after coming to know about the same, the de facto complainant and her husband went to that site at 10:00 A.M. and that A.1 to A.6 abused both of them in filthy language and addressed her as 'lambadi bitch'=It is further contended by the petitioners' counsel that after service of injunction order on the de facto complainant by the Civil Court with regard to disputed property, this false F.I.R. was given as a counter-blast and with malafide intention. It can be also said that the de facto complainant became conscious of her rights under the Act, when the accused intended to assert his alleged rights through Civil Court. I find no reason to quash F.I.R. in this case.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU            

CRIMINAL PETITION No.7752 of 2012  

06.11.2012

Katta Gopal Rao and another

1. The State of A.P., rep by Public Prosecutor,High Court of A.P.,And another

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri M.Venkatram Reddy

Counsel  for the Respondents:  Additional Public Prosecutor

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1 AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1905
2 (2009) 3 Supreme Court Cases 789
3 2009(3) Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 287
4 1993 Supplement Cases 208  
5 (1974) 4 Supreme Court Cases 471
6 (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 59
7 (2010) 12 Supreme Court Cases 427
8 (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 336
9 (2012) 6 Supreme Court Cases 204

ORDER:

        The petitioners 1 and 2/A.1 and A.5 are accused of offences punishable
under Sections 447, 427, 504 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, the Act).
It is alleged that
 the de facto complainant belongs to 'lambada' caste which is
scheduled tribe and that on 10.12.2011 morning A.1 to A.6 and some others came 
to the disputed site in S.No.292 wherein basement for house was raised and they
intended to dismantle the basement and that after coming to know about the same,
the de facto complainant and her husband went to that site at 10:00 A.M. and
that A.1 to A.6 abused both of them in filthy language and addressed her as
'lambadi bitch' and challenged her as to what they would do against them.
Placing reliance on Asmathunnisa v State of A.P.1 of two Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court, it is contended by the petitioners' counsel that
 all the
ingredients of Section 3(i)(x) of the Act are not found in F.I.R. and that
therefore F.I.R. is liable to be quashed.
Three Judges Bench of the Supreme
Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of Maharashtra2 held that
 when caste
of the accused is not mentioned in F.I.R. in order to constitute an offence
under Section 3(i)(xi) of the Act, it is no ground for quashing F.I.R.  After
all, F.I.R. is not encyclopedia of the prosecution case and it is not 'be all
and end all' of the prosecution version.
 (See also Subhash Kumar v State of
Uttarakhan3, Surjit Singh Alias Gurmit Singh vs State of Punjab4, State of U.P.
v Jashodha Nandan Gupta5, Gunnana Pentayya Alias Pentadu v State of Andhra    
Pradesh6, Alagarsamy v State7, Ranjit Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh8 and  
Jitender Kumar v State of Haryana9 of the Supreme Court).
 In that view of the
matter, F.I.R. in this case relating to Section 3(i)(x) of the Act is not liable
to be quashed for want of certain particulars in F.I.R. 
 In any event, this
F.I.R. is also for offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 IPC.
        It is contended by the petitioners' counsel that though the alleged
offence was on 10.12.2011, F.I.R. was given by the de facto complainant on
31.12.2011 with inordinate delay. 
 Delay in matters of this nature may not
defeat the case itself.  According to the de facto complainant, as noted in
F.I.R., the matter was put up before the elders and since the accused did not
turn up before the elders, she was giving the report on 31.12.2011.  
 It is
further contended by the petitioners' counsel that after service of injunction
order on the de facto complainant by the Civil Court with regard to disputed
property, this false F.I.R. was given as a counter-blast and with malafide
intention. 
 It can be also said that the de facto complainant became conscious
of her rights under the Act, when the accused intended to assert his alleged
rights through Civil Court.  I find no reason to quash F.I.R. in this case.
        In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
____________________________    
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU,J        
Dt. 6th November, 2012

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable = Shaik Gousiya Begum. ..Petitioner Shaik Hussan and others.... Respondents = Published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10515

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.