About Me

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Suit for cancellation of sale deed - trial dismissed the suit - their lordships held that the plaintiff failed to prove fraud and failed to produce the primary evidence that is cell phone through which the conversation was recorded not produced - consideration was proved , possession was delivered , etc., clearly established that plaintiff sold the property for consideration and delivered the possession - No fiduciary relationships established - No illiteracy pleaded and proved - their lordships confirmed the judgement of trial court and dismissed the appeal = Kurella Venkata Satyavathi...APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF Kanyamayini Devender Yadav...RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT = 2014 (March. Part) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11081

Suit for cancellation of sale deed  - trial dismissed the suit - their lordships held that the plaintiff failed to prove fraud and failed to produce the primary evidence that is cell phone through which the conversation was recorded  not produced - consideration was proved , possession was delivered , etc., clearly established that plaintiff sold the property for consideration and delivered the possession - No fiduciary relationships established - No illiteracy pleaded and proved - their lordships confirmed the judgement of trial court and dismissed the appeal =

1) Whether the document dated 22.11.2006 in respect of plaint 'A' schedule
property is obtained by the defendant by playing fraud on the plaintiff?
2) Whether the document dated 22.11.2006 executed by the plaintiff in favour of
the defendant is liable to be cancelled?
3) To what relief?

Cell Phone record Evidence - CD produced - Cell Phone not produced - Not admissible 
In the cross-examination, P.W.2 admitted that he recorded the
conversation as they have no other evidence.  This aspect clearly indicates that
the plaintiff's family knows how to secure the evidence in order to substantiate
their stand in the court of law.  
As per the testimony of P.W.2, he recorded the
statement of defendant in his mobile phone bearing No.9811630304.  

The conversation between the plaintiff and defendant, if any, recorded in the mobile
phone as stated by P.W.2 is primary evidence.  
It is a settled principle of law
that primary evidence is the best piece of evidence.  
Admittedly the mobile
phone bearing No.9811630304 was not produced before the trial court.  
Ex.A.20 is
the C.D. copy prepared from the alleged conversation recorded in the mobile
phone.  
The C.D. copy is only secondary evidence. 
The secondary evidence cannot 
be admissible without satisfying the court with regard missing or non-
availability of primary evidence.  
Whether the plaintiff has elicited any
relevant material in support of their version or not is a crucial question.  
It is not out of place to extract relevant portion of cross-examination of P.W.2.
"It is a fact that in the entire conversation recorded by me, there is no
reference to the document in question Ex.A.20".
whether a party to a
document is entitled to adduce oral evidence contrary to its recitals.  
The
underlying object of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is that the admission
of oral evidence would defeat the very object of reducing the agreement to a
written form.  Section 92 of the Act postulates that the parties to the
instrument are precluded from adducing oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to
or subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument.  However, the party to
a document is entitled to adduce oral evidence under which circumstances he was
compelled to execute the same.  Thus, the plaintiff is precluded to adduce oral
evidence contrary to the recitals of the sale deed in question in view of
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
As seen from the evidence of D.W.1, the plaintiff executed the sale deed in
respect of plaint 'A' schedule property but in fact handed over plaint 'B'
schedule property.  As seen from the testimony of D.W.1, he has been in
possession and enjoyment of plaint 'B' schedule property.  As per the testimony
of P.W.1, the relatives of the defendant are in possession of plaint schedule
property and not the defendant.  Even as per the version of the plaintiff, she
is not in possession of the plaint schedule property since 2007.  If really the
plaintiff had not executed the sale deed in question at her volition what
prompted her to allow the relatives of the defendant or the defendant to come
into possession of plaint 'B' schedule property.  This aspect also lends support
to the version of the defendant.  The plaintiff having taken the plea that the
defendant had obtained sale deed in question by playing fraud, failed to
establish the same.  On the other hand, the material available on record
clinchingly establishes that the defendant obtained the sale deed in question,
which is supported by valid consideration.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and in view of
the ratio laid down in cases 2 to 5 cited above, we have no hesitation to hold
that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought by her.
2014 (March. Part) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11081
THE HON'BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI and THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY              

APPEAL SUIT No.220 OF 2010    

27-03-2014

Kurella Venkata Satyavathi...APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF  

Kanyamayini Devender Yadav...RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT        

Counsel for Appellant: Sri K.S. Murthy

Counsel for Respondent: Smt. K. Udaya Sri

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred:

