Railway tribunal not granted interest from the date of petition on the awarded compensation - Claimant is entitled for interest on the award from the date of presentation of petition= ARUNA SINHA AND 2 OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA, REP.BY GM, SC RLY, SECUNDERABAD. - http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.=CMA&mno=686&year=2013

Railway tribunal not granted interest from the date of petition on the awarded compensation - Claimant is entitled for interest on the award from the date of presentation of petition=

In the unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3658 of 2009(arising out of SLP(Civil) No.26654 of 2008 dt.14.05.2009), 

wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the amount awarded as compensation by the Railway Claims Tribunal under the Act shall carry interest from the date of presentation of the claim petition at 6% per annum and from the date of award, till the date of realisation at 9% per annum.

CMA 686 / 2013

CMASR 26206 / 2008

PETITIONER RESPONDENT ARUNA SINHA AND 2 OTHERS   VS UNION OF INDIA, REP.BY GM, SC RLY, SECUNDERABAD. PET.ADV. : KRISHNA PRASAD RESP.ADV. : CHOWDARY SUBJECT: RAILWAY CLAIMS TRIBUNAL DISTRICT:  HYDERABAD

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.686 of 2013

Date: 02.09.2013

Between:

Aruna Sinha

and two others.                                                       … Appellants

AND

Union of India

Rep. by the General Manager,

South Central Railway, Secunderabad.                … Respondent

Counsel for Appellants           : Sri T. L. Krishna Prasad

Counsel for Respondent                   : Sri  B.H.R. Chowdary

The Court made the following:
JUDGMENT:

          This appeal is filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987(for short “the Act”). The only ground on which this appeal is filed is that the Tribunal whose order is impugned herein has not granted interest to the appellants from the date of filing of the claim petition before it and has only granted interest if the respondent did not deposit the compensation awarded within 60 days in the State Bank of Hyderabad, South Lallaguda Branch, Secunderabad.

2.       Heard the learned counsel for appellants and the learned counsel for respondent.

3.       The learned counsel for appellant has placed before me the judgment dt.15.10.2009 in C.M.A.No.1030 of 2009 wherein this Court followed the unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3658 of 2009(arising out of SLP(Civil) No.26654 of 2008 dt.14.05.2009), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the amount awarded as compensation by the Railway Claims Tribunal under the Act shall carry interest from the date of presentation of the claim petition at 6% per annum and from the date of award, till the date of realisation at 9% per annum.

4.       The learned counsel for respondent also admitted that this is the legal position flowing from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to Supra.

5.       Following the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court’s decision dt.15.10.2009 in C.M.A.No.1030 of 2009, this appeal is allowed directing that the amount awarded as compensation by the Tribunal in favour of appellants shall carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of registration of the claim petition till the date of award and thereafter @ 9% per annum till the date of realisation.

6.       Accordingly, this appeal is allowed with the above direction. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this appeal shall stand closed. No costs.

___________________________

M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO, J

Date: 02.09.2013

scs

Sec.302 I.P.C. = The evidence of PWs. is quite contrary to the medical evidence. = THE STATE OF A.P. VS KARUBA HANUMANTHAPPA & 4 OTHERS= Reported in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.=CRLA&mno=624&year=2013

Sec.302 I.P.C. =

  When oral evidence is quiet contrary to the  Medical evidence , the very presence of eye witnesses becomes doubtful and in such an event no reliance can be placed on their evidence for convicting the Accused - Hence the lower court rightly acquitted the accused =

JAIKARAN AND OTHERS V. STATE OF U.P.[2], wherein it is held in paragraph No.12:

“Great emphasis was led on the approximate time of injury. That in no way affects the credibility of PW2’s evidence. Though the evidence of PW1 does not specifically indicate the injury on PW2, that is but natural. Before a young person two murders were committed and it is quite natural to create a sense of shock and minor variations in his evidence do not affect his testimony which is otherwise credible. Unless the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence. (See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujrat reported in (1983) 2 SCC 174). To similar effect is the decision in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal reported in (1988) 4 SCC 302.”

So in view of the above decision no reliance can be placed on the evidence of PWs.1 to 3.

