Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar, then the entire screening committee has to be
found fault with.  It is not the case of the fourth respondent that
petitioners have violated certain Regulations, which were in force and
caused injustice to Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar in getting promotion in 2004.
The fact remains that Dr. Y.Kiran Kumar got promotion in the year
2004 itself. But due to the orders of the Andhra Pradesh
Administrative Tribunal (APAT), he was reverted back.  It is a known
fact that the Government officials have to implement the orders of the
APAT. Otherwise, they have to face consequences.  In order to avoid
the legal consequences, the concerned officials have implemented the
orders of the APAT.  There is no specific averment in the complaint
that Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar was eligible to the post of Associate Professor
much prior to August 2004 and at that point of time the petitioners
alone are competent to promote Dr.Y.Kiran Kumar as Associate
Professor.
10      For better appreciation of the rival contentions, it is apt to
mention few admitted facts.
11      A perusal of the record reveals that G.O.Ms.No.154 HM&FW
(A2) Department, dated 04.5.2002 provides guidelines for fixing of
inter-se seniority in the feeder cadre to the post of Assistant Professor
and Associate Professors by following seniority vertically.  For one
reason or the other, the State Government has made necessary
amendments to G.O.Ms.No.154 and issued G.O.Ms.No.502, HM&FW        
(A1) Department, dated 13.9.2003.  As per G.O.Ms.No.502, the inter-
se seniority in the feeder cadre shall be fixed horizontally.  The
procedure to be followed for fixing of inter-se seniority in both the
G.Os is diametrically opposite.  In the year 2003, the screening
committee recommended and promoted Assistant Professors as  
Associate Professors.  The Assistant Professors who could not get
promotion, in view of the change of mode of fixing the inter-se
seniority, filed O.As before the APAT, challenging the legality of the
G.O.Ms.No.502 dated 13.09.2003.  The said O.As were allowed setting
aside the promotions recommended by the screening committee in the
year 2003.  Due to setting aside of the promotions recommended by
the screening committee, consequently it also effected the promotion
given to Dr. Y. Kiran Kumar and others.  Therefore, the material
placed before this Court clinchingly establishes the root cause for
setting aside of the promotion of Dr. Y. Kiran Kumar and delay in
giving promotion is due to change of the policy of the Government in
respect of inter-se seniority of Assistant Professors.
12              The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the
allegations made in the complaint satisfy the basic ingredients of
Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The Honble apex Court, in Asmathunnisa
Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , observed as follows:
8. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in E. Krishnan
Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan & Others 1997 Crl. L.J. 2036. The
relevant paragraphs of this judgment are paras 12, 13 and 18. The
said paragraphs read as under:
"12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two kinds of insults against the
member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable - one  
as defined under sub-section (ii) and the other as defined under sub-section
(x) of the said section. A combined reading of the two sub-sections shows
that under section (ii) insult can be caused to a member of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or
any other obnoxious substance in his premises or neighbourhood, and to
cause such insult, the dumping of excreta etc. need not necessarily be done
in the presence of the person insulted and whereas under sub-section (x)
insult can be caused to the person insulted only if he is present in view of
the expression "in any place within public view". The words "within public
view", in my opinion, are referable only to the person insulted and not to the
person who insulted him as the said expression is conspicuously absent in
sub-section (ii) of Section 3 of Act 3/1989. By avoiding to use the expression
"within public view" in sub-section (ii), the Legislature, I feel, has created
two
different kinds of offences an insult caused to a member of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes, even in his absence, by dumping excreta etc. in
his premises or neighbourhood and an insult by words caused to a member
of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes "within public view" which
means at the time of the alleged insult the person insulted must be present
as the expression "within public view" indicates or otherwise the Legislature
would have avoided the use of the said expression which it avoided in sub-
section (ii) or would have used the expression "in any public place".
13. Insult contemplated under sub-section (ii) is different from the insult
contemplated under sub-section (x) as in the former a member of the
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes gets insulted by the physical act and
whereas is the latter he gets insulted in public view by the words uttered by
the wrongdoer for which he must be present at the place.
xxx xxx xxx
18. As stated by me earlier the words used in sub- section (x) are not "in
public place", but "within public view" which means the public must view the
person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the
allegations under the said section gets attracted. In my view, the entire
allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make
out any offence against the petitioner".
9. The aforesaid paragraphs clearly mean that the words used are "in
any place but within public view", which means that the public must
view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no
offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted if the
person is not present.
13      Establishment of the following two conditions is sine qua non to
register the crime under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act in view of the ratio
laid down in the case cited supra.
i.      The person belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe being
insulted or intimidated in his presence in the name of the caste;
ii.     The incident must occur in any place within the public view.
14      As per the principle enunciated in Gorige Pentaiah v. State of
A.P. , D. Santosh Reddy v. S.H.O. of Shamshabad P.S  and
U.Sadasivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh , if the allegations made in
the complaint or FIR do not satisfy the basic ingredients of Section 3
(1) (x) of the Act, the Court can quash the proceedings by exercising
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
15      It is an admitted fact that Dr. Y.Kiran Kumar did not lodge the
complaint against the petitioners alleging that the petitioners have
committed the offence under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act.  The fourth
respondent  association lodged the complaint alleging as if the
petitioners have intentionally insulted Dr. Y. Kiran Kumar by delaying
his promotion on the sole ground that he belongs to Scheduled Caste
community.  There is no allegation in the complaint that the
petitioners have intentionally insulted or intimidated Dr. Y. Kiran
Kumar in his presence in the name of his caste and in a place within
the public view.  Even if the allegations made in the complaint ex facie
taken to be true and correct, the petitioners never insulted Dr. Y.
Kiran Kumar in the name of his caste so as to attract the alleged act
of the petitioners within the ambit of Section 3 (1)(x) of the Act.  The
substance of the allegations made in the complaint is that the
petitioners herein denied promotions to Dr. Y. Kiran Kumar as he
belongs to Scheduled Caste community.  Even assuming but not  
admitting the allegations are true and correct, the same will not fall
under anyone of the provisions enumerated under Section 3 of the
Act. When the alleged act of the petitioners is not punishable under
Section 3 of the Act, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be
presumed that the alleged act of the petitioners will come under the
purview of atrocity as defined under section 2 (a) of the Act.
16      It is a settled principle of law that the Court can quash the
proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the following circumstances.
i.      If the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any
offence much less the offence alleged to have been committed by
the accused,
ii.     If there is a legal bar for registration of the criminal case and
continuation of investigation against the accused.
iii.    Even if the allegations made in the complaint ex facie are taken
to be true and correct, the possibility of conviction of the
accused is too remote or bleak,
iv.     If the registration of the case and continuation of the
investigation would amount to abuse of process of law; and
v.      To secure the ends of justice.

17      The Apex Court in R.P.Kapoor v State of Punjab , held as
hereunder:
"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the F.I.R. or the
complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. In such cases, no
question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of
looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide
whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In this case it would
be legitimate to the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly
unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against
the accused person."

