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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Wednesday, July 6, 2016

Section 31 of SARFAESI Act = not describing the said land as agricultural land, he cannot now be permitted to turn round and contend to the contra that he has created security interest in agricultural land in contrast to mere land.= When we look at the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, it emerges that the expression land which is defined in sub-section (4) of Section 2 of that enactment, brings out that land means land which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture, including horticulture, but does not include land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes. Thus, if the land is also capable of being used for agricultural purposes, but not necessarily being used for agricultural purposes as such, it also answers the description of the expression land found mentioned in the said Act. Therefore, the record is prepared under Section 3 of the said enactment of every land, which is merely capable of being used for agricultural or horticulture purposes, but not necessarily being used as it is for the said purpose. Therefore, we have no difficulty to reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since revenue record maintained under the aforementioned 1971 Act has been produced by him, it has to be invariably inferred that the security interest created by the petitioner in favour of the bank is relating to agricultural land and hence, the provisions contained under Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act should come to his rescue. Only when a security interest is specifically created describing the security interest as agricultural land, then alone, the benefit of Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act will enure to such creator of interest, but not otherwise; When any such memorandum of objections has been drawn and presented before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, the said Court is bound to consider the same and pass an appropriate order. In the instant case, no such memorandum of objections has been drawn by the petitioner or filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Therefore, the statement made by the Advocate-Commissioner in her affidavit filed before us, clearly brings out, in paragraph 3, that she has identified the scheduled property and executed the warrant and further went on to assert that the petitioner, his servants, his wife and several others stated that the house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 situated in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District belongs to the petitioner herein. We have to go by her statement of fact that the said house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 is, in fact, lying in Survey No. 51/EE, but not in Survey No. 51/AA. This apart, the learned Advocate-Commissioner has also recorded, in paragraph 3 of her affidavit, that the petitioner never filed any work order (memo) before her requiring her to execute the warrant by any method specified in the work memo. In the absence of any such material to the contra, the conduct of the Advocate-Commissioner in taking possession of the building bearing D.No. 1-5-230 cannot be objected to or found fault with. Even otherwise, there is no credible material that was placed on record of this Court to show that the house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 is actually lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but is not lying in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village. The fact that the house property has been assessed to property tax by the local municipality/corporation, does not necessarily reflect that the said house property is lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but not in Survey No. 51/EE. As was already noticed supra, the revenue record filed by the petitioner itself has brought out that he has land of an extent of Ac.1.03 guntas lying in Survey No. 51/EE and land of an extent of Ac.0.15 guntas lying in Survey No. 51/AA. In which parcel of these two extents of land did the petitioner construct the house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 is a matter left for guessing by us. In the absence of any credible material, we will not be justified in returning a finding of fact that house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 was, in fact, lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but not in Survey No. 51/EE. Even otherwise, that being a controversy of fact, which can only be determined upon collection of evidence, both oral and documentary, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, seldom such collection of evidence is resorted to, in that, this Court is not forbidden from collecting any such evidence, but was not indulged in routinely.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO AND THE HONBLE DR. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO                  

WRIT PETITION No. 41006 OF 2015  

16-02-2016

Sri C. Malla Reddy ....Petitioner

The Authorized Officer, IDBI Bank Limited, Hyderabad & others..Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri K. Gopala Krishna Murthy

Counsel for Respondent No.3:Sri M.A. Mujeeb

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
AND
THE HONBLE DR. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO        

WRIT PETITION No. 41006 OF 2015  

O R D E R: (per Honble Sri Justice Nooty Ramamohana Rao)  
      This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeks a writ of mandamus for declaring the action of Respondents
1 and 2 in taking possession of the residential house bearing D.No.
1-5-230 situated in Survey No. 51/AA, Alwal Village, Malkajgiri
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, as arbitrary, illegal and
unconstitutional and hence, to direct Respondents 1 and 2
together with the 3rd respondent Advocate-Commissioner
appointed in Crl.M.P.No. 654 of 2015 on the file of the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar to
forthwith restore the possession of the house property described
supra to the petitioner and also to quash the proceedings initiated
by Respondents 1 and 2 under the Securitization and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 against the agricultural properties in Survey No.
51/EE, Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and
also to order for stay of all further proceedings initiated by
Respondents 1 and 2 under the provisions of the aforementioned
Act.
      The 4th respondent is stated to be a public limited company
carrying on business in software tracking including development of
required embedded software and mobile shopping software and
that it has availed certain financial assistance from the Industrial
Development Bank of India, whose Deputy General Manager is
impleaded as the 2nd respondent herein.  The financial benefits
availed comprised of two components; 1) a term loan limited to
Rs.4 crores; and 2) a cash credit loan limited to Rs.3.70 crores in
the year 2009.  The writ petitioner, in paragraph 6 of the affidavit
filed in support of this Writ Petition, would describe himself as a
nominal participant in the business of the said company and since
the bank has insisted, the petitioner has created an equitable
mortgage and secured the loan advanced to the 4th respondent
company. It is his specific case that he is an innocent 3rd party and
that he has been induced by the 4th respondent into creating the
security for the loan availed by it.  It is not in dispute that a
mortgage has been created by depositing the title deeds on
18.02.2009 for the land of an extent of Ac.1.03 guntas situated in
Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga
Reddy District.
      Annexure-I to the deed of mortgage dealt with the security
created by the petitioner herein and it reads as under:

      It is not in dispute that the credit facilities availed by the 4th
respondent company have remained un-liquidated and
consequently, the bank has declared the debt as a non-performing
asset.
      The Parliament, with a view to regulate securitization and
reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security
interest and for matters connected therewith and incidental
thereto, enacted  The Securitization and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(henceforth, for brevity referred to as the SARFAESI Act).  The
expression bank has been defined in Section 2(c) which includes a
banking company or the State Bank of India or any subsidiary
bank or a multi-state co-operative bank or such other bank which
the Central Government may, by notification, specify for the
purposes of this Act.  It is hardly in doubt that the bank in the
instant case answers this description as per the definition
contained in Section 2(c) of the Act.  Section 2(f) defined the
expression borrower in the following terms:
       borrower means any person who has been granted
financial assistance by any bank or financial institution or
who has given any guarantee or created any mortgage or
pledge as security for the financial assistance granted by any
bank or financial institution and include a person who
becomes borrower of a securitization company or
reconstruction company consequent upon acquisition by it of
any rights or interest of any bank or financial institution in
relation to such financial assistance.