The specific case of PWs.1 to 3 is that A1 beat the deceased with a stone on the chest and A2 fisted her. 

The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is quite contradictory to the evidence of the Doctor because he did not find any external or internal injuries on the chest of the deceased. 

He found an injury on the right eye and 

another injury on the chin. 

But he found that base of the skull has been fractured. 

The Doctor has categorically stated that the fracture injury on the skull is an independent injury and it cannot be caused with any corresponding external injuries No.1 and 2. 

He has also stated that if a person falls on the ground facing upwards, fracture of the skull cannot be caused. 

The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is that after A1 causing injury to the deceased, she fell down facing upwards on the ground. 

So, it means she would have sustained injury on the backside or on the occipital region of the head. 

No such injury was found on the occipital region. 

Therefore, PWs.1 to 3 must not have witnessed actual assault on the deceased and they are not the witnesses of truth. 

The evidence of PW6 would also go to show that A1 beat the deceased on the chest with a stone, and as a result she fell down and became unconscious. 

Herself and neighbouring couple took the deceased in an auto to the hospital. Similarly, PW7 deposed in the same lines. Further when PW7 and her husband took the deceased to the Government Hospital in auto-rickshaw, the Doctor declared the deceased as brought dead. 

Then the Doctor asked PW7 and others to go to the house of the deceased and inform to her relatives. 

Therefore, this evidence rules out the presence of PWs.1 to 3 at the time of the incident. 

The evidence of PWs.6 and 7 has been disbelieved by trial Court as their evidence is quite contrary to the medical evidence.

CRLA 624 / 2013

CRLASR 4700 / 2008

PETITIONER RESPONDENT THE STATE OF A.P.   VS KARUBA HANUMANTHAPPA & 4 OTHERS PET.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESP.ADV. :  SUBJECT: U/s.302 I.P.C Acquittal DISTRICT:  ANANTAPUR

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

AND

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.624 OF 2013

JUDGMENT:- (per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.C. Bhanu)

                                    

This Criminal Appeal, under section 378 (3) & (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), is directed by the State against the judgment, dated
15-09-2005, in Sessions Case No.187 of 2002 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur, whereunder and whereby, the accused were acquitted of the charges leveled against them.

2.      The brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the present appeal may be stated as follows:

A1 to A5 are closely related to each other; that there was a dispute existing between the material prosecution witnesses and the deceased Kuruba Sanjeevamma with regard to the passage, and for that reason, they used to quarrel with each other; that the accused were allowing the other persons to pass through the passage excepting the family members of the deceased, and for that reason, a quarrel ensured between the deceased and the accused on 26-06-2001 at 8.00 a.m.  That A1 to A5 formed into an unlawful assembly armed with sticks and stones and attacked the deceased and her family members and beat them with sticks and stones and caused the injuries; that as a result, the deceased fell down and became un-conscious, and when the other prosecution witnesses tried to interfere, some of the accused beat them. Immediately the deceased was shifted to Government Hospital, Hindupur where the Medical Officer after examining the deceased, declared as brought dead; that PW1 lodged a report with the police and police registered a case in Crime No.82 of 2001 and investigated into. The Investigating Officer visited the scene of occurrence and observed the scene in the presence of mediators and also prepared a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence. He held inquest on the dead body of the deceased in the presence of mediators and seized the material objects from the dead body of the deceased and sent to Forensic Science Laboratory. Thereafter the dead body was subjected to post mortem examination. The Doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased opined that the deceased died as a result of head injury. Thereafter the accused was arrested and sent to remand.

3.      The charges leveled against the accused are under Section 148 IPC against A1 to A5; Section 302 IPC against A1 and A2; Section 302 r/w.149 IPC against A3 to A5; Section 324 IPC against A1, A2 and A5 and Section 324 r/w.149 IPC against A3 and A4. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4.      To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 10 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-14 besides case properties M.Os.1 to 5.

5.      After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses.  They denied the same and reported no evidence either oral or documentary.

6.      The trial Court after considering the evidence on record acquitted the accused for the charges leveled against them. Challenging the same, the present appeal is preferred by the State.

7.      The points for determination are:

Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt with regard to the charges leveled against the accused and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct, legal and proper or not?

