respondent belongs to Balija caste which is not either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.-A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Article 15(4) status of Scheduled Caste etc.=words used are "in any place but within public view", which means that the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted if the person is not present.=the voluminous material available before this Court and facts and circumstances of the case and various litigations instituted by the fourth respondent and her husband, who is a retired employee of the Central Excise Department, against the petitioners herein drive this Court to an irresistible conclusion that the prosecution launched against the petitioners is undoubtedly and certainly a patent abuse of process of law, which can neither be permitted to be initiated nor be permitted to be continued, lest the citizens loose faith and confidence in the system of rule of law.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI      

 WRIT PETITION No. 16777 OF 2009  

24-03-2015

K. Venugopal Reddy and ors.Petitioners


The Deputy Superintendent of Police,   Ananthapur Division, Ananthapur and
ors. Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri A. Hanumantha Reddy

Counsel for Respondents 1to3:Government Pleader for  Home
Counsel for Respondent No.4: Sri R.Ramanjaneyulu.


<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1.      AIR 1992 SC 604
2.      2009 Crl.L.J. 350
3.      (2011)11 SCC 259
4.      2009(1) ALD (Crl) 22(AP)
5.      AIR 1996 SC 1011
6.      2005(1) ALT (Crl) 213 (AP)
7.      (2013) 3 SCC 330
8.      2004 SCC(Crl) 2104
9.      2006(3)ALT(Crl) 216 (AP)


HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI        

WRIT PETITION No. 16777 of 2009  

DATED 24TH MARCH, 2015.    


ORDER:

1.      In the present Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioners herein are praying this Court
to declare the registration of FIR No. 184 of 2009 on the file of  the
II Town Police Station, Ananthapur for the offences alleged under
Sections 323, 354, 506 of Indian Penal code read with Sections
3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ( for brevity the Act) as illegal
and arbitrary and for consequential quashment of the same.

2.      Heard Sri A.Hanumantha Reddy, learned Counsel for the
petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Home, appearing for
Respondents 1 to 3 and  Sri R.Ramanjaneyulu, learned Counsel
appearing for the fourth respondent.  Perused the material
available before this Court.

3.      The facts and circumstances, in nutshell, leading to the
filing of this Writ Petition are as infra >  The fourth respondent
herein lodged a complaint on 5.6.2009 with the II Town Police
Station alleging that  her husband lodged a complaint on
12.03.2009 and the police registered the same as Crime No.
56/2009 on the file of the II Town Police Station, Ananthapur for
the alleged offences punishable under Sections 344, 383 and 506
IPC against petitioners  3 and 4 and  after obtaining anticipatory
bail, the petitioners herein went to the house of fourth respondent
herein and threatened her with dire consequences for lodging
complaint  and  abused her and her husband in the name of caste
and beaten them to withdraw the complaint.  The II Town Police,
Ananthapur  registered the same as Crime No. 184/2009 for the
alleged offences under Sections 354, 506 IPC and  Section 3(i)(x)
of the Act. Seeking to quash the said FIR No. 184/2009, the
present Writ Petition came to be filed before this Court.

4.      This Court on 13.08.2009 passed an order, directing the
official respondents not to arrest the petitioners in connection with
Crime No. 184 of 2009.

5.      In response to the notice, respondents 1 to 4 filed counter
affidavits, denying the averments and allegations made in the
affidavit filed in support of the Writ petition and, in the direction of
justifying prosecution launched against the petitioners.