Thus, going by the above said definition, whoever has given any
guarantee or created any mortgage or pledge as a security for the
financial assistance granted by any bank or financial institution  to
another person also becomes a borrower.   As was noticed by us
supra, the petitioner herein has created mortgage by depositing the
title deed for the land comprising of Ac.1.03 guntas lying in Survey
No. 51/EE of Alwal Village.  Hence, he is liable to be treated as a
borrower of the bank.
        The expression debt has been defined in Section 2(ha) to
carry the same meaning assigned to it in clause (g) of Section 2 of
the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993.  In that enactment, the said expression has been defined as
under:
        debt means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed
as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a
consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of
any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial
institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in
force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or
assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil
court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and
subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application.

From the above definition, there is hardly any doubt that there
exists a debt between the bank and the principal borrower, the 4th
respondent company.
      The expression default has been defined in Section 2(j) as
meaning  non-payment of any principal debt or interest thereon
or any other amount payable by a borrower to any secured creditor
consequent upon which the account of such borrower is classified
as non-performing asset in the books of account of the secured
creditor.  Therefore, the failure to liquidate the outstanding liability
by the 4th respondent principal borrower amounted to committing
a default.
       The expression financial asset has been defined in Section
2(l) in the following words:
         financial asset means debt or receivables and includes
i)      a claim to any debt or receivables or part thereof, whether
secured or unsecured; or
ii)     any debt or receivables secured by, mortgage of, or charge on,
immovable property; or
iii)    a mortgage, charge, hypothecation or pledge of movable
property; or
iv)     any right or interest in the security, whether full or part
underlying such debt or receivables; or
v)      any beneficial interest in property, whether movable or
immovable, or in such debt, receivables, whether such interest is
existing, future, accruing, conditional or contingent; or
vi)     any financial assistance.

Thus, any debt or receivables secured by mortgage of or charge on
immovable property amounts to a financial asset.
      The expression non-performing asset is defined in section
2(o) as under:
non-performing asset means an asset or account of a borrower,
which has been classified by a bank or financial institution as
substandard, doubtful or loss asset----
(a)     in case such bank or financial institution is administered or
regulated by any authority or body established, constituted or
appointed by any law for the time being in force, in accordance with
the directions or guidelines relating to assets classifications issued
by such authority or body;
(b)     in any other case, in accordance with the directions or guidelines
relating to assets classifications issued by the Reserve Bank.

While the expression property is defined in Section 2(t) as under:
       property means
(i)     immovable property;
(ii)    movable property;
(iii)   any debt or any right to receive payment of money, whether secured
or unsecured;
(iv)    receivables, whether existing or future;
(v)     intangible assets, being know-how, patent, copyright, trade mark,
licence, franchise or any other business or commercial right of
similar nature.

      Section 13 is included in Chapter - III of the SARFAESI Act,
which dealt with Enforcement of Security Interest.  Section 13
would set out that any security interest created in favour of any
secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of court
or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.  Thus, the SARFAESI Act is a special piece of legislation
made by the Parliament for achieving a special objective of
securing the enforcement of the security interest of the secured
creditor.  That is the reason why a special provision is created in
sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act by making it
clear that the security interest created in favour of any secured
creditor can be got enforced without the intervention of the Court.
The intention of the Parliament is so very clear that it wanted to
address the malady of the defaults committed by the borrowers in
repayment of the debt due by them, resulting in getting into the
very vitals of the secured creditors and more particularly financial
institutions including those in the banking sector.  Under
sub-section (2), the secured creditor, by delivering a notice, in
writing, to any borrower whose liability remained unpaid, can call
upon him to discharge in full such liabilities within 60 days. Even
after receipt of such a notice delivered under sub-section (2) of
Section 13, if the borrower does not honour the commitment by
discharging in full the liability and thus fails to do so, sub-section
(4) empowered the secured creditor to take recourse to one or the
other of the measures provided there under to recover his secured
debt.  Clause (a) thereof specified that the secured creditor may
take possession of the secured asset of the borrower including
right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing
the secured asset.  Thus, a secured creditor has been vested with a
special power to take possession of the secured asset of the
borrower and also liquidate it by way of sale for realizing the debt,
but however, if a secured creditor, entirely on his own, attempts to
take possession of any such secured asset, he might encounter
with resistance and sometimes it can also lead to unpleasant
situations, inasmuch as the actions of secured creditor can be
misunderstood as lacking any legal sanction and authority.
Therefore, with a view to address this area of concern, in Section
14, a separate mechanism has been contemplated and provided  
for.  Sub-section (1) of Section 14 empowers that the secured
creditor, who seeks to take possession of any secured asset, may,
for the purpose of taking possession or control of any such secured
asset, request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the
District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any such secured
asset may be situated, to take possession thereof. Whenever any
such application is received by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
or the District Magistrate, he is required to take possession of such
asset and then forward such asset to the secured creditor.  Thus,
wherever possession of a secured asset is sought to be taken by
the secured creditor, he is entitled to approach, in writing, the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate in whose
jurisdiction the secured asset was lying.
      In the instant case, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of
Ranga Reddy District is the appropriate and competent authority
to be approached by the bank, inasmuch as the secured asset in
question was lying within the jurisdiction of the said Court.
Hence, the bank appears to have approached the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar and
accordingly, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate entertained
Crl.M.P.No. 654 of 2015 and appointed the 3rd respondent
Advocate as Commissioner and entrusted the said Commissioner  
with the task of executing the warrant for taking possession of the
scheduled property.  The schedule of property, which is drawn by
the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and entrusted for the
purpose of taking possession of the property, is described as
under:
       Schedule of Property
All that piece and parcel of land admeasuring acres 1.03
guntas in Sy.No. 51/EE situated at Alwal Village, Malkajgiri
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and bounded by:
North           : Neighbors Land
South           : Road
East            : Neighbors Land
West            : Neighbors Land

      This schedule is exactly tallying with that contained in
Annexure-I to the mortgage created by the petitioner on
18.02.2009 in favour of the bank excepting to the following extent:
       together with all structures thereon and all the things
attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth

The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in our considered opinion, has
not committed any error in exercise of power and jurisdiction in
rendering the necessary assistance under sub-section (1) of
Section 14 to the secured creditor, namely the bank, for taking
possession  of the mortgaged property and then, entrusting the
warrant for execution to the 3rd respondent. The provision
contained under sub-section (1) of Section 14 clearly comprises of
two different steps; the first step which is liable to be undertaken
by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is to secure the
possession of the secured asset. Then, the second step is to make
over the possession of the secured asset to the secured creditor.
For achieving the said objective, a Commissioner can be appointed.
The Commissioner, in fact, discharges the functions of the Court
itself, but however, he does it on its behalf as the Court itself need
not travel to the place where the secured asset was lying.  For this
purpose, a warrant is liable to be drawn and issued, so that the
Commissioner can demonstrate his lawful authority to take
possession of the secured asset.  By holding such a lawful
authority, the Commissioner can also neutralize effectively any
resistance, which can be offered in execution of the warrant
entrusted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District
Magistrate, as the case may be.   The warrant has got to be
returned to the Court by way of submission of a report.  For this
purpose, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in the instant
case, directed the Commissioner to execute the warrant and return
it along with the inventory list on or before 26.10.2015, when he
passed the order in Crl.M.P.No. 654 of 2015 on 09.10.2015.  By a
separate order, dated 04.11.2015, the learned Magistrate extended
the said time limit up to 29.12.2015.  Accordingly, the Advocate-
Commissioner appears to have taken possession of the secured
asset on 26.11.2015.  A necessary report in that regard was drawn
by the learned Advocate-Commissioner on 01.12.2015 and filed it
before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
      The grievance of the petitioner is that the Advocate-
Commissioner, instead of strictly proceeding in terms of and in
accordance with the warrant entrusted by the learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, has travelled beyond the scope of the said
warrant and took possession of the house property of the petitioner
bearing D.No. 1-5-230 situated in Survey No. 51/AA, Alwal Village,
Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.  It is in that context and
backdrop, the present Writ Petition with the prayers as noticed by
us has been instituted.
      Heard Sri K. Gopal Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Mujeeb, learned counsel representing the 3rd
respondent Advocate-Commissioner.  None appears for the
respondent bank.
      Sri Gopal Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner
would principally contend that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act
could not have been invoked by the respondent bank, at the first
instance, inasmuch as the secured asset is an agricultural land
and hence, it is exempted from being proceeded against.
Therefore, there was a fundamental error of jurisdiction committed
in invoking Section 14 of the Act and consequently, the exercise of
jurisdiction by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate also lacks
the necessary authority and sanction of law.  In support of this
contention, the learned counsel has drawn our pointed attention to
Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act, which clearly spelt out that the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to, amongst others, any
security interest created in agricultural land.  Therefore, the first
and the foremost question, which we are now called upon to
decide, is whether the security interest created in the instant case
is the one created in agricultural land or merely in land.
      We have already noticed that the petitioner is the one, who
has created the security interest in land comprising of Ac.1.03
guntas in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal,
Ranga Reddy District by creating a mortgage and also by
depositing the title deed thereof.  There is no dispute on this score.
Annexure-I to the mortgage deed dated 18.02.2009 executed and
signed by the petitioner herein, inter alia, describes, in detail, the
security interest so created. The very opening words contained
therein hold the key to the present question when they described
as under:
               All that piece and parcel of land admeasuring Acre
1.03 guntas in  Sy.No. 51/EE situated at Alwal Village,
Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in the State of
Andhra Pradesh bounded as ..  

This document has clearly described the secured asset as land
admeasuring Acre.1.03 guntas but not specified it as agricultural
land admeasuring Ac.1.03 guntas.  Nowhere, the land was 
described as agricultural land. This apart, immediately after the
description of the extent of land, the following expressions are used
in Annexure-I of the mortgage deed:

        together with all structures thereon and all the things
attached to the earth..                  (Emphasis is placed now)

Therefore, the petitioner, while creating a security interest by way
of creating a mortgage in favour of the bank, has himself gone on
record that there are structures standing on this land of Ac.1.03
guntas lying in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village and by his not
describing the said land as agricultural land, he cannot now be
permitted to turn round and contend to the contra that he has
created security interest in agricultural land in contrast to mere
land.
        This apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in support
of his plea that the land in question is agricultural land, but not
non-agricultural land, pressed into service the revenue record in
the form of Pahanis and other documents obtained for the relevant
years.  It is true that the Pahanis and other village account has
clearly brought out that the petitioner possesses land to the extent
of Ac.1.03 guntas situated in Survey No. 51/EE, Alwal Village and
also he possesses Ac.0.15 guntas of land in Survey No. 51/AA of
the same village.  When we look at the provisions of the Andhra
Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, it
emerges that the expression land which is defined in sub-section
(4) of Section 2 of that enactment, brings out that land means land
which is used or is capable of being used for the purpose of
agriculture, including horticulture, but does not include land used
exclusively for non-agricultural purposes. Thus, if the land is also
capable of being used for agricultural purposes, but not
necessarily being used for agricultural purposes as such, it also
answers the description of the expression land found mentioned
in the said Act. Therefore, the record is prepared under Section 3
of the said enactment of every land, which is merely capable of
being used for agricultural or horticulture purposes, but not
necessarily being used as it is for the said purpose.  Therefore, we
have no difficulty to reject the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that since revenue record maintained under the
aforementioned 1971 Act has been produced by him, it has to be
invariably inferred that the security interest created by the
petitioner in favour of the bank is relating to agricultural land and
hence, the provisions contained under Section 31 of the SARFAESI 
Act should come to his rescue.  Only when a security interest is
specifically created describing the security interest as agricultural
land, then alone, the benefit of Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act will
enure to such creator of interest, but not otherwise. This apart, as
we have already noted supra, sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act has contained two separate limbs; one is taking
possession of the secured asset and the next step is making over
the said asset to the secured creditor.
        At the stage of making over the possession of the secured
interest to the secured creditor, any person, whose interests are
adversely impacted in the process of taking possession by the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may
be, acting on its own or acting though a Commissioner appointed
for the said purpose, is entitled to file his objections for recording
the fact of taking possession of the land (secured asset).  When any
such memorandum of objections has been drawn and presented    
before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate,
as the case may be, the said Court is bound to consider the same
and pass an appropriate order.  In the instant case, no such
memorandum of objections has been drawn by the petitioner or 
filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.  Therefore, the
statement made by the Advocate-Commissioner in her affidavit
filed before us, clearly brings out, in paragraph 3, that she has
identified the scheduled property and executed the warrant and
further went on to assert that the petitioner, his servants, his wife
and several others stated that the house bearing D.No. 1-5-230
situated in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal,
Ranga Reddy District belongs to the petitioner herein.  We have to
go by her statement of fact that the said house bearing D.No.
1-5-230 is, in fact, lying in Survey No. 51/EE, but not in Survey
No. 51/AA.  This apart, the learned Advocate-Commissioner has 
also recorded, in paragraph 3 of her affidavit, that the petitioner
never filed any work order (memo) before her requiring her to
execute the warrant by any method specified in the work memo. 
In the absence of any such material to the contra, the conduct of
the Advocate-Commissioner in taking possession of the building
bearing D.No. 1-5-230 cannot be objected to or found fault with.
        Even otherwise, there is no credible material that was placed
on record of this Court to show that the house bearing
D.No. 1-5-230 is actually lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but is not
lying in Survey No. 51/EE of Alwal Village. The fact that the house
property has been assessed to property tax by the local
municipality/corporation, does not necessarily reflect that the said
house property is lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but not in Survey No.
51/EE.  As was already noticed supra, the revenue record filed by
the petitioner itself has brought out that he has land of an extent
of Ac.1.03 guntas lying in Survey No. 51/EE and land of an extent
of Ac.0.15 guntas lying in Survey No. 51/AA. In which parcel of
these two extents of land did the petitioner construct the house
bearing D.No. 1-5-230 is a matter left for guessing by us.  In the
absence of any credible material, we will not be justified in
returning a finding of fact that house bearing D.No. 1-5-230 was,
in fact, lying in Survey No. 51/AA, but not in Survey No. 51/EE.
Even otherwise, that being a controversy of fact, which can only be
determined upon collection of evidence, both oral and
documentary, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, seldom such collection of evidence is resorted to, in
that, this Court is not forbidden from collecting any such evidence,
but was not indulged in routinely.
      For the aforesaid reasons, we are not in a position to accede
to the request made by the petitioner and consequently, we
dismiss this Writ Petition, but however, without costs, leaving it to
the petitioner to work out his remedies in accordance with law.
      Consequently, the miscellaneous applications, if any shall
also stand dismissed.
-----------------------------------------
NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J        
----------------------------------------
DR. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO, J    
16th February 2016