8.      POINTS:-   There cannot be any dispute that in dealing with the Criminal Appeal against the order of acquittal, though Appellate Court has got full power to reappreciate the evidence available on record, still it will be slow in interfering with the findings in view of the fact that there is a presumption under law that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless contrary is proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt and that presumption of innocence is further strengthened by an order of acquittal.  Unless there are compelling or substantial reasons viz., the findings are perverse, or not based upon any evidence, or admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration, or inadmissible evidence was taken into consideration, ordinarily this Court would not interfere with the same. In short, there must be compelling or substantial reasons while interfering with the order of acquittal.  In view of the decision reported inSIDHARTHA VASHISHT @ MANU SHARMA VS. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)[1], the following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal:

(i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found.

(ii) The Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions.

(iii) The Appellate Court can also review the Trial Court’s conclusion with respect to both facts and law.

(iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal.

(v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.

(vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether finding of the Trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly, erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the Appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the Appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion.

(vii) When the Trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of Ballistic Experts etc., the Appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the Trial Court depending on the materials placed.

Keeping the above principles in mind, it is to be seen whether there are any compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court. 

9.      PW9 the inquest mediator, who was present at the time of inquest on the dead body of the deceased on 26-06-2001. The inquest mediators opined that the deceased died as a result of injuries sustained by her. Ex.P7 is the inquest panchanama. PW5 is the Doctor. He conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and found following injuries:

1.     A contusion over the right eye and below the eye 3” x 2” black colour haemorrage in eye ball and

2.    Lacerated injury over the chin 2” x 1” clotted blood present, no external fracture of the skull, base of skull bone fractured, haematoma base of brain and fracture of right side of mandible and maxilla.

Ex.P2 is the post mortem examination report. He opined that the deceased died as a result of head injury. Therefore, from the evidence of PWs.5 and 9 and the recitals in Exs.P2 and P7, homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is established.

10.    PWs.1 to 3 and PWs.6 and 7 were examined to speak about the specific overt acts of the accused in causing injuries to the deceased. According to PW1, a quarrel ensured between A2 and his mother (deceased) on 25-06-2001 at 7.00 a.m. near water tap in respect of use of passage and that the elders have pacified the same; that on the next day at about 8.00 a.m. all the accused came to the house of the deceased and A2 beat the deceased with a stone underneath her right eye and A1 fisted the deceased on the chest, and as the deceased sustained head injury she fell down. A5 beat him with a stick on his left wrist and A5 also beat the deceased on her right hand; that thereafter they immediately shifted the deceased in an auto to the Government Hospital, Hindupur and the Doctor declared her as brought dead.

11.    PWs.2 to 4 who are closely related to the deceased, have testified almost similar to the statement given by PW1. Since they are closely related to the deceased, their evidence has to be evaluated so as to determine whether they were really present at the time of occurrence or not, or whether there is any ring of truth in their evidence so as to accept the same to infer that the accused are the assailants of the deceased. The incident had taken place in the early morning. So it is quite possible for them to be present at the house. But mere presence at the house would not be sufficient to draw inference that they had witnessed the incident. If their evidence is found to be acceptable and their evidence is in corroboration with the medical evidence, then their evidence can be accepted.

12.    In so far as causing injuries to the deceased is concerned, PW1 stated that A2 beat his mother on the right hand, A1 fisted her on the chest and as a result she fell down, and while falling down she sustained head injury on the backside. 

Similarly, PW2 stated that A1 beat her mother with a stone, A2 caught hold of her and A1 pushed her. 

Whereas PW3 stated that A1 beat her mother with a stone on the chest and A2 also beat on the same spot with a stone. 

PW4 is not an eye-witness to the incident. When he returned from the mills several persons gathered there then he came to know about the incident. Though it is alleged that all the accused were armed with sticks, none of them used the sticks in causing injuries to the deceased.

13.    The specific case of PWs.1 to 3 is that A1 beat the deceased with a stone on the chest and A2 fisted her. 

The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is quite contradictory to the evidence of the Doctor because he did not find any external or internal injuries on the chest of the deceased. 

He found an injury on the right eye and 

another injury on the chin. 

But he found that base of the skull has been fractured. 

