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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Friday, March 8, 2013

in compromise,non - compoundable case can be quashed - 2012 (9) Scale 257 -Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & another,[1] it is held thus: (para 57) "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.  132 OF 2013

ORDER:

          This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) seeking to quash the proceedings in crime no.39 of 2009 of Suryapet town police station, Nalgonda District, registered for the offences under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC and 2 ©, 3, 4, 5 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes Banning Act, 1978.

2.       The petitioners herein are accused and the second respondent herein is the complainant, in the above crime.  Both the parties are present in the court.   The complainant produced his Household card in proof of his identity.   He stated that the parties settled the matter amicably at the instance of elders and he voluntarily agreed for compromise, and in view of the settlement, he prayed to quash the impugned proceedings. Some of the offences alleged are not compoundable.  In 
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & another,[1] it is held thus: (para 57)
"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. 
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; 
(i) to secure the ends of justice or 
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. 
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. 
Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. 
Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. 
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. 
In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.
 In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

          It is not a serious and heinous crime to refuse permission to compound the offence. In view of compromise, the chance of conviction is bleak and remote.  Therefore, in view of the compromise between the parties, continuation of the impugned proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of court and there is no impediment to quash the impugned proceedings.   

3.       The Criminal Petition is, accordingly, allowed quashing the impugned proceedings against the petitioners.   Other Miscellaneous Petitions pending in the Criminal Petition are dismissed.

________________

(K.C.BHANU, J.)

04.01.2013

DRK 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU


























CRIMINAL PETITION NO.  132 OF 2013

 

             










           Date: 04.01.2013

 



[1] 2012 (9) Scale 257

Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, = Irrespective of the above controversy under Order XVII C.P.C., even assuming for a moment for the sake of argument that the order passed by the Rent Controller is an ex parte order, then it is to be seen whether there are sufficient grounds for the tenant which prevented him from attending the Court. If really the previous advocate of the tenant gave no objection on 21.09.2011, immediately some other advocate should have filed vakalath on behalf of the tenant with the said no objection endorsement of the previous advocate. Instead, the tenant had left the case to winds. It is only on 04.04.2012, the tenant came up with the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, which was filed by a new advocate with no objection endorsement of the old advocate. There is absolutely no explanation on the part of the tenant/petitioner for the period from 21.09.2011 to 04.04.2012. In these circumstances, this Court has every reason to suspect the tenant colluding with the previous advocate by accommodating with antedated no-objection endorsement. This Court is of the opinion that the tenant is playing all dilatory tactics before the Rent Controller with an intention to drag on the eviction proceedings in order to squat on the tenanted premisis. In spite of the eviction petition being filed on the ground of wilful default, the tenant has not deposited the rents before the Rent Controller after filing of the eviction petition in the year 2009 until today. If there is any dispute with regard to quantum of rent or liability to pay rent, the tenant could have deposited the rents without prejudice to her rights and contentions. He did not do so. There are absolutely no grounds to set aside the eviction order, even if it is taken as ex parte eviction order.


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.150 of 2013
ORDER:

This revision petition filed against the appellate order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, by which the appellate authority dismissed the rent control appeal confirming the order passed by the Rent Controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, by which the Controller refused to set aside the alleged ex parte order of eviction passed by him.  The rent control case before the Rent Controller was filed by the landlord against the revision petitioner/tenant for her eviction from the rented premisis on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents and on other grounds.  The tenant, after receiving notice in the eviction petition, filed counter opposing the same.  Prior to reaching the stage of enquiry, there were several somersaults.   At the time of enquiry before the Rent Controller, the landlord examined himself as P.W.1 and marked his documents.  The tenant’s advocate did not cross-examine P.W.1.  After closure of the landlord’s evidence, the eviction petition was posted by the Rent Controller for evidence on the part of the tenant.  The tenant did not lead her evidence in spite of granting sufficient adjournments.  Therefore, after closing the tenant’s evidence, the Rent Controller posted the matter for arguments.  The petitioner’s advocate filed written arguments.  After the above exercise, the Rent Controller passed eviction order against the tenant.

          To set aside the said eviction order, the revision petitioner filed petition before the Rent Controller under Order IX, Rule 13 and Section 151 C.P.C. through another advocate with no objection endorsement of the previous advocate.