A.P. Schedule Areas Land Transfer Regulations= There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. & Leave and Licence = Permitting Bhadrachalam Board to seed Plantations in the land of petitioner on reciprocal benefit process - is not a transfer of land or interest therein to others - can not be order for eviction = Regulations 2 (g) and 3(2)(a)&(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, which read as under: Section 2(g): Transfer means mortgage with or without possession lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other dealing with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing. Section 3 (2)(a): Where a transfer of immovable property is made in contravention of sub-section (1), the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other prescribed Officer may, on application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant, or suo moto decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due notice to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the transfer or his heirs. Section 3(2)(b): If the transferer or his heirs are not willing to take back the property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case may be, may order the assignment or sale of the property to any other member of a Scheduled Tribe (or a society registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to Co-operative Societies for the time being inforce in the State) composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was a property at the disposal of State Government. As per the recitals in the agreement of leave and licence, dated 27-02-1990 the first party (petitioner herein) is the absolute owner with exclusive possession of 123.48 Hectors (305 acres of land) situated in Sy.No.287/18 of Chirramalla village, Pinapaka mandal, Khammam District and the 1st party is desirous of raising Eucalyptus trees/pulpwood plantations suitable as raw material for manufacture of paper and paperboards. It is further stipulated in the said leave and licence agreement that the 2nd party (Bhadrachalam Paper Board) has requisite knowledge and expertise in industrial pulpwood plantations and management thereof by introducing modern methods and by making use of modern advanced and sophisticated technology in development of land, crop management, in providing irrigation potential, water distribution and conservation and proper use of water, in providing inputs for better and healthy crop and in protection and preservation of crop from pests and wastage, etc. It is further clear from the agreement that the 1st party petitioner herein approached the 2nd party Bhadrachalam Paper Board with a request to take up plantation management on his/her land and as a quid pro quo therefore has further offered to sell the eventual produce of the plantation on his land to the 2nd party on the terms and conditions enumerated in the agreement. It is further clear from the agreement that for the purpose of carrying out plantation management the 1st party/petitioner herein agreed to grant an irrevocable licence to the 2nd party to enter upon the land and to do all acts, deeds, matters and things as are necessary to carry out the said plantation management. As per Clause 4 of the agreement the 1st party will have right to do inter-crop cultivation between the tree-planting lines without, damaging or interfering with the tree-seedlings, for which the 2nd party will not have any objection. It is also evident from Clause 11 of the agreement that the ownership and possession of the schedule land shall always remain and be deemed to remain with the 1st party/petitioner herein and no transfer of interest of any kind in the schedule land shall or shall be deemed to take place at any time from the 1st party to the 2nd party. In the instant case also the recitals clearly show that the petitioner did neither lose the possession of the property nor parted with the same in order to indulge in any transaction which attracts the prohibition as contained under the Regulations. In absence of the necessary and mandatory ingredients as contained in Section 2 (g) of the Regulations, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be concluded that the transaction is hit by the Regulations. Another vital aspect, which cannot be lost sight of is that the petitioner is undertaking welfare activities in the agency area for the tribal people, which fact is not disputed by the respondents. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the orders impugned in the present writ petition are unsustainable and untenable as the transaction in the instant case does not fall under the definition of transfer as defined under Section 2 (g) of the Regulations. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed, setting aside the orders of the 1st respondent State Government issued vide G.O.Ms.No.43 Social Welfare (LTR-2) Department, dated 16-05-2006, confirming the orders of the Agent to Government, dated 27-02-1990 and the orders of the Special Deputy Collector, dated 30-09-1993. There shall be no order as to costs.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI    

WRIT PETITION No.15824 of 2006

09-02-2016

A.P. Gandhi Smaraka Nidhi, Rep. by Jr. Secretary, Gandhi Gyan Mandir, Sultan
Bazar, Hyderabad        ... PETITIONER

Government of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by Principal Secretary,  Social Welfare
Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others  RESPONDENTS    

