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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Friday, March 8, 2013

Bad for non- joinder of necessary parties - The joint family comprised of three brothers. However, he impleaded only one brotherviz., 1st defendant, and omitted the other brother, by name Venkatappa. Even if the plea of the appellant that Venkatappa relinquished share in his favour is true, he ought to have impleaded Venkatappa, so that the truth would come out. He did not do so, despite the objection raised by his brother, the 1st defendant. In addition to that, the evidence that was placed before the trial Court discloses that item No.8 of the suit schedule property stood in the name of Vasudeva Rao and four others (as per Ex.X.3) and item No.4 also stood in the name of Vasudeva Rao and three others. This fact was brought to the notice of this Court as well as the trial Court during the course of trial. Still he did not implead them. The suit filed by the appellant suffered from serious infirmity and the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court have taken correct view of the matter. The basic infirmities that crept into the suit were not even rectified by the appellant despite the fact that they have been pointed out from time to time.


  THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY

Second Appeal No.136 of 2013
JUDGMENT:
         
          The appellant filed O.S.No.209 of 1997 in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Madanapalle, against the respondents herein, for the relief of partition and separate possession of as many as 7 items of property.  According to him, he has two brothers, and out of them, one has relinquished his share.  On this premise, he claimed half share in the suit schedule property.  The brother of the appellant, who figured as
1st defendant, contested the suit.  He denied the relinquishment of share of their brother.  He has also raised an objection as to the non-joinder of necessary parties.  In addition to that, it was pointed out that items 8 and 9 of the suit schedule are in the names of M/s.Vasudeva Rao and four others and those persons were not made parties.  The trial Court took note of these and other factors and dismissed the suit through judgment dated 13.11.2002.  Aggrieved by that, the appellant filed A.S.No.2 of 2003 in the Court of VII Additional District Judge, (FTC), Madanapalle, Chittoor.  The appeal was dismissed on 20.12.2008. Hence, this second appeal.

           Heard Sri K.Mahadeva, learned counsel for the appellant.

The suit was filed for the relief of partition and separate possession of 7 items of property.  On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues:

1.                                “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property into two equal shares and for allotment of one such share to him as prayed for?
2.                                Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties to the suit?
3.                                Whether the suit schedule S.Nos.were divided long back among all the co-owners and the respective co-owners are in separate possession and enjoyment of the extents fallen to their shares by forming ridges?
4.                                To what relief?”

On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.10 were filed.  On behalf of the appellants, DWs.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were filed.   In addition to that, the Court marked Exs.X.1 to X.7.

In the appeal preferred by the appellant, on dismissal of the suit, the lower Appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration:

1.                              “Whether the plaintiff has established that his brother’s son Appinayani Narayana s/o Venkatappa relinquished his right over the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and first respondent?
2.                              Whether the appellant has established the plea of Ouster and the plea of adverse possession?
3.                              Whether the plaintiff being the Co-sharer or Co-owner, entitled to take the plea of ouster and plea of adverse possession against the other co-owners or co-sharers?”

  All the points were answered against the appellant and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant herein pleaded co-parcenary rights.  
The joint family comprised of three brothers.  However, he impleaded only one brotherviz., 1st defendant, and omitted the other brother, by name Venkatappa. 
Even if the plea of the appellant that Venkatappa relinquished share in his favour is true, he ought to have impleaded Venkatappa, so that the truth would come out.  
He did not do so, despite the objection raised by his brother, the 1st defendant.  
In addition to that, the evidence that was placed before the trial Court discloses that item No.8 of the suit schedule property stood in the name of Vasudeva Rao and four others (as per Ex.X.3) and item No.4 also stood in the name of Vasudeva Rao and three others.  
This fact was brought to the notice of this Court as well as the trial Court during the course of trial.  Still he did not implead them.  
The suit filed by the appellant suffered from serious infirmity and the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court have taken correct view of the matter.  
The basic infirmities that crept into the suit were not even rectified by the appellant despite the fact that they have been pointed out from time to time.