          It is contention of the revision petitioner that the previous advocate made no objection endorsement on 21.09.2011 and that in spite of it he did not report no instructions in Court for the tenant.  Placing reliance on B.JANAKIRAMAIAH CHETTY v. A.K. PARTHASARTHI[1] of the Supreme Court, it is contended by the revision petitioner’s counsel that disposal given by the Rent Controller is one under Order XVII, Rule 2 CPC and not under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC and that therefore the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller is one in the nature of ex parte order.  
Irrespective of the above controversy under Order XVII C.P.C., even assuming for a moment for the sake of argument that the order passed by the Rent Controller is an ex parte order, then it is to be seen whether there are sufficient grounds for the tenant which prevented him from attending the Court.  
If really the previous advocate of the tenant gave no objection on 21.09.2011, immediately some other advocate should have filed vakalath on behalf of the tenant with the said no objection endorsement of the previous advocate.  
Instead, the tenant had left the case to winds. 
 It is only on 04.04.2012, the tenant came up with the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, which was filed by a new advocate with no objection endorsement of the old advocate.  
There is absolutely no explanation on the part of the tenant/petitioner for the period from 21.09.2011 to 04.04.2012.  
In these circumstances, this Court has every reason to suspect the tenant colluding with the previous advocate by accommodating with antedated
no-objection endorsement.  
This Court is of the opinion that the tenant is playing all dilatory tactics before the Rent Controller with an intention to drag on the eviction proceedings in order to squat on the tenanted premisis.  
In spite of the eviction petition being filed on the ground of wilful default, the tenant has not deposited the rents before the Rent Controller after filing of the eviction petition in the year 2009 until today.  
If there is any dispute with regard to quantum of rent or liability to pay rent, the tenant could have deposited the rents without prejudice to her rights and contentions.  He did not do so.  
There are absolutely no grounds to set aside the eviction order, even if it is taken as ex parte eviction order.  
The Courts below rightly exercised their discretion in favour of the landlord and rightly dismissed the petition as well as the appeal filed by the tenant.

          In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.


__________________________
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU, J
Date: 14.02.2013
Ssv/Rns

 




HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

                                                           












CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.150 of 2013









                                       Date: 14.02.2013


Ssv/Rns


[1] (2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases 641

Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) to direct the respondent to furnish security for the suit amount, failing which the suit schedule property be attached. In support of his application, the petitioner filed third party affidavit of one B.G. Ramalingam, wherein he has stated that the respondent/defendant shifted his family to Bangalore and that he is seeking to alienate the petition schedule property to evade debt to the petitioner. - The respondent further stated that he is having a jewellery shop wherein he has invested several lakhs of rupees; that he is a permanent resident of Hindupur and that he has no intention to sell the property or shifting to Bangalore. petitioner failed to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code and that as the plea of the petitioner in the suit is identical to the defence of his wife in O.S.No.36/2003, there is not even a remote chance of the petitioner succeeding in the suit. On this reasoning, the Court below has dismissed the petitioner’s application.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
C.R.P.No.30 of 2013
Date : 22-1-2013
Between:
 K. Surya Prakash                                                                   .. Petitioner
And

N. Namburi Prabhakar                                                  .. Respondent






Counsel for petitioners : Sri P. Lakshmana Rao
Counsel for respondent :  --












The Court made the following:


ORDER:
           This Civil Revision Petition arises out of order dated 16-11-2012 in I.A.No.468/2011 in O.S.No.29/2011 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge, Hindupur.
          The petitioner filed the above mentioned suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.17,93,960/- against the respondent.  He has also filed I.A.No.468/2011 under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) to direct the respondent to furnish security for the suit amount, failing which the suit schedule property be attached.  In support of his application, the petitioner filed third party affidavit of one B.G. Ramalingam, wherein he has stated that the respondent/defendant shifted his family to Bangalore and that he is seeking to alienate the petition schedule property to evade debt to the petitioner. 
 The respondent filed a counter-affidavit wherein he has stated that the wife of the petitioner has borrowed a sum of Rs.80,000/- from N.P. Satish, his son, and executed a registered simple mortgage deed; that his son filed O.S.No.36/2003 in the Court of the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, against the petitioner’s wife for recovery of the mortgage debt wherein the petitioner deposed as DW-2; that in the said suit, the wife of the petitioner has taken the plea that she has discharged the mortgage debt under receipt from the respondent and that disbelieving the said version, the Court has decreed the suit O.S.No.36/2003 on 21-3-2006.  It is further averred that the respondent’s son, in execution of the decree, has brought the mortgaged property to sale and the same was sold in the Court auction which was purchased by the decree-holder himself.  The respondent also averred that having failed in convincing the Court in O.S.No.36/2003 that the mortgage debt was discharged, the petitioner has filed the present suit with a malafide intention to recover the said amount.  
The respondent further stated that he is having a jewellery shop wherein he has invested several lakhs of rupees; that he is a permanent resident of Hindupur and that he has no intention to sell the property or shifting to Bangalore. 
          On the above mentioned pleadings, the lower Court has concluded that the petitioner failed to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code and that as the plea of the petitioner in the suit is identical to the defence of his wife in O.S.No.36/2003, there is not even a remote chance of the petitioner succeeding in the suit.  On this reasoning, the Court below has dismissed the petitioner’s application.
          Having carefully considered the case in its entirety, I am of the opinion that the reasons assigned by the lower Court do not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in this revision petition.  The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed.
          As a sequel to dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition, CRPMP No.30/2013 is disposed of as infructuous.
          ________________________
Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy
Date : 22-1-2013
AM