6.      The submissions/contentions of the learned Counsel for the
petitioners are:

(1)      that the very complaint lodged by the fourth respondent
which culminated in registration of FIR  No. 184/2009 is
a  patent abuse of process of Court;
(2)     that  the fourth respondent made a complaint for
extraneous considerations and only for the purpose of
dragging the petitioners towards the negotiating table to
extract money;
(3)     that the husband of the fourth respondent is an educated
person and executed an agreement of sale on
05.03.2009 for sale of the land to an extent of
Ac.0.92.236 cents in Sy.No.135/20 of Kukkalapalli
village of Rudraram Gram Panchayat, Ananthapur
District followed by registration of the sale deed vide
document bearing No.1244/2009, dated 0.3.2009 on the
file of the Sub Registrar, Ananthapur and having sold the
property, he  lodged a complaint on 12.3.2009, which
ended in acquittal  in C.C.No.286 of 2010 by the Court of
the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Ananthapur;
(4)     that the fourth respondent belongs to Balija community,
which is  a Forward Caste, as such,  she cannot
maintain a complaint under the provisions of the Act and
simply because her husband belongs to Scheduled
Caste, she (fourth respondent) would not automatically
become a member of SC community;  
(5)     that the fourth respondent, acting as next friend and
guardian for her minor children, instituted O.S.No.17 of
2009  on 23.3.2009 before the Court of learned
Additional District Judge-cum-Family Court, Ananthapur
for partition of the suit schedule properties including the
subject property stating that without their consent  her
husband sold away the subject property for his personal
and the said suit ended in dismissal. The suit in
O.S.No.58 of 2009 got filed by the husband of the fourth
respondent against himself and fourth respondent herein
also ended in dismissal on 17.07.2014;
(6)     that  earlier on 12.03.2009, the husband of the  fourth
respondent  lodged a complaint  and the same was
registered as crime No. 56/2009 against the petitioners
3 and 4  and the prosecution launched in C.C.No.286 of
2010 based on the complaint for the alleged offences
under Sections 344, 383, 506 and 420 IPC ended in
acquittal by the Court of the learned Judicial First class
Magistrate, Ananthapur; and
(7)      that the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the
Act are absent in the crime registered against the
petitioners.


7.      To substantiate his submissions and contentions, the
learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the
decisions in  the State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal {AIR 1992
SC 604), Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. { 2009 Crl.L.J.
350}, Asmathunnisa Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh {(2011)11
SCC 259}, M. Ramesh Vs. State of AP { 2009(1) ALD (Crl)
22 (AP)},  Mrs. Valsamma Paul Vs. Cochin University {AIR
1996 SC 1011},  Gara Yesobu Vs. State of AP {2005 (1)
ALT (crl) 213 (AP)},  Rajiv Thapar Vs. Madanlal Kapoor
{(2013) 3 SCC 330},  State of Orissa through Kumar
Raghavender Singh Vs,. Ganesh Chander Jew {2004 SCC    
(Crl) 2104} and BVSS Ramana Murthy Vs. State of AP  
{2006(3) ALT (Crl) 216 AP}.


8.      The submissions/contentions of the learned Government
Pleader, appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and learned Counsel,
appearing for Respondent No.4 are:

(1)     that the prosecution launched  in the instant case
is in conformity with the law and there is no
illegality nor any abuse of process of law as
alleged by the petitioners and as such, extra-
ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India cannot be permitted to
be invoked;
(2)     that there are necessary and essential ingredients
of the provisions of law as indicated in the First
Information Report;
(3)     that only in the extra-ordinary circumstances, the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can be invoked to quash the
FIR and the present case is not a case of such
nature; and
(4)     that the allegations made against the petitioners
herein cannot be gone into in the present Writ
Petition and unless a full-fledged trial is conducted
by the criminal courts truth would not come out.


9.      In the  above back ground of the facts and circumstances of
the case and submissions/contentions advanced by the learned
counsel on either side, the only issue that emerges for
consideration of this Court is, whether the petitioners herein are
entitled for any relief  from this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India ?

10.     The legislative intent behind in enacting the criminal laws is
to maintain law and order, peace and tranquility in the society.
Therefore the prosecutions shall be in the direction of achieving
the said goal and in the direction of inspiring confidence and faith
of the people in the system and the process of law should never
be permitted for wreaking vengeance against the persons for
individual benefits in the said disguise. It is a well settled  law that
inherent and extra-ordinary powers of this Court under Section
482 of Cr.P.C., and Article 226 of the Constitution of India  are
required to be pressed into service  very sparingly  and with great
care, caution and circumspection and within the principles and
parameters laid down in the authoritative pronouncements. In the
event of there being any abuse of process of law, there is a sacred
obligation and duty cast on the courts to arrest the same to
strengthen the confidence of the people in the system guided by
rule of law.

