Or.1, rule 10 and consequential amendment - injunction granted not to alienate - pending suit properties are alienated - petition to implead them as defendants - notice was order to the proposed respondents , they remain exparte - despite of it the trial court dismissed the application - their Lordships held that The manner, in which the lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is in a highly confused state of mind. Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non application of mind on its part as there is no such law and regarding boundaries the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers, the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers.The fact, however, remains that the survey number remains common both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in the sale deed.the lower Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit.=
A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
(i) that the suit is part heard;
(ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
examined;
(iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
Court can permit impleadment of a party
under Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
commencement of the trial;
(iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
alleged to have been sold to the proposed
parties and the person having direct interest
in subject matter of the suit and who would
be affected by the result of the suit should be
allowed to come on record;
(v) that there is variation in the names given by
the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
support of the IA and the copy of the sale
deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
name of the purchaser was shown as
Gutta Conventions Services Limited
represented by its Director C.S.Neelkantha
whereas in Paras 4 and 5, the name was
mentioned as Butta Conventions Services
Limited represented by its Director
B.S.Neelkantha;
(vi) that there is variation in the name of the
Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
name of the Company is also shown as Gutta
Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3 and
4, the Companys name is shown as Butta
conventions.
I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard. The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind. As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning. The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial. On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court. No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit. The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity. In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes. After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.
He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers. This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason. The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers. It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not. The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.
2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11971
The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy
Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013
04-09-2014
K.Yogender Reddy and another.. Petitioners
Smt.K.Usha Rani and 2 others. .. Respondents
Counsel for the petitioners: Mr.R.Satyanarayana Reddy
Counsel for respondent No.1: Mr.Vivek Chandrasekhar.S
Counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3: Ms.N.Niyatha
<Gist
>Head Note:
Cases referred :
----
The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy
Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013
Dated 04.09.2014
The Court made the following:
Order:
This Civil Revision Petition arises out of Order, dated
31.07.2013, in IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on
the file of the Court of the learned IV Additional District
Judge, Ranga Reddy District (for short the lower Court),
whereby the application, filed by the petitioners for
impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein as defendant
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit, was dismissed.
The petitioners have filed the abovementioned suit
(i) for declaration of their title in respect of plot No.112
admeasuring 1111 square yards in Survey No.13 of Khanamet
Village, Serilingampalli Municipality, Ranga Reddy District (for
short the suit schedule property); (ii) for ejection of
respondent No.1 from the suit schedule property; (iii) for
putting the petitioners in possession of the suit schedule
property; and (iv) for grant of perpetual injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from interfering with their possession of the
suit schedule property. The petitioners also sought for a decree
for damages for illegal use and occupation of the suit schedule
property by respondent No.1.
It is the case of the petitioners that pending the suit, the
lower Court has granted ad interim injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from alienating the suit schedule property.
The petitioners filed IA.No.100 of 2003 under Order I Rule 10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the CPC) with
the allegation that despite subsistence of the said order of
injunction, respondent No.1 has executed a registered sale deed
in favour of respondent No.2 represented by respondent No.3,
conveying certain extent of land in Survey No.13, which
includes the suit schedule property. The petitioners have,
therefore, sought for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3
in the suit.
Respondent No.1 filed a counter-affidavit wherein she
has pleaded that an extent of Ac.1-10 guntas in Survey No.13
of Khanamet Village was purchased by her under valid
registered sale deed, dated 19-11-1997, from its previous owner;
that the said property was sold to respondent Nos.2 and 3; that
the said property is no way concerned with the suit schedule
property and that therefore, the question of impleading
respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit would not arise.
Respondent Nos.2 and 3 did not appear to have either
entered their appearance or filed their counter-affidavits.
Regrettably, the lower Court has not even referred in its order
as to whether notices were ordered on respondent Nos.2 and 3
and if so, whether they have entered their appearance or not.
