5. Application of the Code to Revenue Courts.—(1) Where any Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of this Code in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the State Government 12[***] may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable by this Code shall not apply to those Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the State Government 13[***] may prescribe.

(2) “Revenue Court” in sub-section (1) means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or otter proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature.

12. The words “with the previous sanction of the G.G. in C”, omitted by Act No. 38 of 1920.

13. The words “with the sanction aforesaid” omitted by Act No. 38 of 1920.

6. Pecuniary jurisdiction.—Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction.

7. Provincial Small Cause Courts.— The following provisions shall not extend to Courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887(9 of 1887) 14[or under the Berar Small Cause Courts Law, 1905], or to Courts exercising the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes 15[under the said Act or Law], 16[or to Courts in 17[any part of India to which the said Act does not extend] exercising a corresponding jurisdiction] that is to in say.—

(a) So much of the body of the Code as relates to-

(i) Suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes;

(ii) The execution of decrees in such suits;

(iii) The execution of decrees against immovable property; and

(b) The following Sections, that is to say.—

Section 9,

Sections 91 and 92,

Sections 94 and 95 18[so far as they authorize or relate to-

(i) Orders for the attachment of immovable property;

(ii) Injunctions,

(iii) The appointment of a receiver of immovable property, or

(iv) The interlocutory orders referred to in clause (e) of Section 94], and Sections 96 to 112 and 115.

14. Inserted by Act No. 4 of 1941.

15. Substituted by Act No. 4 of 1941, for the words “under that Act”.

16. Inserted by Act No. 2 of 1951.

17. Substituted by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order, 1956, for the words “Part B States”.

18. Substituted by Act No. 1 of 1926, for the words “so far as they relate to injunctions and interlocutory order”.

8. Presidency Small Cause Courts.—Save as provided in Sections 24, 38 to 41, 75, clauses (a), (b) and (c), 76, 19[77, 157 and 158], and by the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, (15 of 1882) the provisions in the body of this Code shall not extend to any suit or proceeding in any Courts of Small Causes established in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay:

20[Provided that-(1) The High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras and Bombay, as the case may be, may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct21 that any such provisions not inconsistent with the express provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, (15 of 1882) and with such modifications and adaptations as may be specified in the notification, shall extend to suits or proceedings or any class of suits or proceedings in such Court;

(2) All rules heretofore made by any of the said High Courts under Section 9 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (15 of 1882) shall he deemed to have been validly made.]

19. Substituted by Act No. 104 of 1976, for the words and figures “77 and 155 to 158”, w.e.f. 1st. February, 1977.

20. Inserted by Act No. 1 of 1914.

21. See also Calcutta Gazette, 1910, Pt. I, p. 814.

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