18      In State of Haryana v Bhajanlal  the Apex Court after having
surveyed the entire case law on the point has laid down certain
indicia with reference to which, a High Court may in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under
Section 482 Cr.P.C may interfere in proceedings relating to
cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
19      In State of Karnataka v L.Muniswamy , the Supreme Court
observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.PC
entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceedings ought to be quashed.
20      A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Mohan
Goswami v State of Uttaranchal , after examining the scope and
ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, observed that
inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the
advancement of justice.  If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is
brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be fully justified in
preventing injustice by invoking the inherent powers of the Court.
21      Before parting with the order, one has to observe that the
parliament enacted the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act with avowed object to
prevent atrocities against the members of that community. The
scheme of the Act clearly demonstrates that the parliament with an
intention to enhance the social dignity and self respect of the
members of the S.C. & S.T community incorporated various
provisions in the Act.  The various provisions of the Act will be a
shield but not a sword.  In recent days the number of cases
registered under this Act is increasing day by day, which clearly
manifests the social awareness among the members of the S.C &
S.T. community.  The letter and spirit of the constitution of this
country is that a citizen of this country should not claim that he
can do everything as a matter of right without discharging the social
and moral obligations cast on him.  Before making an allegation,
one should take reasonable care and caution.  Lodging a complaint
by an association without noticing the factual background may
send a wrong signal to the society.  The provisions of the Act are
being misused for selfish ends. In the instant case, the possibility of
filing of the present complaint by the association in order to achieve
the object of the Act without verifying the factual background may
not be ruled out. If the association has bestowed its interest prior to
filing of the complaint to the rules and regulations governing the
promotion avenues as well as the inter-se seniority being followed in
the feeder cadre, certainly it would not have ventured to lodge the
complaint.  The trauma likely to be undergone, more particularly,
by person at the helm of affairs to be an accused of moral turpitude
on the ground that he has shown discrimination towards down
trodden people, is unfathomable.  For one reason or the other, the
person whose promotion was alleged to have been denied or delayed
by the petitioners, has not chosen to invoke the provisions of the
Act.  Strictly speaking, any dispute pertaining to inter-se seniority
or the service matter falls outside the purview of the provisions of
the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act.  The parliament in its wisdom visualised
the far reaching consequences being faced by the officials who were
entrusted with the work of promotions, might have intentionally
deleted the service matters from the purview of the Act.
22      Viewed from any angle, the association has no locus standi to
fight for the cause related to the service matters.  The parliament in
its wisdom excluded the service jurisprudence from the purview of
S.C & S.T (PoA) Act.  If the intention of the legislature is otherwise,
certainly, it would have brought the service matters pertaining to
the members of the S.C & S.T community within the purview of the
Act.
23      Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and
also the principle laid down in cases cited supra, I am of the
considered opinion that this is a fit case to quash the proceedings
for two reasons viz., a) the allegations made in the complaint do not
constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners under Section 3 (1) (x) of the S.C & S.T (PoA) Act; and b)
entrustment of investigation to the police in Cr.No.242 of 2011 is
nothing short of abuse of process of law. Hence the proceedings in
Crime No.242 of 2011 of Nagarampalem P.S deserve to be quashed.   
24      Accordingly, the criminal petitions are allowed and the
proceedings against the petitioners/A1 to A4 in Crime No.242 of
2011 of Nagarampalem P.S are hereby quashed. Miscellaneous   
petitions, if any, pending in these petitions shall stand closed.
___________________________    
T.SUNIL CHOWDARY, J    
01.08.2014.

Sec.499,500 of I.P.C. - Sec.197 Cr.P.C. and Sec.482 of Cr.P.C.- Defamatory letter addressed to the Higher authorities as a president of Association - whether sanction necessary - whether complaint is liable to be quashed - High court held that The test to be applied is whether the alleged act of the petitioner will fall within the four corners of Section 197 Cr.P.C or not? It is not the case of the petitioner that he addressed the letter dated 20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies department while discharging his duties as Additional Director of Civil Supplies. Nowhere it is mentioned that the The Association activities forms integral part of the official duties of an Additional Director. and It is a settled principle of law that the Court has to take into consideration the allegations made in the complaint only while deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry to ascertain the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint at the pre-trial stage. The allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.= CRIMINAL PETITION No.8936 OF 2011 01-08-2014 E. Laxmi Reddy...PETITIONER The State of A.P. rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P, Hyderabad and another.RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11790

 Sec.499,500 of I.P.C. - Sec.197 Cr.P.C. and Sec.482 of Cr.P.C.- Defamatory letter addressed to the Higher authorities as a president of Association - whether sanction necessary - whether complaint is liable to be quashed - High court held that The test to be applied is whether the alleged act of
the petitioner will fall within the four corners of Section 197 Cr.P.C or not? It is not the case of the petitioner that he addressed the letter dated 20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies
department while discharging his duties as Additional Director of Civil Supplies.  Nowhere it is mentioned that the The Association activities forms integral part of the official
duties of an Additional Director. and It is a settled principle of law that the Court has to take
into consideration the allegations made in the complaint only while deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry to
ascertain the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint at the pre-trial stage.  The allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.=

The petitioner and the respondent are acting as
president and honorary president of the Association.  In
course of time, disputes arose between them in connection
with the day to day affairs of the association.
        While things stood thus, the petitioner addressed a
letter to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies on 20.04.2010
making some allegations against the second respondent.
Being felt ashamed of the allegations made in the said letter,
the second respondent filed the complaint before the court
below. =
1) Second respondent filed the complaint without following the due
procedure as contemplated under Section 197 Cr.P.C; and
=
A perusal of Section 197 Cr.P.C. at a glance
demonstrates that this section was incorporated in Cr.P.C. to
protect a public servant in respect of an act or omission
committed by him while discharging duties in his official
capacity.  The test to be applied is whether the alleged act of
the petitioner will fall within the four corners of Section 197
Cr.P.C or not?
        It is not the case of the petitioner that he addressed the
letter dated 20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies
department while discharging his duties as Additional
Director of Civil Supplies.  Nowhere it is mentioned that the
The Association activities forms integral part of the official
duties of an Additional Director. =
 2) The allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any
offence, much less the alleged offence under Section 500 IPC.=

It is a settled principle of law that the Court has to take
into consideration the allegations made in the complaint only
while deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  The
Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry to
ascertain the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the complaint at the pre-trial stage.  The allegations
made in the complaint, prima facie, constitute the offence
alleged to have been committed by the petitioner for the
offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.
        A perusal of the record reveals that the learned
Magistrate, after satisfying himself with the material available
on record, has taken cognizance of the offence against the
petitioner under Section 500 IPC.   Viewed from either legal or
factual aspects, I am of the considered opinion that the trial
Court has not committed any irregularity or illegality while
taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner.
   2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11790    

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY        

CRIMINAL PETITION No.8936 OF 2011    

01-08-2014

E. Laxmi Reddy...PETITIONER  

The State of A.P. rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P, Hyderabad and
another.RESPONDENTS    

Counsel for Petitioners :Sri P. Veera Reddy, Senior    
                          Counsel
                          For Sri Karri Murali Krishna

Counsel for 1st Respondent: Additional Public
                             Prosecutor
Counsel for 2nd Respondent:Sri J. Sudheer