partition suit - duty of advocate commissioner - the Commissioner is only directed to take the assistance of the surveyor and submit a report to the proposal for division of the properties and thereafter, it is the duty of the executing Court to pass such decree for allotment of the properties. But, it is needless to say the Commissioner cannot himself deliver possession of the properties without passing of the final decree.


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3 OF 2013


ORDER:-

The revision is filed against the order in I.A.No.1294 of 2010 in O.S.No.24 of 2006 on the file of the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy.
Revision petitioner is the 3rd defendant in the suit.  The suit for partition was filed and a preliminary decree was passed. I.A.No.1294 of 2010 was filed for appointment of a Commissioner for division of the properties.  The said petition was allowed and assistance of the surveyor was also given.  
The apprehension of the petitioner herein is that the learned Commissioner is making a division of the properties physically and allotment of the properties is duty of the Court after report is filed by the Commissioner. 
Therefore, the Commissioner is only directed to take the assistance of the surveyor and submit a report to the proposal for division of the properties and thereafter, it is the duty of the executing Court to pass such decree for allotment of the properties.  But, it is needless to say the Commissioner cannot himself deliver possession of the properties without passing of the final decree.
Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. No costs.  Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this petition shall stand closed.
          _______________________________

JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO

Date: 02.01.2013
INL                                                                                                                               

Statutory rules, which are made under the provisions of any enactment and regulations, subject to parliamentary approval stand on entirely different footing. The administrative rules are always considered and have repeatedly been held to be rules of administrative practice merely, not rules of law and not delegated legislation and they have no statutory force. Mere description of such rules of administrative practice as “rules” does not make them to be statutory rules. Such administrative rules can be modified, amended or consolidated by the authorities without following any particular procedure.


HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
 SRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR
                                       
Writ Appeal Nos.1491, 1522 of 2012
and 13 of 2013, Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012
and PIL No.387 of 2012


11th February, 2013

Writ Appeal No.1491 of 2012

Between:

Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University,
Represented by its Registrar,
Hyderabad.                                                             … Appellant

And

M. Devender Reddy and others.                                … Respondents





                                                                        

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
SRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR

Writ Appeal Nos.1491, 1522 of 2012
and 13 of 2013, Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012
and PIL No.387 of 2012


JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice)