11.         The Parliament enacted the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act in the year 1989
and also framed rules under the said legislation. There is
obviously historic background for the said legislation and this is
evidently one of the major steps towards achieving the
constitutional goals as enshrined under Chapter III and IV of our
Magna Carta.  There is sacred and holy object behind the
legislation and one of the objects is elimination of certain social
evils which have become hurdles and menace for the
development and growth of certain vulnerable sections of our
society. Therefore, the prosecutions under this legislation shall be
in furtherance of the same, but not in the direction of frustrating
sacred and laudable object. Various issues raised  in the present
Writ Petition are needed to be viewed  and examined in the light of
the above aspects and the law laid down by the constitutional
Courts in the authoritative pronouncements.


12.         Petitioners 3 and 4  are husband and wife, and, are the
parents of petitioners 1 and 2. Initially on the complaint of the
husband of the fourth respondent, namely, Juturu Ramanjaneyulu,
the police registered a crime in FIR No.56/2009 on 12.03.2009
against the petitioners 3 and 4 herein for the offences alleged
under Sections 344, 383, 506 and 420 IPC.  In the said complaint,
it was alleged that the accused by wrongfully confining the
complainant got registered the sale deed on 09.03.2009 in the
office of the Sub Registrar, Rudrampeta, Ananthapur in respect of
the land admeasuring 0.92.236 cents situated in Sy.No.135/20 of
Kukkalapalli village of Rudraram Gram Panchayat, Ananthapur
District. After investigation, the police filed a charge sheet and it
was numbered as C.C.No.286 of 2010 on the file of the Court of
the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Ananthapur.  The learned Magistrate, by way of Judgment dated
18.02.2013, acquitted the accused/petitioners 3 and 4 herein. It is
evident from a perusal of the said judgment that the learned
Magistrate took into consideration the evidence of P.Ws. 6 and 7,
who were the Senior Assistant in the office of the Sub Registrar
and Scribe of the sale deed respectively, who deposed  that the
husband of the fourth respondent voluntarily executed the sale
deed on 12.03.2009  for valid sale consideration and received the
entire sale consideration. On 5.6.2009 the fourth respondent
herein, who is the wife of the complainant in Cr.No.56 of 2009,
lodged the present complaint, alleging that after obtaining
anticipatory bail in Cr.No.56 of 2009, the accused in the said
crime, who are the petitioners 3 and 4 herein, along with
petitioners 1 and 2, came to their house and threatened the fourth
respondent and her husband, and abused them in the name of
their caste and threatened them with dire consequences. It was
also alleged that the accused demanded them to withdraw the
complaint.  Based on the said complaint, the II Town Police,
Ananthapur registered a case in Crime No.184/2009 for the
offences alleged under Sections 323, 354, 506 IPC and Section
3(1)(x) of the Act. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the
petitioners, the complaint is absolutely silent as to when exactly
the offence took place, i.e. time and date of occurrence of offence.
The complaint is also not clear as to who committed the act of
outraging the modesty of the fourth respondent. Another
significant aspect, which needs mention at this juncture is that the
husband of the fourth respondent  executed the agreement of sale
on 5.3.2009, agreeing to sell the subject property which is the
centre of controversy.  But curiously there is no mention of the
same either in the complaint in Crime No. 56 of 2009 or in Crime
No. 184 of 2009. Yet another vital aspect which requires to be
noticed  is that the fourth respondent-complainant, acting as
guardian and, next friend on behalf of the minor children, instituted
O.S.No.17 of 2009 on  23.03.2009, for partition of the suit
schedule property including the subject  property, on the file of the
learned District Judge, Ananthapur, against her husband,  who
was arrayed as first defendant therein and  sons & daughters, who
were arrayed as Defendants 2 to 6, who were born through the
first wife of the first defendant and 4th petitioner herein as
Defendant No.7.  In the plaint filed in the said suit, she pleaded as
follows:


      ..The  7th defendant who is purchaser of the
part in scheduled property recently on 9.3.2009 and
receiving the same by the 1st defendant for his
personal. More over the 1st defendant have no right to
sale the part of the plaint scheduled property without
consent of the other members. The plaintiffs entitled
1/8th share in the plaint scheduled property


13.          According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the
said suit ended in dismissal.  While referring to the contents of the
plaint, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners
that having stated in the plaint that her husband sold the subject
property in favour of the petitioners herein for his personal use, it
is not open for the fourth respondent to launch criminal
prosecution against the petitioners herein.  It is further contended
by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the attempt of the
fourth respondent is to pressurize and drag the petitioners to
negotiating table for extraneous consideration and to extract
money. This Court having gone through the material available
before this Court found sufficient force in the said submissions of
the learned Counsel for the petitioners.  It is also the case of the
petitioners that the husband of the fourth respondent got filed
another suit by one Erigala Sudhakar Reddy vide O.S.No.58 of
2009 on 27.10.2009 against himself and fourth petitioner herein
on the file of the Court of the learned District Judge, Ananthapur,
seeking specific performance of agreement of sale dated
15.01.2009 and the said suit also ended in dismissal on
17.07.2014. A copy of the said judgment dated 17.07.2014 is
placed on record by the learned Counsel for the petitioners.  It is
appropriate to reproduce the relevant findings of the learned
District Judge on additional issue No.1, which read as follows:


         In this case D2 obtained a registered sale
deed on 9.3.2009 and as DW.1 himself admitted in
his evidence that in criminal case he stated before the
sub-registrar while registering Ex.B.1 that he received
sale consideration and hence it is concluded that
execution of Ex.B.1 is bonafide and genuine. Further
according to D3 immediately after receiving legal
notice from the plaintiff, she went to the house of D1
and she also came to know that D1 went to Proddatur
and the house was locked and the same was not
denied. In this case the conduct of the plaintiff that
though he came to know about execution of Ex.B.1
he did not try to contact D2 to inform her about his
agreement of sale also creates a doubt about the
case of plaintiff and D1. Added to that agreement of
sale is not registered and hence D2 also has no
knowledge about it. According to her she is a
bonafide purchaser for a valid consideration and
since D2s title and possession is under a registered
document it is considered. D2 also deposed that she
has been in possession and therefore this issue is
answered in favour of D2.




14.             It is also the case of the petitioners that at relevant point of
time, the first petitioner was studying engineering course at
Hyderabad and second petitioner was doing her project work at
Hyderabad after completion of her MBA and petitioners 3 and 4
were at Chennai for treatment of petitioner No.4 for Cancer at
Apollo Hospital, Chennai. Relevant documents have been filed in
support of the same.

15.      Yet another contention canvassed by the learned Counsel
for the petitioners is that there are no essential ingredients of
Section 3 (i)(x) of the Act in the present FIR registered against the
petitioners. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners,
the necessary ingredients are,  namely, (1) victim should belong to
a member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe ,and (2)
intention to humiliate within public view;, and in the absence of the
same in the complaint lodged by the fourth respondent, no case is
made out against the petitioners. In order to consider the said
contention, it is apposite to refer to the said provision of law, which
reads as under:
3: Punishment for offences of atrocities:- (1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,-

                    (i) to (ix)     xxxxxx             xxxx

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent
to humiliate a member  of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public
view.

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months but which
may extended  to five years and with fine.