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  


? Cases referred

  AIR 1979 SC 1841
2 (2008) 14 SCC 661
3 2006 (3) ALT (Crl.) 355 (A.P.)
4 (2010) 15 SCC 163
5 (1981) 3 SCC 208



THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY        
CRIMINAL PETITION No.8936 OF 2011    
ORDER:
        This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash
the proceedings in C.C.No.616 of 2011 on the file of XIV
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal
Courts, Namapply, Hyderabad.
        Sri P. Veera Reddy, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner submitted that institution of
criminal proceedings against the petitioner is not
maintainable for the following two grounds, viz., 1) Second
respondent filed the complaint without following the due
procedure as contemplated under Section 197 Cr.P.C; and 2) 
The allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any
offence, much less the alleged offence under Section 500 IPC.
        Per contra, Sri J. Sudheer, the learned counsel for the
second respondent submitted that there is no need to follow
the procedure contemplated under Section 197 Cr.P.C.  He
further submitted that since the allegations made in the
complaint satisfy the basic ingredients of Section 499 IPC, the
complaint before the Court below is maintainable.
        The second respondent filed a complaint under Section
200 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner for the offence punishable
under Section 500 IPC on the file of the learned XIV
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal
Courts, Nampally, Hyderabad.   The learned Magistrate, after
following the due procedure contemplated under Cr.P.C, has
taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioner under
Section 500 IPC and issued process.
        The second respondent worked as Additional Director of
Civil Supplies and retired from service on attaining the age of
superannuation.  He also worked as president of Civil
Supplies Welfare Association (hereinafter referred as the
association) while he was in government service. The
petitioner has been working as Assistant Director of Civil
Supplies department, Somajiguda, Hyderabad. After 
retirement of the second respondent, the petitioner was
elected as president of the Association.  However, the 2nd
respondent was elected as honorary president of the
Association.  The petitioner and the respondent are acting as
president and honorary president of the Association.  In
course of time, disputes arose between them in connection
with the day to day affairs of the association.
        While things stood thus, the petitioner addressed a
letter to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies on 20.04.2010
making some allegations against the second respondent. 
Being felt ashamed of the allegations made in the said letter,
the second respondent filed the complaint before the court
below.  The above said fact is the root cause which made the
petitioner and the second respondent to approach the
criminal court as well as this Court.
        The first question that arises for consideration is
whether the filing of complaint by the second respondent is
hit by the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C.
        Section 21 IPC defines public servant.  There is no
doubt that the petitioner herein will fall within the scope of
public servant, as defined under Section 21 IPC.  But whether
he is entitled to take shelter under Section 197 Cr.P.C has to
be considered in the light of the alleged lis between the
petitioner and the second respondent.  The relevant portion of
Section 197 Cr.P.C reads as follows:
        197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.-
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or 
Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the Government is
accused of any offence alleged to have been committed
by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take
cognizance of such offence except with the previous
sanction-
(a) x x x x x x
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs
of a State, of the State Government.
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
        A perusal of Section 197 Cr.P.C. at a glance
demonstrates that this section was incorporated in Cr.P.C. to
protect a public servant in respect of an act or omission
committed by him while discharging duties in his official
capacity.  The test to be applied is whether the alleged act of
the petitioner will fall within the four corners of Section 197
Cr.P.C or not?
        It is not the case of the petitioner that he addressed the
letter dated 20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies
department while discharging his duties as Additional
Director of Civil Supplies.  Nowhere it is mentioned that the
The Association activities forms integral part of the official
duties of an Additional Director.  It is a known fact that
associations are formed to pursue the welfare and well being
of the employees of that particular department. It is the
choice of the government employee either to join in the
association or not. The nature of the duties discharged by the
petitioner as Additional Director of Civil Supplies is entirely
different to that of a president of the Civil Supplies Service
Association.  The association activities cannot be equated
with the official duties. Both are distinct and different to each
other.   A perusal of the letter dated 20.04.2010 clearly
manifest that the petitioner addressed the said letter to the
Commissioner of Civil Supplies in the capacity of president of
the Association but not while discharging his official duties as
Additional Director of Civil Supplies Department.  Addressing
of letter by the petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil
Supplies will not fall within the purview of Section 197
Cr.P.C.
        The Honble Supreme Court, in B.Saha and Ors. Vs.
M.S. Kochar , while interpreting the scope of Section 197
Cr.P.C, held as under:
                17. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability
of this Section is that the offence charged, be it one of
commission or omission, must be one which has been  
committed by the public servant either in his official
capacity or under colour of the office held by him.

        Having regard to the facts of the case on hand and the
principle enunciated in the case cited supra, I am unable to
accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that filing of the complaint is hit by Section 197
Cr.P.C.        
        Sri P.Veera Reddy, the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner would submit that the alleged imputation, if any,
made by the petitioner against the second respondent will fall
within the exceptions of Section 499 IPC; hence it is a fit case
to quash the proceedings.
        Per contra, Sri J. Sudheer, the learned counsel for the
second respondent submitted that the allegations made in the
complaint will fall within the ambit of Section 499 IPC;
therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
        To substantiate his argument, the learned counsel for
the petitioner has drawn my attention to the ratio laid down
in the following decisions:
i. Lakhwant Singh Vs. Jasbir Singh and Others .  The
relevant portion at para No.9 of the judgment reads as under:
.It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the
case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order
to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and
on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings
are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint,
exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is
called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose
any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the
allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the
offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate,
it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not,
however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis
of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would
end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as
a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations
in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant
that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed
and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala
fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court..
ii.     K. Papi Reddy Vs. B. Venkateshwarlu and another
wherein this Court held that where a statement imputation is
made against a person in good faith, for public good, without
malice or ill-will, the same will fall within the ambit of
Exception 9 of Section 499 IPC.
iii.     Rajesh Rangarajan Vs. Crop Care Federation of Indian
and Another .  As per the principle enunciated in this case,
the Court can quash the proceedings under Section 482
Cr.P.C. if the allegations made in the complaint do not satisfy
the basic ingredients of Section 499 IPC.
        Let me consider the facts of the case on hand in the
light of the rival contentions and the legal principle cited
supra.
        It is not out of place to extract hereunder the relevant
portion in para No.8 of the complaint, which reads as under:
                .Even the distribution of the handbook by the
Complainant is tainted as an action to gain sympathy and
support. Anonymous Complaint if any made against the
employees cannot be attributed to any individual/Association
and at any rate it cannot be attributed to the complainant.
Above all, the action of the Accused in tarnishing the image
and reputation of the Complainant only to defame him
requires criminal action against the accused.  Due to writing
such letters several enquiries were made by known persons
about truth and otherwise of the allegations made against the
Complainant in the said letter.  He faced several embracing
situations in view of such reckless allegations.

        A perusal of the complaint prima facie reveals that the
petitioner made certain imputation or allegations against the
second respondent.
        The next question that fall for consideration is whether
the allegations or imputation made by the petitioner against
the second respondent will fall within the ambit of Exceptions
1, 2, 3 and 9 of Section 499 IPC as contented by the learned
counsel for the petitioner.
        Exception 2 to Section 499 IPC deals with public
conduct of a public servant.  Admittedly, the second
respondent is not a public servant as defined under Section
21 IPC as he retired from service long back.  The gist of
Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 is that making of imputation against a
person in good faith and in public interest.
        Whether a person made an accusation against the other
in good faith or public interest or not will be considered with
reference to the facts and circumstances of a particular case
and other attending circumstances.  Whether the petitioner
addressed the letter dated 20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of
Civil Supplies Department in good faith or not is purely a
question of fact. It is a settled principle of law that a pure
question of fact shall not fall within the ambit of Section 482
Cr.P.C.  Even otherwise, the burden of proof lies on the
petitioner to establish that he addressed the letter dated
20.04.2010 to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies Department
in good faith and in public interest.
        In identical circumstances, the apex Court in Sewakram
Sobhani Vs. R.K.Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz & Others
held as under:
   The prayer in the application before the High Court was
merely to quash the order dated November 30, 1977 of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal and not to quash
the complaint itself as the High Court has done. But, that
was only a technical defect and we do not take serious
notice of it in an appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution where we are very naturally concerned with
substantial justice and not with shadow puppetry. The
position now is this: The news item in the Blitz under the
caption MISA Rape in Bhopal Jail undoubtedly contained
serious imputations against the character and conduct of
the complainant. In order to attract the Ninth Exception to
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, the imputations must
be shown to have been made (1) in good faith, and (2) for the
protection of the interest of the person making it or of any
other person or for the public good. Good faith is defined,
in a negative fashion, by Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code
as follows: Nothing is said to be done or believed in good
faith which is done or believed without due care and
attention. The insistence is upon the exercise of due care
and attention. Recklessness and negligence are ruled out by
the very nature of the definition. The standard of care and
attention must depend on the circumstances of the
individual case, the nature of the imputation, the need and
the opportunity for verification, the situation and context in
which the imputation was made, the position of the person
making the imputation, and a variety of other factors. Good
faith, therefore is a matter for evidence. It is a question of
fact to be decided on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. So too the question whether an imputation was
made for the public good. In fact the First Exception of
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code expressly states
Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of
fact. Public good like good faith is a matter for evidence
and not conjecture.