No substantial question of law arises for consideration.  The judgments rendered by the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court do not warrant any interference by this Court.

The second appeal is accordingly dismissed.   There shall be no order as to costs.

The miscellaneous petition filed in this second appeal shall stand disposed of.
____________________
L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J.    
Dated:22.02.2013
GJ











THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Second Appeal No.136 of 2013



Date:22.02.2013

GJ                                                                     





The attachability of the salary and the adjustment of payments is a matter, which has to be decided by the executing Court.Without putting appearance before the executing Court and submitting the reasons as to the non-attachability of the salary, the present revision is filed contending that already some amounts were paid and they were not given credit.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO

 

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.244 of 2013

ORDER:

The 1st Judgment Debtor in E.P.No.53 of 2011 in O.S.No.216 of 2008 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, has filed this Civil Revision Petition.

2.       The suit was one filed for recovery of the money and in execution of the decree, attachment of the salary of the Revision Petitioner has been ordered.  He said to be an employee in the Naval Armament Department (NAD) at Visakhapatnam. Without putting appearance before the executing Court and submitting the reasons as to the non-attachability of the salary, the present revision  is filed contending that already some amounts were paid and they were not given credit.  The attachability of the salary and the adjustment of payments is a matter, which has to be decided by the executing Court.
                       
3.       Therefore, in view of the circumstances, the Revision is disposed of with a liberty to the Judgment Debtor to approach the executing Court and file a counter and raise objections about the attachment or the liability of the payment of the decretal amount.

4.       Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Civil Revision Petition, shall stand closed.

____________________________
N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO,J
Dated: 11.02.2013
VSV/KH          

Appellant court can not reverse or modify the lower court decree and judgement in the absence of appeal /cross appeal /cross objections on that count - In the absence of any such appeal, the lower appellate Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the decree of the trial Court with regard to the award of damages. Therefore, the findings rendered by the lower appellate Court that the appellant is not entitled to damages as he has not supplied the remaining ballast to the respondents and reversal of the judgment and decree regarding damages cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the judgment to this extent is set aside. In the result, the decree of the trial Court awarding damages of Rs.1.00 lakh is restored. The sum of Rs.1,92,473/- along with 6% interest, in respect of which a further decree has been passed by the lower appellate Court, shall be paid by the respondents in addition to the sum of Rs.1.00 lakh payable by them towards the damages awarded by the trial Court. The judgment of the lower appellate Court accordingly stands modified to the above extent.


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY

Second Appeal No. 92 of 2013

Date: 21-02-2013

Between:

C.H. Nagi Reddy                                                
... Appellant

And

Union of India, Owning South Central
Railway, rep.by its General Manager,
Rail Nilayam, Secunderabad & another.         
... Respondents



Counsel for the appellant:  Sri Katta Laxmi Prasad

Counsel for the respondents:  Sri P.Bhaskar


The Court made the following:












JUDGMENT:
This Second Appeal arises out of judgment and decree, dated 17.07.2009, in A.S.No.84 of 2007, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VI Additional District Judge (FTC), Gooty. 
The appellant filed O.S.No.5 of 2001 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gooty 
for declaration that the termination of the contract through letter, dated 27.01.2000, by the respondents is illegal; 
for mandatory injunction directing the respondents not to penalize him; to restore the benefits of the contract; 
for award of damages of Rs.3.00 lakhs and 
for return of the sum of Rs.1,92,473/- along with interest towards the work done by him.
After a full-fledged trial, 
the trial Court partly decreed the suit to the extent of payment of damages of Rs.1.00 lakh and dismissed the suit for the remaining reliefs.  
Feeling partly aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellant filed A.S.No.84 of 2007 in the lower appellate Court.  
By its judgment, dated 17.07.2009, 
the lower appellate Court has partly allowed the appeal holding that the appellant is entitled to recovery of Rs.1,92,473/- together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization towards the work done by the appellant.  
However, while doing so, the lower appellate Court had held that the appellant is not entitled to award of damages and directed that the sum of Rs.1.00 lakh already awarded by the trial Court towards damages shall be adjusted towards the sum of Rs.1,92,473/- and that the appellant is entitled to recover the balance amount of Rs.92,473/- with interest at 6% per annum.
At the hearing, Sri Katta Laxmi Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the lower appellate Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in reversing the judgment of the trial Court with respect to award of damages as no appeal was filed by the respondents against that part of the decree of the trial Court. 
Sri P.Bhaskar, learned Standing Counsel for Railways appearing for the respondents, is unable to show that the respondents have filed any appeal either substantive or by way of cross-objections against the judgment and decree of the trial Court awarding damages to the appellant. 
In the absence of any such appeal, the lower appellate Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the decree of the trial Court with regard to the award of damages.  Therefore, the findings rendered by the lower appellate Court that the appellant is not entitled to damages as he has not supplied the remaining ballast to the respondents and reversal of the judgment and decree regarding damages cannot be sustained in law.  Accordingly, the judgment to this extent is set aside.
In the result, the decree of the trial Court awarding damages of Rs.1.00 lakh is restored.  
The sum of Rs.1,92,473/- along with 6% interest, in respect of which a further decree has been passed by the lower appellate Court, shall be paid by the respondents in addition to the sum of Rs.1.00 lakh payable by them towards the damages awarded by the trial Court. 
 The judgment of the lower appellate Court accordingly stands modified to the above extent.  
The Second Appeal is allowed accordingly.

 

                                                   C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J

21st February, 2013.
Mgr/VGB
                                                                             

Section 100 CPC admission of Second Appeal is not routine- In view of the amendment to Section 100 CPC admission of Second Appeal is not routine and the appellants must show the Second Appeal involves a substantial question of law. Substantial question of law has not been defined but it has been stated that it substantially affects the rights of the parties. When the findings are not based upon admissible evidence or when inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or when both the courts below gave a perverse finding, then it can be said that a substantial question of law is involved.


 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU


SECOND APPEAL NOS.419 OF 2009 AND 93 OF 2013


COMMON JUDGMENT:
         
These Second Appeals are filed under Section 100 CPC against the decree and common judgment dated 30-08-2007 passed in A.S.Nos.40 of 2000 and 44 of 2000 in O.S.Nos.352 of 1993 and 136 of 1999 respectively on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur.

2.      Heard both sides. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed in the trial court.

3.      O.S.No.352 of 1993 and 136 of 1999 were filed before the Prl. Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur, for permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties respectively. The Suits were clubbed together and a common judgment was rendered by the Prl. Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur, dismissing the Suits. Challenging the same, the un-successful plaintiffs filed appeals before the first appellate court, namely Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. By impugned judgment dated 30-08-2007 both the appeals were dismissed confirming the decree and common judgment of the trial court. Challenging the same, the present Second Appeals are filed.

4.      In view of the amendment to Section 100 CPC admission of Second Appeal is not routine and the appellants must show the Second Appeal involves a substantial question of law. 
Substantial question of law has not been defined but it has been stated that it substantially affects the rights of the parties. 
When the findings are not based upon admissible evidence or 
when inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or when both the courts below gave a perverse finding, 
then it can be said that a substantial question of law is involved.

5.      The Suits are filed for permanent injunction by the plaintiffs in respect of three items in plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs in both the suits based their claim on two un-registered Wills. Both the Wills were disbelieved by the trial court after giving substantial reasons. When both the wills have been disbelieved by the trial court as well as the first appellate court, the incidental title of the party cannot be decided because for grant of permanent injunction three requirements have to be satisfied namely 1) prima facie case 2) balance of convenience must be in favour of the plaintiff and 3) if the injunction is granted, whether any irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiff.