The Doctor has categorically stated that the fracture injury on the skull is an independent injury and it cannot be caused with any corresponding external injuries No.1 and 2. 

He has also stated that if a person falls on the ground facing upwards, fracture of the skull cannot be caused. 

The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is that after A1 causing injury to the deceased, she fell down facing upwards on the ground. 

So, it means she would have sustained injury on the backside or on the occipital region of the head. 

No such injury was found on the occipital region. 

Therefore, PWs.1 to 3 must not have witnessed actual assault on the deceased and they are not the witnesses of truth. 

In view of the fact that the medical evidence completely rules out the possibility of taking place of the incident in the manner as testified by the prosecution witnesses, it is not desirable to place any reliance on the evidence of these witnesses in view of a decision reported in JAIKARAN AND OTHERS V. STATE OF U.P.[2], wherein it is held in paragraph No.12:

“Great emphasis was led on the approximate time of injury. That in no way affects the credibility of PW2’s evidence. Though the evidence of PW1 does not specifically indicate the injury on PW2, that is but natural. Before a young person two murders were committed and it is quite natural to create a sense of shock and minor variations in his evidence do not affect his testimony which is otherwise credible. Unless the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence. (See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujrat reported in (1983) 2 SCC 174). To similar effect is the decision in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal reported in (1988) 4 SCC 302.”

So in view of the above decision no reliance can be placed on the evidence of PWs.1 to 3.

14.    The other evidence remains on record is the evidence of PW6 and 7. The evidence of PW6 would also go to show that A1 beat the deceased on the chest with a stone, and as a result she fell down and became unconscious. 

Herself and neighbouring couple took the deceased in an auto to the hospital. Similarly, PW7 deposed in the same lines. Further when PW7 and her husband took the deceased to the Government Hospital in auto-rickshaw, the Doctor declared the deceased as brought dead. 

Then the Doctor asked PW7 and others to go to the house of the deceased and inform to her relatives. 

Therefore, this evidence rules out the presence of PWs.1 to 3 at the time of the incident. 

The evidence of PWs.6 and 7 has been disbelieved by trial Court as their evidence is quite contrary to the medical evidence.

15.    Therefore, after elaborate consideration of the evidence on record the trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused and that the order of acquittal needs no interference as there are no compelling or substantial reasons and the appeal is devoid of merits.

16.    Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment, dated 15-09-2005, in Sessions Case No.187 of 2002 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur.

17.    Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.

                     ______________________

JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

____________­­­_______________________

JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM

June 25, 2013

PN

 

 

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

AND

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM

CRIMINAL APPEAL (SR) No.624 OF 2013

June 25, 2013

PN

---

[1] 2010 (6) SCC 1

[2] (2003) 12 SCC 655

in partition suit mere long possession and enjoyment of one of the coparcener does not vest him with any special rights from partition = GUDIVADA NARAYANAMURTHY VS GUDIVADA PARVATHAMMA & 13 ORS= Reported in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.=SA&mno=855&year=2013

in partition suit mere long possession and enjoyment of one of the coparcener does not vest him with any special rights from partition =

Though he is said to be the illegitimate child of late Yerranna, he is entitled to a share.  It is not his case that either any prior partition in the family has taken place, or an item claimed by him is his
self-acquisition.  The mere fact that he is in long possession of the property, by itself does not take away the property from the purview of partition. 

SA 855 / 2013

SASR 9690 / 2007

PETITIONER RESPONDENT GUDIVADA NARAYANAMURTHY   VS GUDIVADA PARVATHAMMA & 13 ORS PET.ADV. : SUBRAHMANYAM RESP.ADV. :  SUBJECT: CONCURRENT DISTRICT:  VISAKHAPATNAM

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY

SECOND APPEAL No.855 of 2013

JUDGMENT:

         

Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed O.S.No.63 of 1994 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Narsipatnam, against the appellant (defendant No.1) and respondents 3 to 14, for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree through judgment, dated 23.11.2001.  Aggrieved by that, the 1^st defendant filed A.S.No.19 of 2002 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Narsipatnam.  The appeal was dismissed on 23.06.2006.  Hence, this second appeal.

For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed in the suit.