1 (2004) 9 SCC 468
2 AIR 1937 PC 146
3 AIR 1941 PC 93
4 AIR 1951 SC 280
5 2010 (3) ALD 815

THE HON'BLE Ms.JUSTICE G.ROHINI    

AND

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY        

APPEAL SUIT No.220 OF 2010    

JUDGMENT: (Per T. Sunil Chowdary, J.)
        This appeal, under section 96 C.P.C, is filed assailing the decree and
judgment dated 29.12.2009 passed in O.S.No.169 of 2007 on the file of the I
Additional District Judge, Guntur, whereby the suit filed by the
appellant/plaintiff for cancellation of the sale deed dated 22.11.2006 in
respect of the plaint 'A' schedule property was dismissed.
        For the sake of convenience, parties to this appeal will hereinafter be
referred as they are arrayed before the trial Court.
        The case of the plaintiff, in nutshell, is that she got the land
admeasuring 649-8/9 and house bearing Assessment No.162 (new Assessment No.616),    
Door No.4-1-23, situated in Ward No.5 (old Ward No.1), T.S.No.509 of Guntur town
(hereafter, plaint 'A' schedule property) from her parents.  Originally the said
property along with plaint 'B' property and other properties were purchased by
her father, by name Kurella Adinarayana Sastry, from Pannala Venugopala Krishna
Murthy under registered sale deed dated 19.01.1959.  Part of the property was
sold by her father to Mogili China Kotaiah and to Beesa Venkata Subbamma under
registered sale deeds.  After death of plaintiff's father, her mother filed
O.S.No.829 of 1986 against Beesa Venkata Subbamma and her son-in-law Veera  
Brahmam.  The suit was partly decreed against which plaintiff's mother preferred
A.S.No.238 of 1989 wherein the appellate court directed Venkata Subbamma and her
adopted daughter to pay Rs.10,000/- in respect of the site occupied by them.
Aggrieved by the said direction, Venkata Subbamma and her adopted daughter
preferred S.A.No.576 of 1994 and the same is pending.
        In September, 2006 plaintiff's mother suffered with intestinal cancer and
plaintiff took her to Kamineni Hospital, Hyderabad.  In the hospital, one G.N.R.
Lakshmi who introduced herself as member of Santhiniketan, which is a social
welfare organisation, and her husband was also taking treatment in Kamineni
Hospitals due to cancer in the next room of plaintiff's mother.  The said
Lakshmi introduced the defendant to the plaintiff stating that defendant is a
social worker and real estate dealer.  The defendant pretended as if he is a
well-wisher of the plaintiff and his services can be secured for any purpose,
which the plaintiff requires.  The defendant made enquiries about the properties
of the plaintiff and came to know that the plaint schedule property is owned by
her at Guntur and there is no body to look after the same.  At that time the
plaintiff owned a vacant site at Kuntluru, which is under dispute.  The
defendant with a view to gain confidence of the plaintiff purchased the same for
a price which is far lower than the real market value.  Having gained confidence
of the plaintiff, the defendant acted as if he is very much interested in the
welfare of the plaintiff and now and then helping the plaintiff in consulting
the doctors for treatment of plaintiff's mother.  The plaintiff's mother passed
away on 26.10.2006.
The defendant represented plaintiff that there is a cancer society, which is a
Non Governmental Organisation, to help the cancer patients.  The defendant was
having a big plot and out of which he already conveyed a portion in favour of
the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff executes a document in respect of the said plot
in favour of society, the society will pay her Rs.2 to 3 lakhs.  The plaintiff
was asked to come to the Registrar's office on 22.11.2006 and she went there and
executed a document in favour of cancer society.  A week thereafter the
defendant brought a draft for Rs.10.00 lakhs and after crediting the amount in
plaintiff's bank account, the defendant took Rs.7.00 lakhs representing that the
cancer society gave Rs.3.00 lakhs only to the plaintiff.
        The plaintiff believed the words of defendant because her mother was
hospitalised and her sons are not with her.  Her elder son fell in love with a
Punjabi girl and married her.  Her younger son failed B.Com and living as a
vagabond.  The defendant pretended as if cancer society gave Rs.3.00 lakhs to
the plaintiff towards sale consideration of the alleged plot.  The defendant
represented that he has spent huge amounts on the younger son of the plaintiff.
At the request of the plaintiff, her elder son came to Hyderabad on 10.9.2007.
There was a confrontation between her younger son and elder son. At that stage,
the defendant revealed that the plaintiff's younger son had incurred several
debts and involved in number of criminal cases and as he spent huge amounts on
younger son, the plaintiff executed the sale deed in respect of the plaint 'A'
schedule property. Since the plaintiff was under depression, the defendant took
advantage of her position and fraudulently obtained the sale deed in his favour
in respect of plaint 'A' schedule property.  The plaintiff never intended to
execute such deed in favour of the defendant.  After coming to know about the
fraud played by the defendant, the plaintiff had conversation with defendant in
the mobile and the same was recorded.  Hence, the suit for cancellation of the
sale deed dated 22.11.2006.
        The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement, inter alia
contending that the plaintiff sold plaint 'A' schedule property to the defendant
for an amount of Rs.40,90,000/- and out of which Rs.10.00 lakhs was credited to
the plaintiff's bank account.  The remaining amount was given to the plaintiff
at the time of registration before the attestors.  The plaintiff is a Post
Graduate and is well versed with the consequences of execution of a document
being daughter of a document writer.  The plaintiff is acting as President of
'WORTH' organisation from the year 1994 and 'Vani Balananda Sangham' and drew   
more than Rs.35.00 lakhs from the Government on behalf of the above two
organisations.  The conversation of the plaintiff with the defendant was
recorded in a mobile phone is not true and if the plaintiff choose to file such
C.D. it is nothing but manipulation by using advanced technology.  The plaintiff
filed the suit 91/2 months after execution of the sale deed, but she has not
given any notice to the defendant prior to the filing of the suit.  The original
link documents are with the defendant.  The defendant is a bona fide purchaser
for valuable consideration.  Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.
        Basing on the above pleadings, the trail court framed the following issues
for trial:
1) Whether the document dated 22.11.2006 in respect of plaint 'A' schedule
property is obtained by the defendant by playing fraud on the plaintiff?
2) Whether the document dated 22.11.2006 executed by the plaintiff in favour of
the defendant is liable to be cancelled?
3) To what relief?
        Before the trial Court on behalf of the plaintiff P.Ws.1 to 3 were
examined and Exs.A.1. to A.21 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1
and 2 were examined and Ex.B.1 was marked.  
        After scrutinising the oral, documentary evidence and other material
available on record, the trial court by disbelieving the version of the
plaintiff, dismissed the suit.  Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful
plaintiff preferred this appeal.
        The points that arise for determination are viz.,
a. Whether the document dated 22.11.2006 in respect of plaint A schedule
property is obtained by the defendant by playing fraud on the plaintiff?
b.  Whether document dated 22.11.2006 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the
defendant is liable to be cancelled? and
c. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court are sustainable?
        The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff is two
fold. 1)  Since the defendant obtained the sale deed dated 22.11.2006 by playing
fraud on the plaintiff, the same is liable to be cancelled; and 2) Ex.A.2 sale
deed is not supported by consideration.
        Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant submitted
that there are no grounds much less valid grounds to interfere with the well
considered judgment and decree of the trial Court.
        To substantiate the case, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and got
marked Exs.A.1 to A.21.  P.W.2 was examined to prove the conversion of Ex.A.20
C.D.  P.W.3 was examined to prove that the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.7.00
lakhs to the defendant.  To dislodge the case of the plaintiff, the defendant
examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked Ex.B.1.  D.W.2 is one of the attestors
of Ex.A.2.
Point Nos.1 and 2:
        Points Nos.1 and 2 are intertwined.  Hence we are inclined to address
these two points together in order to avoid repetition of the facts and
evidence.
        It is needless to say that a person, who challenges the validity of sale
transaction on the ground of fraud, undue influence and charges his opponent
with bad faith, has the burden of proof on him in view of Section 101 of the
Indian Evidence Act.  There is an exception to this rule where a fiduciary of
the contractual relationship subsists between the contracting parties.  Section
111 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Indian
Evidence Act.
        The plaint was drafted cleverly so as to fix the burden of proof on the
defendant to establish that the sale transaction dated 22.11.2006 is perfectly
fair and reasonable and no advantage has been taken of defendant's position.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this type of transaction
in Krishna Mohan Kul Alias Nani Charan Kul v Pratima Maity and Others1.  At para
No.12 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
        ".......... A person standing in a fiduciary relation to another has a
duty to protect the interest given to his care and the Court watches with
jealously all transactions between such persons so that the protector may not
use his influence or the confidence to his advantage. When the party complaining
shows such relation the law presumes everything against the transaction and the
onus is cast upon the person holding the position of confidence or trust to show
that the transaction is perfectly fair and reasonable, that no advantage has
been taken of his position. This principle has been engrained in Section 111 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872............"
        Let us consider the facts of the case on hand in the light of the legal
principle enunciated in the case cited supra.
        As per the averments in the plaint and the testimony of P.W.1 and D.W.2
coupled with Exs.A.8, A.9, A.12 and A.13 to A.16, the mother of the plaintiff
was admitted in Kamineni hospital, Hyderabad for taking treatment for cancer.
Ex.A.11 death certificate reveals that the mother of the plaintiff died on
26.10.2006.  Even as per the stance of the plaintiff, D.W.2 introduced the
defendant to her in Kamineni hospital.  Plaintiff executed the sale deed in
favour of the defendant on 22.11.2006. Hardly the plaintiff had two months
acquaintance with the defendant prior to the execution of Ex.A.2 sale deed.  The
version of the plaintiff that she sold her property situated in Kuntlur of
Hyderabad, which is in litigation, to the defendant for lower price, is not
supported by any documentary evidence. The version of the plaintiff that the
defendant conveyed his plot in her favour with an understanding to reconvey the
same in favour of Cancer Society is also not supported by any documentary
evidence.  The possibility of distortion of the facts by the parties to the
proceedings in order to strengthen their case eventually to weaken the case of
the opposite party cannot be ruled out completely.  It is not uncommon to take
certain pleas by the parties to the suit in order to gain the sympathy of the
Court.  The court shall not lost sight of the human conduct while appreciating
the testimony of the witnesses. Suffice to say, suspicion is integral part of
human psychology more particularly in financial and property dealings.  An
individual, however high intellectual he may be, may not gain the confidence of
the other person within a short span of time. The fiduciary relationship between
two individuals always depends upon relation by blood, by friendship and some
times by operation of law such as ward and guardian, trustee etc.
        In a sale transaction if one of the parties to the document is in a
dominant position to other party, then the court can suspect the bonafides of
the transaction. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
case, the plaintiff is not a weak person so as to act as per the directions of
the defendant.  Even assuming that the plaintiff has some family problems, she
can capable of solving the problems by taking the advice and help of her
husband.  Domestic problems are common in a family life. The problems of the
plaintiff as mentioned in the plaint by itself are not sufficient to blindly
believe the words of the defendant, who is a stranger to their family.  The
material placed before this Court is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion
that the defendant is in a dominant position to gain unlawful advantage by
influencing the plaintiff at the time of execution of the sale deed. By any
stretch of imagination, it cannot be presumed that fiduciary relationship was
existed or subsisted between the plaintiff and the defendant as on 22.11.2006.
        In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation to hold
that the facts of the case on hand will fall outside the purview of Section 111
of the Indian Evidence Act.
        The gist of the plaint is that the defendant obtained the sale deed by
playing fraud on her.  A perusal of the plaint, at a glimpse, gives an
impression that the plaintiff is a defrauded party.  Before adverting to the
findings of the trial Court on the plea of fraud, it is apposite to refer to
certain precedents in order to resolve the lis involved in this case.
i.      Bharat Dharma Syndicate Ltd v Harish Chandra2 wherein the ratio laid down
is that the person who alleges the fraud has to give full particulars of
allegations which he intended to prove.
ii.     A.L.N. Narayana Chettyar v Official Assignee, High Court Rangoon3 wherein
the principle enunciated is that fraud of any nature, like any other charge of a
criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
iii.    Bishundeo Narain v Seogeni Rai and Jagernath4. In this case, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court at para No.28 held that "..........If there is one rule which is
better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence
and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the
case can only be decided on the particulars as laid.  There can be no departure
from them in evidence. General allegations are sufficient even to amount to an
averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the
language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue
influence and coercion."
iv.     Regati Ramraju v Neelamsetti Kataji Rao5.  In this case, the ratio
decidendi is that the allegations have to be proved in court with the help of
evidence either by way of oral, documentary or circumstantial evidence.
        In view of the principle enunciated in the cases referred supra, the
burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish that the Ex.A.2 is outcome of
the fraud played by the defendant.  As observed earlier, for the first time, the
plaintiff had seen the defendant in Kamineni hospitals, Hyderabad in the month
of September 2006.  As per the averments in the plaint and the oral testimony of
P.W.1, the defendant told her that she will get Rs.3.00 lakhs from a cancer
society if she accepts the property from the defendant and reconvey the same to
the cancer society.  If really the defendant transferred his plot to the
plaintiff as alleged by her, what prevented the plaintiff to produce the
document executed by the defendant in her favour as well as the document
executed by her in favour of the alleged Cancer Society? In the absence of
cogent and convincing evidence in this regard, much weight cannot be attached to
the oral testimony of plaintiff.  Even if the version of the plaintiff is true
and correct, it appears that the plaintiff wants to take undue advantage by
joining hands with the defendant to get money from the Cancer Society, which
idea of the plaintiff is not appreciable.
        It is not in dispute that the father of the plaintiff purchased a vacant
site under registered sale deed dated 19.01.1959 (ExB.1) from one P.V.G.K.
Murthy. The oral testimony of P.W.1 coupled with certified copy of the sale deed
dated 02.04.1978 reveals that the father of the plaintiff sold the vacant site
in favour of Venkata Subbamma. As per the averments of the plaint, the father of
the plaintiff sold certain extent of vacant site in favour of Mogili China
Kotaiah. For one reason or the other, the plaintiff did not choose to file the
sale deed executed in favour of said Mogili China Kotaiah.  The oral testimony
of P.W.1 coupled with Ex.A.5 certified copy of plaint in O.S.No.829 of 1986
clearly reveals that the plaintiff and her mother filed suit against Venkata
Subbamma and her son-in-law for declaration, recovery of possession and
mandatory injunction.  The suit was partly decreed.  Feeling aggrieved by the
disallowed portion of decree and judgment dated 05.09.1986, the plaintiff and
her mother preferred A.S.No.238 of 1989 and the same was allowed.  Exs.A.6 and
A.7 are the certified copies of judgment and decree dated 29.06.1994 in
A.S.No.238 of 1989.  The dispute between the plaintiff and Venkata Subbamma has
nothing to do with the present suit.
        The plaintiff in unequivocal terms admitted that Ex.A.2 certified copy of
sale deed bears her signature on each page.  At one stage, P.W.1 deposed that
the defendant has taken 1959 sale deed to get the death certificate of her
mother.  In order to overcome the adverse situation, the plaintiff came forward
with a plausible explanation that the defendant has taken the sale deed Ex.B.1
obtained by her father to get the death certificate of her mother and returned
the same.  The plaintiff categorically deposed that Ex.B.1 sale deed is with
her.  If that is so, how the defendant has produced the same before the trial
Court is not properly explained by the plaintiff.  Basing in the material
available on record, the court can safely presume that the plaintiff might have
handed over Ex.B.1 sale deed to the defendant at the time of execution of sale
deed in question.
        It is a known fact that a sale transaction cannot be entered into without
verifying the link documents.  In Ex.A.2, certified copy of the registered sale
deed dated 22.11.2006 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant,
minute details as to the date of purchase of property by the father of the
plaintiff under registered sale deed dated 19.01.1959 (Ex.B.1), and the dates of
death of the mother and father of the plaintiff are mentioned.  It is not
possible to mention all these minute factual aspects in Ex.A.2 without
cooperation and help of the plaintiff.  It is not the case of the plaintiff that
the photo affixed in the sale deed is not of her. For the reasons best known,
the plaintiff did not mention in the plaint, the place where the plot of the
defendant is situated. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the property
alleged to have been reconveyed by her to Cancer Society is situated in Guntur
at least to probablise the stand of the plaintiff that she subscribed her
signature on the sale deed in question under misconception. Generally the Sub-
Registrars of the Registration Department accept registration of a document if
the property covered under the document is situated within their jurisdiction.
As per the testimony of D.W.2, she is one of the attestors of sale deed
(Ex.A.2).  It is not elicited in the cross-examination of D.W.2 that the
plaintiff and herself have subscribed their signatures on the sale deed in
question under a bona fide impression that the document relates to Cancer
Society.  A careful scanning of the testimony of D.W.2 reveals that P.W.1
executed a sale deed in question in her presence with an intention to convey the
property situated in Guntur in favour of the defendant.
        Exs.A.17, A.18 and A.19 are marked to substantiate the stand of the
plaintiff that D.W.2 and defendant have cheated one lady by name Smt.Y.Seetha
Lakshmi.  Neither D.W.2 nor the defendant herein is the parties to O.S.No.1614
of 2004.  In fact Smt.Y.Seetha Lakshmi is the competent person to speak whether
she was cheated by D.W.2 and defendant.  More over she is the competent person
to speak about Exs.A.17, A.18 and A.19.  Non-examination of Smt.Y.Seetha Lakshmi  
also casts a cloud on the stand of the defendant.  These documents are no way
helpful to the plaintiff to establish that D.W.2 and defendant are persons of
dubious character as contended by her.  As seen from the testimony of D.W.1, he
purchased the property from the plaintiff by paying the sale consideration.
Nothing is elicited in the cross examination of D.W.1 so far as payment of
consideration in respect of the sale transaction is concerned.  A perusal of
Ex.A.2 reveals that the defendant paid an amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs by way of
demand draft and Rs.30,90,000/- by way of cash on the date of registration of
the sale deed.  In the cross-examination, D.W.1 in unequivocal terms deposed
that he spent money on the younger son of the plaintiff to help her.  In the
chief examination itself, P.W.2 deposed that he was informed by his mother that
the defendant told her as if he had spent huge amount for bailing out younger
son of the plaintiff from police cases.  This aspect also supports the version
of the defendant that the sale deed in question is supported by consideration.
        As per the testimony of P.W.1, the defendant taken her to the bank and in
his presence she deposited the demand draft in her Savings Bank account
(S.B.A/c.).  In the cross-examination, she simply stated that she paid
Rs.7,75,000/- to the defendant.  As per the chief-examination of P.W.1, she
withdrew Rs.10.00 lakhs from the bank and the defendant paid Rs.3.00 lakhs to
her.  A perusal of Ex.A.16 S.B.A/c. passbook of the plaintiff issued by S.B.I.,
Malakpet branch, Hyderabad, clearly reveals that the demand draft for Rs.10.00
lakhs referred in Ex.A.2 was encashed by her.  As seen from the cross-
examination of P.W.2, elder son of the plaintiff, he is very much aware of
deposit of Rs.10.00 lakhs in the S.B.A/c. of his mother.  As per the testimony
of P.W.3, on 27.11.2006, the plaintiff withdrew an amount of Rs.8.00 lakhs from
her S.B.A/c. and paid an amount of Rs.7,75,000/- to the defendant.  There is no
specific pleading in the plaint that P.W.3 was present at the time of withdrawal
of the amount by the plaintiff from her S.B.A/c. on 27.11.2006.  In order to
prove the plea of fraud, the plaintiff ought to have laid foundation in the
plaint.  Non-mentioning of the name of P.W.3 in the plaint also creates a doubt
in the mind of the court.  Whatever deposed by P.Ws.1 and 3 is not tallying with
the entries in Ex.A.16 S.B.A/c. passbook of the plaintiff.
        It is an admitted fact that P.W.3 is not a resident of Hyderabad.  In such
circumstances, the presence of P.W.3 on 27.11.2006 along with plaintiff in
S.B.I., Malakpet branch premises is somewhat doubtful.  In the cross-
examination, P.W.3 categorically deposed that he is accompanying plaintiff to
the court every day and watching the proceedings in the court.  This fact is
being admitted by P.W.1 in her cross-examination. As seen from the testimony of
P.W.3, the plaintiff is his elder sister.  In view of the close relation between
P.W.3 and plaintiff, the possibility of distortion of facts by him to suit the
version of the plaintiff cannot be ruled out.  The testimony of P.W.3 does not
inspire the confidence of the court; therefore much weight cannot be attached to
the oral testimony of P.W.3.
        Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the demand draft for Rs.10.00 lakhs was encashed and the
plaintiff paid Rs.7.00 lakhs to the defendant on 27.11.2006.
P.W.2 in the chief-examination stated that the conversation between his mother
and defendant was recorded in his mobile phone on 14th, 15th and 16th September,
2007.  In the cross-examination, P.W.2 admitted that he recorded the
conversation as they have no other evidence.  This aspect clearly indicates that
the plaintiff's family knows how to secure the evidence in order to substantiate
their stand in the court of law.  As per the testimony of P.W.2, he recorded the
statement of defendant in his mobile phone bearing No.9811630304.  The
conversation between the plaintiff and defendant, if any, recorded in the mobile
phone as stated by P.W.2 is primary evidence.  It is a settled principle of law
that primary evidence is the best piece of evidence.  Admittedly the mobile
phone bearing No.9811630304 was not produced before the trial court.  Ex.A.20 is
the C.D. copy prepared from the alleged conversation recorded in the mobile
phone.  The C.D. copy is only secondary evidence. The secondary evidence cannot 
be admissible without satisfying the court with regard missing or non-
availability of primary evidence.  Whether the plaintiff has elicited any
relevant material in support of their version or not is a crucial question.  It
is not out of place to extract relevant portion of cross-examination of P.W.2.
"It is a fact that in the entire conversation recorded by me, there is no
reference to the document in question Ex.A.20".
The fact remains that there is no material in Ex.A.20 to establish the alleged
fraud played by the defendant in obtaining the sale deed from the plaintiff.
Therefore, Ex.A.20 is no way helpful to the plaintiff.
The court has to take into consideration the socio-economic, education and
cultural background of the parties to the proceedings while appreciating their
evidence. The plaintiff is a Graduate and daughter of a document writer.  Even
as per the admitted facts, the plaintiff is running a hostel for girls since
2001.  She has been maintaining a voluntary organisation for rural development
and the Government granted an amount of nearly Rs.30.00 lakhs from 2002 to 2004 
to her organisations.  All these facts go to prove that the plaintiff is a
worldly-wise person.  The plaintiff might have come across several people while
running an organisation with the financial aid and funds of the Government. In
such circumstances, the possibility of subscribing her signature on each page of
the sale deed without knowing the nature of the document is highly improbable
and far away from truth.  The court has to scrutinise minute details while
appreciating the testimony of rustic villagers, who are prone for cheating
easily in the hands of intellectual persons. Along with the plaint, plaintiff
filed Ex.A.3 laminated copy of sale deed with colour Xerox and obtained interim
order.  In the cross-examination, P.W.1 categorically deposed that she has not
gone through the contents of Ex.A.3.  She further deposed that the respondent
(sic, defendant) taken the plea that Ex.A.3 is a fake document and then she
filed a memo stating that she was misled and deceived. In the cross-examination,
P.W.3 stated that the defendant has taken a plea that Ex.A.3 is not original
document.  All these facts go to prove that plaintiff is not innocent person to
sign on a document without knowing the contents of it.
The next crucial question that falls for consideration is whether a party to a
document is entitled to adduce oral evidence contrary to its recitals.  The
underlying object of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is that the admission
of oral evidence would defeat the very object of reducing the agreement to a
written form.  Section 92 of the Act postulates that the parties to the
instrument are precluded from adducing oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to
or subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument.  However, the party to
a document is entitled to adduce oral evidence under which circumstances he was
compelled to execute the same.  Thus, the plaintiff is precluded to adduce oral
evidence contrary to the recitals of the sale deed in question in view of
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
As seen from the evidence of D.W.1, the plaintiff executed the sale deed in
respect of plaint 'A' schedule property but in fact handed over plaint 'B'
schedule property.  As seen from the testimony of D.W.1, he has been in
possession and enjoyment of plaint 'B' schedule property.  As per the testimony
of P.W.1, the relatives of the defendant are in possession of plaint schedule
property and not the defendant.  Even as per the version of the plaintiff, she
is not in possession of the plaint schedule property since 2007.  If really the
plaintiff had not executed the sale deed in question at her volition what
prompted her to allow the relatives of the defendant or the defendant to come
into possession of plaint 'B' schedule property.  This aspect also lends support
to the version of the defendant.  The plaintiff having taken the plea that the
defendant had obtained sale deed in question by playing fraud, failed to
establish the same.  On the other hand, the material available on record
clinchingly establishes that the defendant obtained the sale deed in question,
which is supported by valid consideration.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and in view of
the ratio laid down in cases 2 to 5 cited above, we have no hesitation to hold
that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought by her.  Hence point
Nos.1 and 2 are answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant.
Point No.3:
The trial court considered the oral and documentary evidence in right
perspective keeping in mind the scope of the lis involved in the suit.  The
findings recorded by the trial court are based on sound reasoning.  There are no
grounds much less valid grounds to set aside the well considered decree and
judgment of the trial court.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the decree and judgment dated
29.12.2009 in O.S.No.169 of 2007 on the file of I Additional District Court,
Guntur.  No costs.  Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions if any pending in
this appeal shall stand closed.
______________
G. ROHINI, J
__________________________  
T. SUNIL CHOWDARY, J    
Date: 27.03.2014