6.      Insofar as the first requirement is concerned, it must be incidentally proved by both the plaintiffs. In view of the fact that there are some suspicious circumstances existing in respect of the execution of Wills, the trial court as well as the first appellate court rightly dismissed the suit. In all respects, the appellants ought to have filed a suit for declaration in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Instead of doing so, the present second appeals are filed. Even in these Second Appeals also no substantial question of law has been raised. Even with regard to the grant of injunction, the plaintiffs must show that they were in possession of the property by the date of filing of the Suits. Right from the date of filing of the suits, none of the parties filed any document to show that they are in actual possession and enjoyment of the property. Therefore, when the plaintiffs in both the suits failed to establish their physical possession and enjoyment of the property as on the date of filing of the suits the question of granting of injunction does not arise. Hence, there is no substantial question of law involved in these second appeals.

7.      Accordingly, both the second appeals are dismissed at the admission stage.  There shall be no order as to costs. 

8.      Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in these Second Appeals shall stand closed.
 ______________________
JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

February 12, 2013
PN

 


                                                    


 

 

 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





                                         



 







 

 


SECOND APPEAL NOS.419 OF 2009 AND 93 OF 2013


February 12, 2013


PN

Title = In a suit for injunction, what becomes material is the state of affairs, pertaining to possession as on the date of filing of the suit. The title is certainly important, but assumes significance only after possession. Though the title to the respective properties is yet to be established, if the appellant was able to prove his possession over the property, the relief of injunction could have certainly been granted ; Possession = The appellant, no doubt, filed Exs.A-5 and A-6 the 10(1) account and No.2 Adangal for the year 2005. However, immediately, prior to that period, Adangals were issued in the name of the respondents. The same is evident from Exs.B-7 to B-12. Things would have been different altogether, had the possession of the vendor of the petitioner been reflected in any records prior to 2005. Once Exs.B-7 to B-12 reflect possession of the respondents over the land, the appellant can succeed if only he claimed possession through them. Added to that, the possession of the vendor of the petitioner is nowhere shown in the records.


* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY
+ SECOND APPEAL No.1425 OF 2012

 


% 13-02-2013

Between:

# Yachamaneni Rajaiah Naidu
                                                                    … Appellant

And

$ Yachamaneni Munikrishnaiah and others
                        …Respondents


! Counsel for the Appellant                            :        Sri S. V. Muni Reddy

^ Counsel for the Respondents                      :          None

            
< Gist:





> Head Note:





? Cases referred: 
  

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY

SECOND APPEAL No.1425 of 2012

JUDGMENT: 

The appellant filed O.S. No.514 of 2005 in the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikalahasthi, against the respondents for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of eight items of agricultural lands, aggregating to an extent of Acs.2.29 cents of land in different survey numbers of Kanamanambedu Village, Buchinaidu Kandriga Mandal, Chittoor District.  He pleaded that the suit schedule property was purchased under four registered Sale Deeds, dated 03-11-2005,
01-12-2005, 05-12-2005 and 08-12-2005 from the original owner and that his name was entered in the 10(1) account and No.2 Adangal in the year 2005.  It was alleged that the respondents are trying to interfere with his possession.  The respondents, on the other hand, filed written statement stating that the father of the vendor of the petitioner sold items 3 to 8 of the suit schedule property to them, way back in the year 1974 and ever since then they are in possession of the lands. 

2. The trial Court partly decreed the suit in respect of items 1 and 2 of the schedule and dismissed the suit as regards items 3 to 8.  Feeling aggrieved by denial of relief in respect of items 3 to 8, the appellant filed A.S. No.15 of 2007 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Srikalahasthi. The appeal was dismissed through judgment, dated
30-08-2012.  Hence, this Second Appeal.

3.  Sri S.V. Muni Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the source of title for the appellant in respect of 8 items of property and the nature of defence of the respondents is one and the same, but the Trial Court and the lower appellate Court denied the relief in respect of items 3 to 8.  He contends that the possession of the appellant over all the items is reflected through Exs.A-5 and A-6. 

4. The suit filed by the appellant was for the relief of injunction simplicitor.  The trial Court framed two issues; as to whether the appellant is entitled for the relief of injunction?, and whether the cause of action is true? 