          In these cases, the issue that arises for consideration is with regard to the procedure to be adopted for appointment of Vice-Chancellor toAcharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University, Hyderabad.  As such, all the cases were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. For the purpose of disposal of these cases, the facts in Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 may be noticed and the parties herein are referred to as they are arrayed in the said writ petition.  With the consent of the parties, we have taken up Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 also for hearing and disposal.
2.       Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 has been filed for a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University in not following the UGC Regulations 2010/ICAR Model Act for Agricultural Universities as adopted by the University and G.O.Ms.No.14, Higher Education (UE.II) Department, dated 20.2.2010 with regard to appointment of Vice-Chancellor to the University as arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and for a direction to the Government and the University to make appointment of Vice-Chancellor in accordance with UGC Regulations 2010/ICAR Model Act.
3.       By the impugned order passed in WPMP.No.43447 of 2012 in Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 respondent Nos.1 to 3, Government of Andhra Pradesh and the University, were directed to follow the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010 for selecting and appointing a candidate as the Vice-Chancellor of Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University, Hyderabad.  As against the said direction, while the Government filed Writ Appeal No.1522 of 2012, Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University preferred Writ Appeal No.1491 of 2012.   Writ Appeal No.13 of 2013 has also been filed against the same order of the learned Single Judge by one Dr. A. Padma Raju seeking leave of this Court, as he is not a party to the writ petition.  PIL No.387 of 2012 has been filed by M. Govind Reddy, a retired Professor of the University, seeking a direction to the Government and the University to make appointment of Vice-Chancellor in accordance with UGC Regulations, ICAR Model Act and G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010.
4.       It is mainly contended in the writ appeals that unless Statue 4 of the First Statutes and Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the APAU Act’) are amended by the State Legislature, the University has to follow the procedure prescribed under the Act and the First Statutes framed thereunder for appointment of Vice-Chancellor and cannot follow the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010.  
5.       Learned Advocate General representing the State and also the University contended that the appointment of Vice-Chancellor is made as per Section 11 of the APAU Act and the procedure prescribed under Statute 4 of the First Statutes made under sub-section (1) of Section 39 and these are not amended by the State Legislature and, therefore, the Government and the University are bound to follow the procedure as prescribed under the said provisions.  He submitted that the procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the APAU Act and Statute 4 of the First Statutes does not provide for appointment of a search committee and a notification inviting applications for appointment of Vice-Chancellor.  The procedure prescribed under the APAU Act cannot be said as non-transparent as contended by the petitioner as the Board of Management consists of very eminent people. He further submitted that Section 11 of the APAU Act and Statute 4 of the First Statutes govern the appointment of Vice-Chancellor and the UGC Regulations are not mandatory for the State Government and the University.  G.O.Ms.No.14 was mainly issued for implementation of the revised pay scales of the UGC and there is no reference to the Statutes of the University.  The amendment of the Statutes needs specific prior approval by the Government and then only the University has to amend the same.  Section 39 of the APAU Act stipulates the procedure for amending the statutes and without amending Statute 4 of the First Statutes as provided therein, the new procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14 cannot be followed. Therefore, the learned Single Judge could not have directed to follow the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14 for appointment of Vice-Chancellor.   The learned Advocate General placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Agricultural University v. Ashok Kumar Prasad[1] to contend that when the APAU Act lays down the manner in which a statute should be made, it shall have to be made in that manner and no other.  He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in B. Bharath Kumar v. Osmania University[2] and a judgment of this Court in Prof. B. Surya Prakash Rao v. Union of India[3] and another judgment of the Bombay High Court in Suresh Patilkhede of Thane v. The Chancellor Universities of Maharashtra[4] and submitted that the UGC Regulations, 2010 are not mandatory and are merely recommendatory in nature and they are not binding on the State Government.  The learned Advocate General also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khandesh College Education Society, Jalgaon v. Arjun Hari Narkhede[5] and submitted that unless the First Statutes made under the APAU Act are modified or superseded, they continue to be in force.  He submitted that the University addressed a letter to the Government on 24.12.2010 proposing some changes to the APAU Act on par with the model Act of ICAR and requesting for Government’s approval and the same is pending consideration.
6.       Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Writ Appeal No.13 of 2013 (not a party to the writ petition) submitted that the writ petitioner having participated in the selection for appointment of Vice-Chancellor without protesting the procedure followed is now estopped from questioning the same after failing in the said selection.  In support of this, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. State of J & K[6] and Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P.[7]   He submitted that the procedure laid down in the APAU Act has to be strictly followed and not the procedure which is yet to be incorporated in the said Act.   The UGC Regulations and the instructions contained in G.O.Ms.No.14 are in the nature of advice and the University being a statutory body need to take a decision to accept the same and it needs to be translated into an Act or a statute before giving effect to it.   When a procedure is laid down by law, the authority concerned is required to exercise power conferred on it in the manner prescribed by it and not otherwise and the selection procedure is to be completed in accordance with law as it stood at its commencement.  In this connection, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court inP. Mahendran v. Matteesh Y. Annigeri[8].   Placing reliance on another judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines[9], the learned counsel submitted that the rules/instructions contained in G.O.Ms.No.14 are considered as administrative rules and not rules of law and they have no statutory force.   He further submitted that the petitioner chose to file the writ petition without impleading his client as party respondent and approached this Hon’ble Court with unclean hands by suppressing the facts.   Thus, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