 It was pleaded that the suit schedule properties were held in common by three brothers, viz., Gudivada Peda Tammunaidu, China Thammunaidu and Yerranna.  The plaintiffs are the legal representatives of China Thammunaidu.   The 3^rd defendant is the wife, defendant No.4 and one Chinathalli are the daughters, whereas defendants 1 and 2 are illegitimate son and daughter, respectively, of Yerranna.  It was further pleaded that the property was not partitioned.  The suit was mainly opposed by the 1^st defendant. 

Heard learned counsel for the appellant (1^st defendant).  None appears for the plaintiffs.

The relationship between the parties is indicated in the preceding paragraphs.  The plaintiffs i.e. legal heirs of one of the branches, filed the suit for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties. 

On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration:

i)                    “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek for partition of the plaint schedule property?

ii)                  Whether item No.2 of the plaint schedule is absolutely belonged to the defendant No.1?

iii)                 To what relief?”

On behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.3 were filed.  On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.37 were filed. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree through judgment dated 23.11.2001 in respect of items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties.

In A.S.No.19 of 2002, filed by the 1^st defendant, the lower Appellate Court framed the following point for its consideration and dismissed the appeal:

i)                    “Whether the finding of the trial Court that Lot No.II house property of the plaint schedule property liable for partition is liable to be set aside?”

  

There existed three main branches in the family.  It is stated that the eldest of the brothers - Gudivada Peda Tammunaidu, died intestate leaving behind him his wife and son.  The plaintiffs are the children of the 2^nd brother, whereas defendants 1 to 4 are said to be the legal representatives of the third brother.

The contest to the preliminary decree was only by the
1^st defendant.  Though he is said to be the illegitimate child of late Yerranna, he is entitled to a share.  It is not his case that either any prior partition in the family has taken place, or an item claimed by him is his
self-acquisition.  The mere fact that he is in long possession of the property, by itself does not take away the property from the purview of partition. The trial Court and the lower Appellate Court have considered the matter from the correct perspective.  No question of law, much less any substantial question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal.

Hence, the second appeal is dismissed.   There shall be no order as to costs.

The miscellaneous petition filed in this second appeal shall stand disposed of.

____________________

L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J.   

Dated:23.08.2013

GJ/KH

Sec.306 of I.P.C. - Mere scolding - Teacher scolded the student that " Not to commit theft - go and die " - never amounts to abatement which comes under sec. 306 of IPC if the student died due to that as there is no mensrea as by mistake he thought that the student committed theft = Vijayalakshmi .. Petitioner Vs 1.The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Swamimalai Police Station, Swamimalai, Thanjavur District. 2.K.Anandavalli .. Respondent= Reported in http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/filename=62191

Sec.306 of I.P.C. - Mere scolding - Teacher scolded the student that " Not to commit theft - go and die " - never amounts to abatement which comes under sec. 306 of IPC  if the student died due to that as there is no mensrea as by mistake he thought that the student committed theft = 

Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, praying to call for the records relating to the charge sheet

in P.R.C.No.13 of 2012 in Crime No.44 of 2011 on the file of the Judicial

Magistrate, Kumbakonam and quash the same.=

 when the petitioner  as a teacher asked her student Suriya

to keep her handbag at a place, a five hundred rupees note fell out from the bag

and when she was keeping it inside the bag, the petitioner having seen that

mistook it that the deceased was committing theft and the petitioner reprimanded

the deceased and stated that 'instead of committing theft, she should go and

die'.  As the deceased was scolded in the presence of the students and other

teachers by the petitioner, she felt ashamed and she went to her house, poured

kerosene on her body and set fire.  She was admitted in the hospital on

12.02.2011 and died on the next day.  The deceased was aged only 14 years at

that time.

N.Anjali Devi and another Vs. State by the Superintendent of Police, Villupuram

and another) in paragraph No.15, it is observed as follows;

"One important thing to be noted in this case is that the petitioners

being the Teachers of the Government School in the interest of the Institution

correct any mistake done by the student in order to cultivate good habits and

get rid of bad habits, such as stealing money. In fact, the father of the

deceased girl had been summoned and it is stated that he gave a letter of

apology for the conduct of his daughter and also undertook that the same would

not recur again.  In such view of the matter, the act of the petitioners cannot

be said that it would amount to abetment of suicide."