5.  On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 sale deeds and Ex.A-5 copy of No.2 Adangal and Ex.A-6 copy of 10(1) account were marked.  On behalf of the respondents, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-3 sale letters, Ex.B-4 Old Ryot passbook, Ex.B-5 New Pattadar passbook and Ex.A-6 title deed were marked.  In addition to that, Exs.B-7 to B-12 copies of 10(1) account and No.2 Adangal were filed.

6.  The suit was partly decreed and in the appeal preferred by the appellant, the lower Appellate Court framed the following points for consideration:
1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of  the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit by having right in it?
2. Whether there is any interference of the defendants with the plaint schedule property as claimed by the plaintiff, if it is so whether such interference is justifiable one or not?

The appeal was, ultimately, rejected.
          7.  In a suit for injunction, what becomes material is the state of affairs, pertaining to possession as on the date of filing of the suit.  The title is certainly important, but assumes significance only after possession.  
The appellant, no doubt, purchased eight items of property through four contemporaneous sale deeds in the year 2005.  The respondents, however, pleaded that about three decades earlier to that, the father of the vendor of the petitioner conveyed the lands through three sale letters, marked as Exs.B-1 to B-3.  
Though the title to the respective properties is yet to be established, if the appellant was able to prove his possession over the property, the relief of injunction could have certainly been granted.

          8.  The appellant, no doubt, filed Exs.A-5 and A-6 the 10(1) account and No.2 Adangal for the year 2005.  
However, immediately, prior to that period, Adangals were issued in the name of the respondents.  The same is evident from Exs.B-7 to B-12.  
Things would have been different altogether, had the possession of the vendor of the petitioner been reflected in any records prior to 2005.  
Once Exs.B-7 to B-12 reflect possession of the respondents over the land, the appellant can succeed if only he claimed possession through them.  
Added to that, the possession of the vendor of the petitioner is nowhere shown in the records.  
Therefore, no exception can be taken to the concurrent judgments rendered by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court.  
If the petitioner is so advised, he can file a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession.

          9.  The Second Appeal is dismissed, with the above observation.  There shall be no order as to costs.  The miscellaneous petition filed in this second appeal shall also stand disposed of. 

____________________
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J   

February 13, 2013.


Note:
L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/O. KTL.

appreciation of evidence = This claim of the appellant is evidently untenable because when the suit was pending and when possession was not obtained by the decree holder, it is difficult to believe that when the execution petition was filed, she could have inducted the appellant into possession of the property. Ex.P1-residence certificate and also Exs.P2 to P4 are brought into existence and the same cannot be ruled out.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD


FRIDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND THIRTEEN

 

PRESENT

 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO

 

C.M.S.A.No.44 of 2012

                                                                                

 

Between:

Dara Mani
..... APPELLANT
And
Kakinada Sarada and another
.....RESPONDENTS



The Court made the following:

                                                                                 

 


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO

 

C.M.S.A.No.44 of 2012

JUDGMENT:

