D.V.C.- after the marriage, the first respondent and the complainant lived together. There is no basis to say that the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied. On this ground, the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned. In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

CRIMINAL PETITION No.4140 of 2010  

2-8-2012

Nagamuthula Kondaiah

State of A.P., rep. by P.P. & another.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri P.SRIDHAR REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor

< Gist:

> Head Note:

 ? Cases referred:

ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of II
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kothagudem.
 2.     The petitioner is the respondent and the second respondent is the
complainant in the DVC case.  The respondent filed the complaint under Sections
12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (for short 'the Act') against the petitioner herein with a plea to restrain
him from dispossessing her from shared household and also to pay compensation.
3.      For the sake of convenience, I refer the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
It is pleaded and alleged in the complaint as follows.
4.      (a)     The complainant is the legally wedded wife of Chembeti Chinna
Koteshwar Rao, whereas their marriage took place as per Hindu Rites and Customs
on 15.11.2008.  In fact, her husband was first married to one Uma Maheshwari,
daughter of the respondent on 11.8.2000 and a girl by name Keerthi who is aged 7
years was born to them.   On 7.3.2008 Uma Maheshwari died.  The respondent used
to reside in their house as family member.  In fact he was looking after the
affairs of the house.  Her husband reposed implicit confidence on the respondent
in all respects.  Factually, the husband of the petitioner married her as she
was a relative of him and also for taking necessary care of the minor.
According to the complainant, further she and her husband have been taking care
of the minor.  The respondent got no interest in the welfare of the minor.  On
the other hand, he made several efforts to grab the amounts kept in the name of
the minor girl.
(b)     She alleges that apart from that, the respondent has also been making
efforts to subject her to domestic violence one way or the other for the purpose
of ruining the matrimonial house.  The petitioner is always under threat and
danger in the hands of the respondent.   While such circumstances existed, on
30.6.2009 the respondent along with some anti-social elements entered the house
and threatened her with dire consequences and expressed his intention to kidnap
the minor.  Apart from that on 1.7.2009, the respondent attempted to kidnap the
minor and in that context, criminally intimidated her again threatening her with
dire consequences.  Later, she informed about the incident to her husband,
following which they gave a report in Palvancha Police Station, which was
registered in Cr.No.170 of 2009  under Sections 363, 511, 506 read with Section
34 IPC and then the respondent was arrested by the police. She claims that
because of the conduct of the respondent, her health is endangered.   It is also
stated that the respondent left the sharing roof of the petitioner's matrimonial
house, but he is continuously making an onslaught to wreck vengeance against the
family.
5.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
6.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Act' are important.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. So existence of domestic relationship and living in shared house as
defined in Sections 2(f) and 2(s) of the Act are the conditions precedent for
the aggrieved party to initiate proceedings under the Act.    
(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
The meaning of the proviso can be better understood while analyzing what is
meant by domestic relationship.
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  Thereby to constitute domestic
relationship in between two parties, they should have lived in a shared house
and they are related by consanguinity marriage or through a relationship in the
nature of marriage, adoption or as members of a joint family.  The person
aggrieved, covered by the proviso under Section 2(q) falls within the ambit of
the definition of domestic relationship being a relative of the respondent by
marriage.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3.  Section 3 of the Act contemplates "Definition of
domestic violence".  For the purpose of this Act, any act, omission or
commission or conduct of the respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in
case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