However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners pleaded that
as per the established convention, notices were sent to
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and despite the same, they have not
entered appearance and contested the application. The lower
Court, in my opinion, has committed a serious lapse in not
adverting to this aspect at all. Be that as it may, IA.No.100 of
2013 filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit remained uncontested by the latter. By
its order, dated 31-07-2013, the lower Court has dismissed the
said application.
A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
(i) that the suit is part heard;
(ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
examined;
(iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
Court can permit impleadment of a party
under Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
commencement of the trial;
(iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
alleged to have been sold to the proposed
parties and the person having direct interest
in subject matter of the suit and who would
be affected by the result of the suit should be
allowed to come on record;
(v) that there is variation in the names given by
the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
support of the IA and the copy of the sale
deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
name of the purchaser was shown as
Gutta Conventions Services Limited
represented by its Director C.S.Neelkantha
whereas in Paras 4 and 5, the name was
mentioned as Butta Conventions Services
Limited represented by its Director
B.S.Neelkantha;
(vi) that there is variation in the name of the
Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
name of the Company is also shown as Gutta
Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3 and
4, the Companys name is shown as Butta
conventions.
I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard. The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind. As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning. The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial. On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court. No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit. The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity. In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes. After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.
The plea of the petitioners is that, in defiance of the order
of injunction suffered by respondent No.1, she has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3. Having regard
to the substantive reliefs claimed by the petitioners viz.,
declaration of title, recovery of possession and perpetual
injunction against respondent No.1, it cannot be said that
respondent Nos.2 and 3, who, allegedly, purchased the suit
schedule property pending the suit and during the subsistence
of the injunction order, are not necessary parties. Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 are proper and necessary parties to the suit, for, if
they are not impleaded as the defendants, the petitioners may
be forced to institute another substantive proceedings for
invalidation of the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 and
recovery of possession from respondent Nos.2 and 3. Such a
course would only result in multiplicity of proceedings. The
lower Court, by dismissing the present application on jejune
grounds, has given room for multiplicity of proceedings.
Mr.S.Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel for
respondent No.1, submitted that the property sold by his client
to respondent Nos.2 and 3, is different from the one in respect
of which the suit is filed. He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers. This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason. The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers. It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not. The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.
For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court is of the
opinion that the lower Court has committed a serious
jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the
petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the
suit.
Accordingly, the Order under revision is set aside.
IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on the file of the
Court of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy
District, is allowed. The lower Court is directed to reopen the
entire case, allow all the parties to amend their pleadings and
adduce additional evidence, if necessary, and dispose of the suit
thereafter.
As a sequel, CRPMP.Nos.3653 of 2014 in/&
CRPMP.No.6020 of 2013 are disposed of.
_____________________
(C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J)
Dt: 4th September, 2014
numbers.The fact, however, remains that the survey number remains common both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in the sale deed.the lower Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit.=
A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
(i) that the suit is part heard;
(ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
examined;
(iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
Court can permit impleadment of a party
under Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
commencement of the trial;
(iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
alleged to have been sold to the proposed
parties and the person having direct interest
in subject matter of the suit and who would
be affected by the result of the suit should be
allowed to come on record;
(v) that there is variation in the names given by
the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
support of the IA and the copy of the sale
deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
name of the purchaser was shown as
Gutta Conventions Services Limited
represented by its Director C.S.Neelkantha
whereas in Paras 4 and 5, the name was
mentioned as Butta Conventions Services
Limited represented by its Director
B.S.Neelkantha;
(vi) that there is variation in the name of the
Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
name of the Company is also shown as Gutta
Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3 and
4, the Companys name is shown as Butta
conventions.
I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard. The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind. As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning. The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial. On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court. No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit. The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity. In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes. After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.
He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers. This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason. The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers. It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not. The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.