whether filing of report with the police by the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC against the husband and his close relations and even, the maintenance case against the husband, would by themselves suffice to grant decree of divorce? = We are, therefore, of the opinion that granting of divorce by the Court below on the mere ground that the appellant filed criminal case against the respondent and others under Section 498-A IPC and the maintenance case in M.C. No.49 of 2003, is unjustified. = Smt. Katada Baby @ Kollati Baby.. Appellant Katadi Sri Venkata Satya Raja Sekhar .. Respondent = 2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11080

whether filing of report with the police by the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section
498-A IPC against the husband and his close relations and even, the maintenance
case against the husband, would by themselves suffice to grant decree of

divorce? =
We are, therefore, of the opinion that granting of divorce by the
Court below on the mere ground that the appellant filed criminal case against
the respondent and others under Section 498-A IPC and the maintenance case in 
M.C. No.49 of 2003, is unjustified.  
Further, we opine that though, no cogent
and convincing evidence is adduced by the respondent to prove the ground of
cruelty and despite withholding the best evidence through the disinterested
persons, still, basing on the interested evidence of PWs.1 and 2, who are no
other than the son and father, granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, is
contrary to the well established principles of law.
2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11080

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R.SUBHASH REDDY AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.SHANKAR NARAYANA                  

 CIVIL MISCELLANEIOUS APPEAL No.1361 OF 2004      

24-03-2014

Smt. Katada Baby @ Kollati Baby.. Appellant

Katadi Sri Venkata Satya Raja Sekhar .. Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant :Sri K. Sarva Bhouma Rao

Counsel for Respondent:Sri Y. Sudhakar

<GIST:
     
>HEAD NOTE:  

?CASES REFERRED:    

1. 2000 (1) ALD 697 (DB)
2. 2013 (5) ALD 230 (DB) (date of judgment 10-06-2013)
3. 2013 (4) ALD 416 (DB) (date of judgment 25-03-2013),
4. 2013 (4) ALD 680 (DB) (date of judgment 25.6.2013)


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY      

AND

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A. SHANKAR NARAYANA        

CIVIL MISCELLANEIOUS APPEAL No.1361 OF 2004      


JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice A. Shankar Narayana)

        Granting decree of divorce by dissolving the marital tie between the
parties herein driven the appellant - wife to approach this Court, by preferring
the instant appeal, challenging the order dated
25-03-2004 in Original Petition No.178 of 2002 on the file of the Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry.