15. By applying the well settled principles pronounced by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and by our High Court, and taking into consideration of the

materials on record, this Court is of the view that the petitioner cannot be

held directly liable for the suicide committed by the deceased, as there was no

mens rea on the part of the petitioner. Hence, the proceedings in P.R.C.No.13 of

2012 against the petitioner is quashed.   Consequently, connected miscellaneous

petitions are closed.

.In the result, this appeal succeeds.  The charge-sheet dated 2.7.2001

framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in Sessions Trial No.469 of

1998 for an offence under section 306 IPC and the order of the High Court under

challenge are hereby quashed."

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 03/01/2013

CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE T.SUDANTHIRAM

CRL.O.P.(MD)No.3775 of 2012
and
M.P.(MD).Nos.1 & 2 of 2012


.Vijayalakshmi .. Petitioner

Vs

1.The State rep. by the
  Inspector of Police,
  Swamimalai Police Station,
  Swamimalai, Thanjavur District.

2.K.Anandavalli .. Respondent



Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, praying to call for the records relating to the charge sheet
in P.R.C.No.13 of 2012 in Crime No.44 of 2011 on the file of the Judicial
Magistrate, Kumbakonam and quash the same.

!For Petitioner  ... Mr.C.Selvaraj,
    Senior counsel for
    M/s.C.S. Associates

^For 1st respondent...Mrs.S.Prabha,
    Government Advocate

For 2nd respondent...Mr.G.Thalaimutharasu
- - - - -


:ORDER

The petitioner herein is an accused in P.R.C.No.13 of 2012 on the file of
the learned Judicial Magistrate,  Kumbakonam.  The first respondent Police filed
a final report against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Section 305
IPC.  The petitioner filed this petition seeking to quash the proceedings
against her.

2. The case of the prosecution is that the petitioner was working as a
Headmistress in Panchayat Union Middle School, Neerathanallur, Kumbakonam
Panchayat Union, Thanjavur District.  The daughter of the defacto complainant in
this case by name Suriya (deceased) was studying in the said school.  According
to the prosecution, when the petitioner  as a teacher asked her student Suriya
to keep her handbag at a place, a five hundred rupees note fell out from the bag
and when she was keeping it inside the bag, the petitioner having seen that
mistook it that the deceased was committing theft and the petitioner reprimanded
the deceased and stated that 'instead of committing theft, she should go and
die'.  As the deceased was scolded in the presence of the students and other
teachers by the petitioner, she felt ashamed and she went to her house, poured
kerosene on her body and set fire.  She was admitted in the hospital on
12.02.2011 and died on the next day.  The deceased was aged only 14 years at
that time.

3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner had only advised the deceased for stealthily removing the amount from
the petitioner's  handbag and she had no bad intention and as a teacher, with
the bona fide expectation, she had only advised the student.  Learned senior
counsel further submitted that even as per the allegation made by the
prosecution, the ingredients of the offence under Section 305 IPC are not made
out and the petitioner is not responsible for the act of suicide committed by
the student. Learned senior counsel further submitted that as a gesture, the
petitioner had already paid a sum of Rs.2,10,000/- to the mother of the deceased
and now a further sum of Rs.1,10,000/- is also paid to the mother of the
deceased, who is present before this Court today.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant, who is mother of
the deceased, has admitted the fact of receiving a total sum of Rs.3,20,000/-
from the petitioner.

5. Learned Government Advocate submitted that the case has not been
committed in the Sessions so far and also submitted that the petitioner had
called the deceased as a thief, and she was put to shame and disgrace in the
presence of other students and teachers.  Being ashamed, she had committed
suicide and as such the petitioner is responsible for the death of the deceased.

6. This Court considered the submissions and perused the records.

7. It appears from the statements of some of the students and teachers
that the petitioner was scolding the deceased Suriya for having committed theft
of cash and the deceased had denied about committing theft and she was crying.
After this incident, the deceased went to her home and she poured kerosene on
her body and set fire.  The mother of the deceased also gave a statement to the
effect that the deceased had informed her that she was put to shame, since her
teacher (the petitioner herein) had focused her as a thief.