        It is a settled principle of law that the Court has to take
into consideration the allegations made in the complaint only
while deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  The
Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry to
ascertain the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the complaint at the pre-trial stage.  The allegations
made in the complaint, prima facie, constitute the offence
alleged to have been committed by the petitioner for the
offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.
        A perusal of the record reveals that the learned
Magistrate, after satisfying himself with the material available
on record, has taken cognizance of the offence against the
petitioner under Section 500 IPC.   Viewed from either legal or
factual aspects, I am of the considered opinion that the trial
Court has not committed any irregularity or illegality while
taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner.
        Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case, I am of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case to
quash the proceedings in C.C.No.616 of 2011 on the file of
XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal
Courts, Namapply, Hyderabad.
        The Criminal petition is accordingly dismissed. As a
sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this
Criminal Petition shall stand closed.
__________________________  
T. SUNIL CHOWDARY, J.  
Date: 01-08-2014.

Or. 7, rule 11 C.P.C. - Suit against the Bank which institute a claim under Debts Recovery Tribunal challenging the very mortgage is not valid as they have got share in it - petition to dismiss the suit -The trial Court dismissed the I.A - High court held that the counter claim mentioned under sec.18,19 of Debt Recovery Act not bar the plaintiffs to file a suit and further the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of Mortgage deed and further this petition under Or. VII, rule 1 is not maintainable as there are no ingredients and as such dismissed the revision = CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 1245 OF 2014 01-08-2014 State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Recovery Branch (SARB), Nampally, Hyderbad, rep., by its Chief Manager... PETITIONER Archana Adiraju and three others RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11806

 Or. 7, rule 11 C.P.C. - Suit against the Bank which institute a claim under Debts Recovery Tribunal  challenging the very mortgage is not valid as they have got share in it - petition to dismiss the suit -The trial Court dismissed the I.A - High court held that the counter claim mentioned under sec.18,19 of Debt Recovery Act not bar the plaintiffs to file a suit and further the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of Mortgage deed and further this petition under Or. VII, rule 1 is not maintainable as there are no ingredients and as such dismissed the revision =

 The loan became
non-performing asset (NPA) on account of failure to pay
instalments.
Therefore, the petitioner got issued a notice
dated 10-01-2013 to respondent Nos.1 to 4 for repayment of
the loan.  Since there was no positive response, O.A No. 303
of 2013 was field before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
Hyderabad (for short the Tribunal) by invoking the provisions
of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 (for short the Act). =

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 i.e., the daughter and the son
of late Srinivas Kumar Mawle filed O.S No. 2073 of 2013 in
the Court of V Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, with a prayer that the transaction of mortgage
covered by letter dated 27-12-2006, followed by the deposit of
instrument, be declared as null and void. =
  On receipt of the summons in the suit, the petitioner
filed I.A No. 364 of 2013 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, with a
prayer to reject the plaint.
It was pleaded that the O.A
pending before the Tribunal is comprehensive in nature and
being a party to that, respondent Nos.1 and 2 can put
forward their contentions, including the filing of counter
claim.
It was pleaded that the filing of a separate suit would
lead to several complications.
 According to the petitioner, the
Act is a self-contained code in relation to the loan
transactions with banks and once an O.A is filed, any suit in
relation to that very dispute is barred.
The application was
opposed by respondent Nos.3 and 4.
They pleaded that the
plaint can be rejected only when the circumstances provided
for under various clauses of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC are
shown to be existing and that such grounds were not even
pleaded.
It was also pleaded that the Tribunal does not have
the jurisdiction to decide the legality or otherwise of a
mortgage deed.=

 Respondent Nos.1 and 2 were very much justified in
choosing a civil Court for the relief of declaration in relation to
the transaction of mortgage between their father on the one
hand and the petitioner on the other hand.
Though the
Tribunal is conferred with the power to adjudicate the
disputes between the bank or banking institutions; and the
persons who are indebted to such banks, its jurisdiction is
circumscribed by the provisions of the Act.
It has to proceed
under the assumption that the deed of mortgage is legal and
valid, in all respects.
It cannot decide the contentious issues about the very legality of the mortgage.
    None of the grounds pleaded by the petitioner fit into
Order VII Rule 11 CPC.  The trial Court has taken note of this
fact and dismissed the I.A.  No fresh or further grounds are
pleaded before this Court.
     The apprehension of the petitioner is that the pendency
of the suit may be cited as a ground to stall the proceedings
in the O.A.
Even according to respondent Nos.1 and 2, they
have 50% share in the mortgaged property.  Therefore, they
cannot have any objection for the adjudication that may be
undertaken by the Tribunal vis--vis the balance of 50%.

   Therefore, the C.R.P is dismissed. It is however directed
that it shall be open to the Tribunal to proceed with the
matter and if the sale of the mortgaged property becomes
necessary, it shall be confined to undivided 50% share.
However, if the suit filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 is
dismissed, the mortgage shall be in respect of the entire
property.


2014 - Aug. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11806
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY      

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 1245 OF 2014  
     
01-08-2014

State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Recovery Branch (SARB), Nampally,
Hyderbad, rep., by its Chief Manager... PETITIONER

Archana Adiraju and three others RESPONDENTS    

Counsel for the Petitioner:   Sri Hari Prasad Polida

Counsel for the Respondents: Sri G. Rama Chandra Reddy

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 1245 OF 2014  
Dated:01-08-2014

ORDER:
     

      One Sri Srinivas Kumar Mawle, the father of respondent
Nos.1 to 3 and husband of respondent No.4 obtained loan
from the petitioner for higher studies of respondent No.3 in
the United States of America.  An item of immovable property
bearing house No.3-4-846/1, Barkatpura, Hyderabad was
mortgaged for repayment of the loan.  The original loanee
Srinivas Kumar Mawle died.  The loan became
non-performing asset (NPA) on account of failure to pay
instalments.  Therefore, the petitioner got issued a notice
dated 10-01-2013 to respondent Nos.1 to 4 for repayment of
the loan.  Since there was no positive response, O.A No. 303
of 2013 was field before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
Hyderabad (for short the Tribunal) by invoking the provisions
of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 (for short the Act).