2014 - Oct. Month - http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=11971
The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy
Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013
04-09-2014
K.Yogender Reddy and another.. Petitioners
Smt.K.Usha Rani and 2 others. .. Respondents
Counsel for the petitioners: Mr.R.Satyanarayana Reddy
Counsel for respondent No.1: Mr.Vivek Chandrasekhar.S
Counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3: Ms.N.Niyatha
<Gist
>Head Note:
Cases referred :
----
The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy
Civil Revision Petition No.4410 of 2013
Dated 04.09.2014
The Court made the following:
Order:
This Civil Revision Petition arises out of Order, dated
31.07.2013, in IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on
the file of the Court of the learned IV Additional District
Judge, Ranga Reddy District (for short the lower Court),
whereby the application, filed by the petitioners for
impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein as defendant
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit, was dismissed.
The petitioners have filed the abovementioned suit
(i) for declaration of their title in respect of plot No.112
admeasuring 1111 square yards in Survey No.13 of Khanamet
Village, Serilingampalli Municipality, Ranga Reddy District (for
short the suit schedule property); (ii) for ejection of
respondent No.1 from the suit schedule property; (iii) for
putting the petitioners in possession of the suit schedule
property; and (iv) for grant of perpetual injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from interfering with their possession of the
suit schedule property. The petitioners also sought for a decree
for damages for illegal use and occupation of the suit schedule
property by respondent No.1.
It is the case of the petitioners that pending the suit, the
lower Court has granted ad interim injunction restraining
respondent No.1 from alienating the suit schedule property.
The petitioners filed IA.No.100 of 2003 under Order I Rule 10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the CPC) with
the allegation that despite subsistence of the said order of
injunction, respondent No.1 has executed a registered sale deed
in favour of respondent No.2 represented by respondent No.3,
conveying certain extent of land in Survey No.13, which
includes the suit schedule property. The petitioners have,
therefore, sought for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3
in the suit.
Respondent No.1 filed a counter-affidavit wherein she
has pleaded that an extent of Ac.1-10 guntas in Survey No.13
of Khanamet Village was purchased by her under valid
registered sale deed, dated 19-11-1997, from its previous owner;
that the said property was sold to respondent Nos.2 and 3; that
the said property is no way concerned with the suit schedule
property and that therefore, the question of impleading
respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the suit would not arise.
Respondent Nos.2 and 3 did not appear to have either
entered their appearance or filed their counter-affidavits.
Regrettably, the lower Court has not even referred in its order
as to whether notices were ordered on respondent Nos.2 and 3
and if so, whether they have entered their appearance or not.
However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners pleaded that
as per the established convention, notices were sent to
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and despite the same, they have not
entered appearance and contested the application. The lower
Court, in my opinion, has committed a serious lapse in not
adverting to this aspect at all. Be that as it may, IA.No.100 of
2013 filed by the petitioners for impleadment of respondent
Nos.2 and 3 in the suit remained uncontested by the latter. By
its order, dated 31-07-2013, the lower Court has dismissed the
said application.
A perusal of the impugned order would show that the
lower Court has assigned the following reasons for dismissal of
IA.No.100 of 2013:
(i) that the suit is part heard;
(ii) that respondent No.1 was thoroughly
examined;
(iii) that as per the recent amendment, no
Court can permit impleadment of a party
under Order I Rule 10 CPC, after
commencement of the trial;
(iv) that admittedly, the suit schedule property
alleged to have been sold to the proposed
parties and the person having direct interest
in subject matter of the suit and who would
be affected by the result of the suit should be
allowed to come on record;
(v) that there is variation in the names given by
the petitioners in the affidavit filed in
support of the IA and the copy of the sale
deed in that in Para 3 of the affidavit, the
name of the purchaser was shown as
Gutta Conventions Services Limited
represented by its Director C.S.Neelkantha
whereas in Paras 4 and 5, the name was
mentioned as Butta Conventions Services
Limited represented by its Director
B.S.Neelkantha;
(vi) that there is variation in the name of the
Director in Paras 3, 4 and 5 and that the
name of the Company is also shown as Gutta
Conventions in Para 3 whereas in Paras 3 and
4, the Companys name is shown as Butta
conventions.
