CORRECTION OF DATE OF BIRTH IN SERVICE REGISTER =The petitioner filed declaratory suit in 1990 for correction of his date of birth as 08.07.1954 in all records including service records i.e. after completion of almost 15 years of his joining the service. Even if it is assumed that the date of birth of the petitioner is wrongly entered in the service records, the petitioner has not properly explained what prevented him from getting his date of birth altered by taking necessary steps within a reasonable period of time, and as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner is diligent in taking steps to correct his date of birth. The Apex Court time and again cautioned the civil Courts including High Courts against entertaining and accepting the claim made by the government servant long after entering into service for correction of the recorded date of birth. Further, a perusal of the record shows that on 30.11.1994, the petitioner submitted his declaration declaring that his date of birth is 08.07.1952, which is subsequent to passing of decree and judgment by the civil Court. In the circumstances, we do not find any error or irregularity in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. The writ petition is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO                
W.P. No.38766 OF 2012  

24.04.2013    

S.Ram Manohar  s/o. late S.Sundera  Murthy

The Union of India,rep. by the Deputy Commissioner,Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sanghatan, Regional Office, Picket, Secunderabad, and another

Counsel for the petitioner: Mr.V.R. Balachary

Counsel for Respondents:Mr.B.Narasimha Sarma  

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

Referred Cases:
     nil


ORDER: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B.N. Rao Nalla)

This writ petition is filed for a writ of Certiorari calling for the records
relating to the order dated 05.10.2012 passed by the Central administrative
Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short 'the Tribunal') in O.A. No.866 of 2012, and
to quash the same by declaring the action of the respondents  in prematurely
retiring the petitioner from service as contrary to law, and consequently direct
the respondents to correct the entry relating to the date of birth of the
petitioner in the service record as 08.07.1954 with all attendant benefits
including  reinstatement into service.

2.      The brief facts of the case of the petitioner are that he was appointed on
22.12.1975 as Lower Division Clerk with the respondents, thereafter he was
promoted as Upper Division Clerk and subsequently he was promoted as Assistant.
The date of birth of the petitioner was recorded as 08.07.1952 in service
register.
The petitioner came to know through his mother that his actual date of birth is 08.07.1954.  
The petitioner approached the schools where he
studied.  His date of birth was wrongly entered as 08.07.1952 instead of
08.07.1954, in transfer certificate issued by Government Primary School,
Kattelguda, Hyderabad where he studied from III standard to V standard and the
same was entered in admission records in Government High School, Azampura, where  
he studied from VI standard to X standard.
The petitioner made a representation
to the school authorities to correct his date of birth in the records, however,
the school authorities advised him to approach a competent civil Court for
declaring the correct date of birth.  
Then the petitioner filed O.S.No.2516 of
1990 on the file of VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the
2nd respondent, Government High School, Azampura, Hyderabad, Secretary, Board of   
Intermediate Education and Registrar of Osmania University, Hyderabad for a
declaration that his date of birth as 08.07.1954 instead of 08.07.1952 as
entered in School records and in all services including his service record.  The
defendants did not contest the suit and the suit was decreed
ex parte on 27.04.1993.
As the defendants did not challenge the decree, it has
become final.  Pursuant to the decree and judgment, he made several
representations to the respondent authorities, but there was no response from
them. 