7.       Sri Gandra Mohan Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions raised before the Hon’ble Single Judge and submitted that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.14 for implementation of the service conditions recommended by the University Grants Commission (UGC) within a timeframe by amending the statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations and this would amount to prior approval of the Government for modification of the First Statutes of the University, and the University also issued proceedings dated 2.3.2010 for implementing G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010, therefore, there could not have been any objection for following the new procedure for selecting a candidate for appointment as Vice-Chancellor.   The University also proposed necessary changes to the APAU Act on the lines of the model Act suggested by Indian Council of Agricultural  Research (ICAR) in the meeting of the Board of Management held on 1.12.2010 and, therefore, it was not open to the University to fall back on the old procedure prescribed under Statute 4 of the First Statutes.  Section 11 of the APAU Act or the First Statutes do not prescribe any procedure for selection of Vice-Chancellor.  In the absence of any procedure prescribed in the Act and the Statutes, there is nothing wrong in the direction of the Hon’ble Single Judge to follow the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010, when the said G.O. was adopted by the University.   He submitted that executive instructions can supplement the rules which may not deal with every aspect of the matter and the law merely prohibits issuance of a direction which is not in consonance with the Act or the statutory rules.  In support of his contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala[10], NDMC v. Tanvi Trading & Credit (P) Ltd.[11] and Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Assn. of India v. DG of Civil Aviation[12].
8.       Learned counsel further submitted that the Government constituted a committee to examine the issues relating to implementation of the revised pay scales of 2006 to the teaching staff of the universities and colleges and after examining the report of the said committee, suggestions of the Government of India and the UGC Regulations, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010.  Appendix to the said G.O. deals with pay scales and selection of Vice-Chancellor among other matters.  According to the procedure prescribed in the said G.O., the selection of Vice-Chancellor should be by a search committee by issuing a public notification and the search committee should prepare a panel of 3 to 5 names and the Chancellor is required to appoint Vice-Chancellor out of the said panel.  All the universities in the State adopted G.O.Ms.No.14 and it was adopted by the Board of Management of the University, and hence the First Statutes of the University are deemed to be amended by incorporation of the procedure relating to the selection of Vice-Chancellor.  The requirements of Section 39(2) of the APAU Act are complied with and no other procedure is prescribed in the said Act for giving effect to the amendments.  Since the First Statutes are deemed to be amended, the University is bound to follow the procedure of constitution of search committee etc. for selection of Vice-Chancellor.  The Board of Management of the University considered the revision of the APAU Act on par with the model Act for agricultural universities framed by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and approved the changes in the APAU Act and, therefore, the UGC Regulations and the model Act are binding on the University and it cannot deviate from the same and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Suresh Patilkhede’s case has no application to this case.  Further, the question of petitioner’s participation in the selection process does not arise as there was no interview or any test.  The new procedure ensures equality of opportunity to all eligible persons and eliminates favouritism and brings transparency to the selection process and such procedure is the constitutional mandate as held by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)[13].
9.       Sri J. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in PIL No.387 of 2012, raised almost similar contentions as raised by Sri Gandra Mohan Rao.    He submitted that the UGC Regulations and the model Act framed by ICAR prescribe the procedure for appointment of Vice-Chancellor and they are binding on the University.  However, the Government and University are not following the said procedure and appointing persons of their choice as Vice-Chancellor.  Any appointment to a post under the State must be within the constitutional scheme and rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of the Constitution.  He, therefore, prayed for direction to the Government to give wide publicity through an advertisement inviting applications from eligible and meritorious candidates and to make appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor.
10.     In view of the rival contentions, the question that arises for consideration is whether the University can follow the procedure stipulated under Statute 4 of the First Statutes made under the APAU Act or the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010 for appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the University.
11.     Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University, formerly known as Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, was established under the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963.  The University shall consist of a Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, a Board of Management and an Academic Council.  The appointment of Vice-Chancellor is governed by Section 11 of the APAU Act.   Section 20 of the said Act speaks about the powers and functions of the Board of Management.  Section 20(i) confers power on the Board of Management to determine and regulate all policies relating to the affairs of the University in accordance with the Act and the statutes.  Section 39 states as to how statutes are made.  Sub-section (1) of   Section 39 states that the First Statutes with regard to matters set out in clauses (a) to (m) of Section 38 namely, constitution, powers and duties of the authorities; powers, functions, duties and conditions of service of the officers etc., shall be made by the Government.  Sub-section (2) of Section 39, which is relevant for the purpose, reads thus:
“(2) subject to the prior approval of the Government, the Board may, from time to time, make any statute in addition to the first statutes referred to in sub-section (1), and may amend or repeal any statute in the manner hereinafter provided in this section.”