      Respondent Nos.1 and 2 i.e., the daughter and the son
of late Srinivas Kumar Mawle filed O.S No. 2073 of 2013 in
the Court of V Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, with a prayer that the transaction of mortgage
covered by letter dated 27-12-2006, followed by the deposit of
instrument, be declared as null and void.  The petitioner
herein was shown as defendant No.1 and respondent Nos.3
and 4, as defendant Nos.2 and 3 in the suit.

      On receipt of the summons in the suit, the petitioner
filed I.A No. 364 of 2013 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, with a
prayer to reject the plaint.  It was pleaded that the O.A
pending before the Tribunal is comprehensive in nature and
being a party to that, respondent Nos.1 and 2 can put
forward their contentions, including the filing of counter
claim.  It was pleaded that the filing of a separate suit would
lead to several complications.  According to the petitioner, the
Act is a self-contained code in relation to the loan
transactions with banks and once an O.A is filed, any suit in
relation to that very dispute is barred.  The application was
opposed by respondent Nos.3 and 4.  They pleaded that the
plaint can be rejected only when the circumstances provided
for under various clauses of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC are
shown to be existing and that such grounds were not even
pleaded.  It was also pleaded that the Tribunal does not have
the jurisdiction to decide the legality or otherwise of a
mortgage deed.

      The trial Court dismissed the I.A through order dated
14-03-2014.  Hence, the revision.

      Sri Hari Prasad Podila, learned Standing Counsel for the
petitioner submits that the effort of respondent Nos.1 and 2 is
to dispute and deny their obligation under the transaction of
mortgage and that the same can be urged by filing a counter
claim in the O.A.  He made extensive reference to Sections 18
and 19 of the Act.

      Sri G. Rama Chandra Reddy, learned counsel for
respondent Nos.1 and 2, on the other hand, submits that the
facility of filing a counter claim no doubt exists in an O.A filed
under the Act, but the Tribunal is not conferred with the
jurisdiction to declare the legality or otherwise of a
transaction of mortgage.  He submits that respondent Nos.1
and 2 have a definite share in the mortgaged property and
mortgage of the property without their participation is null
and void and at least, not binding upon them.  He submits
that the trial Court has taken the correct view of the matter
on finding that none of the ingredients of Rule 11 of Order VII
CPC are proved, and that the order under revision does not
warrant any interference.

      Late Sri Srinivas Kumar Mawle, the father of respondent
Nos.1 to 3 and the husband of respondent No.4 obtained loan
from the petitioner for the education of respondent No.3.  An
item of immovable property was mortgaged for securing
repayment of the loan.  Srinivas Kumar Mawle died before the
loan could be liquidated.  The petitioner filed the O.A before
the Tribunal against his legal representatives.

      Respondent Nos.1 and 2 who are parties to the O.A
instituted suit O.S No. 2073 of 2013 for declaration to the
effect that the mortgage of the immovable property for
repayment of the loan obtained by their father is void and
illegal.  The petitioner who figured as defendant No.1 wanted
the plaint in the suit be rejected.  It is too well known that
rejection of plaint is an extraordinary step to be taken by a
Court.  Whenever a suit is filed, its natural course is that it
should lead to a decree granting or rejecting the relief, after
contest by both the parties.  Rejection of plaint leads to
termination of the proceedings at the threshold.  It is only
when the grounds stipulated in Order VII Rule 11 CPC exist,
that such an extreme step can be taken.  In the instant case,
the only basis pleaded by the petitioner was that O.A No. 303
of 2013 filed by them is already pending and if respondent
Nos.1 and 2 have any objection for the mortgage deed, it can
be canvassed in the O.A itself.

      Section 19 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be
followed by the Tribunal while dealing with an O.A filed before
it.  Apart from the right to contest in the O.A, the respondents
who are the opposite parties are conferred with the power to
plead set off or even to present the counter claim.  This
facility is similar to the one created under the CPC.
Therefore, it has to be seen as to how far the existence of
facility of filing of counter claim in the O.A would bar a
separate suit.

      The set off or counter claim is a facility created for the
benefit of a defendant in a suit, to put forward independent
claim against the plaintiff, apart from opposing the suit.  In a
way, this facility obviates the necessity to file a separate suit
by the defendant, against the plaintiff in respect of a matter,
which arises mostly out of the same cause of action, which
constituted the basis for the suit in which the person figures
as a defendant.  However, de hors such facility, if a defendant
in a suit, files an independent suit, against the plaintiff
though he had the facility of filing a counter claim in relation
thereto, the suit filed by him does not become barred by law.
It is almost an act of election or exercise of option by the
defendant to choose between the facilities of filing a counter
claim in the suit filed against him, or to file a separate suit
against the plaintiff.  In the event of a separate suit being
filed, the only requirement would be that both the suits must
be clubbed together.  The person who first filed the suit would
not be entitled to file an application under Order VII Rule 17
CPC to reject the plaint in a suit filed against him by the
defendant, by pleading the ground that there exists a facility
for the defendant to file counter claim.  When this is the state
of affairs in relation to the proceedings which are exclusively
covered by the CPC, the O.A instituted under the Act does not
stand on a higher footing.

      Respondent Nos.1 and 2 were very much justified in
choosing a civil Court for the relief of declaration in relation to
the transaction of mortgage between their father on the one
hand and the petitioner on the other hand.  Though the
Tribunal is conferred with the power to adjudicate the
disputes between the bank or banking institutions; and the
persons who are indebted to such banks, its jurisdiction is
circumscribed by the provisions of the Act.  It has to proceed
under the assumption that the deed of mortgage is legal and
valid, in all respects.  It cannot decide the contentious issues
about the very legality of the mortgage.

      None of the grounds pleaded by the petitioner fit into
Order VII Rule 11 CPC.  The trial Court has taken note of this
fact and dismissed the I.A.  No fresh or further grounds are
pleaded before this Court.

      The apprehension of the petitioner is that the pendency
of the suit may be cited as a ground to stall the proceedings
in the O.A.  Even according to respondent Nos.1 and 2, they
have 50% share in the mortgaged property.  Therefore, they
cannot have any objection for the adjudication that may be
undertaken by the Tribunal vis--vis the balance of 50%.

      Therefore, the C.R.P is dismissed. It is however directed
that it shall be open to the Tribunal to proceed with the
matter and if the sale of the mortgaged property becomes
necessary, it shall be confined to undivided 50% share.
However, if the suit filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 is
dismissed, the mortgage shall be in respect of the entire
property.

        The miscellaneous petitions filed in this revision shall
also stand disposed of.  There shall be no order as to costs.
__________________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J  
01-08-2014

Claim under sec.47 of C.P.C. - objecting for execution of the decree which granted interest at 36% per annum even though it is not a commercial transaction - trial court partly allowed the claim and reduced interest at some periods - High court held that this Court has no hesitation to hold that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said application in E.A.No.3961 of 2005 and the said application itself was not maintainable. The Executing Court ought to have rejected such application and left it open to the judgment-debtor to file an appeal against decree, if so advised. Thus the very application itself being not maintainable, the Civil Revision petition is dismissed, consequently in E.A.No.3965 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 on the file of IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, stands dismissed and it is held that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. No costs. =CRP (NPD) No.2105 of 2005 Mr.Narendra Kumar ... Petitioner Vs. Mrs.Sumathi ... Respondent = 2012 - Jan. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/filename=34776