The petitioner in E.A.No.1154/2009 in E.P.No.262/2009 in O.S.No.190/2006 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry is the appellant herein.
The application was filed under Order 21 Rule-97 CPC claiming that the appellant herein is the tenant of the premises and a collusive decree was obtained by the respondent/decree holder and in pursuance of the said decree, the appellant is sought to be evicted forcibly.
According to the case of the appellant, the premises was given to her on lease in August, 2009.  The respondent/decree holder has contended that the alleged lease is not true and she has obtained certain documents from the Mandal Revenue Officer, which are not valid.  According to her, when the EP was filed, the delivery was sought to be effected on 09.10.2009, but due to holidays, it cannot be executed. 
The Court below after considering the evidence on record and also the documents came to the conclusion that the claim of the appellant is not bona fide.  As against that order A.S.No.47/2012 was filed and the lower appellate Court has dismissed the said appeal.  Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal is filed.
The Second Appeal was admitted without framing any substantial question of law that arises for consideration.  However, after going through the grounds of appeal, the only question that stands for consideration is whether the claim of the appellant under Order 21 Rule-97 CPC is legal and sustainable?
Point:
Evidently, the suit O.S.No.190/2006 was filed for eviction and the same was decreed on 09.07.2009.  Thereafter, EP was filed and delivery was ordered.  According to the case of the appellant, the tenancy is said to have been created in August, 2009.  This claim of the appellant is evidently untenable because when the suit was pending and when possession was not obtained by the decree holder, it is difficult to believe that when the execution petition was filed, she could have inducted the appellant into possession of the property.  Even otherwise, the appellant has filed O.S.No.789/2009 on the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry for injunction and initially the injunction was dismissed and thereafter as against the refusal of injunction, CMA was filed and the lower appellate Court has dismissed the CMA also. In fact, there is said to be a serious doubt about the documents relied on by the appellant.  In fact an opinion was given by the Executing Court that Ex.P1-residence certificate and also Exs.P2 to P4 are brought into existence and the same cannot be ruled out.  As a question of fact, both the Courts below have found that the appellant is not in possession of the property and consequently being a question of fact, it has to be decided after taking evidence of both sides, which does not appear to be against the evidence available on record.
I find no question of law much less substantial question of law that arise for consideration in this appeal or misappreciation of evidence by the Court below.  The Appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.  However, if the appellant is in possession of the property in question, four weeks time is granted from this day for vacation of the premises, and she shall abide by the execution proceedings, which were initiated in the original suit.  Interim stay granted on 19.10.2012 shall stand vacated, CMSA MP Nos.125/2012 and 7/2013 shall stand dismissed in consequence.  No order as to costs. 

____________________________
N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO,J
Dated: 01.03.2013
Dsr

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.


The Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Chandra Kumar
Appeal Suit No.144 of 2012

Dated 9th August, 2012
Judgment:
          The appellant filed this appeal challenging Order, dated
27-01-2012, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, refusing to register the suit filed by him on the ground that the same is barred by limitation .
          The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance basing on agreement of sale, dated 13-11-2008.  As per the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale, the balance amount of Rs.4 lakhs out of the total sale price of Rs.9 lakhs was to be paid within two months from the date of expiry of the limitation of the said agreement of sale.  
The case of the appellant is that though he had been requesting the respondent to receive the balance sale consideration and register the sale deed in his favour, the respondent did not come forward; that therefore, he got issued a legal notice to the respondent on
12-10-2011; that the respondent acknowledged the same and got issued a reply notice on 17-10-2011. 
          The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the cause of action for filing the suit arose on 13-11-2008, which is the date of execution of the agreement of sale, and also on 12-10-2011, when he got issued a legal notice, and on 17-10-2011, when the respondent issued reply, refusing to perform his part of contract.  But, the lower Court erroneously rejected the plaint on the ground that the date of the suit document being 13-08-2008, the suit ought to have been filed on or before 13-11-2011, on which date the period of limitation expires.
          The Court below, taking into consideration the period of two months for paying the balance of sale consideration amount from the date of the agreement of sale, came to the conclusion that suit is barred by limitation.  If the date of document or the period of two months as agreed by the parties for payment of balance sale consideration is taken into consideration, the conclusion arrived at by the Court below appears to be correct.  But, however, the fact remains that the plaintiff got issued legal notice on 12-10-2011, and according to Counsel for the appellant, as per the second limb of Article 54, the period of limitation starts on 17-10-2011, when the respondent issued reply notice refusing to perform his part of contract. 
          Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows:
“For Specific performance of a contract:
Three years
The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”
          The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on a judgment of the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs.  Bibijan[1],
 wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. 
          Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent submits that from the plaint averments, it is clear that the suit is barred under by limitation and therefore, the Court below while exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has rightly rejected the plaint.
          The issue that may arise for consideration is whether second limb of Article 54 is applicable to the facts of the present case when no specified date in the calendar is mentioned i.e., whether limitation of three years period commences from the date when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused.
          Therefore, it appears that whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold.    In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. 
          The Appeal is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.  However, the parties are at liberty to take all the pleas available to them including the plea of limitation before the Court below and the Court below shall consider the same in accordance with law. 
_____________________

B.Chandra Kumar, J

9th August, 2012
lur


[1] 2009 (5) SCC 462