        2.  The marriage between the appellant - wife, Katada Baby alias Kollati
Baby and respondent - husband, Katada Sri Venkata Satya Rajasekhar was
solemnized on 19-12-1997 at the house of appellant's parents at L.B. Cherla
village of Narsapuram Mandal, as per Hindu rites and customs.  The marriage
between the parties was duly consumated.  The appellant joined the respondent at
Rajahmundry at her in-laws house.

i)  The respondent, who approached the Court below, pleaded that the appellant
right from the date of marriage, started ill-treating him and insulting him in
the presence of his family members and, thus, subjected to humiliation.
According to him, the appellant gave birth to a female child on 04-11-1999 at
Narsapuram.  She got the job in the month of September, 1998, whereas he secured
the job in the month of January, 2002.

ii) He states that she was not inclined to join his conjugal society which made
him to undergo great mental agony and she did not allow him to see the child.
He states that the matter was mediated through the elders R. Adinarayana, A.B.
Rao and some others, but the appellant and her parents did not heed to the
advice of the elders.  He was, therefore, constrained to issue a legal notice on
08-07-2002 which stood unanswered.  So, he moved the Court below seeking decree
of divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty under Sections 13(1)(i-a) and
(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

        3. Appellant denied the ill-treatment and the other related facts pleaded
by the respondent.  According to her, after she joined the respondent at
Kakinada on 18-08-1998, since she got Teacher's job at Parasavari Meraka of West
Godavari District, she joined in the job at that village, and the respondent
used to visit her and stay with her, and he also got job in the month of
January, 2002 at Katrenikona village and she had been residing at Kovvur. The
respondent along with his parents used to come to Kovvur, and on their demand, a
sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) given towards additional dowry.
That demand was made and they spent the amount for securing job to the
respondent.  Insatiated with the same, still, they subjected her to physical and
mental cruelty.

i)  She states that she gave a suitable reply to the legal notice got issued by
the respondent.  She claims that after the respondent got job, since, she
refused their demand for payment of additional dowry, they even, beat her
mercilessly and she was constrained to make a report which was registered in
Crime No.169 of 2002 under Section 498-A of IPC.  Claiming that she was inclined
to join the respondent and to continue marital life, she sought for dismissal of
the petition.

        4.  The Court below formulated the point for consideration thus:

"Whether the petitioner/husband is entitled to get decree of divorce against the
respondent/wife on the ground of desertion and cruelty as prayed for?"

        5.  During Inquiry, the respondent besides examining himself as PW.1 has
examined his father as PW.2 and got exhibited Exs.A-1 to A-7 to substantiate his
stand.  Whereas, the appellant examined herself as RW.1 and exhibited ten
documents as Exs.B-1 to B-10 to disprove the case of the respondent.

        6.  The Court below, on appraisal of evidence both, oral and documentary,
referring to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent,
acceded to the request, mainly basing on a particular circumstance that being,
that after receipt of notice from the Court in the petition, the appellant
engaged a counsel and by seeking time to file counter, she filed a report with
the Police under
Section 498-A IPC against the respondent and others and, since, the filing of
that report as supported through the evidence of Exs.A-3 and A-4, which are
copies of remand report and bail order, amounted to cruelty and, thus, the
conduct of the appellant - wife amounted to causing mental cruelty.  The next
circumstance which weighed with the Court below to accede to the relief is that
the appellant except examining herself, has not attempted to examine anyone in
order to speak about the harassment meted out by her in the hands of respondent
and his parents, and even Exs.B-2 to B-10 do not reflect any such demands
alleged by the appellant as having been made by the respondent and his family to
get additional dowry.  The third circumstance which favoured the Court in
acceding to the relief sought for by the respondent is, filing of M.C. No.49 of
2003 by the appellant though, the appellant got job prior to the respondent
getting job.  Basing on these circumstances, the Court below observing that they
developed hatred against each other and that there is no possibility for re-
union between the parties, as the conduct of the appellant suggests separation
and not re-union and holding that the respondent established mental cruelty on
the part of the appellant and also the desertion, as the appellant deserted the
respondent voluntarily without any reasonable cause and living separately from
the respondent, answered the point in favour of the respondent, and
consequently, granted decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage between the
parties.

        7.  Aggrieved of the above order, the appellant - wife preferred the
instant appeal contending that the Court below did not properly appreciate the
pleadings and evidence on record, despite the fact that no pleading about any
specific instance of treating cruelly or a specific period of desertion, still,
arrived at a wrong conclusion. There is no pleading touching the filing of
criminal case and the alleged humiliation and loss of prestige to the respondent
by such criminal case, and the same was not introduced even by way of amendment.
The Court below, somehow, over-looked the fact that the evidence let in by the
respondent is only through himself and his father as PW.2 and, though, the
respondent has taken a stand that there was a mediation still, did not examine
any mediator.  The Court below even, failed to consider Ex.B-1 photograph and
Exs.B-2 to B-10, which were the letters written by the respondent showing the
continued relationship between them, which would falsify the case of the
respondent.

        8.  Heard Sri K. Sarva Bhouma Rao, learned counsel for
the appellant, and Sri Y. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the
respondent.

        9.  During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant
contends that no specific acts constituting cruelty have been mentioned in the
petition, and the allegations of appellant subjecting the respondent to insult
and humiliation are very vague and supported by any specific instances.  His
next submission is that mere filing of maintenance case and lodging report under
Section-498-A IPC is no ground to arrive at that they aided the respondent
proving cruelty.  Even, there is no evidence worth the name to establish the
desertion pleaded by the respondent.  He has also placed reliance on the
decisions of this Court.

        10.  The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the
evidence let in by the respondent through PWs.1 and 2 and the documentary
evidence would clinchingly establish both the grounds of cruelty and desertion.
It is also his submission that law is
well-settled that filing of report and registering crime for the offence under
Section-498-A IPC is sufficient enough to entitle the respondent for grant of
decree of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty besides, in the instant case,
the appellant also filing maintenance case despite the fact that she was already
working as a teacher, which has to be considered that it was in the direction of
harassing the respondent.
He has also placed reliance on the decisions of this Court.

        11.  The points that arise for consideration are:

        i)  Whether the respondent made out a case for grant of
                           divorce?
ii)  Whether the order challenged can be sustained?

        12.  The grounds on which the respondent claimed the relief of divorce
are; firstly, cruelty under Section 13(1) (i-a), and second, desertion under
Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act.  It is needless to mention that to establish
cruelty; strict proof in accordance with evidentiary rule is absolutely
indispensable.

        13.  In the direction of substantiating the plea of cruelty raised by the
respondent, it is according to him, that right from the marriage day, perhaps
from day one onwards, the appellant started treating him harshly and insulting
him in the presence of his parents and family members by abusing him in filthy
language and scolding him, and for ten days she stayed him and demanded him to
stay at L.B. Cherla expressing that she was not interested to join him at
Rajahmundry at her in-laws house.  The next circumstance he quotes is that when
the appellant gave birth to a female child on 04-11-1999, at Narsapuram even,
that fact was not communicated to him.  The third, that though, mediation is
convened still, she did not heed to the request and advice of the elders, and
the last, that she did not even answer the legal notice got issued by him dated
08-07-2002.

14.  At the outset, we would like to observe that the respondent ought to have
amended his petition and ought to have introduced the factum of filing complaint
under section 498-A I.P.C. and the maintenance case, as it is well settled
principle that no evidence can be permitted to be let in without there being a
plea therefor and even if let in should not look in to.

        15.  Ex.B-1 is a photograph with negative showing the presence of
appellant and respondent along with their daughter.  Their common case is that,
the female child was born on 04-11-1999.  The very fact that they were together,
as seen from Ex.B-1, would completely condemn the stand of the respondent that
right from the marriage day onwards which indicates that from day one, the
appellant was treating him harshly and showing disrespect to him by abusing him
in filthy language and scolding him in the presence of his family members.
Even, it completely falsifies the stand of the respondent that the factum of
birth of female child was not communicated to him and the further fact that the
appellant never allowed him to see the child also gets totally falsified. These
pleas put-forth in the petition when found to be false in the presence of Ex.B-
1, any amount of assertions made by PWs.1 and 2, who are no other than the
respondent and his father, is of any consequence and would not assist the
respondent in establishing the plea of cruelty set up by him.  Even, the
circumstance that his legal notice dated 08-07-2002, stood unanswered is no
ground at all to draw any adverse inference in a case of this nature, where
breaking of marital tie is involved, as the evidence required to break the
marital tie is subject to strict proof through the evidence on record.

        16.  Now turning to the submission of learned counsel for the appellant,
we are of the view, that there is substance in the submission made by the
learned counsel for the appellant that these allegations touching cruelty
averred in the petition and asserted by PWs.1 and 2, have to be construed as
vague allegations, as no specific instances at all, have been projected in the
petition.  We would also like to mention that, though, the respondent has
specifically averred that they have placed the matter before the elders, R.
Adinarayana, A.B. Rao and others, but the appellant or her parents did not heed
the requests and advise, still, the respondent has not chosen to examine none of
the said elders, despite mentioning the names of the elders, and no reasons are
forthcoming as to their non-examination by the respondent, as one of the
witnesses on their behalf to prove the alleged mediation.  Certainly, the said
circumstance cannot be sidelined as it constitutes a vital circumstance from
which an inference adverse to the stand taken by the respondent as to the
alleged acts constituting cruelty has to be invariably drawn.