3.      While the petitioner was working at Kendriya Vidyalaya, Gachibowli,
Hyderabad, the 1st respondent issued proceedings dated 01.12.2011 to the
Principals of all Kendriya Vidyalayas in Hyderabad region calling upon them to
send the details as to the retirement of employees on superannuation during the
period 01.04.2012 to 31.03.2013.
The Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, Gachibowli,
sent a reply dated 07.12.2011 showing the retirement date of the petitioner as
31.07.2012.
 Immediately, the petitioner  got issued a  notice, dated 07.12.2011
to the 1st respondent bringing to his notice the decree and judgment dated
27.04.1993 passed in O.S.No.2516 of 1990 wherein his date of birth is declared
as 08.07.1954, and called upon him to direct the concerned authority to stop
further proceedings with reference to letter (reply) dated 07.12.2011.
The 1st
respondent sent a reply dated 16.01.2012 to the said notice stating that his request for correction of date of birth could not be conceded as it should have been urged within five years of his joining the service as per Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules.  
Then the petitioner filed Writ Petition
No.8990 of 2012 before this Court assailing the premature retirement letter
dated 07.12.2011 in pursuance of proceedings dated 01.12.2011 stating that his
actual date of birth is 08.07.1954 but it was wrongly entered in service record
as 08.07.1952 by the respondent authorities and that the VII Assistant Judge,
City Civil Court, Hyderabad, passed a decree and judgement dated 27.04.1993 in
O.S. No.2516 of 1990 declaring his date of birth as 08.07.1954.  This Court
while admitting the said writ petition on 26.06.2012 granted interim order in
W.P.M.P.No.11371 of 2012 suspending the impugned proceedings and directed the  
respondent authorities to continue the petitioner in service by reckoning his
date of birth as 08.07.1954. The respondents filed a counter affidavit in the
said writ petition raising a plea that the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghathan is an
institution notified under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition.  In view
of the same, the writ petition was dismissed.  Then the petitioner approached
the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.866 of 2012 questioning the legality and validity
of the proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 01.12.2011 and the information
furnished by the Principal through letter dated 07.12.2011.

4.      The respondents filed their counter denying the claim of the petitioner
and stated that while entering into service, he declared his date of birth as
08.07.1952 and as per Rules he has to retire on 31.07.2012, and as such, the
application is devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.

5.      The Tribunal taking into consideration the material available on record
and the submissions made by either counsel, dismissed the O.A. on 05.10.2012  
holding that the petitioner has not made out any case for correction of date of
birth in his service register as 08.07.1954 in place of 08.07.1952.   As against
the order of dismissal, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

6.      Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing
Counsel for Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghathan appearing for the respondents.

7.      The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the
Tribunal having observed that the judgment of the civil Court became final,
erred in observing that the petitioner has not filed execution petition for
implementing the decree and judgment of the civil Court and that the Tribunal
has no jurisdiction to direct the respondents to correct the date of birth of
the petitioner in service register basing on the judgment of the civil Court.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Tribunal has
erroneously held that the petitioner did not make any application for correction
of date of birth within the stipulated period as per instructions dated
07.10.1988 under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, in fact, the said
instructions are not applicable to him since he was appointed prior to framing
of those instructions.  The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended
that the Tribunal erred in observing that the petitioner gave a declaration
before the respondent authorities on 30.11.1994 that his date of birth is
08.07.1952. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal
ought to have seen that the date of birth of the petitioner is corrected in all
the school records including the matriculation certificate on the basis of the
decree and judgement of the civil Court.

8.      On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sanghathan appearing for the respondents submitted that the Tribunal has given
cogent and convincing reasons while passing the impugned order, and as such, it
needs no interference at the hands of this Court.

9.      We have perused the record.  The petitioner entered the Government service
on 22.12.1975 as Lower Division Clerk, thereafter he was promoted as Upper
Division Clerk and then as Assistant.  The date of birth of the petitioner was
recorded in service register as 08.07.1952 based on his matriculation
certificate and his declaration.
The petitioner filed declaratory suit in 1990
for correction of his date of birth as 08.07.1954 in all records including
service records i.e. after completion of almost 15 years of his joining the
service. 
Even if it is assumed that the date of birth of the petitioner is
wrongly entered in the service records, the petitioner has not properly
explained what prevented him from getting his date of birth altered by taking
necessary steps within a reasonable period of time, and as such, it cannot be
said that the petitioner is diligent in taking steps to correct his date of
birth.   
The Apex Court time and again cautioned the civil Courts including High
Courts against entertaining and accepting the claim made by the government
servant long after entering into service for correction of the recorded date of
birth.   
Further, the petitioner cannot seek a direction from the Tribunal to
the respondent authorities for correction of date of birth in his service
register pursuant to the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 2516 of 1990, as the
Tribunal is not competent forum for implementing the decree and judgment passed
by a civil Court.  
Further, a perusal of the record shows that on 30.11.1994,
the petitioner submitted his declaration declaring that his date of birth is
08.07.1952, which is subsequent to passing of decree and judgment by the civil
Court.  In the circumstances, we do not find any error or irregularity in the
impugned order warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10.      The writ petition is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly
dismissed.  No order as to costs.
_______________________  
ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA, J      

B.N. RAO NALLA, J  
DATE:24.04.2013

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