8. It is a very unfortunate incident. It is not possible to decide now
whether the deceased committed theft of amount from the handbag of the
petitioner or the petitioner mistook that the deceased committed theft.  The
fact remains that the petitioner has suspected that the deceased attempted to
commit theft of cash from her handbag and consequently, the petitioner had
scolded the deceased in the presence of other students and teachers. The
question now to be decided is whether the act of the petitioner herein would
attract the ingredients of the offence under Section 305 IPC, which is as
follows;
305.Abetment of suicide of child or insane person.- If any person under
eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious person, any idiot, or
any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide, whoever abets the
commission of such suicide, shall be punishment with death or imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine."

9. Section 107 IPC defines 'Abetment' which reads as follows;
"107.ABETMENT OF A THING:- a person abets the doing of a thing, who-
First-Instigates any person to do that thing; or,
Secondly-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any capacity
for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of
that thing."

10. For the first category, there should be direct act of instigation by
the accused.  The second category need not be discussed for the purpose of this
case. For the third category, the accused should have intentionally aided the
deceased.  In this case, as per the available facts, there is nothing to show
that there was any intentional act by the petitioner for the deceased to commit
suicide or intentionally aided or there was any illegal omission on the part of
the petitioner for the deceased to commit suicide.

11.The words attributed by the petitioner are only to the extent that
'instead of committing theft, the deceased should go and die'.  By attributing
those words, it cannot be said that the petitioner being a teacher intentionally
wanted her student to commit suicide.  Of-course, she should have been more
careful in using words.
12. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2002 SCC
(Crl.) 1141 (Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P.) in paragraph Nos.12
to 15, it is observed as follows;
"12.Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have
erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is
the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25.7.1998 wherein it is
alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told the
deceased, "to go and die".  For this, courts relied on a statement of Shashi
Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under section 161 Cr.P.C., when
reportedly, the deceased after coming back from the house of the appellant, told
him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words.  The
statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., is annexed  as
Annexure P-3 to this appeal and going through the statement, we find that he has
not stated that the deceased had told that the appellant had asked him "to go
and die".  Even if we accept the prosecution story that the appellant did tell
the deceased "to go and die", that itself does not constitute the ingredient of
"instigation". The word "instigate" denotes incitement or urging to do some
drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite.  Presence of mens rea
therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge
that the words uttered in a quarrel or on the spur of the moment cannot be taken
to be uttered with mens rea.  It is in a fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the
alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25.7.1998
ensued by a quarrel.  The deceased was found hanging on 27.7.1998.  Assuming
that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time
in between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the
abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25.7.1998 drove the
deceased to commit suicide.  Suicide by the deceased on 27.7.1998 is not
proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on 25.7.1998. The
fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27.7.1998 would itself clearly point
out that it is not the direct result of the quarrel taken place on 25.7.1998
when it is alleged that the appellant had used the abusive language and also
told the deceased to go and die.  This fact had escaped notice of the courts
below.
13.The next most important material is the suicide note left by the
deceased.  The translated copy is annexed to this appeal as Annexure P-1.  It is
extracted:
SUICIDE NOTE
Dainik Bhaskar
581, South civil Lines,
Jabalpur.
Agent's name-Sengar News Agency
Place-Goshalpur
Number of copies-409
Date
Name of the person who prepared lable
    Goshalpur Sengar has threatened to report under dowry demand and threatened
to involve family members due to this I am writing in my full senses that Sanjay
Sengar is responsible for my death. Sanjay Sengar also Mukraj commandaer loota
tha Sanjay ki.
Sengar News Agency
Goshalpur
I was threatened therefore I am Dying
Sengar, Goshalpur
My name Chander Bhushan Singh GoutamChander Bhushan Singh Goutam Babloo Goutam
In my senses,
Sengar responsible for my death.
My Moti,
Darling my Moti.  You look after my Chukho.  My darling Moti Neelam Sengar @
Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam, Gandigram Budhagar.
Sengar is responsible for my death
Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death
Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death
Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam, Gandhigram Budhagar."
14.A plain reading of the suicide note would clearly show that the
deceased was in great stress and depressed.  One plausible reason could be that
the deceased was without any work or avocation and at the same time indulged in
drinking as revealed from the statement of the wife Smt.Neelam Sengar. He was a
frustrated man.  Reading of the suicide note will clearly suggest that such a
note is not the handiwork of a man with a sound mind and sense.  Smt.Neelam
Sengar, wife of the deceased, made a statement under section 161 CrPC before the
Investigating Officer.  She stated that the deceased always indulged in drinking
wine and was not doing any work.  She also stated that on 26.7.1998 her husband
came to them in an inebriated condition and was abusing her and other members of
the family.  The prosecution story, if believed, shows that the quarrel between
the deceased and the appellant had taken place on 25.7.1998 and if the deceased
came back to the house again on 26.7.1998, it cannot be said that the suicide by
the deceased was the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on
25.7.1998. Viewed from the aforesaid circumstances independently, we are clearly
of the view that the ingredients of "abetment" are totally absent in the instant
case for an offence under section 306 IPC.  It is in the statement of the wife
that the deceased always remained in a drunken condition.  It is common
knowledge that excessive drinking leads one to debauchery.  It clearly appeared,
therefore, that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct unconnected with
the quarrel that had ensued on 25.7.1998 where the appellant is stated to have
used abusive language. Taking the totality  of materials on record and facts and
circumstances of the case into consideration, it will lead to the irresistible
conclusion that it is the deceased and he alone, and none else, is responsible
for his death.
15.In the result, this appeal succeeds.  The charge-sheet dated 2.7.2001
framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in Sessions Trial No.469 of
1998 for an offence under section 306 IPC and the order of the High Court under
challenge are hereby quashed."