        17.  Now, the question is, whether filing of report with the police by the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section
498-A IPC against the husband and his close relations and even, the maintenance
case against the husband, would by themselves suffice to grant decree of
divorce?

        i)  The decision relied on by the learned counsel in Anagalla Padmalath v.
A. Sudarshan Rao1, this Court while considering the circumstance of wife filing
a petition under Section 498-A IPC and also under Section 125 Cr.P.C. on facts
therein, opined that the said circumstance indicated that the wife has decided
to abondon the matrimonial home permanently and thereby held that the husband
has proved the ground of desertion and in that view of the matter, held that it
was unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant has treated
the respondent with cruelty but not on mere circumstance of filing the complaint
under section u/s 498-A I.P.C.  Thus, this Court in the said decision, has not
viewed the fact of wife filing petitions under Section 498-A IPC and also the
petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. by itself amounting to cruelty, warranting
grant of decree of divorce.  Therefore, this decision would not aid the
respondent.

        ii) The learned counsel has relied on yet another decision of this Court
in Ganti Srinivas v. G. Vasantha2, wherein the husband preferred appeal
challenging the refusal order to grant decree of divorce in a petition filed by
him on the ground of cruelty.  A Division Bench of this Court observing that "in
the recent past, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that the filing of
criminal cases, by a wife, against the husband and his family members, would, by
itself, constitute cruelty, particularly, when it ends up in acquittal" affirmed
the order of the trial Court, allowing the appeal.  However, this Court in an
earlier decision in Lakshmi Chaitanya v. B. Sharat Chandra3 wherein the
appellant - wife challenged the decree of divorce granted by the trial Court on
the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act, while considering the
effect of filing of complaint by wife under Section 498-A IPC. whether amounts
to cruelty by itself, referring to the fact-situation observed that the case on
hand was a typical one where the learned Family Court which concentrated only
upon the evidence of respondent in a petition filed for divorce and the contents
of the counter, and there was not even a remote reference to the evidence of the
only witness i.e., PW.1, and even in the order, no discussion as to what was the
evidence, which, the respondent - husband has adduced, to substantiate his plea
of cruelty only rested,  his conclusions on the factum of filing of a complaint
under Section 498-A IPC. Thus, finding fault with the approach of family Court
observing that the effort of the Family Court should be, to ensure that the
institution of marriage is strengthened and nurtured, and to the extent possible
the spouses are made to live together, than to grant divorce, just for the
asking of it, allowed the appeal.

        iii) Even subsequent to the decision in Ganti Srinivas's Case (Supra 2),
this Court in Akuladevi Padmaja v. Akula Veera Venkata Satyanarayana4 found
fault with the approach of the trial Court, in granting divorce by merely
stating that filing of complaint under Section 498-A IPC amounted to mental
cruelty without basing on evidence, as unjustified and contrary to settled
principles of law, set aside the impugned order and decree passed therein.


        18.  We are, therefore, of the opinion that granting of divorce by the
Court below on the mere ground that the appellant filed criminal case against
the respondent and others under Section 498-A IPC and the maintenance case in 
M.C. No.49 of 2003, is unjustified.  Further, we opine that though, no cogent
and convincing evidence is adduced by the respondent to prove the ground of
cruelty and despite withholding the best evidence through the disinterested
persons, still, basing on the interested evidence of PWs.1 and 2, who are no
other than the son and father, granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, is
contrary to the well established principles of law.


        19.  What remains now is, whether the decree of divorce granted by the
Court below can be sustained, at least, on the ground of desertion.  At the cost
of repetition, we deem it appropriate to refer to the evidence on record again
contextually.  The respondent's stand has been that from the day one there was
no cordiality between them, mainly, due to the arrogant behavior of the
appellant by which he claims that he was subjected to harassment in the hands of
the appellant, as mentioned in the above, including the alleged refusal of the
appellant to allow the respondent to see the child.  We have already observed in
the above, that Ex.B-1 would belie that stand. Besides, the respondent is not
specific as to on what date, or from which day, the appellant voluntarily
withdrawn herself from the society of the respondent to reckon statutory period
for sustaining the ground of desertion alleged by the respondent.  Even Exs.B2
to B10, which are the in-land letters addressed by the respondent to the
appellant from 12-10-1998 to 16-12-1999 covering a period of more than one year,
since, in unambiguous terms, establish the cordiality between them and exchange
of visits and in the face of such strong constant communication and
correspondence between them accounting for cordial relations between them
further strengthened by Ex.B1 positive and negative photograph, we are of the
considered view, that the respondent failed to establish even the ground of
desertion, and thereby disentitle him for grant of decree of divorce.


        20.  We, thus, conclude that the respondent failed to establish none of
these two grounds, either cruelty or desertion, and consequently, we are
constrained to set aside the decree and decretal order passed by the Court below
by allowing the appeal.

     
21.  In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The decree of divorce granted by the
Court below dissolving the marriage between the parties in original petition
No.178 of 2002, stands set aside.
 The parties are directed to bear their own costs.


        22.  As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this
appeal, shall stand closed.

_______________________  
R. SUBHASH REDDY, J  
_____________________  
A. SHANKAR NARAYANA, J    
March ______2014.

Tuesday, April 8, 2014

Or.39, rule 1 and 2 C.P.C - the objection as to maintainability of suit can not bar the court to grant injunction on merits - objections as to maintainability of suit - No counter suit - Trial court dismissed the I.A. - Their Lordships of High court held that the objection as to maintainability of suit can not bar the court to grant injunction on merits and held that The trial Court shall decide the matter on merits, if necessary by framing a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the suits.The C.M.As. are also allowed and the orders passed by the trial Court dismissing the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are set aside. As a result, the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. in the respective suits are allowed = M/s. Ashok International rep., by its Managing Director. State of A.P. and others.= 2013 ( April. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9751

Or.39, rule 1 and 2 C.P.C -  the objection as to maintainability of suit can not bar the court to grant injunction on merits - objections as to maintainability of suit - No counter suit - Trial court dismissed the I.A. - Their Lordships of High court held that  the objection as to maintainability of suit can not bar the court to grant injunction on merits  and held that The trial Court shall decide the matter on merits, if necessary by framing a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the suits.The C.M.As. are also allowed and the orders passed by the trial Court dismissing the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are set aside.  As a result, the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. in the respective suits are allowed =
The objection raised by the defendants as to the maintainability of the
C.M.As., on the ground that the suits themselves stood terminated cannot be
countenanced.  The order passed by the trial Court dismissing the applications
filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. on the sole ground that the suits
stood terminated, on account of reference of the matter to arbitration cannot be
accepted.
Hence, the C.R.Ps. are allowed and the orders under revisions are set
aside. The trial Court shall decide the matter on merits, if necessary by
framing a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the suits.
        The C.M.As. are also allowed and the orders passed by the trial Court
dismissing the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are set
aside.  As a result, the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C.
in the respective suits are allowed and the respective defendants are restrained
from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs or evicting them from the
suit schedule premises, subject, however, to the condition that the rent shall
be paid with enhancement at 10% over and above what is provided for under the
lease deeds from January 2013 onwards.
2013 ( April. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9751

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY AND   THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR                  

C.M.A.Nos.126 of 2012 and Batch

03.04.2013
       
M/s. Ashok International rep., by its Managing Director.

State of A.P. and others.

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri V.L.N.G.K.Murthy

Counsel for respondents: G.P. for Arbitration

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  
? Cases referred:
1. AIR 1988 SUPREME COURT 897    

C.M.A.Nos.126, 127, 128, 207, 209 & 218 of 2012
And
C.R.P.Nos.814, 815, 816, 1174, 1296 & 1307 of 2012

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per LNR,J)      
        In this batch of C.M.As. and C.R.Ps., common questions of fact and law are
involved.  Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment.
        For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as "plaintiffs"
and "defendants".
        The Government of Andhra Pradesh has initiated various steps for the
development of Kakinada Port.  Fairly large extent of land was identified for
construction of godowns and for creation of other facilities around the Port.
Many traders were granted long leases of about 30 years by executing lease deeds
on 26.03.1996 and incorporating conditions.  However, the Government issued
notices, dated 15.12.2006 requiring the lessees to vacate the property by
30.06.2007, on the ground that the clause providing for revision of rent for
every three years as contemplated under various G.Os. was missing and due to
inadvertence, a clause providing for rent only for 30 years was included.  After
undertaking some correspondence, the effected lessees filed O.S.No.47 of 2007
and batch in the Court of III Additional District Judge, Kakinada, for a
declaration to the effect that the respective notices issued to them are illegal
and untenable and contrary to the terms of the agreements.  They have also filed
applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. for temporary injunction, to
restrain the defendants therein i.e., the officials of the Government, from
interfering with their possession over the property.
        The trial Court initially passed orders of ad interim temporary
injunction.  The defendants, on the other hand, filed I.A.No.3228 of 2007 and
batch with a prayer to stay the further proceedings in the suit and to refer the
dispute to arbitration in terms of the clauses in the lease deeds. Through
common orders, the trial Court dismissed the applications filed under Order 39
Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. by the plaintiffs and allowed the applications filed under
Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') by
the defendants. referring the matters to arbitration.
        The plaintiffs approached this Court, feeling aggrieved by the said
orders.   While the C.M.As. are filed against the orders passed dismissing the
applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., the Revisions are filed
assailing the orders passed in the applications filed under Section 8 of the
Act.
        Sri V.L.N.G.K.Murthy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the
suits were filed for the relief of declaration that the notices of termination
issued by the defendants are not tenable and that such notices were totally
outside the scope of the agreements themselves. He contends that the occasion to
seek reference of the dispute to arbitration would have arisen, if only the
respondents have taken any steps under the terms of the agreements and that
there was no justification for the trial Court in referring the matter to
arbitration and thereby, indirectly terminating the suits.
        As regards the relief of temporary injunction, he contends that the
plaintiffs are very much in possession of the property and the application ought
to have been allowed.  He submits that the correspondence that ensued between
the parties clearly discloses that the respondents themselves admitted that a
clause for revision of rents after every three years was missing. Learned
counsel submits that if the defendants are of the view that such a clause ought
to have been included, they should have filed a suit for this purpose or
undertaken negotiations.
        Learned Government Pleader for Arbitration, on the other hand, submits
that the lease deeds contain a clause for arbitration and Section 8 of the Act
mandates that wherever the relationship between the parties is borne out by any
contract containing a clause providing for arbitration, the filing of a suit is
barred.  He submits that the plaintiffs cannot maintain any distinction between
the actions that are referable to any specific clause in the lease deeds, or any
other external factor, as long as the matter pertains to the lease.  He submits
that the trial Court has taken the correct view of the matter.
        As regards temporary injunction, learned counsel submits that the
plaintiffs have already been put on notice about the inadequacy of rents and
despite the same, they did not come forward to pay the demanded amount and that
they do not have the right to continue in possession.  He raised an objection as
to the maintainability of the C.M.As., on the ground that once the suits stood
terminated on account of the reference of the matter to arbitration, it is not
open for the plaintiffs to challenge the order passed in the interlocutory
applications.
        The plaintiffs are lessees of the lands that are owned by the respondents
and their relationship is governed by the lease deeds executed in the year 1996.
The clause that provided for the stipulation of rent and the revision, thereof
reads:
        "The rent will be at the rate of 6% on the land value of Rs.145/- per
square yard for 5600 sq. yards and amounts to Rs.48,720/- per annum upto 30
years payable yearly, in advance in one instalment on or before 1st April of
each year with initial EMD equal to 6 months rent to be deposited at the
commencement of the tenancy by the Lessee with the Lessor.
        And thereafter the rent to be revised and raised at the end of every three
years at the rate calculated at 6% on the revised value of teh land as made by
the District Revenue Authorities in their basic value register or based on some
other objective criterion or guidelines laid down by the Government subject to
the condition that the increase in annual rent shall not at any stage be less
than 15% of the proceeding years rent.  The Lessee shall not question the
valuation made by the District Revenue Authorities and shall abide by the
fixation made by the Lessor thereon and also pay to THE LESSOR on demand by in  
addition to rent, a sum equal to the amount the Lessor may pay from time to time
for insuring the demised premises under powers hereinafter provided, and also
pay unto the Lessor, in the event of and immediately upon the said term being
determined earlier by re-entry under the provision hereinafter contained, a
proportionate part of the said rent upto the delay of such re-entry, provided
that the said valuation of the land by the District Revenue Authorities shall be
final and binding on both the parties."