Claim under sec.47 of C.P.C. - objecting for execution of the decree which granted interest at 36% per annum even though it is not a commercial transaction -
trial court partly allowed the claim and reduced interest at some periods - High court held that this Court has no hesitation to hold that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said application in E.A.No.3961 of 2005 and the said application itself was not maintainable.  The Executing Court ought to have rejected such application and left it open to the judgment-debtor to file an appeal against decree, if so advised.  Thus the very application itself being not maintainable, the Civil Revision petition is dismissed, consequently in E.A.No.3965 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 on the file of IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, stands dismissed and it is held that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief.  No costs.    =

The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.86 of 2001 for recovery of the advance amount of Rs.45,000/- paid for purchase of the property bearing door No.49, NSC Bose Road, Chennai 79 together with interest at the rate of 36% per annum.
The petitioner/defendant contested the suit claim and filed a written statement.
The trial Court granted a decree in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by judgment and decree dated 22.09.2003.
The respondent/decree-holder filed E.P.No.643 of 2005, to recover the decree amount by arrest and detention of the petitioner/judgment-debtor.   =

The petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) in E.A.No.3945 of 2005, stating that the trial Court passed the decree without considering the legal position as regards the rate of interest under Section 34 CPC and since the transaction is not a commercial transaction, the trial court has no jurisdiction to award interest more than 6% per annum during pendente lite period and after the decree.  Therefore, it was contended that the decree dated 22.09.2003, is a nullity. =

The decree-holder resisted the said application by filing a counter affidavit by raising a preliminary objection stating that an application under Section 47 CPC is not maintainable.
 Further it was stated that the decree is not a nullity and on facts, it was categorically pointed out that the petitioner agreed to pay 36% interest on Rs.45,000/- as the amount was used by the petitioner in his Silver business and the pleadings made by the plaintiff were not controverted by the petitioner/defendant and therefore, the petitioner cannot question the decree.  
Further, it was contended that the trial Court after considering the evidence on record, exercised discretion and awarded 36% interest and the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and the Appellate Court alone has jurisdiction to set aside the decree, if it is found to be beyond the scope of law. =
Similarly, the Apex Court in (Sunder Doss v. Ram Parkash) , held that, the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and, that is, that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up even in an execution proceedings.=
In view of the above legal principle, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said application in E.A.No.3961 of 2005 and the said application itself was not maintainable.  The Executing Court ought to have rejected such application and left it open to the judgment-debtor to file an appeal against decree, if so advised.  Thus the very application itself being not maintainable, the Civil Revision petition is dismissed, consequently in E.A.No.3965 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 on the file of IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, stands dismissed and it is held that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief.  No costs.    

2012 - Jan. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/filename=34776

IN THE H IGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED:12.01.2012
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM
CRP (NPD) No.2105 of 2005

Mr.Narendra Kumar ... Petitioner
Vs.

Mrs.Sumathi ... Respondent

Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order and decreetal order dated 19.09.2005, passed by the learned IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, by partly allowing the E.A.No.3961 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 as far as in not disallowing the decree holder's claim for interest at 36% p.a. for the period from November 1999 to 01.01.2001 and for the pendente lite period from 02.01.2001 to 21.09.2003, (the date of decree).  

For Petitioner : Mr.N.Nagu Sah
For Respondents : Mr.B.S.Jothi Raman

O R D E R

This revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order and decreetal order dated 19.09.2005, passed by the IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai partly allowing E.A.No.3965 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 as far as it disallowed the decree-holder's claim for interest at 36% per annum from November 1999 to 01.01.2001 and for the pendente lite period from 02.01.2001 to 21.09.2003, the date of decree.

2. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.86 of 2001 for recovery of the advance amount of Rs.45,000/- paid for purchase of the property bearing door No.49, NSC Bose Road, Chennai 79 together with interest at the rate of 36% per annum. The petitioner/defendant contested the suit claim and filed a written statement.  The trial Court granted a decree in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by judgment and decree dated 22.09.2003.  The respondent/decree-holder filed E.P.No.643 of 2005, to recover the decree amount by arrest and detention of the petitioner/judgment-debtor.   The petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) in E.A.No.3945 of 2005, stating that the trial Court passed the decree without considering the legal position as regards the rate of interest under Section 34 CPC and since the transaction is not a commercial transaction, the trial court has no jurisdiction to award interest more than 6% per annum during pendente lite period and after the decree.  Therefore, it was contended that the decree dated 22.09.2003, is a nullity.  The petitioner relied upon a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in AIR 1991 P&H 187[Taria alias Tara Chand vs. Amar Singh and another].

3. The decree-holder resisted the said application by filing a counter affidavit by raising a preliminary objection stating that an application under Section 47 CPC is not maintainable. Further it was stated that the decree is not a nullity and on facts, it was categorically pointed out that the petitioner agreed to pay 36% interest on Rs.45,000/- as the amount was used by the petitioner in his Silver business and the pleadings made by the plaintiff were not controverted by the petitioner/defendant and therefore, the petitioner cannot question the decree.  Further, it was contended that the trial Court after considering the evidence on record, exercised discretion and awarded 36% interest and the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and the Appellate Court alone has jurisdiction to set aside the decree, if it is found to be beyond the scope of law.  It was further stated that the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, does not state that the decree awarding interest at 36% is void.  Further, the respondent contended that the petitioner was fully aware about the proceedings before the trial Court and his counsel cross examined the plaintiff, however the petitioner did not chose to give evidence despite several opportunities granted by the trial Court.  With the above contentions, the decree-holder prayed for dismissal of the application filed Under Section 47 CPC.



4. The Executing Court solely relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, referred supra, granted partial relief to the petitioner, by scaling down the interest to 6% from 22.09.2003 and denied the relief for the other periods as sought for by the petitioner.  Aggrieved by such order, the petitioner has filed this revision petition.  

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the stand taken before the Executing Court and contended that the Executing Court having scaled down the interest from 22.09.2003 to 6% ought to have granted the full relief i.e. the interest for the period from November 1999 to January 2001and for the pendente lite period from 02.01.2001 to 21.09.2003.  The learned counsel further submitted that the transaction between the petitioner and the respondent not being commercial in nature, the trial Court did not have jurisdiction to grant interest more than 6%.  Therefore, the decree itself was a nullity and therefore, the trial Court ought to have granted full relief as sought for by the petitioner.

6. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the application under Section 47 CPC in E.A.No.3961 of 2005, was not maintainable and the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the decree and the relief granted to the petitioner was erroneous and the trial Court award interest at 36% after examining the transaction and the evidence available on record and the money obtained was used by the petitioner in his silver business and the decree was passed considering the evidence available on record, the Executing Court exercising power under Section 47 CPC cannot re-write the decree and ought to have dismissed E.A.No.3961 of 2005.   In support of his contention, the learned counsel referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India vs. Sharad Kanna [AIR 1993 Bombay 304].

7. It is on these rival contentions, it has to be decided as to whether the application filed by the petitioner/judgment debtor in E.A.No.3961 of 2005 under Section 47 CPC, for scaling down the percentage of the interest awarded by the trial Court in judgment and decree dated 22.09.2003 is maintainable and proper.

8. The judgment-debtor's contention is that the transaction between the parties was not a commercial transaction and therefore, the trial Court has no jurisdiction to award 36% interest and by awarding 36% interest, the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter of award of interest as laid down under Section 34 CPC and therefore, the decree is a nullity.  Since the decree is a nullity, the Executing Court has sufficient jurisdiction under Section 47 CPC to decide all questions between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and the same has to be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

9. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the application under Section 47 CPC for the relief sought for by the judgment-debtor was maintainable.