16.     The said provision of law, in clear and vivid terms
demonstrates that in order to launch prosecution under Section
3(1)(x ) of the Act, two necessary and indispensable  ingredients
must exist. They are, the victim should belong to Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe and there  must be humiliation of such person
in public view.  It is the case of the petitioners that the fourth
respondent belongs to Balija community which is a Forward
caste/(OC), but not either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In
order to demonstrate the same, a caste certificate dated
11.08.2009 issued by the Tahsildar, Ananthapur  is placed on
record by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, which
unambiguously shows that the fourth respondent belongs to
Balija Community. The genuineness of the said certificate is not
disputed by any of the respondents and on the other hand in the
counter filed by the official respondents, it is stated that the fourth
respondent  belongs to Balija community which can never be a
Scheduled Caste. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the
petitioners that the Tahsildar, Ananthapur Mandal  initiated
enquiry against the fourth respondent by issuing notice dated
17.11.2009. A copy of the said notice is also placed on record by
the learned Counsel for the petitioners. It reads as under:


      L.Dis.B/1718/2009                        Office of Tahsildar,
                                                           Ananthapur,
                                                           Dated 17.11.2009

Notice
      Smt. Gajula Lakshmi W/o G.Ramanjaneyulu, resident
of D.No.6-1-433, Lakshminagar, Ananthapur is hereby
informed that after thorough and detailed enquiry into the
matter regarding obtained caste certificate by you and after
verifying the school certificate of your brother, it reveals that
originally you belongs to Balijaby caste. Further it is also
informed to you that you have obtained false Caste
Certificate as you belongs to S.C. from this office. Further
you have also been issued a notice previously to attend this
office along with your original certificates. You have
informed to this office that you are not feeling well. But you
have not produced any Medical Certificate for the above
reason.

      Hence you are hereby informed that attend this office
on 30.11.2009 along with your all original certificates for
verification and if you did not turn up on the above date,
criminal action will be initiated against you as per Section 10
of Act 16/1993 (The A.P.(SC,ST BCs)Regulation of  Issue of
Community Certificates Act, 1993 and Rules, 1997).

                                                        Sd/- Tahsildar,
        Ananthapur.
                18.11.2009
      To
      Smt. Gajula Lakshmi
      W/o G.Ramanjuaneyulu,
      D.No.6-1-433, Lakshminagar,
      Kadapa.



17.              According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners,
the fourth respondent did not attend the said enquiry.

18.             It is the categorical case of the petitioners that the
fourth respondent belongs to Balija caste which is not either
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In the counter affidavit of
the fourth respondent, there is no specific denial of the said
averment. Simply because the fourth respondent married a person
belonging to Scheduled Caste, caste status of the fourth
respondent would not automatically alter.  In the absence of any
material to disclose the caste of the fourth respondent that she
belongs to Scheduled Caste, it can safely be concluded that there
is no first ingredient. It is also not the case of the fourth
respondent in the complaint that  the alleged incident took place
in the public view. The complaint does not disclose that the
alleged incident occurred within public view and the complaint
also does not mention  of  any such open place. Even according to
the complaint only, the fourth respondent and her husband were
present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident
Therefore even the second ingredient is also not present.

19.             Coming to the judgment cited by the learned Counsel
for the petitioners.

20.            In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal (supra),
the Apex Court observed at Para 102 as follows:

           108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
      1.Where the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

      2.Where the allegations in the First Information
Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I.
R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

      3.Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
      4.Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

      5.Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

      6.Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
oncerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

      7.Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.


21.           In Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. (supra), at Paras
23,24,25,26, 28, 29.30, 31, 32 and 38 read as under:
      23. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy
and Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome
power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to
quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
the process of the court or that the ends of justice require
that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts
have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A
court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate
into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court
observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the
ends of mere law though justice must be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. This case has
been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this
court and other courts.

      24. In Chandrapal Singh and Others v. Maharaj Singh
and Another (1982) 1 SCC 466, in a landlord and tenant
matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated, this
Court observed in para 1 at page 467 as under :-

      "A frustrated landlord after having met his
Waterloo in the hierarchy of civil courts, has further
enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal
prosecution which prima facie appears to be an
abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated
are so telling that the further discussion may appear
to be superfluous."