Sub-section (6) of Section 39 is as follows:
“(6) Every first statute made under sub-section (1) shall immediately after it is made, be laid before each House of the State Legislature if it is in session and if it is not in session in the session immediately following, for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, both Houses agree in making any modification in the statute or in the annulment of the statute, the statute shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be; so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the statute.”
           
          A combined reading of the above extracted provisions makes it clear that the Board of Management of the University may amend or repeal any statute including First Statutes subject to prior approval of the Government, and any such modification in the statute shall have effect only when it is laid before each House of the State Legislature and on agreeing for such modification.   Therefore, in our opinion, the Hon’ble Single Judge was not correct in holding that the procedure set out in           Section 39(6) of the APAU Act has no application to the amendment or repeal of any existing statute of the University.   Merely because there was failure on the part of the Board of Management in taking steps for amendment of Statute 4 of the First Statutes within the time stipulated in G.O.Ms.No.14, dated 20.2.2010, it cannot be said that the procedure prescribed therein cannot be followed and the University must necessarily adopt the procedure stipulated in G.O.Ms.No.14.  It is true that the selection procedure for appointment of teachers stipulated in G.O.Ms.No.14 was adopted by the State Government and the University, however, we are of the view of that the said procedure cannot be followed for appointment of Vice-Chancellor as the same is governed by Section 11 of the APAU Act and Statute 4 of the First Statutes made thereunder and unless and until Statute 4 is amended as provided under Section 39(6), the same will govern the field. Clause 13 of G.O.Ms.No.14 says that the service conditions of teachers like recruitment and qualifications, selection procedure etc. shall be implemented by all universities by amending necessary statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations.  In our view, it is a general direction or advice to all the universities in the State and it cannot be termed as prior approval of the Government to amend the First Statutes of the University; the Board of Management has to follow the procedure stipulated in Section 39 of the APAU Act for making amendments to the statutes of the University. Thus, it is clear that unless and until the manner of appointment of Vice-Chancellor as prescribed in Statute 4 of the First Statutes is amended as provided in Section 39(6) of the APAU Act, the University has to follow the same.  
12.     It is now well settled that any guidelines which do not have any statutory flavour are merely advisory in nature. They cannot have the force of a statute. They are subservient to the legislative Act and the statutory rules. (See State of Haryana v. Mahender Singh[14], Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India[15], J.R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P.[16] and Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India[17].  It is also well settled that instructions cannot be so framed or utilized as to override the provisions of law and such a method will destroy the very basis of the rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly administration of law (See Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam[18]).
13.     In this connection, it is apposite to quote the following observations from K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines (supra):
“…………Mere administrative rules are not legislation of any kind. They are in the nature of statements of policy and the practice of government departments, statutory authorities, whether published or otherwise.  Statutory rules, which are made under the provisions of any enactment and regulations, subject to parliamentary approval stand on entirely different footing. The administrative rules are always considered and have repeatedly been held to be rules of administrative practice merely, not rules of law and not delegated legislation and they have no statutory force.  Mere description of such rules of administrative practice as “rules” does not make them to be statutory rules. Such administrative rules can be modified, amended or consolidated by the authorities without following any particular procedure. There are no legal restrictions to do so as long as they do not offend the provisions of the Constitution or statutes or statutory rules as the case may be.”

14.     It is thus clear from the above that administrative rules are merely rules of practice and not rules of law and not delegated legislation and they have no statutory force and cannot override the provisions of law.
15.     In this case, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.14,                        dated 20.2.2010 directing all the universities in the State to implement the service conditions as recommended by the UGC and the Six Member Committee constituted by the Government by amending necessary statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations.  We are, therefore, of the view that till Statute 4 of the First Statutes is amended as per the recommendations of the UGC, the University has to follow the manner of appointment of Vice-Chancellor as provided in Statute 4 of the First Statutes and the petitioner cannot seek a direction from this Court to follow the procedure prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.14, Higher Education (UE.II) Department, dated 20.2.2010. The Government may consider the changes proposed by the Board of Management of the University to the APAU Act and take necessary steps for making suitable amendments, at the earliest.
16.     In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPMP.No.43447 of 2012 in Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 is set aside,  Writ Appeal Nos.1491 and 1522 of 2012 and 13 of 2013 are allowed, Writ Petition No.34156 of 2012 and PIL No.387 of 2012 stand dismissed.  No order as to costs.  All the pending miscellaneous applications stand closed.

