when once another Division Bench dealing with the land, which is also notified along with the land of the present appellant and has fixed the value of such land at Rs.33/- per square yard, we are bound by such decision of another coordinate Bench.=when vast extents of land, which are not developed and divided into layouts, are acquired by the State, such lands would not be straightaway divided into housing/commercial/industrial plots. The lands need some improvements to be made such as compaction, improving its level and bringing it at least at par with the existing road level and also provide for other basic civic amenities such as road, electricity, drainage, water pipelines and pavements and community facilities etc. Consequently, depending upon the location of the land namely rural, semi urban and urban, certain percentage of the land would get consumed towards these basic civic amenities and that would be ranging between 30-40%. Once those civic amenities are provided, the land covered by such facilities become inalienable by the original land owner. In other words, only the remaining extent of land ranging between 60-70% of the total extent of land owned originally would become available for sale as individual plots. This apart, the aforementioned developmental activities including compaction and other provisions would nearly cost 50-60% of the land cost itself. So without undertaking any such exercises, the claimants are not liable to secure compensation on the basis of the value of the land per square yard. But, however, when once another Division Bench dealing with the land, which is also notified along with the land of the present appellant and has fixed the value of such land at Rs.33/- per square yard, we are bound by such decision of another coordinate Bench.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO  AND THE HONBLE SMT JUSTICE ANIS                    

APPEAL SUIT No.2027 OF 2002    

18-11-2015

Ramdharma Reddy S/o Ganga Reddy R/o Thorikonda Village, Jakranpally Mandal    
Nizamabad District Petitioner

The Land Acquisition Officer (Revenue Divisional Officer) Nizamabad.
Respondent

Counsel for the petitioner:Sri N. Sridhar Reddy
                                       
Counsel for the respondent:Government Pleader for Appeals (TG)

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred

1.      (1992) 4 SCC 659
2.      (2012) 5 SCC 432


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
AND
THE HONBLE MRS. JUSTICE ANIS    

APPEAL SUIT No.2027 of 2002  

JUDGMENT: (Per Honble Sri Justice Nooty Ramamohana Rao)    
      This appeal has been preferred under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act (for short the Act) by the claimant, not being
satisfied by the enhanced amount of compensation ordered to be
paid by the Reference Court in O.P.No.281 of 1998.
      With a view to provide house sites to the weaker sections of
the society, during the year 1995-1996 certain lands situate in
Thorlikonda Village of Jakranpally Mandal, Nizamabad District,
have been notified for compulsory acquisition and accordingly,
notification under Sub Section 1 of Section 4 of the Act was got
gazetted on 22.06.1996.  The land of total extent of Ac.8.25 guntas
has been acquired, out of this the claimants land of an extent of
Ac.3.00 guntas has also been acquired.  The Land Acquisition
Officer passed an award fixing the market value at Rs.18,000/- per
acre and thus, paid an amount of Rs.77,625/- as compensation.  It
is in those set of circumstances, when the appellant herein sought
for compensation @ Rs.150/- per square yard, the reference came
to be made under Section 18 of the Act for determination of the
civil Court, though the claim before the RDO appears to be
Rs.1,00,000/- per acre.  Entertaining the reference, the civil Court
has arrived at a finding that the value of the land is liable to be
fixed at Rs.20/- per square yard and since 1/4th has to be
deducted towards developmental purposes, the value has been
worked out at Rs.15 per square yard and on that basis, the
compensation arrived at duly allowing 12% per annum as
additional market value in terms of Section 23(1-A) of the Act and
30% solatium and interest for one year from date of taking
compensation @ 9% and thereafter at 15%.
      Sri N.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant,
would submit that in Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of
Chandigarh  and Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (Registered) Vs.
State of Punjab , the Supreme Court has allowed the formula of
quantitative improvement in payment of compensation by allowing
10 to 15% of value addition for the time gap between the previous
notification and the present notification.  Sri N.Sridhar Reddy has
also pointed out to us that when two different appeals
A.S.Nos.2028/2002 and 1236/2003 concerning the very same  
notification have been considered by another Division Bench of
this Court, on 09.09.2015, the said Division Bench by following the
principles set out in the aforesaid judgments has arrived at a
finding that the market value of the land should be worked out at
Rs.33/- per square yard and accordingly, concluded the issue.
      The learned Government Pleader while ageing that the
another Division Bench dealing with aforementioned
A.S.Nos.2028/2002 and 1236/2003 has taken the view that the
market value should be fixed at Rs.33/- per square yard, but
however, would submit that the concept of incremental addition to
the value of the land depends upon the contemporary
developmental activities that have taken place there around and if
there are no developments, in the vicinity of the land acquired, the
theory of quantum improvement would not get attracted.
      Though we are thoroughly conscious that when vast extents
of land, which are not developed and divided into layouts, are
acquired by the State, such lands would not be straightaway
divided into housing/commercial/industrial plots.  The lands need
some improvements to be made such as compaction, improving its
level and bringing it at least at par with the existing road level and
also provide for other basic civic amenities such as road,
electricity, drainage, water pipelines and pavements and
community facilities etc.  Consequently, depending upon the
location of the land namely rural, semi urban and urban, certain
percentage of the land would get consumed towards these basic
civic amenities and that would be ranging between 30-40%.  Once
those civic amenities are provided, the land covered by such
facilities become inalienable by the original land owner.  In other
words, only the remaining extent of land ranging between 60-70%
of the total extent of land owned originally would become available
for sale as individual plots.  This apart, the aforementioned
developmental activities including compaction and other provisions
would nearly cost 50-60% of the land cost itself.  So without
undertaking any such exercises, the claimants are not liable to
secure compensation on the basis of the value of the land per
square yard.
      But, however, when once another Division Bench dealing
with the land, which is also notified along with the land of the
present appellant and has fixed the value of such land at Rs.33/-
per square yard, we are bound by such decision of another
coordinate Bench.  All the more so, when learned Judges of the
coordinate Bench have based their reasoning upon the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh and Mehrawal
Khewajis cases referred supra. Therefore, we reserve the notion
which we have set forth today for proper debate and consideration
in another case and prefer to follow the judgment rendered by the
coordinate Bench in A.S.Nos.2028 of 2002 and 1236 of 2003 and
also fix the market value at Rs.33/- per square yard even in this
case. As otherwise, we will be failing to render justice to one
claimant covered by the same notification while another claimant
gets paid compensation at Rs.33/- per square yard.
      Hence, this appeal stands allowed to the extent of
redetermining the compensation payable to the appellant herein by
working out the value at Rs.33/- per square yard.
      Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall
also stand closed.  No costs.

_______________________________________      
JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO          
_______________  
JUSTICE ANIS
18.11.2015

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