      25. The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is
very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down
heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process
would come to ridicule. The court also observed that
chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to
give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction
of the criminal court.

      26. This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and
Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others
(1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under :

      "7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the
court to take into consideration any special features
which appear in a particular case to consider whether
it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a
prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that
the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose
and where in the opinion of the court chances of an
ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful
purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal
prosecution to continue, the court may while taking
into consideration the special facts of a case also
quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage."

      27.       xxxxxxx          xxxxxxx         xxxxxxxx
                   Xxxxxxx         xxxxxxx        xxxxxxxx

      28. This court in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and
Others (1992) 4 SCC 305 observed thus :

      "132. The criminal courts are clothed with
inherent power to make such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though
unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously
or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in
appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which
alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the
High Court under section 482 of the Code are very
wide and the very plentitude of the power requires
great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to
see that its decision in exercise of this power is based
on sound principles."

      29. In G. Sagar Suri and Another v. State of UP and
Others (2000) 2 SCC 636, this court observed that it is the
duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great
deal of caution in issuing the process particularly when
matters are essentially of civil nature.

      30. This court in Roy V. D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8
SCC 590 observed thus :-

      "18. It is well settled that the power under
section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised by the High
Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on
illicit material collected on search and arrest which
are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and
sentence based on such material but also the trial
itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as
it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the
court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings
would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court
resulting in great hardship and injustice to the
accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under
section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like
the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of
justice."

      31. This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.
and Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another (2005) 1
SCC 122 observed thus :-
      "It would be an abuse of process of the court to
allow any action which would result  in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers, court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the complainant has alleged and whether any offence
is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto."

      32. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and
Others (2006) 6 SCC 736, this court again cautioned about
a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely
civil disputes into criminal cases. The court noticed the
prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of
lenders/ creditors. The court further observed that "any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve
any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal
prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."

                           xxxxxxx                 xxxxxxxx            xxxxxxx
                           xxxxxxx            xxxxxxxx             xxxxxxx

      35.In our considered opinion, filing of such a frivolous
complaint in the instant case is a total abuse of process of
law. Consequently, we set-aside the impugned judgment
passed by the High Court and quash the complaint
emanating from Crime No.281 of 2004, Police Station,
Uppal, Hyderabad.



22.               In Asmathunnisa Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
(supra), the Apex Court at paras 8 and 9 observed as follows:
        In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant
has placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court
in E.
      Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan & Others
1997 Crl. L.J. 2036. The relevant paragraphs of this
judgment are paras 12, 13 and 18. The said paragraphs
read as under:
      "12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two
kinds of insults against the member of Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable -
one as defined under sub-section (ii) and the other as
defined under sub-section (x) of the said section. A
combined reading of the two sub-sections shows that
under section (ii) insult can be caused to a member of
the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by
dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or any
other obnoxious substance in his premises or
neighbourhood, and to cause such insult, the
dumping of excreta etc. need not necessarily be done
in the presence of the person insulted and whereas
under sub-section (x) insult can be caused to the
person insulted only if he is present in view of the
expression "in any place within public view". The
words "within public view", in my opinion, are
referable only to the person insulted and not to the
person who insulted him as the said expression is
conspicuously absent in sub-section (ii) of Section 3
of Act 3/1989. By avoiding to use the expression
"within public view" in sub-section (ii), the Legislature,
I feel, has created two different kinds of offences an
insult caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes
or Scheduled Tribes, even in his absence, by
dumping excreta etc. in his premises or
neighbourhood and an insult by words caused to a
member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled  
Tribes "within public view" which means at the time of
the alleged insult the person insulted must be present
as the expression "within public view" indicates or
otherwise the Legislature would have avoided the use
of the said expression which it avoided in sub-section
(ii) or would have used the expression "in any public
place".
      Insult contemplated under sub-section (ii) is
different from the insult contemplated under sub-
section (x) as in the former a member of the
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes gets insulted
by the physical act and whereas is the latter he gets
insulted in public view by the words uttered by the
wrongdoer for which he must be present at the place.
      xxx xxx xxx
      As stated by me earlier the words used in sub-
section (x) are not "in public place", but "within public
view" which means the public must view the person
being insulted for which he must be present and no
offence on the allegations under the said section gets
attracted. In my view, the entire allegations contained
in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make
out any offence against the petitioner".
       The aforesaid paragraphs clearly mean that the
words used are "in any place but within public view", which
means that the public must view the person being insulted
for which he must be present and no offence on the
allegations under the said section gets attracted if the
person is not present.