        From this, it is evident that the lease amount is liable to be revised on
expiry of 30 years.  However, the defendants felt that the clause providing for
revision of rent on expiry of term of every three years ought to have been
incorporated. Reliance was placed upon G.O.Ms.No.19, dated 31.01.1994 and
G.O.Ms.No.312, dated 26.11.1994.  Notices were issued on 15.12.2006, requiring
the plaintiffs to pay the amount calculated on the basis of G.O., and in default
to vacate the premises.  That gave rise to the cause of action for the
plaintiffs to file the suits.
        It is no doubt true that the leases contained a clause providing for
arbitration, which reads:
        "In the event of any dispute, question of difference at any time arising
between the parties hereto or their respective representatives or assigns
touching or arising out of or in respect of those presents or as to the
construction, meaning or the subject matter of these presents or as to any act
done or omitted to be done under these presents or as the rights, duties and
liabilities of the respective parties (except 'such matters the decision whereof
is otherwise expressly hereinbefore provided for) the same shall be referred to
the sole arbitration of the Collector, East Godavari District, Kakinada.  If he
be unable or unwilling to act as an Arbitrator, then to any one of the three
persons kept in panel that may be appointed by him, and the provisions of the
Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment
thereof and the rules made thereunder from time to time shall apply to such
arbitration AND this DEED shall be deemed to be an submission to Arbitration
within the meaning of the said Act, the Arbitrator shall give a detailed
reasoned award and that the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and
binding on the parties hereto, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration
Act".

        Law is also fairly well settled to the effect that if the agreement
governing relationship of the parties contains a clause providing for
arbitration, a suit for seeking redressal in relation to any dispute covered by
the agreement cannot be maintained and it stands barred by Section 8 of the Act.
However, a keen observation of the clause extracted above reveals that it is
only when the dispute or question of difference arises out of, or in respect of,
those presents or as to the construction, meaning or the subject matter of the
lease presents or as to any act done or omitted to be done under the lease or
the rights, duties and liabilities of the respective parties, referable to the
agreement, that the matter shall be referred to arbitration.
        In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not seek adjudication of any
dispute, which is referable to the clause in the lease deed.  On the other hand,
they very much wanted to abide by it.  It is the defendants. who felt that the
agreements are somewhat defective, inasmuch as they did not provide for
escalation of rents once in every three years.  The gist of their contention is
evident from paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed before this Court.
        "4. It is submitted that as per the said G.Os. the Rentals chargeable on
the Port land so allotted shall be @ 6% on the land value of Rs.145/- per square
yard per annum with an upward increase of 15% per annum for every three years as
agreed and incorporated in the lease Agreement, but however the escalation
clause is missing in the lease agreement which is clerical error."

        If the sole basis for the action of the defendants is a clause, which is
missing in the lease agreement, it is un-understandable as to how the dispute
arising out of their action can be treated as the one referable to lease deed.
        The matter can be viewed from another angle.  If the defendants felt that
the plaintiffs were under obligation to pay any amount over and above the one
mentioned in the lease deeds or that the leases were liable to be terminated,
they ought to have initiated arbitration, if they have any respect for the
clause.  Instead, they have resorted to unilateral action.  Once the defendants
have exhibited their disrespect to the clauses of the lease deeds, including the
one, which provides for arbitration, they cannot fall back upon the same clause
and oppose the suit filed for enforcing the lease deed. At any rate, these are
all the aspects, which need to be examined on merits in detail, by framing an
issue, than to be decided at the stage of interlocutory applications.  Further,
no application was filed by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for
rejection of the plaint.  They did not make any counter claim in the suit nor
did they file any suit for reference of the matter to arbitration.  Therefore,
the order passed by the trial Court, referring the matter to arbitration cannot
be sustained in law.  The termination of the suit does not accord with the
procedure prescribed under C.P.C.  A decree could not have been passed outside 
the prayer in the suits.
        Now comes the question pertaining to temporary injunctions.  It is not in
dispute that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the property.  As
a matter of fact, the defendants wanted them to vacate the premises.  Till the
question raised in the suit is decided, they are entitled to be in possession,
subject however to payment of rents.
        The objection raised by the defendants as to the maintainability of the
C.M.As., on the ground that the suits themselves stood terminated cannot be
countenanced.  The order passed by the trial Court dismissing the applications
filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. on the sole ground that the suits
stood terminated, on account of reference of the matter to arbitration cannot be
accepted.  In G.Ramegowda vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Banglore1, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the orders of this category are 'dependant' in
nature and the challenge thereto cannot be rejected, on the ground that the suit
itself stood terminated.  That was a case, in which the delay in filing of
appeal was condoned and the effected party challenged the order passed by the
Court condoning the delay.  Even while the proceedings, in which the order
condoning delay was challenged, were pending, the appeal that came to be
numbered was disposed of.  An objection was raised to the effect that once the
appeal has been disposed of, it is not at all open to the parties to challenge
the order, through which the delay was condoned.  This contention was negatived
and the Hon'ble Supreme Court treated such appeals as 'dependant' upon the
order, condoning the delay being sustained, whenever challenged.  The same
situation obtains in this case.
        Hence, the C.R.Ps. are allowed and the orders under revisions are set
aside. The trial Court shall decide the matter on merits, if necessary by
framing a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the suits.
        The C.M.As. are also allowed and the orders passed by the trial Court
dismissing the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are set
aside.  As a result, the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C.
in the respective suits are allowed and the respective defendants are restrained
from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs or evicting them from the
suit schedule premises, subject, however, to the condition that the rent shall
be paid with enhancement at 10% over and above what is provided for under the
lease deeds from January 2013 onwards.  The difference of rent, if any in, this
behalf, shall be paid within four (4) weeks from today. The payment of extra
amount shall be subject to the outcome of the suits.
        The miscellaneous petitions filed in this C.M.As and C.R.Ps. shall also
stand disposed of.  There shall be no order as to costs.
_______________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
_______________________  
K.G.SHANKAR, J  
Dt:.04.2013

Or. 21, rule 32 C.P.C.- Execution of injunction suit - when a third party made constructions over the suit schedule property , JDr should not be send to civil prison when specifically pleaded , he has no way concerned with the constructions - Trial court wrongly allowed the E.P. - Their lordships of High court held that the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. It is made it clear that the petitioner shall not, in any way, interfere with the rights of the respondents 1 to 4 and it shall be open to the latter to remove the structure,which is said to have been made upon the suit schedule property.= Kulukulri Suresh Varma V.Venkata Satya Subrahmanya Mallikarjuna Surya Rao and others = 2013(April.Part ) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9795

Or. 21, rule 32 C.P.C.- Execution of injunction suit - when a third party made constructions over the suit schedule property , JDr should not be send  to civil prison when specifically pleaded , he has no way concerned with the constructions - Trial court wrongly allowed the E.P. - Their lordships of High court held that  the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order under
revision is set aside. It is made it clear that the petitioner shall not, in any way, interfere with the   rights  of the respondents 1 to 4 and it shall be open to the latter to remove the structure,which is said to have been made upon the suit schedule property.=

The
respondents 1 to 4 filed E.P.No.24 of 2012, under Order XXI Rule 32 of CPC, with
a prayer to send the petitioner and the 5th respondent to civil prison on the
ground that they violated the decree for perpetual injunction. 
It was pleaded
that the petitioner brought into existence a structure over the suit schedule
property,  part of a plot of 377 square yards of site.=

The petitioner filed a counter denying the allegations. He stated that he
is not at all concerned with the so-called structure and that he did not make
it. The executing Court partly allowed the E.P. directing that the petitioner be
sent to civil prison.  =
"I submit that we never interfere with the E.P. schedule property in any manner
and we are nothing to do it. The D.Hrs filed the E.P. creating evidence to
harass us though they have knowledge that one Paradesi Naidu purchased the E.P.  
schedule property and that he is making constructions. After filing the E.P. we
made enquiries. Then only, we came to know that M. Paradesi Naidu making  
constructions."
Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order under
revision is set aside. It is made it clear that the petitioner shall not, in any
way, interfere with the   rights  of the respondents 1 to 4 and it shall be open to the latter to remove the structure,which is said to have been made upon the suit schedule property. There shall be
no order as to costs.
2013(April.Part ) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9795

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

Civil Revision Petition No.1532 of 2013

04-04-2013

Kulukulri Suresh Varma

V.Venkata Satya Subrahmanya Mallikarjuna Surya Rao and others  

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

Counsel for petitioner : Sri Ravi Cheemalapati

Counsel for respondents 1 to 4 : Sri T.D. Phani Kumar

?CASES REFERRED :    

ORDER:
        Respondents 1 to 4 filed O.S.No.114 of 2011 in the Court of the Junior
Civil Judge, Bheemunipatnam, against the petitioner and the 5th respondent, for
the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. The
suit was decreed on 05.11.2011 and the decree is said to have become final. The
respondents 1 to 4 filed E.P.No.24 of 2012, under Order XXI Rule 32 of CPC, with
a prayer to send the petitioner and the 5th respondent to civil prison on the
ground that they violated the decree for perpetual injunction. It was pleaded
that the petitioner brought into existence a structure over the suit schedule
property,  part of a plot of 377 square yards of site.

2.      The petitioner filed a counter denying the allegations. He stated that he
is not at all concerned with the so-called structure and that he did not make
it. The executing Court partly allowed the E.P. directing that the petitioner be
sent to civil prison. The same is challenged in this civil revision petition.

3.      Sri Ravi Cheemalapati, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that
once the petitioner stated that he did not make any structure and that he is not
concerned with it, the executing Court ought to have simply dismissed the E.P.
He contends that just on the basis of certain suggestions made in the
cross-examination, the E.P. was allowed. He further submits that even according
to the respondents 1 to 4, there are disputes with one Sri Paradesi Naidu in
relation to the suit schedule property.