Counsel for petitioner  : Sri V. Hari Haran

Counsel for Respondents: GP for Social Welfare

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred

1.AIR 1959 SC 1262
2.AIR 1988 SC 184
3.AIR 1991 Kerla 281
4.AIR 1925 Mad. 434


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI    

WRIT PETITION No.15824 of 2006

 ORDER:
      The issue in the present writ petition arises under A.P.
Schedule Areas Land Transfer Regulations. In the present
writ petition challenge is to the order of the State Government
issued vide G.O.Ms.No.43 Social Welfare (LTR-2) Department,
dated 16-05-2006. By virtue of the said order, the 1st
respondent  State Government confirmed the orders passed
by the District Collector/Agent to Government, Khammam
and the Spl. Deputy Collector.
      The subject matter of the writ petition is the land
admeasuring 123.48 Hectors situated in Sy.No.287/18 of 
Chirramalla village, Pinapaka mandal, Khammam District.
On the report submitted by the Mandal Revenue Officer
(Tahsildar), Pinapaka Mandal the Special Deputy Collector
pressed into service the provisions of A.P. Schedule Areas
Land Transfer Regulations (hereinafter called, Regulations)
and passed an order, dated 30-09-1993 in case
No.83/93/PNK, directing the Mandal Revenue Officer,
Pinapaka to take over the possession of the subject land on
the ground of violation and contravention of Regulations.
      As against the said order of ejectment, the petitioner
preferred appeal before the Agent to Government/District
Collector and the District Collector by virtue of an order,
dated 25-02-1994 dismissed the said appeal vide
C.M.A.No.17 of 1993. 
      Assailing the said orders passed by the primary and
appellate authorities the petitioner preferred revision before
the State Government. The 1st respondent  State
Government vide G.O.Ms.No.43, dated 16-05-2006 dismissed
the said revision filed by the petitioner. The said orders of the
primary, appellate and revisional authorities are under
challenge in the present writ petition.
      This Court while ordering rule nisi on 31-07-2006 in
W.P.M.P.No.19730 of 2006 granted interim stay.
      Heard Sri V. Hari Haran, learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare
for respondents, apart from perusing the material available
before this Court.
      Submissions/contentions of the learned counsel for the
petitioner:
1.      The orders passed by the respondent authorities are
erroneous, contrary to law and opposed to the very spirit
and object of the provisions of Regulations.
2.      Having held that the special leave and licence agreement
is inadmissible in evidence, the authorities ought to have
held in favour of the petitioner.
3.      The leave and licence is not a transfer of interest in the
property and the same would not fall under the
definition of transfer as defined under the Regulations.
4.      The respondent authorities ought to have appreciated
that no possession of the property much less any title
was transferred to the 4th respondent under the leave
and licence agreement. 
5.      Various clauses in the leave and licence agreement
categorically demonstrate titular and possessory rights
of the petitioner only.
6.      The authorities ought to have seen that the petitioner
itself is an organization working for the welfare of the
Tribals, as such, the question of the petitioner
transferring any right to a non-tribal does not arise.
7.      The authorities failed to note that the agreement by itself
does not have the effect of deviating the object of
Regulations. The reasoning of authorities to treat the
leave and licence agreement under the category of other
dealing as stipulated under Section 2 (g) of Regulation
is only erroneous and in-correct.

      In support of his submissions and contentions the
learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the
following judgments:
1.      AIR 1959 SC 1262. (paragraph Nos.32, 33 and 36)
2.      AIR 1988 SC 184. (paragraphNos.9, 10 and 14)
3.      AIR 1991 KER 281. (paragraph Nos.4, 5 and 8)
4.      AIR 1925 Mad 434 (paragraph Nos.2, 3 and 4)

      The submissions/contentions of learned Government
Pleader:
1.      There is no illegality nor there exists any infirmity in the
orders under challenge, as such, the present writ petition
is not maintainable and the petitioner is not entitled for
any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
2.      The subject transaction between the petitioner and
Bhadrachalam Paper Board falls under the definition of
transfer as defined under Clause 2 (g) of the Regulations,
as such, the same falls under the prohibition as
contained under Clause 3 of the Regulations.
3.      Since the orders impugned are supported by valid and
cogent reasons, the same are not amenable for any
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
4.      Impugned orders are strictly in accordance with the
Regulations, as such, the present writ petition has no
merit and is liable to be dismissed.

        In the above backdrop, the issues that boil down for
consideration of this Court are:
1.      Whether the questioned orders are in accordance with the A.P.
Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulations?
2.      Whether the transaction between the petitioner and the
Bhadrachalam Paper Board is hit by the provisions of the
Regulations.
3.      Whether the petitioner herein is entitled for any relief from this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

        The information available before this Court reveals that
the petitioner and the Bhadrachalam Paper Board entered
into an un-registered leave and licence on 27-02-1990. On
the ground that the said transaction amounts to transfer as
defined under Regulation 2(g) of the Regulations thereby
attracts the prohibition contained under Regulation 3,
respondent authorities passed the questioned orders.
        On the otherhand, it is the case of the petitioner
precisely that the said transaction in between the petitioner
and the 5th respondent does not fall under the said
prohibitory regulations.
      In order to examine the above said issues and for
arriving at just and correct conclusions, it may be apt and
appropriate to refer to the relevant recitals in the said
agreement of leave and licence, dated 27-02-1990. Clauses 2,
3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 16 of the said agreement of leave and
licence read as under:
2. The FIRST PARTY agrees to grant an irrevocable
licence to the SECOND PARTY to carry out the  
plantation management as envisaged in these presents 
on the Scheduled Land, subject to the terms and
conditions hereof, and the SECOND PARTY agrees to   
take up the said plantation management in the manner 
set out hereunder and subject to the terms and
conditions of these presents.

3.      For the purpose of and in the course of carrying
out the plantation management, the FIRST PARTY   
hereby agrees that the SECOND PARTY shall and is   
hereby permitted to do the following for and on behalf
and for the benefit of the FIRST PARTY:

a) to carry out survey of the Scheduled Land and make
appropriate plots or partitions, as may be required for
the purpose of carrying out these presents;                     
        
b) to level and develop the Scheduled Land including
digging and excavation in a scientific manner and
employing modern techniques;                                    
        
c) to carry out all such operations and to do all such
acts, deeds and things as are necessary for and
incidental to the plantation management envisaged
under these presents;                                           
        
d) to erect necessary temporary structures as are
required for the purpose on the Schedule Land;          
        
e) to bring such machinery and tools and tackles for the
purpose of digging wells, laying pipes, and to provide
sprinklers and such other equipment on the Schedule
Land as are necessary for the purpose;                  
        
f) to provide for suitable storage tank on the Schedule
Land for storing water for plantation operations and
management;                                                     
        
g) to install requisite irrigation equipment, dig channels,
trenches, lay pipes, etc., on the Schedule Land;                
        
h) to install pumps, electric poles, electrical equipment
and lay the power lines on the Schedule Land;           
        
i) to bring and operate on the Schedule Land
mechanized and other transport vehicles for purposes of
carrying out the plantation management;                 
        
j) to bring water from adjacent lands and other sources
by such means as are convenient and economical to  
create water facilities for the plantation operations;  
                
k) to provide for suitable fence and stockades on the
Schedule Land, as may become necessary and    
incidental in order to protect the Schedule Land and the
plantations, and the requisite equipment, implements,
etc., in the course of carrying out of the said plantation
management, and                                                         
        
l) to do all other acts, deeds, matters and things as are
incidental and ancillary to the operations envisaged in
these presents for the purpose of effectively carrying out
the plantation management. 

