the binding nature of the temporary injunction Order granted by the lower Court on the LRs. of the party, who suffered the Order as also the interpretation of Order 39 Rule 2(A) of Code of Civil Procedure.- 2015 A.P.[2003] MSKLAWREPORTS


The Appellants in A.S. No. 2301 of 1987 filed an application in C.M.P. No. 13578 of 1999 for injunction restraining Sharfuddin, Defendant No. 1 in the suit from alienating the 'B' schedule property. However, the Court granted Orders of status quo and the status quo Orders were made absolute on 15.10.1987.
While so, C.C. No. 1412 of 1997 was filed by the Appellants alleging contempt of the Orders dated: 15.5.1997 on the ground that on 11.4.1997 the respondent No. 6 and on 30.5.1997, the respondent No. 7 alienated 'B' schedule property by executing registered sale deeds. It is the contention of the petitioners that they were also bound by the status quo Orders passed by the Court against their father Sharfuddin. The petition was contested by the respondents on the ground that they are the LRs. of Sharfuddin that the property in question was already gifted to them by their father in 1981 and they sold the same to third parties in 1997. 
However, this Court observed that no contempt case would lie under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and left it open to the petitioners to convert the contempt application to that of application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure. 
Thereafter, petition in C.M.P. No. 19697 of 1997 purported to be under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure filed for punishing the respondents for alienating the scheduled properties and to detain them in civil prison for disobeying the Orders of the Appellate Court dated 15.10.1987 in C.M.P. No. 15518 of 1987 and C.M.P. No. 13575 of 1987 in A.S. No. 2301 of 1987. 
It was resisted by the L.Rs. stating that the property was gifted to them in January, 1981 prior to the suit was instituted and that the Order passed against their father is not binding and that there is no injunction Orders against them subsequent to their bringing on record as L.Rs.
The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties held that the respondents disobeyed the Orders and accordingly, directed the issuance of warrant for attachment of the property of the respondent Nos.3 to 7 for a period of six months or until such time the respondents deposit the sum of Rs.20,000/-. It is further directed that the petitioners were permitted to withdraw the same. Against the said Order, the present L.P.A. has been filed.
Admittedly, in the instant case, status quo orders were issued against the father and when an application was filed for punishing the father of the appellants for disobeying the status quo orders, he had stated that he had already gifted the 'B' schedule property to his sons and all the sons are making constructions. After the death of Sharfuddin, the appellants were brought on record. Thereafter application was filed for punishing the appellants for contempt. It was the case of the appellants in the application filed by the petitioners/ plaintiffs that the property in question was gifted by their father in 1981 and they have every right to proceed against the property. They further stated that they have also executed certain sale deeds in 1997 much after the status quo order was passed against their father. They further stated that the status quo order was confined to their father only and they are not bound by the status quo orders. It is not their case that they were not aware of the status quo orders passed against their father.
 At any rate, knowing fully well that there is specific order against their father, they have executed the sale deeds in respect of 'B' Schedule property.

though status quo order was granted against the father, yet the sons cannot be allowed to flout the status quo order which was granted against their father after they were brought on record as legal representatives. 

It is not the case of the appellants that they have parted with the property by executing sale deed prior to their bringing on record as legal representatives, but it is only after they were brought on record, they have parted with the property. Thus, it is clearly established that the appellants having full knowledge of the status quo order which was passed against their father, executed the sale deeds on the premise that the status quo orders would not in any way bind them.
Therefore, a person knowing fully well that an injunction order was passed against the defendant and still violates the injunction order irrespective of the fact whether he is a party to the injunction or not and commits violation of the order, is required to face the consequences under Rule 2-A of Order 39. - 
2015 A.P.[2003] MSKLAWREPORTS

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Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.

cancellation of the sale deeds = Under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide that registration/cancellation of document is only with reference to the executant and the claimant under a document, which is already registered. Petitioner, being a third party, is, therefore, not entitled to approach the registering authority and seek cancellation of the documents executed by third party in favour of any other party. Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Registration Act is also misconceived inasmuch as Rule 26(k)(i) of the Rules specifically refer to the duty of the registering authority to ensure that the deed of cancellation is executed by all the executants and the claimants, who are parties to previously registered document and only on mutual consent a deed of cancellation can be registered. Since petitioner is not a party to the impugned sale transactions between two different individuals, he is not entitled to seek cancellation thereof and in any case, the petitioner does not satisfy even the requirement of Rule 26, referred to above.