4.      Sri T.D. Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4, who
filed caveat, on the other hand, submits that on one hand, the petitioner stated
that he is not concerned with the suit schedule property or the structure made
thereon, but on the other hand, he went on doubting the very right of the
respondents 1 to 4 over the suit schedule property.

5.      It is no doubt true that the petitioner has figured as defendant No.2 in
the suit and the decree passed therein became final. If the petitioner had
violated the decree for perpetual injunction, he is certainly liable to be
punished.

6.      In his counter filed in the E.P., the petitioner stated  that he
did not involve in any illegal or unlawful acts and violate the decree, much
less caused any obstructions to the respondents
1 to 4. In the affidavit filed in lieu of chief-examination, the petitioner
repeated the same. To be precise, his statement is as under:
"I submit that we never interfere with the E.P. schedule property in any manner
and we are nothing to do it. The D.Hrs filed the E.P. creating evidence to
harass us though they have knowledge that one Paradesi Naidu purchased the E.P.  
schedule property and that he is making constructions. After filing the E.P. we
made enquiries. Then only, we came to know that M. Paradesi Naidu making  
constructions."

Once the petitioner stated as above, the Executing Court ought to have dismissed
the E.P. leaving it open to the respondents 1 to 4 to remove the structure, if
any, that is existing over the schedule property. However, by presuming that the
petitioner is behind one Mr. Paradesi Naidu in bringing into existence the
structure, the Executing Court allowed the E.P. The order passed by the
Executing Court cannot be sustained either on facts or in law and the same is
liable to be set aside.

7.      Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order under
revision is set aside. It is made it clear that the petitioner shall not, in any
way, interfere with the   rights  of the
respondents 1 to 4 and it shall be open to the latter to remove the structure,
which is said to have been made upon the suit schedule property. There shall be
no order as to costs.

8.      The Miscellaneous Petitions filed in this civil revision petition shall
stand disposed of.
_____________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
4th April, 2013

Saturday, April 5, 2014

Execution of Decree - against any party - Trial court allowed the E.P. against the execution of decree against surety salary only - their lordships of High court held that From the Judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the decree holder can proceed against any one of the Judgment Debtors and he is not required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.Therefore, the order passed by the trial Court is strictly in accordance with law and it does not require any interference in this revision.= Bejjanki Peddiraj ....Petitioner/Judgment Debtor M/s. Lavanya Chit Fund Pvt.Limited, Warangal and others....Respondents/Defendants = 2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11092

Execution of Decree - against any party - Trial court allowed the E.P. against the execution of decree against surety salary only - their lordships of High court held that From the Judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the decree holder can proceed against any one of the Judgment Debtors and he is not required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.Therefore, the order passed by the trial Court is strictly in accordance
with law and it does not require any interference in this revision.=

"The decree is a money decree against all the defendants-respondents and a
mortgage decree only against defendant-respondent No. 2 so far as the shop is
concerned. The decree does not put any fetter on the right of the decree-holder
to execute it against any party, whether as a money decree or as a mortgage
decree. It is simultaneous and is jointly and severally against all the
defendants-respondents, including the guarantor. It is the right of the decree-
holder to proceed with it in a way he likes. There is nothing in law which
provides a composite decree to be first executed only against the property.
The decree for money is a simple decree against the judgment-debtors, including
the guarantor and in no way subject to the execution of the mortgage decree
against the judgment debtor No. 2-Respondent No. 2. If, on principle, a
guarantor could be sued without even suing the principal- debtor there is no
reason, even if the decretal amount is covered by the mortgage decree to force
the decree-holder to proceed against the mortgaged property first and then to
proceed against the guarantor."
        From the Judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the
decree holder can proceed against any one of the Judgment Debtors and he is not
required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.
        Therefore, the order passed by the trial Court is strictly in accordance
with law and it does not require any interference in this revision.
        Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed without any order as
to costs.  Consequently, the Miscellaneous Petitions pending if any shall stand
closed.

2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11092

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO      

CIVIL REVISION CASE No.5335 of 2013  

12-03-2014

Bejjanki Peddiraj ....Petitioner/Judgment Debtor                              
M/s. Lavanya Chit Fund Pvt.Limited, Warangal and
others....Respondents/Defendants

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri A.Ravinder

Counsel for Respondents:       --

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1. 2013 (5) ALD 425
2. 1992 AIR 1740


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO      

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.5335 OF 2013    


ORDER:

        Heard the learned counsel appearing for lthe petitioner and the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent No.1./Decree holder.
        This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 115 of C.P.C., against
the order dated 22-11-2013 in E.P.No.154 of 2013 in O.S.No.1340 of 2003 on the
file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Warangal.
        The brief facts of the case are that a money decree was passed in favour
of the decree holder and against the Judgment Debtors 1 to 5 for an amount of
Rs.94,450/- (Rupees ninety four thousand, four hundred and fifty only).  The
decree was put to execution in the aforesaid E.P., by the decree holder.  All
the Judgment Debtors were made respondents in the said E.P.  The Decree Holder
opted for execution of the decree against Judgment Debtor No.2 by attachment of
his salary.  The Judgment Debtor No.2 resisted the execution by filing a counter
stating that the decree holder is not supposed to seek execution against him
only who is one of the guarantors, leaving the principal debtor who is Judgment
Debtor No.1 and therefore, the Execution Petition is liable to be dismissed.
        Repelling the contention of the Judgment Debtor No.2, the learned
executing Court held that it is settled law that the decree holder can opt
execution against any of the Judgment Debtor in case the Judgment Debtors are
more than one. The prorogative available to the decree holder in the execution
proceedings cannot be denied at the whims and fancies of Judgment Debtor No.2.
The executing Court also clarified that if the Judgment Debtor No.2 is aggrieved
by the act of the decree holder realizing the decretal amount from him, he can
proceed against the principal borrower (Judgment Debtor NO.1) by filing a suit
for recovery of the amount.
        Thus, rejecting the contention of the Judgment Debtor No.2, the executing
Court ordered attachment of his salary by passing an order under Rule (48) of
Order XXI of C.P.C.  The said order is challenged in the present Civil Revision
Petition.
        Reliance is placed by the learned counsel appearing for the revision
petitioner in Jaichand T.Gangwal Vs. Shriram Chits Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad and
others1, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows:-
"The basic obligation to pay the decretal amount is with the prized subscriber.
In case, the 1st respondent finds any difficulty in recovering the amount from
the 2nd respondent, it can certainly take steps against other judgment debtors.
An effort as such must be made against the principal debtor. The proceedings
against one of the guarantors, keeping aside the principal debtor and the other
sureties, would certainly give scope for the collusion between the decree holder
on the one hand and some of the judgment debtors on the other. The only legal
consequence of the liability being joint and several is that the discharge by
one of them, would ensure to the benefit of others. The determination in this
behalf, however, must take place in the presence of all. If the other judgment
debtors are omitted from the array of the parties in the E.P., the one who is
singled out and proceeded against would face handicap in the context of pleading
satisfaction of the decree by others or collusion among the other parties."

        Relying on the afore cited Judgment, the learned counsel submits that the
decree holder has to first proceed against the principal borrower/Judgment
Debtor No.1 and therefore, the E.P., is liable to be dismissed.
        The facts of the case before the learned Single Judge are altogether
different from the facts of the case on hand.  However to understand the legal
position as to the liability of the Judgment Debtors when they are more than
one, it is necessary to look into the following Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Indexport, Registered and others2,
wherein, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"The decree is a money decree against all the defendants-respondents and a
mortgage decree only against defendant-respondent No. 2 so far as the shop is
concerned. The decree does not put any fetter on the right of the decree-holder
to execute it against any party, whether as a money decree or as a mortgage
decree. It is simultaneous and is jointly and severally against all the
defendants-respondents, including the guarantor. It is the right of the decree-
holder to proceed with it in a way he likes. There is nothing in law which
provides a composite decree to be first executed only against the property.
The decree for money is a simple decree against the judgment-debtors, including
the guarantor and in no way subject to the execution of the mortgage decree
against the judgment debtor No. 2-Respondent No. 2. If, on principle, a
guarantor could be sued without even suing the principal- debtor there is no
reason, even if the decretal amount is covered by the mortgage decree to force
the decree-holder to proceed against the mortgaged property first and then to
proceed against the guarantor."
        From the Judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the
decree holder can proceed against any one of the Judgment Debtors and he is not
required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.
        Therefore, the order passed by the trial Court is strictly in accordance
with law and it does not require any interference in this revision.
        Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed without any order as
to costs.  Consequently, the Miscellaneous Petitions pending if any shall stand
closed.
___________________  
R.KANTHA RAO,J  
Date: 12-03-2014

P.D. Act - Several criminal cases of illicit liquor - Their lordships of High court held that Hence, I am of the opinion that the periodical involvement of the detenu in various excise offences at regular interval, which have been chronicled in the Detention Order do not lend sufficient support for the Detaining Authority to pass a Preventive Detention Order against the husband of the petitioner. - The contention canvassed by Sri Vivekananda has, in fact, been effectively answered by the Supreme Court in REKHA's case and that was the reason why in MUNAGALA's case, the Supreme Court has held that preventive detention is not the measure that should be applied merely because several cases have been registered against the detenu earlier. I am bound, in law and on principle, by the ratio laid down in REKHA's case and MUNAGALA's case. = Stm. Sheela Bai..... Petitioner. The State of A.P. and another......RESPONDENTS = 2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11093

 P.D. Act - Several criminal cases of illicit liquor - Their lordships of High court held that  Hence, I am of the opinion that the periodical involvement of the detenu in various excise offences at regular interval, which have been chronicled in the Detention Order do not lend sufficient support for the Detaining Authority to pass a Preventive Detention Order against the husband of the petitioner.  - The contention canvassed by Sri Vivekananda has, in fact, been effectively answered by the Supreme Court in REKHA's case and that was the reason why in MUNAGALA's  case, the Supreme Court has held that preventive detention is not the measure
that should be applied merely because several cases have been registered against
the detenu earlier.  I am bound, in law and on principle, by the ratio laid down in REKHA's case and MUNAGALA's case.     = 
  
It appears that when the Detaining Authority sought
for the opinion of the Professor of Medicine & Chief Physician, Osmania General
Hospital, Hyderabad, he has pointed out the ill-effects of consumption of
illicit liquor on the health of the consumers.  The Detaining Authority, after
considering this material, had formed an opinion that the detenu was engaged in
preparation and sale of illicitly distilled liquor, which would have adverse
effect in maintenance of public order and also is a source for grave and
wide-spread danger to the public health.  Therefore, the Detaining Authority is
satisfied that the Provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (henceforth referred to as 'the Act'),
should be invoked and he should be detained in custody.  The Detaining Authority
has formed his opinion, based upon subjective satisfaction of the factors spelt
out by him in the following manner:
"       It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to
maintenance of Public Order, but I feel that recourse to normal law would
involve considerable time and may not be effective deterrent in preventing you
from indulging in further activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order
in and around Janardhanreddy nagar of Jillellaguda, Saroornagar Rangareddy
District under Excise Station limits of Saroornagar, Rangareddy District." =

 Hence, I am of the opinion that the periodical involvement of the detenu
in various excise offences at regular interval, which have been chronicled in
the Detention Order do not lend sufficient support for the Detaining Authority
to pass a Preventive Detention Order against the husband of the petitioner.  
The
contention canvassed by Sri Vivekananda has, in fact, been effectively answered
by the Supreme Court in REKHA's case and that was the reason why in MUNAGALA's      
case, the Supreme Court has held that preventive detention is not the measure
that should be applied merely because several cases have been registered against
the detenu earlier.  
I am bound, in law and on principle, by the ratio laid down in REKHA's case and MUNAGALA's case.     
        Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands allowed at the admission stage, but
however, without costs and the detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith.
Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand disposed of.