10. In The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India vs. sharad Kanna [AIR 1993 Bombay 304], an identical question came up for consideration. In the said case, the defendant by way of chamber summons sought for declaring an exparte decree passed by the Bombay High Court to be a nullity and/or non executable with the further prayer that the said exparte decree be set aside.  The defendant contended that the Court has no jurisdiction under Section 34 CPC to direct interest to be awarded upon interest in the suit claim.  The Bombay High Court in the aforementioned decision, after taking note of the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decree was not passed by a Court which lacked inherent jurisdiction and a situation where a statute mandates the Court to do or not to do something and the Court breaches the mandate, cannot be equated with a situation where the Court inherently lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject matter of the dispute or with the case of a special forum  of limited jurisdiction acting out of bounds of its jurisdictional limits and the former results in an erroneous decree; the later in a decree which is a nullity.  It was further held that if a Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 CPC awards interest on the aggregate of principle sum plus interest, it would be an exercise lacking in    inherent jurisdiction and not merely of an erroneous exercise within its jurisdiction and a Court which otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute equally have jurisdiction to decide it erroneously and the remedy in such a situation is by way of appeal against such order.   Therefore, Bombay High Court held that a decree which grants interest upon interest cannot be said to be nullity nor can the Court which passes the decree, be said to be coram non-judice.  The Bombay High Court also took note of the decision of this Court in Ganapathy vs. Balasubramania Goundar, [AIR 1987 Madras 124], wherein it has been held that the question of validity of a decree is not one which can be agitated in execution, because it does not relate to the satisfactory discharge of the decree.  It is only where a decree is passed by a Court, which lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree, that the objection to the validity of the decree may be raised in a proceeding in execution, if such an objection appears on the face of the record.  At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the decision of the Bombay High Court:
20. In the case of the defendants, however, the decree was not passed by a Court which lacked inherent jurisdiction. It is not disputed, indeed it could not be, that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the summary suit, in which the ex parte order was passed. What is, however, contended is that, under S. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as expounded by the Full Bench, this Court lacked inherent power to award interest upon interest, and, therefore, this situation was no different from the situation of lack of jurisdiction, which was considered by the Supreme Court in the cases cited hereinabove.

21. It is difficult to agree with this contention advanced by the learned counsel. A situation, where a statute mandates the Court of plenary jurisdiction to do or not to do something, and the Court breaches the mandate, cannot be equated with a situation where the Court inherently lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject-matter of the dispute or with the case of a special forum of limited jurisdiction acting out of bounds of its jurisdictional limits. The former results in an erroneous decree; the latter in a decree which is a nullity.

25. It is difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that, if a Court, while exercising jurisdiction under S. 34, awards interest on the aggregate of the principal sum plus interest, it would be an exercise lacking in inherent jurisdiction and not one merely of an erroneous exercise within its jurisdiction. A Court, which otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute, equally has jurisdiction to decide it erroneously. The remedy, in such a situation, is by way of appeal, if one is provided, or other constitutional one. If there is no resort to them, or, as in the instant case, the resort to them draws a blank, the order of the Court becomes final and it is not capable of being ignored on the ground of its being noh est or a nullity. In my view, the Court, in such a situation, cannot and does not became coram non judice.

26. It would be useful, at this juncture, to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Kali. Nath, MANU/SC/0041/1961 : [1962]2SCR747 , This was a case where the decision of the High Court was challenged on the ground that the suit filed on the Original. Side was wholly incompetent for want of territorial jurisdiction, and, therefore, the award which followed on the reference to arbitration, and the decree of the Court under execution, were all null and void. The Supreme Court, repelling the contention, observed (at page 200):
 "The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seized of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in' respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it."

The Supreme Court turned down the objection based on territorial jurisdiction as deemed to have been waived and held that the parties were estopped from raising such objection at the execution stage.
29. For a moment, even assuming the correctness of the contention of Mr. Diwan that the Full Bench judgment has expounded the law and held that the "power" of the Court under S. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure is "restricted" and that the Court is "prohibited" from granting interest upon interest, a Court, which acts contrary thereto, does not act without inherent jurisdiction; it may act erroneously. Thus, a decree, which grants interest upon interest, cannot be said to be a nullity, nor can the Court, which passes the decree, be said to be coram non judice. In my view, therefore, the ex parte decree dated 5th November, 1990, made by Agarwal, J., does not amount to nullity, nor is it "non est"; much less can be Court be said to have been coram non judice.

34. Mr. Doctor also relied on a judgment of the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in Ganapathi v. Balasubramania Gounder MANU/TN/0127/1987 : AIR1987Mad124 , which takes the view that the question of validity of a decree is not one which can be agitated in execution, because it does not relate to the satisfactory discharge of the decree. It is only where a decree is passed by a Court, which lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree, that the objection to the validity of the decree may be raised in a proceeding in execution, if such an objection appears on the face of the record.

37. In the result, I hold that the ex parte Decree dated 5th November, 1990, made by Agarwal, J., is not a nullity, nor is it non est. The Court which passed the said decree was not coram non judice. Consequently, it is not open to the defendants in these proceedings or in other collateral proceedings to object to the validity of the said decree.


11. In the instant case, the only objection raised by the judgment-debtor in the application filed under Section 47 CPC, is by stating that the transaction between the parties is not a commercial transaction and therefore, interest cannot be ordered to be paid at 36%.  In my view this is the question of fact, which was considered and a decree was passed by the trial Court giving certain reasons for exercise of discretion in directing interest at 36%. 

12. Undoubtedly the Executing Court does not have jurisdiction to go behind the decree, unless, there was lack of inherent jurisdiction and the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree in cases of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. The only remedy in cases of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction is to challenge the same by filing an appeal.   The Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree under execution and an erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity.  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain, AIR 1996 SC 1819 (1996 4 SCC 178), considered this very question and held as follows:-
  15......a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution.


13. The Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in K.P.Antony vs. Thandiyode Plantations (Pvt) Ltd. (FB) [AIR 1996 Kerala 37 (FB) held as follows:

10. The Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash AIR 1977 SC 1201 has laid down that the validity of a decee can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree lacked inherent jurisdiction. A court is said to be lacking in jurisdiction when it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time of institution of the suit or when the suit was decreed. Inherent lack of jurisdiction means a power or jurisdiction which does not at all exist or vest in a court. A court lacks inherent jurisdiction when the subject matter is wholly foreign to its ambit and is totally unconnected with its recognised jurisdiction. So long as it-cannot be said that the court lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the petition contention of the respondents does not deserve acceptance. In V. Appannammanayuralu v. B. Sreeramulu, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 160 the Andhra Pradesh High Court held:
"The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction. It can be said that the court, which has passed a decree, is lacking in inherent jurisdiction only when it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction, or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it."
As the question of jurisdiction has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court and as that has become final, it cannot be reagitated when the judgment is sought to be enforced. In other words, as the judgment in M.P.A. has been confirmed by the Supreme Court when the Special Leave Petition was dismissed respondent cannot advance the contention that the court lacked jurisdiction in entertaining the petition.
11. The settled legal position is that the executing court can go behind a decree only if there was lack of inherent jurisdiction and not on the ground that there was erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. It will not be open to a party to challenge a judgment when it is sought to be enforced on the ground that the judgment is based on wrong conclusions or on erroneous findings or on wrong application of law. As the remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is to challenge the same in appeal or revision as the case may be and not to challenge it when it is sought to be enforced, the respondent's challenge in this case against the judgment can be sustained. In the present case, lack of jurisdiction was pleaded by the respondents and that has been considered and found against them. So they cannot raise the very same point in the executing court.