I have carefully tried to decipher the true purport of the
order of the lower Court, but, I must confess, I could not
succeed, in my effort, in this regard. The manner, in which the
lower Court has passed the impugned order, reflected that it is
in a highly confused state of mind. As noted above, one of the
reasons assigned by it is that, as per the recent amendment, no
third party can be impleaded after commencement of trial.
A perusal of the Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC shows that it
does not support this reasoning. The said provision envisages
that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon
or without the application of either party, and on such terms, as
may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any
party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person, who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable
the Court, effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
The aforesaid provision does not anywhere bar
impleadment of any party after the commencement of trial. On
the contrary, sub-Rule (2) of Order X Rule 10 CPC empowers
the Court to strike out or add any party at any stage of the
proceedings, if it feels it just and that the presence of such party
is necessary to enable itself to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the reasoning of the lower Court that addition of party
after commencement of trial is barred reflects a complete non-
application of mind on its part.
With regard to the reason pertaining to the variation in
the names, less this Court deals with it, it is better for the lower
Court. No doubt, there are variations in the description of the
names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in different Paras of the
affidavit filed in the support of the application filed for their
impledment in the suit. The fact, however, remains that there
is no dispute relating to their identity. In the prayer in the said
application, the petitioner has correctly described the names of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the same match with the names
mentioned in sale deed, dated 25-10-2012, executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. This
being the admitted position, reliance on the purported variation
in the description of the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in
different paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of the
implead application is wholly misplaced and the Court is not
expected to rely upon such inconsequential mistakes. After all,
the intendment of law is to render substantial justice and not to
deny justice on inconsequential or inadvertent mistakes.
The plea of the petitioners is that, in defiance of the order
of injunction suffered by respondent No.1, she has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3. Having regard
to the substantive reliefs claimed by the petitioners viz.,
declaration of title, recovery of possession and perpetual
injunction against respondent No.1, it cannot be said that
respondent Nos.2 and 3, who, allegedly, purchased the suit
schedule property pending the suit and during the subsistence
of the injunction order, are not necessary parties. Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 are proper and necessary parties to the suit, for, if
they are not impleaded as the defendants, the petitioners may
be forced to institute another substantive proceedings for
invalidation of the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 and
recovery of possession from respondent Nos.2 and 3. Such a
course would only result in multiplicity of proceedings. The
lower Court, by dismissing the present application on jejune
grounds, has given room for multiplicity of proceedings.
Mr.S.Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel for
respondent No.1, submitted that the property sold by his client
to respondent Nos.2 and 3, is different from the one in respect
of which the suit is filed. He has invited my attention to the
plaint schedule and also to the schedule in the sale deed and
submitted that while the plaint schedule has referred to
different plot numbers as boundaries, the suit schedule referred
only to survey numbers. This submission of the learned
Counsel is liable to be rejected for more than one reason. The
lower Court has not made this reason as a ground to dismiss
the application, though respondent No.1 has raised a vague
plea in this regard in Paragraph 4 of her counter-affidavit.
Even otherwise, a perusal of the plaint schedule vis-a-vis the
schedule contained in the sale deed would show that while the
former has described the boundaries in terms of plot numbers,
the latter has described the boundaries in terms of survey
numbers. It will be a matter for evidence to be adduced by the
parties as to whether respondent No.1 has sold the suit
schedule property to respondent Nos.2 and 3 or not. The fact,
however, remains that the survey number remains common
both in the plaint schedule and also in the schedule shown in
the sale deed.
For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court is of the
opinion that the lower Court has committed a serious
jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the
petitioners for impleadment of respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the
suit.
Accordingly, the Order under revision is set aside.
IA.No.100 of 2013 in OS.No.308 of 2006, on the file of the
Court of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy
District, is allowed. The lower Court is directed to reopen the
entire case, allow all the parties to amend their pleadings and
adduce additional evidence, if necessary, and dispose of the suit
thereafter.
As a sequel, CRPMP.Nos.3653 of 2014 in/&
CRPMP.No.6020 of 2013 are disposed of.
_____________________
(C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J)
Dt: 4th September, 2014