4.      The FIRST PARTY will have right to do inter-crop
cultivation between the tree-planting lines without,
however, damaging or interfering with the tree-
seedlings, for which the SECOND PARTY will not have  
any objection.

 

7.      In consideration of the FIRST PARTY agreeing to
sell the ultimate yield coming from the Schedule Land at
the end of each 7-year period as envisaged in these
presents and the SECOND PARTY being thus assured of  
the steady and sustained supply of the raw material
required by it for its manufacturing operations, and
further the FIRST PARTY having agreed to sell the said
material at the pre-agreed firm rates as mentioned in
Clause (5) above irrespective of the market price of such
material at the end of each such 7-year period, the
SECOND PARTY agrees to bear all the expenses that
are required to be incurred by the FIRST PARTY for the
operations contemplated under these presents and shall
not lay any claim on the FIRST PARTY on this account,
subject, however, to Clause (14) infra.

8.      The SECOND PARTY shall, at the end of each
year of leave and licence herein contemplated, furnish
to the FIRST PARTY a statement of account detailing the
expenditure incurred by the SECOND PARTY in carrying
out the plantation management as envisaged in these
presents upon the Schedule Land, and obtain from the
FIRST PARTY an acknowledgment thereon.  

 

11.     It is specifically understood and agreed by both
the parties that notwithstanding anything contained in
these presents, the ownership and possession of the
Schedule Land shall always remain and be deemed to  
remain with the FIRST PARTY. It is also specifically
understood and agreed that no transfer of interest of
any kind in the Schedule Land shall or shall be deemed
to take place at any time from the FIRST PARTY to the
SECOND PARTY by virtue of these presents. The FIRST    
PARTY shall be responsible for regular payment of all
taxes, cesses, assessment and other outgoings on the 
Schedule Land. 

 

16.     It is mutually agreed that at the end of the
agreement period as envisaged in Clause (1) above, the
SECOND PARTY, if desired by the FIRST PARTY, leaves     
the stumps on the Scheduled Land, free of any
compensation therefor. Likewise, the SECOND PARTY    
agrees to leave all the structures of immovable nature
and improvements made on and attached to the  
Schedule Land, against payment at their book value.
      The Regulations relevant and pertinent for the present
case on hand are:
      Regulations 2 (g) and 3(2)(a)&(b) of the Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, which read 
as under:
Section 2(g): Transfer means mortgage with or without
possession lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other
dealing with immovable property, not being a
testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such
property or a contract relating to such property in
respect of such mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or
other dealing.

Section 3 (2)(a): Where a transfer of immovable
property is made in contravention of sub-section (1), the
Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other
prescribed Officer may, on application by any one
interested, or on information given in writing by a public
servant, or suo moto decree ejectment against any
person in possession of the property claiming under the
transfer, after due notice to him in the manner
prescribed and may restore it to the transfer or his
heirs.

Section 3(2)(b): If the transferer or his heirs are not
willing to take back the property or where their
whereabouts are not known, the Agent, the Agency 
Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case may
be, may order the assignment or sale of the property to
any other member of a Scheduled Tribe (or a society
registered or deemed to be registered under any law
relating to Co-operative Societies for the time being
inforce in the State) composed solely of members of the
Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was
a property at the disposal of State Government.

      As per the recitals in the agreement of leave and licence,
dated 27-02-1990 the first party (petitioner herein) is the
absolute owner with exclusive possession of 123.48 Hectors
(305 acres of land) situated in Sy.No.287/18 of Chirramalla
village, Pinapaka mandal, Khammam District and the 1st 
party is desirous of raising Eucalyptus trees/pulpwood
plantations suitable as raw material for manufacture of paper
and paperboards. It is further stipulated in the said leave and
licence agreement that the 2nd party (Bhadrachalam Paper 
Board) has requisite knowledge and expertise in industrial
pulpwood plantations and management thereof by  
introducing modern methods and by making use of modern   
advanced and sophisticated technology in development of
land, crop management, in providing irrigation potential,
water distribution and conservation and proper use of water,
in providing inputs for better and healthy crop and in
protection and preservation of crop from pests and wastage,
etc. It is further clear from the agreement that the 1st party 
petitioner herein approached the 2nd party  Bhadrachalam
Paper Board with a request to take up plantation
management on his/her land and as a quid pro quo therefore
has further offered to sell the eventual produce of the
plantation on his land to the 2nd party on the terms and
conditions enumerated in the agreement. It is further clear
from the agreement that for the purpose of carrying out
plantation management the 1st party/petitioner herein agreed
to grant an irrevocable licence to the 2nd party to enter upon
the land and to do all acts, deeds, matters and things as are
necessary to carry out the said plantation management.
      As per Clause 4 of the agreement the 1st party will have
right to do inter-crop cultivation between the tree-planting
lines without, damaging or interfering with the tree-seedlings,
for which the 2nd party will not have any objection. It is also
evident from Clause 11 of the agreement that the ownership
and possession of the schedule land shall always remain and
be deemed to remain with the 1st party/petitioner herein and
no transfer of interest of any kind in the schedule land shall
or shall be deemed to take place at any time from the 1st party
to the 2nd party.
      In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the
judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
In case of Associated Hotels Of India Limited v.
R.N. Kapoor , the Honble Apex Court held at paragraph
Nos.32, 33 and 36 as under:
32.    There is a marked distinction between a lease
and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property
Act defines a lease of immoveable property as a
transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a
certain time in consideration for a price paid or
promised. Under s. 108 of the said Act, the lessee is
entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease
is there-' fore a transfer of an interest in land. The
interest, transferred is called the leasehold interest. The
lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during
the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the
lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor.
Whereas s. 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a
licence thus :
"Where one person grants to another, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do
in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor,
something which would, in the absence of such right, be
unlawful, and such right does not amount to an
easement or an interest in the property, the right is
called a licence."
33.     Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives
only a right to use the property in a particular way or
under certain terms while it remains in possession and
control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The
legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the
owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to
make use of the premises for a particular purpose'. But
for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It
does not create in his favour any estate or interest n the
property. There is, therefore, cleat distinction between
the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though
sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred. At one
time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession
was infalliable and if a person was given exclusive
possession of a premises, it would conclusively
establish that he was a lessee. But there was a change
and the recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in
Errington v. Errington [1952] 1 All E.R. 149, wherein
Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject
summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p. 155:
"The result of all these cases is that, although a person
who is let into exclusive possession is prima facie, to be
considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held
to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to
create a tenancy."
   