14. An identical question as in the case on hand, arose before the Bombay Court in Joaquim Joao Fernandes vs. Nazario Pinto [2006 AIHC 2116 (Bombay) and the Bombay High Court after taking note of the various decisions on the point including the decisions of this Court held that the Executing Court could not have reduced the interest.  At this stage, it would be useful to refer the relevant paragraph of the said decision:-
5. Undoubtedly, Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Executing Court to decide all the questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree is passed when such question relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. In other words, the Executing Court is empowered to deal with all the points relating to execution or discharge or satisfaction of a decree. The provision speaks of eventualities subsequent to issuance of the decree. It does not relate to the causes arising prior to issuance of the decree. It does not include questions like entitlement or right of the parties to get the decree of the nature passed. The question to be dealt with by the Executing Court, therefore, should, be necessarily relating to the execution part of the decree, albeit lawful and executable decree and not the one which is a nullity.
6. The power to decide about the executability of the decree cannot and does not include the power to alter the decree merely because the Executing Court has different opinion about the right of the parties regarding the subject-matter in relation to which the decree is sought to be executed. While dealing with the issue relating to the executability of the decree, the Executing Court cannot re-adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to obtain the decree already passed.
7. The Executing Court has jurisdiction only to execute the decree in accordance with the procedure laid down under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Apex Court in (Rameshwar Das Gupta v. State of U.P. and Anr.) , while dealing with a
matter relating to money claim based on computation of arrears of salary, gratuity and pension in accordance with the service law, and wherein the decree was for a specific amount without any direction for payment of interest thereon, and dealing with the question that in such cases whether the Executing Court could step out and grant a decree for execution on the ground of delay in payment or for unreasonable stand taken in execution, clearly held that: "the Executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction and the order is one without jurisdiction and is thereby a void order. It is true that the High Court normally exercises its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. but once it is held that the Executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is but the duty of the High Court to correct the same. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with and setting aside the order directing payment of interest.
In the said case, the Executing Court had granted interest on the decretal amount on the ground that there was delay in payment of amount in view of the unreasonable stand taken by the judgment-debtor in denying the legitimate claim of the petitioner.
8. Similarly, in (State of Punjab and Ors. v. Krishan Dayal Sharma) , it was clearly held that the decree
which does not contain any order or direction for payment of any interest on the amount which is payable to the decree holder, it is not open to the Executing Court to award interest and the Executing Court is bound by the terms of the decree and cannot add or alter the decree on its notion of fairness or justice. The right of the decree holder to obtain relief is determined in accordance with the terms of the decree.
9. In fact, it is a settled principle of law that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and the issues which can be dealt with in exercise of powers under Section 47 of the C.P.C. are strictly related to the executability of the decree.
10. In (V. Chinna Lakshmaiah v. Samurla Ramaiah and Ors.) , while dealing with the powers of the Executing Court under Section 47 of the C.P.C., it was held that, it is not for the Executing Court to decide whether the decree passed is legal or illegal or whether it is erroneous or not, though it is open to the Executing Court to consider whether the decree sought to be executed is void or not.
11. In (Hira Devi and Ors. v. Harinath Chaurasiya and Ors.) , it was held that, if the defendant rails to raise the plea of the suit being barred under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and the decree is passed and becomes final in all respect, he is not entitled to raise such objection at the stage of execution of the decree nor the Executing Court can assume jurisdiction to deal with such objections. Such objections do not relate to execution or discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The term "execution" means carrying into operation the effect of the decree and, therefore, such an issue relating to bar under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act cannot be dealt with in exercise of powers under Section 47 of the C.P.C. by the Executing Court.
12. In (Ganapathi and Anr. v. Balasubramania Gounder) , it was held that, the Executing Court must execute the decree as it stands and it cannot go into the correctness or validity of the decree except when the decree is a nullity and if the decree is of a Court with jurisdiction, the Executing Court is bound to execute the decree as it stands. The question as to the validity of the cannot be agitated in execution proceedings because it is not a question which relates to the discharge or the satisfaction of the decree. It is only where a decree is passed by Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree that the objection to the validity of the decree may be raised in a proceeding in execution. Reliance was placed by the Madras High Court in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Vosudev Dhanjibhoi Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman) . In the said case before the Madras High
Court, in execution of a mortgage decree the judgment debtors prayed for the relief that the decree in respect of certain properties be so modified as to make it ineffective and inoperative in respect of those properties and, thus the dispute was sought to be raised whether the decree in respect of some of the properties was a valid decree or not. It was held that such a question could not be said to relate to the construction of the decree and the objection raised being frivolous, ought to have been rejected when there was no dispute as to the identify of the properties.
13. In (Gopal Ch. Paul v. Smt. Amala Mondal) reported in A.I.R. 1990 Calcutta 105, while accepting the contention on behalf of the decree holder that while exercising the powers under Section 47, it is not open to the Executing Court to go into the question of validity of the decree passed by the competent Court unless it is shown that there was any legal impediment to pass such a decree, and while holding that an Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree, also observed, that if it could be shown that the decree is a nullity, certainly the Executing Court can go into the said question and hold that the decree is a nullity because it is the fundamental principle that the decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution as well as in collateral proceedings,
14. Similarly, the Apex Court in (Sunder Doss v. Ram Parkash) , held that, the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and, that is, that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up even in an execution proceedings.
15. The law on the point that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree is well-settled. The Executing Court cannot sit in appeal over the decree passed by the Court nor is entitled to pass an order which will virtually result in affecting the rights of the parties already settled under the decree. Once under the decree the trial Court had adjudicated the issue relating to entitlement of interest and fixed the rate of interest to be 21%, the remedy to the aggrieved being available in the form of an appeal and the Executing Court being not entitled to go beyond the decree, certainly the Executing Court could not have reduced the interest from +21% to 6%. It apparently discloses total arbitrary exercise of power as also apparent error in exercise of the jurisdiction by the Executing Court, ignoring its limitation.


15. The impugned order in this revision was passed by the Executing court solely relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, referred supra, in the said decision, the Punjab and Haryana High Court exercised its jurisdiction by taking note of the pleadings and judgment preceding the decree and rendered a factual finding that the transaction in the said case did not relate to any commercial transaction and therefore, the proviso to Section 34 CPC was not attracted to the facts of the said case in any manner.  However, in the case on hand, the Executing Court did not embark upon any such exercise, but merely quoted the judgment and granted partial relief to the judgment-debtor.  In my view, the Punjab and Haryana High Court did not have an occasion to consider the legal aspect of the matter as discussed in the aforementioned paragraphs of this order and hence, this Court is of the view that the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case, that apart the Court did not consider the effect of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have been relied on by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court.

16. In view of the above legal principle, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said application in E.A.No.3961 of 2005 and the said application itself was not maintainable.  The Executing Court ought to have rejected such application and left it open to the judgment-debtor to file an appeal against decree, if so advised.  Thus the very application itself being not maintainable, the Civil Revision petition is dismissed, consequently in E.A.No.3965 of 2005 in E.P.No.643 of 2005 on the file of IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, stands dismissed and it is held that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief.  No costs.    


12.01.2011
Index   :Yes
Internet:Yes
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T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.
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To
1.The learned IX Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai









Pre-Delivery Order in
CRP (NPD) No.2105 of 2005















12.01.2012