   13.In the decision of this Court reported in 2007-1-L.W.(Crl.) 163  [Ananda
Sekaran Vs. State by the Inspector of Police, K1 Sembiam Police Station,
Chennai), it is observed in paragraphs 19 and 21 as follows:
"19.In the second case, referring the above decision, when the case was
dealt with under section 306 read with 107 IPC, the Apex Court held that the
words uttered in a quarrel or on the spur of the moment such as 'to go and die'
cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea and therefore, the person so said
cannot be convicted under section 306 IPC.  If the accused had the motive or
intention that his wife should die committing suicide on her own, then there
must be some instance bringing to surface the mens rea, which is essential as
held by the Apex Court.  No instance brought to the notice of the Court how the
accused entertained mens rea or how and why he should think that his wife should
commit suicide for which he should have abetted ........
21.In State of Gujarat Vs. Sunilkumar Kanaiyalal Jain (1997 Crl.L.J.2014)
a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court considering the scope of Section 306
IPC elaborately dealt with abetment, realising the responsibility of the Court
also has observed, "better die today than tomorrow", if had been uttered cannot
be said to be the abetment in the eye of law since the words might have been
uttered due to outburst of one's own fatuity or anger or consternation without
any intention or knowledge or might be the rude or insulting, not with desire to
instigate the person to commit suicide, which principle also could be extended
to the above case on hand....."

14. In another decision of this Court reported in (2010) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 34,
(N.Anjali Devi and another Vs. State by the Superintendent of Police, Villupuram
and another) in paragraph No.15, it is observed as follows;
"One important thing to be noted in this case is that the petitioners
being the Teachers of the Government School in the interest of the Institution
correct any mistake done by the student in order to cultivate good habits and
get rid of bad habits, such as stealing money. In fact, the father of the
deceased girl had been summoned and it is stated that he gave a letter of
apology for the conduct of his daughter and also undertook that the same would
not recur again.  In such view of the matter, the act of the petitioners cannot
be said that it would amount to abetment of suicide."

15. By applying the well settled principles pronounced by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and by our High Court, and taking into consideration of the
materials on record, this Court is of the view that the petitioner cannot be
held directly liable for the suicide committed by the deceased, as there was no
mens rea on the part of the petitioner. Hence, the proceedings in P.R.C.No.13 of
2012 against the petitioner is quashed.   Consequently, connected miscellaneous
petitions are closed.

gcg

To

1.The Judicial Magistrate,
  Kumbakonam.

2.The Inspector of Police,
  Swamimalai Police Station,
  Swamimalai, Thanjavur District.