2014 (March. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11093

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE  NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO  
        

W.P.NO.4686 OF 2014  

28-03-2014

Stm. Sheela Bai..... Petitioner.

The State of A.P. and another......RESPONDENTS  

For the Appellant:  M. Laxman Rao


For the Respondents : Advocate General,
                       G.P. for Home .

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?CITATIONS:

1. 2012 (2) SCC 386
2.2011 (10) SCALE 224
3. (2011) 5 SCC 244
4.(1975) 3 SCC 198
5. 2012(2) SCC 176

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

W.P.No.4686 of 2014

O R D E R:


The petitioner is the wife of the detenu and hence, challenges the Order of
Preventive Detention, passed by the 2nd respondent on 24-09-2013, in this Writ
Petition.
It is stated that the detenu has been indulging in paddling prohibited
intoxicants, such as sale of arrack and spurious and illicit liquor.  It also
appears that he is being prosecuted in Crime No.202 of 2011/12 of Prohibition &
Excise Station, Saroornagar, Ranga Reddy District, which case was booked against
him after the Task Force raided his premises and detected 70 illicit liquor
sachets, each containing 100 milli liters.  The criminal Court concerned has
released him on bail in the said case.  The Government Chemical Examiner, who
analyzed the sample, declared it as 'illicitly distilled liquor', which is unfit
for potable purposes.  The detenu was again booked in Crime No.396 of 2011/12
registered on 25-10-2011, after another raid on his premises resulted in
detecting 106 illicit liquor sachets, each containing 100 milli liters.  Even in
this case, he was enlarged on bail later on.  The Government Chemical Examiner
filed his report disclosing that the material is illicitly distilled liquor and
the same is unfit for human consumption.  Again, on 02-11-2011, another raid on
the premises of the detenu has helped in detecting 100 illicitly distilled
liquor sachets, each containing 100 milli liters.  He was released on bail in
this case also.  On 04-03-2013, again, the Enforcement Directorate, when raided
the premises of the detenu, it resulted in detecting 170 illicit liquor sachets,
each containing 100 milli liters.  Similarly, cases were booked against him on
15-05-2013 and 28-05-2013.  The detenu was again enlarged on bail by the
criminal Court concerned.  It appears that when the Detaining Authority sought
for the opinion of the Professor of Medicine & Chief Physician, Osmania General
Hospital, Hyderabad, he has pointed out the ill-effects of consumption of
illicit liquor on the health of the consumers.  The Detaining Authority, after
considering this material, had formed an opinion that the detenu was engaged in
preparation and sale of illicitly distilled liquor, which would have adverse
effect in maintenance of public order and also is a source for grave and
wide-spread danger to the public health.  Therefore, the Detaining Authority is
satisfied that the Provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (henceforth referred to as 'the Act'),
should be invoked and he should be detained in custody.  The Detaining Authority
has formed his opinion, based upon subjective satisfaction of the factors spelt
out by him in the following manner:
"       It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to
maintenance of Public Order, but I feel that recourse to normal law would
involve considerable time and may not be effective deterrent in preventing you
from indulging in further activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order
in and around Janardhanreddy nagar of Jillellaguda, Saroornagar Rangareddy
District under Excise Station limits of Saroornagar, Rangareddy District."

        It appears that the State Government had accorded its approval to the said
Detention Order, in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act.
Subsequently, the Advisory Board on Preventive Detentions, constituted under
Section 9 of the said Act, reviewed the case of the detenu on 11-10-2013 and
tendered an opinion that there is sufficient cause for the preventive detention
of the detenu.  Thus, these orders have given rise to the present Writ Petition.
        Heard Sri M. Laxman Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Y.V.
Vivekananda, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the learned Advocate
General for the respondents.
        Sri Laxman Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that in
exactly identical fact situation prevailing in MUNAGALA YADAMMA v. THE STATE OF  
ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS1, the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier      
Judgments rendered by it in G. REDDELAH v. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND              
ANOTHER2 and REKHA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHER3, had come to the conclusion            
that where the offences complained of against the detenu are liable to be tried
by the ordinary law of the land, the preventive detention shall not be resorted
to by the State.  He, therefore, submits that the present case is squarely
covered by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in MUNAGALA YADAMMA's case    
cited (1) supra.
        Per contra, Sri Vivekanda, learned Special Government Pleader appearing
for the respondents, would submit that a close look at the Provisions of the Act
in question will clearly bring out a distinction in the instant case.  According
to him, Section 2(a) of the Act defined the expressions "Acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" in the following words:
"2(a) "Acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"
means when a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug offender, a goonda, an immoral
traffic offender or a land grabber is engaged or is making preparations for
engaging in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely
to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order."

Based thereon, Sri Vivekananda would contend that a habitual offender, who has
taken to bootlegging activities, is liable to be detained so as to prevent him
from engaging in future or making preparations for engaging in any such
bootlegging activity, which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.  Therefore, the exercise of power by the Detaining Authority in terms of
and in accordance with Section 3 of the Act cannot be taken exception to.  Sri
Vivekananda would further contend that when this distinction is kept in view,
the Judgment of the Supreme Court in MUNAGALA YADAMMA's case, is clearly    
distinguishable.
        It would be essential to notice that the Supreme Court in HARADHAN SAHA,
MADAN LAL AGARWALA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL4, has crisply drawn the distinction          
between the preventive detention and criminal prosecution, in the following
manner:
"The essential concept of preventive detention is that detention of a person is
not to punish him for something has done, but to prevent him from doing it."


In view of this principle, the Preventive Detention Order passed by the
Detaining Authority has got to be judged on the touchstone of its
sustainability, but however, it should also be kept in view that a three-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in REKHA's case cited (3) supra, after exhaustively
reviewing the earlier Judgments rendered by it, had held in para 32 that, the
view expressed by it earlier in HARADHAN's case cited (4) supra, does not mean
that it was laid down that in all cases the authorities can take recourse to
both criminal proceedings as well as the preventive detention, even though, in
the view of the Court, the former is sufficient to deal with the situation.
Thus, the principle enunciated by the Constitution Bench in HARADHAN's case has
been explained in REKHA's case.  In REKHA's case, it was clearly held that the
right to liberty guaranteed by our Constitution by Article 21 means that, before
sending a person to a prison, a trial must ordinarily be held giving him an
opportunity of placing his defense through a lawyer.  It should also be noted
that the Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the
principle relating to the proximate live link to the preventive detention and
the antecedent activities concerned.  In YUMMAN ONGBI LEMBI LEIMA v. STATE OF      
MANIPUR AND OTHERS 5, in para 27, the principle that should be observed by  
Courts has been crystallized in the following manner:
"As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the
personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right
guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof.  The State has been
granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws
of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due
caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such
acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the scrutiny of the State
and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the
issuance of such an order.  An individual incident of an offence under the Penal
Code, however heinous, is sufficient to make out a case for issuance of an order
of preventive detention."

In this context, the Supreme Court in MUNAGALA YADAMMA's case cited (1) supra,  
after noticing Judgments in REKHA's case and YUMMAN ONGBI's case, has held as    
under:
"10. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties,
we are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the State in view of
the fact that the decision in Rekha's case (supra), in our view, clearly covers
the facts of this case as well.  The offences complained of against the
appellant are of a nature which can be dealt with under the ordinary law of the
land.  Taking recourse to the provisions of preventive detention is contrary to
the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and sufficient grounds have to be made out by the detaining
authorities to invoke such provisions.  In fact, recently, in Criminal Appeal
No.26 of 2012, Ymman Ongbi Lembi Leima Vs. State of Manipur & Ors., we had  
occasion to consider the same issue and the three-Judge Bench had held that the
personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right
guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof.  The State has been
granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws, as also under the
laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised
with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to
whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of
the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting
the issuance of such an order.

11. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are
such as to attract punishment under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, but that
in our view has to be done under the said laws and taking recourse to preventive
detention laws would not be warranted.  Preventive detention involves detaining
of a person without trial in order to prevent him / her from committing certain
types of offences.  But such detention cannot be made a substitute for the
ordinary law and absolve the investigating authorities of their normal functions
of investigating crimes which the detenue may have committed.  After all,
preventive detention in most cases is for a year only and cannot be used as an
instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial.  Accordingly,
while following the three-Judge Bench decision in Rekha's case (supra), we allow
the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 20th July,
2011, and also quash the Detention Order dated 15th February, 2011, issue by the
Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh."

The principle is, if an earlier Judgment of the Supreme Court has been
understood by subsequent Judgments of the Supreme Court in a particular manner
and the principle is also explained, that becomes the legal principle that
should be followed by all inferior Courts and Tribunals.  In view of the
principle enunciated in REKHA's case and YUMMAN ONGBI's case and followed in  
MUNAGALA's case, it emerges that so long as the ordinary criminal law is
adequate to deal with the offences said to have been indulged in by a detenu,
then, using the power of preventive detention without subjecting the detenu to
the procedure of free and fair trial does not fit into the constitutional scheme
of guaranteed liberty.
        Hence, I am of the opinion that the periodical involvement of the detenu
in various excise offences at regular interval, which have been chronicled in
the Detention Order do not lend sufficient support for the Detaining Authority
to pass a Preventive Detention Order against the husband of the petitioner.  The
contention canvassed by Sri Vivekananda has, in fact, been effectively answered
by the Supreme Court in REKHA's case and that was the reason why in MUNAGALA's      
case, the Supreme Court has held that preventive detention is not the measure
that should be applied merely because several cases have been registered against
the detenu earlier.  I am bound, in law and on principle, by the ratio laid down
in REKHA's case and MUNAGALA's case.     
        Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands allowed at the admission stage, but
however, without costs and the detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith.
Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand disposed of.

____________________________    
NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J.