(e)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household.  Significantly, it is emphasized that to constitute a shared
household, it must be a household where the aggrieved person lives or lived in a
domestic relationship subject to the other formalities incorporated therein.
7.      Thereby the main requirements here are as to whether the complainant and
the respondent lived together in a shared house and whether the complainant is
related to the respondent by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship
in the nature of marriage, adoption or being a member of a joint family who
lived together as envisaged in Section 2(f) with regards to domestic violence.
Pertinently, the daughter of the respondent i.e the first wife of the husband of
the complainant died, thereby the first marriage of the husband of the
complainant does not exist now.  Thus, the complainant is altogether a different
person, who got no relationship with the respondent by virtue of any marriage
otherwise or by consanguinity or by being a member of a joint family within the
meaning of section 2(f).  What is envisaged under the proviso in Section 2(q),
which section defines what is meant by 'respondent' that an aggrieved wife or
female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may  file a
complaint against a relative of the husband or male person is well within the
ambit of the definition of domestic relationship only.  In other words, when
domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(q) is one of the conditions to
file an application under the Act, a relative of the husband or male person must
be one who comes within the ambit of that definition which excludes a relative
like the respondent in this case.
8.      With regards to the question of living in a shared house as defined in
Section 2(s), the respondent must have a right to live in the house or allowed
to live in the house under an obligation having domestic relationship as
contemplated in Section 2(f) with the other inmates of the house which is one of
the conditions to initiate the proceedings under the Act.  Importantly in the
definition of shared house also it is emphasized that the person aggrieved must
have lived in a shared house having got domestic relationship which in fact does
not include a person like the respondent herein subject to the formalities
mentioned.  That apart, neither the complainant nor her husband got any
obligation to allow him to reside in the house.  It is not a case of husband
keeping the respondent in the house aiding the respondent to harass the
complainant, rather it is admittedly a case of both the complainant and her
husband living together harmoniously and both of them facing the alleged conduct
of the respondent.  If he is residing in the house unwantedly, they can take
measures to send him out.  Thus, as the respondent cannot be brought within the
purview of the provisions enumerated that debars the complainant to file the
complaint.
9.      In addition to the discussion made above, the complaint is based only  on
surmises and conjectures.  There are no specific allegations, in other words,
there are only bald allegations against the respondent.  It clearly appear that
false allegations were made against the respondent for some purpose.  It is
something unbelievable in view of the circumstances of the case that the
respondent preferred to stay in the house of the complainant and her husband
after the death of his daughter, who was the first wife of the husband of the
complainant.  It is claimed by the respondent that the husband of the
complainant has filed D.W.O.P.No.777 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal District Judge, Khammam for appointing him as the Guardian of the
minor and he has also filed O.S.No.169 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem for damages against him on the ground
that he made derogatory allegations against him in another legal proceedings and
he also gave report to the Station House Officer, Palvancha Police Station and
got him arrested, which establish that the complainant and her husband are bent
upon to harass him to force him to accept their terms.
10.     Hence good grounds are made out to quash the proceedings in the DVC.  No
body should be tried or enquired into unnecessarily in any proceeding.  If it is
done, it is nothing but abusing the process of law and harassing him or her.
11.     In the result, the criminal petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings in the D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 are quashed.


______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 2.8.2012
Note:
L.R. copy be marked.
        B/o
DA




THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          










Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010




2.8.2012
















IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH            
AT HYDERABAD    


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010


Date: 2.8.2012

Between:

Nagamuthula Kondaiah
.. Petitioner/Accused
And


The State of A.P., rep. by its
Public Prosecutor and another.
.. Respondents

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          
Criminal Petition No.5558 of 2009
ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Armoor, Nizamabad district.
 2.     The petitioners are the respondents 1 to 3 and the second respondent
herein is the complainant in the DVC case.  For the sake of convenience, I refer
the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
3.      The complainant filed the complaint under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short 'the
Act') against the petitioners herein to pass protection orders, residence order,
maintenance order, custody order and to pay monetary relief compensation order
and any other reasonable order respectively.
4.      The claim of the complainant is as follows.
        Her marriage with the first respondent was performed on 14.7.2008 at
Tirupati.  Before the marriage, the first respondent was engaged to another girl
belonging to Ramadugu, by reason of which, he expressed his unwillingness to
marry her and therefore the engagement was cancelled subject to paying damages.
For two days after the marriage, the first respondent was cordial with her.
Later, the parents of the first respondent i.e. respondents 2 and 3 started
harassing her expressing that she was not suited to the first respondent and if
another girl was married to the first respondent, they would have got a dowry of
Rs.20.00 lakhs with the help of which, the husband of their daughter i.e. the
fourth respondent could have been sent to foreign countries for getting better
jobs.  Further it is alleged that the respondents 1 to 4 harassed her asking her
to leave the house voluntarily and also suggested her to marry another male
person.  Further, she was not allowed to take coffee, breakfast and launch by
the respondents and she was also not allowed to speak to the first respondent
and lead marital life with him.  It is further alleged that whenever she was
wearing good clothes, they used to irritate her saying where you were going.  It
is also alleged that the fourth respondent pushed the complainant out of the
house while asking her to leave the house expressing that they would conduct
another marriage to the first respondent after getting rid of her.   It is
further alleged unable to bear the torture of the respondents, the complainant
left the house and has been staying with her parents house.
5.      Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the marriage
between first respondent and the complainant is in dispute, by reason of which
alone, the domestic violence case is not maintainable.  Further the complainant
and the first respondent never lived together and there was no consummation of
marriage.
6.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
7.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short
'the Act')  are to be considered.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. Thereby the main criteria to file the case is that there should be
domestic relationship between the person aggrieved and the respondent.  It
necessitates to understand what is domestic relationship in this context.

(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner;
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  So, to satisfy this definition both
should have lived or live in a shared house and they are related by
consanguinity marriage etc.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household. 
(e)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3. This is the criteria in fact to grant the reliefs
under the Sections 18 to 22.
(f)     Section 3 of the Act reads - "Definition of domestic violence".  For the
purpose of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

8.      From the pleas taken, it appears that after the marriage, the first
respondent and the complainant lived together.  There is no basis to say that
the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as
defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied.  On this ground,
the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be
quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned.
        In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is
concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned.


______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 9.8.2012

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