___________________________
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, CJ

11th February, 2013.
________________________
   VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J.

LR COPY BE MARKED: Yes/No.
ARS      


[1] (2010) 1 SCC 730
[2] (2007) 11 SCC 58
[3] 2012 (2) ALT 681
[4] 2012 (6) ALL MR 336
[5] (2011) 7 SCC 172
[6] (1995) 3 SCC 486
[7] (2007) 11 SCC 522
[8] AIR 1990 SC 405
[9] (2009) 5 SCC 515
[10] (2006) 6 SCC 395
[11] (2008) 8 SCC 765
[12] (2011) 5 SCC 435
[13] (2006) 4 SCC 1
[14] (2007) 13 SCC 606
[15] (1981) 1 SCC 166
[16] (1988) 4 SCC 364
[17] 1990 (Supp) SCC 440
[18] AIR 1962 SC 386

Sections 7(1), 2(ia), (m) read with Section 16(1)(a) and(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, ‘the Act’).-the certificate given by the Director, Central Forensic Science Laboratory supercedes the report given by Public Analyst=The Public Analyst, after analysis, opined that the sample does not conform to the standards of milk fat and therefore the same is adulterated.-After receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, the accused made a request to send a second sample to the Central Food Laboratory, Pune. Accordingly, second sample was sent and the Public Analyst opined that there is no sub-standard milk fat. =There cannot be any dispute that the certificate given by the Director, Central Forensic Science Laboratory supercedes the report given by Public Analyst under Section 13(3) of the Act. A perusal of Ex.C1, the report given by the Central Food Laboratory, Pune, discloses that the content of the milk fat is 12%, whereas the prescribed standard is not less than 10%. Therefore, if that is taken into consideration, the accused is entitled for a benefit of doubt.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.19 of 2013

JUDGMENT:

        This Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.07.2009 passed in C.C.No.715 of 2007 on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ongole, whereunder and whereby the respondent/accused was acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 7(1), 2(ia), (m) read with Section 16(1)(a) and(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, ‘the Act’).

2.      The appellant herein is the complainant and the respondent herein is the accused in the above Calendar Case.

3.      The allegations in the complaint are:
On 16.05.2007, the Food Inspector - complainant, along with his staff inspected the shop of the accused, who was transacting business; that during inspection, the Food Inspector found 100 cups of ice cream, each 50 grams, without label, kept for sale of human consumption; that the Food Inspector purchased 18 cups of ice cream by paying Rs.90/- and divided the same into three parts, and sent one sample to the Public Analyst for analysis.  The Public Analyst, after analysis, opined that the sample does not conform to the standards of milk fat and therefore the same is adulterated. After obtaining permission from the competent authority, prosecution was launched against the accused.
4.      During the course of trial, on behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P1 to P16 were marked.  On behalf of the accused, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced.  Ex.C.1 was marked through Court. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court acquitted the accused. 

5.      Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent.

6.      For the charges levelled against the accused, the Food Inspector has to establish that the sample was adulterated.  In the instant case, one of the samples was sent to the Public Analyst, who opined that the same does not conform to the standard of milk fats and therefore it was adulterated.  
After receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, the accused made a request to send a second sample to the Central Food Laboratory, Pune.  Accordingly, second sample was sent and the Public Analyst opined that there is no sub-standard milk fat.  
There cannot be any dispute that the certificate given by the Director, Central Forensic Science Laboratory supercedes the report given by Public Analyst under Section 13(3) of the Act.  A perusal of Ex.C1, the report given by the Central Food Laboratory, Pune, discloses that the content of the milk fat is 12%, whereas the prescribed standard is not less than 10%.  Therefore, if that is taken into consideration, the accused is entitled for a benefit of doubt. Hence, the order passed by the trial Court does not warrant any interference, as there are no compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the same and the same is liable to be dismissed.

7.      Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed.   Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed.

________________

                                                              (K.C. BHANU, J.)

27.11.2012

KH