23.               In M.Ramesh Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), a
learned single Judge of this Court at para 27 of the judgment
observed as follows:
       The father of the deceased, who was examined
as P.W.2 though stated that he is a Madiga by caste,
admitted in his cross-examination that his father is
chengaiah and his father belongs to Balija community.
When once the father of P.W.2 is a Balija by caste, P.W.2
will not get the status of Madiga.  In fact, this was admitted
by P.W.1, i.e. the wife of P.W.2. In her cross-examination,
she has categorically stated  that L.W.2 K.Murali Swamy  is
Balija by caste and he is her husband. Of course, she has
stated in the chief examination that she belongs to Madiga
community. Even in an inter-caste marriage, the offspring
gets the status of father, but not that of the mother. When
once the father of the deceased is admitted to be a member
belonging to Balija caste, it cannot be said that the
deceased is a Madiga by caste, so as to attract the
provisions of the Act.

24.             In Mrs. Valsamma Paul Vs. Cochin University, the
Apex Court observed as follows:
      In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath
Pandu, (1995) 3 JT (SC) 563 : (1995 AIR SCW 2224); and
R. Chandevarappa v. State of Karnataka, (1995)7 JT (SC)
93, this Court had held that economic empowerment is a
fundamental right to the poor and the State is enjoined
under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39 to provide them
opportunities.Thus, education, employment and economic
empowerment are some of the programmes, the State has  
evolved and also provided reservation in admission into
educational institution, or in case of other economic benefits
under Articles 15(4) and 46 or in appointment to an office or
a post under the State under Article 16(4). Therefore, when
a member is transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and OBCs
he/she must of necessity also undergo same handicaps, be
subject to the same disabilities, disadvantages, indignities
or sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail the
facility of reservation. A candidate who had the
advantageous start in life being born in forward caste and
had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in
backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion,
does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either
under Article 15(4) status of Scheduled Caste etc. by
voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on
the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign
constitutional policy under Articles 15(4)and 16(4)of the
Constitution.
      xxxxx                             xxxxxxx
      xxxxx                             xxxxxxx
      The recognition of the appellant by the member of
Latin Catholic would not, therefore , be relevant for the
purpose of her entitlement to the reservation under Article
16(4), for the reason that she, as a member of the forward
cast, had advantageous star in life and after her completing
education and becoming major married Yesudas; and so,
she is not entitled to the facility of reservation given to the
Latin Catholic, a backward class.


25.             In Gara Yesobu Vs. State of AP (supra), a learned
single judge of this Court held at para 5 as follows:

 As rightly contended by Sri E.B.Ghagiratha Rao,
learned Counsel for the petitioners in Crl.P.No. 3342
of 2003 (ie.A-63 to A-66) the charge is bald and does
not state who among the 66 persons named as
accused uttered the offending words or which of the
accused said what words and/or their overt acts. A
plain reading of the charge-sheet shows that all the
accused abused the alleged victims. As rightly
contended by the learned Counsel it is not possible to
believe that all accused in chorus could have uttered
the same words at the same time. So prima facie
prosecution for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act is an abuse of process of law.