36.     The following propositions may, therefore, be
taken as well-established: (1) To ascertain whether a
document creates a licence or lease, the substance of
the document must be preferred to the form ; (2) the real
test is the intention of the parties-whether they intended
to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates
an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only
permits another to make use of the property, of which
the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a
licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets
exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is
considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be
established which negative the intention to create a
lease. Judged by the said tests, it is not possible to hold
that the document is one of licence. Certainly it does not
confer only a bare personal privilege on the respondent
to make use of the rooms. It puts him in exclusive
possession of them, untrammelled by the control and
free from the directions of the appellants. The covenants
are those that are usually found or expected to be
included in a lease deed. The right of the respondent to
transfer his interest under the document, although with
the consent of the appellants, is destructive of any
theory of licence. The solitary circumstance that the
rooms let out in the present case are situated in a
building wherein a hotel is run cannot make any
difference in the character of the holding. The intention
of the parties is clearly manifest, and the clever
phraseology used or the ingenuity of the document-
writer hardly conceals the real intent. I, therefore, hold
that under the document there was transfer of a right to
enjoy the two rooms, and, therefore, it created a
tenancy in favour of the respondent.

      In case of Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v. Tufelhussein
Samasbhai Sarangpurwala , the Honble Apex Court held at
paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 14 as under:
9.     In support of this appeal Sree R.F. Nariman very
laboriously took us through the documents. He
submitted that the document in question in the instant
case read as a whole was lease and not a licence. He
referred us to the decision of this Court in the case of
Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, [1960] 1
S.C.R. 368 where at page 383 this Court noted that
there was a marked distinction between a lease and a
licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 defined a lease of immovable property as a
transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a
certain time in consideration of a price paid or promised.
Under section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled
to be put in possession of the property. A lease involves
a transfer of an interest in land, Subba Rao, J. as the
learned Chief Justice then was, observed in that case.
This Court referred to the well-known decision in the
case of Errington v. Errington, [1952] 1 All E.R. 149
where Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the
subject summarized the position as follows:
"The result of all these cases is that, although a person
who is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be
considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held
to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to
create a tenancy."
The Court of Appeal in England again in Cobb v. Lane,
[1952] 1 All E.R. 1199 considered the legal position and
laid down that the intention of the parties was the real
test for ascertaining the character of a document.
Somervell, L.J., had observed:
"... The solution that would seem to have been found is,
as one would expect, that it must depend on the
intention of the parties."
Denning, L.J. also reiterated the same decision.
Reviewing these decisions Denning, L.J. had observed
at page 384 of the report (1) that to ascertain whether a
document created a licence or lease, the substance of
the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real
test was the intention of the parties-whether they
intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the
document created an interest in the property, it is a
lease; but if it only permitted another to make use of the
property, of which the legal possession continued with
the owner, it was a licence; and (4) if under the
document a party got exclusive possession of the
property, prima facie, he was considered to be a tenant;
but circumstances might be established which negative
the intention to create a lease.

10.     Mr. R.F. Nariman very strenuously relied on the
decision of this Court in Mrs. M.N. Clubwala and
another v. Fida Hussain Saheb and others, [1964] 6
S.C.R. 642 at page 653. This Court emphasised the if
the exclusive possession to which a person was entitled
under an agreement with a landlord was coupled with
an interest in the property, the agreement would be
construed not as a mere licence but as a lease. Mr.
Nariman's point was that the facts of the case were
identical to the facts of the present case. Our attention
was drawn to a decision of the Bombay High Court in
the case of Sohanlal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath
Gadit, (68 Bombay Law Reporter 400) where Tarkunde,
J. Observed that the intention of the parties and
exclusive possession were important elements. This
decision was approved in appeal by this Court in Sohan
Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit, [1971] 3
S.C.R. 319 where this Court reiterated that the test of
exclusive possession was important point. He drew our
attention to the observations of Shah, C.J. at page 321
of the Report. Reliance was also placed on the
observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in the decision of
Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, [1974] 2
S.C.R. 530 where at page 533 of the report Krishna
Iyer, J. Observed that there is no simple litmus test to
distinguish a lease as defined in section 105, Transfer
of Property Act from licence as defined in section 52 of
the Easements Act, but the character of the transaction
turns on the operative intent of the parties. To put
precisely if an interest in immovable property entitling
the transferee to enjoyment was created, it was a lease;
if permission to use land without exclusive possession
was alone granted, a licence was the legal result. we
are of the opinion that this was a licence and not a
lease as we discover the intent. For this purpose
reference may be made to the language used and the
restrictions put upon the use of the premises in question
by the appellant. In the document in question the
expression "licence" was introduced and clause (2) said
that it was only for the business purposes. The licence
fee was fixed. It permitted user only for 20 hours.
Restriction in the hours of work negates the case for a
lease. Clause (12) is significant which gave to the
licensor the right to enter upon the premises and inspect
the same at any time. In our opinion the background of
the facts of this case and the background of the entire
document negate the contention of the appellant that it
was a lease and not a licence.
     
14.     In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are clearly
of the opinion that in view of the intention of the parties
in the document and the facts and circumstances of this
case, it was a licence and not a lease. We need not
detain ourselves with the question of estoppel upon
which very interesting arguments were advanced before
us by Mr. Nariman is noted above.

      In case of T.K. Jacob v. Gracykutty and others , the
Kerala High Court held in paragraph Nos.4, 5 and 8 as under:
4. The recent decision of the Supreme Court on the
subject is reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845(RajbirKaurv.
M/s. Chokosiriand Co.). Venkatachaliah, J. speaking for
the Bench consisting of Chief Justice and himself has
articulately and lucidly considered the question
referring to the fundamental principles, in the decisions
of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said (at page
1850 of AIR 1988 SC):--
"Exclusive possession itself is not decisive in favour of a
lease and against a mere licence, for, even the grant of
exclusive possession might turn out to be only a licence
and not a lease where the grantor himself has no power
to grant the lease. In the last analysis the question
whether a transaction is a lease or a licence "turns on
the operative intention of the parties" and that there is
no single., simple litmus test to distinguish one from the
other."
5. The property in question is an extent of 90 cents. It is
within the Municipal Corporation limits. The document
shows that in the property, there were trees and the
executant reserved his rights to take the yield of the
trees. The document is Ext. Bl. It is dt. 31-3-1967. As
per the document, defendant obtained certain rights
stated in the document and for that, he has agreed to
pay a remuneration (rent) of Rs. 350/ - per mensum for
the first five years and thereafter, for the next five years
Rs. 375/-. Thus the period fixed in Ext. Bl is ten years.
Of course, there is a clause that after ten years, if the
first defendant wants, the period can be extended on a
rent to be fixed on mutual agreement of the parties. In
the document, it is stated that the property is taken for
a commercial purpose, to wit, stacking timber. It is also
provided in the document that necessary sheds can be
constructed by the defendant for facilitating the
commercial purpose of the defendant. , There it is stated
that he is allowed to do it as a licensee and further it is
provided that after the expiry of the period, the
structures Court by the defendant have to be removed
by him and vacant possession of the property has to be
given to the owner of the property --Vakkachan.
 