26.               In Rajiv Thapar Vs. Madanlal Kapoor (supra), the
Apex Court observed as paragraphs 26 and 27 as follows:

        This Court had an occasion to examine the
matter in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi,
(supra) (incidentally the said judgment was heavily
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondent-complainant), wherein it was held thus:-
      29. Regarding the argument of accused
having to face the trial despite being in a
position to produce material of unimpeachable
character of sterling quality, the width of the
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code and Article 226 of Constitution of
India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of
justice the High Court can make such orders as
may be necessary to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice within the parameters laid down
in Bhajan Lal's case. (emphasis is ours).

       Recently, this Court again had an occasion to
examine the ambit and scope of Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. in Rukmini Narvekar Vs. Vijaya Satardekar &
Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 1, wherein in the main order it
was observed, that the width of the powers of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was
unlimited. In the instant judgment, this Court held that
the High Court could make such orders as may be
necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any
court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In a
concurring separate order passed in the same case, it
was additionally observed, that under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C., the High Court was free to consider even
material, that may be produced on behalf of the
accused, to arrive at a decision whether the charge
as framed could be maintained. The aforesaid
parameters shall be kept in mind while we examine
whether the High Court ought to have exercised its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
in the facts and circumstances of this case.



27.                  In State of Orissa through Kumar Raghavender Sing
Vs. Ganesh Chander Jew, the Apex Court at para 20 held that:

                   When the background facts of the case
are considered the question regarding applicability of
Section 197 of the Code takes a temporary back seat.
The factual scenario as indicated above goes to show
that on 28.2.1991 respondent was produced before
the Magistrate. He was specifically asked as to
whether there was any ill-treatment. Learned SDJM
specifically records that no complaint of any ill-
treatment was made. This itself strikes at the
credibility of the complaint. Additionally, the doctor
who has examined him stated that for the first time on
2.3.1991 he treated the complainant. Though there
are several other aspects highlighted in the version
indicated in the complaint and the materials on record
are there, we do not think it necessary to go into them
because of the inherent improbabilities of the
complainant's case and the patent mala fides
involved. It is no doubt true that the threshold
interference by exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code has to be in very rare cases, and this
case appears to be of that nature. It fits in with the
category no.7 of broad categories indicated in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). It
is to be noted that though plea regarding non-
complaint before the Magistrate was specifically
taken to justify interference, the High Court has not
dealt with this aspect at all thereby adding to the
vulnerability thereof.


28.                 In B.V.S.S. Ramana Murthy Vs. State of AP (supra),
a learned single Judge of this Court at para 4  observed that:

        The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends
that no sanction as contemplated under Section 197
Cr.P.C. is also obtained. As pointed out, there are
inherent improbabilities in the complainants case.
The Supreme Court in State of Orissa through Kumar
Raghvendra Singh and others Vs. Ganesh Chandraw  
Jew held that where the complaint is coupled with
inherent improbabilities  it can be quashed.
Accordingly  this petition has got to be allowed.


29.            The principles laid down in the above referred
judgments,  the voluminous material available before this Court
and facts and circumstances of the case and various litigations
instituted by the fourth respondent and her husband, who is a
retired employee of the Central Excise Department, against the
petitioners herein drive this Court to an irresistible conclusion that
the prosecution launched against the petitioners is undoubtedly
and certainly a patent abuse of process of law, which can neither
be permitted to be initiated nor be permitted to be continued, lest
the citizens loose faith and confidence in the system of rule of law.
This Court is also of the definite opinion that this is eminently a fit
case where extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India  is required to be pressed into
service to restrain and avoid and avert the abuse of process of
law.

30                  For the aforesaid reasons, this Writ Petition is
allowed and the case in Crime No. 184 of 2009 on the file of the II
Town Police Station, Ananthapur is hereby quashed.

31.          Miscellaneous petitions pending consideration if any in
the Writ Petition shall stand closed in consequence. No order as
to costs.
------------------------------------
JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI  
DATED 24TH MARCH, 2015

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