8.      In Quadrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality (AIR
1974 SC 396), Krishna lyer, J. had occasion to consider
the question in detail. This decision has been referred to
in -AIR 1988 SC 1845. Krishna lyer, J. said that . "there
is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease as defined
in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act from a
licence as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act,
but the character of the transactions turns on the
operative intent of the parties. To put it pithily, if an
interest in immovable property, entitling the transferors
to enjoyment, is created, it is a lease; if permission to
use land without right to exclusive possession is alone
granted, a licence is the legal right."

        In case of the Acting Secretary, Board of Revenue
(Separate Revenue) v. the Agent, South Indian Railway
Company Limited , the Madras High Court held in paragraph
Nos.2 to 5 as under:
2. Ordinarily a lease is a grant of property for a time by
one who has a greater interest in the property, the
consideration being usually the payment of rent. A
license, on the other hand, is a permission to do some
act which, without such permission, it would be
unlawful to do. All the cases to which we have been
referred make the distinction between a lease and a
license to depend upon whether sole and exclusive
occupation is given.
3. Now, the document in its terms contains a number of
restrictions which might be consistent with the grant of
a lease but which collectively indicate in my opinion
that what was granted was a license. The drawer of the
document was evidently anxious to avoid giving a lease
so as not to contravene the instructions of the
Government of India that Railway Companies have no
permission to lease lands in their possession without
the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Throughout
the document the person who is given possession is
called a "licensee," and in Clause 12 there is an express
provision that "nothing herein contained shall be
construed to create a tenancy in favour of the licensee."
The fact that certain clauses of the agreement impose
conditions which would be ordinarily implied by the
grant of a license but would be exceptions to the grant
of a lease, does not necessarily indicate that it is a
lease. These clauses were probably inserted ex
abundante cautela; for instance, under Clause 4 " The
licensee shall allow the General Traffic Manager . . . or
any one authorised by him in this behalf free access at
all times to the said land." Clause 1 makes the use of
the land subject to any regulations or by-laws as may
from time to time be passed. Under Clause 2 the
licensee is prohibited from erecting any building on the
land. Under Clause 3 he cannot allow the land to be
used for any other goods but his own. Under Clause 6
there is an agreement to pay rent, but that of itself will
not make the document a lease. It is simply a misuse of
the term to call it "rent "instead of "fees" if it is not a
lease. Clause 10 further provides for the "privileges," as
they are termed, not being transferred or sub-let without
the consent of the General Traffic Manager. Clause 11
provides for the license being revocable on 15 days'
notice on either side. Finally, the document is one
signed by both parties to the agreement and is not a
unilateral deed. All these terms which I have quoted
indicate that the merchants were not given the sole and
exclusive occupation of the plots of ground upon which
they were to deposit the coal.
4. That being so, the intention of the parties as gathered
from the document is against its being construed as a
demise of an interest in property. The ground put
forward by the Agent of the Railway for holding that the
document is a license rather than a lease, namely, that
in every lease the lessor should have a legal right to
lease out the land, does not affect my judgment. Even a
person without a title to land may execute what
purports to be a lease of that land. The test is not the
right of the lessor to give the lease, but the interest
intended by him to be created by the document. The fact
however that the Railway Company is prohibited by
orders of the Government of India from executing leases
of lands in their possession is important for
understanding the intention of the framer of the
document as showing that the Company would be
naturally averse to giving away any rights that ought to
be reserved. A number of cases have been quoted
before us, but the two which to my mind appear to have
most bearing on the question are Frank Warr and Co.,
Ltd. v. London County Council (1904) 1 KB 713, where
the use of refreshment rooms was given by the lessees
of a Theatre, and Sweetmeat Automatic Delivery Co. v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1895) 1 QB 484,
where automatic machines were placed on the platform
of Railway Stations. In both these cases the permission
given was held to fall short of a lease for the reason
that no interest in land was given by the agreements.

5. Coming now to decisions of this Court, both in Seeni
Chettiar v. Santhanathan Chettiar (1896) ILR 20 M 58 :
6 MLJ 281 (FB) and in Mammi-kulti v. Puzhakkal Edom
(1906) ILR 29 M 353 the test of whether a document
was a lease or not was held to be whether it vested any
exclusive interest in immoveable property in the
transferee or whether it gave him merely a right to enter
on the property and to do something thereon.

A perusal of the appellate order passed by the Agent to the
Government discloses that the appellate authority, except
referring to the judgments of the Honble Apex Court, did not
examine the issues in the light of the principles laid down in
the said judgments. Though the petitioner filed written
submissions and also cited the judgments of the Honble Apex
Court, the revisional authority simply endorsed the orders of
the lower authorities. Except endorsing the orders of the
lower authorities, there was absolutely no objective
consideration by the revisional authority.

      Another significant and peculiar aspect which requires
to be noted in this context is that on one hand the authorities
conclude that the subject document is inadmissible in
evidence and on the other hand, they attempted to interpret
the recitals contained therein against the petitioners. The
principles laid down in the above-referred judgments in the
considered and definite opinion of this Court are squarely and
aptly applicable to the case on hand.
      In the instant case also the recitals clearly show that
the petitioner did neither lose the possession of the property
nor parted with the same in order to indulge in any
transaction which attracts the prohibition as contained under
the Regulations. In absence of the necessary and mandatory 
ingredients as contained in Section 2 (g) of the Regulations,
by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be concluded that the
transaction is hit by the Regulations.
      Another vital aspect, which cannot be lost sight of is
that the petitioner is undertaking welfare activities in the
agency area for the tribal people, which fact is not disputed
by the respondents. In these circumstances, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the orders impugned in the
present writ petition are unsustainable and untenable as the
transaction in the instant case does not fall under the
definition of transfer as defined under Section 2 (g) of the
Regulations.
      For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed,
setting aside the orders of the 1st respondent  State
Government issued vide G.O.Ms.No.43 Social Welfare (LTR-2)  
Department, dated 16-05-2006, confirming the orders of the
Agent to Government, dated 27-02-1990 and the orders of the
Special Deputy Collector, dated 30-09-1993. There shall be
no order as to costs.
      The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Writ
Petition shall stand closed.
___________________
A.V. SESHA SAI, J
February 09, 2016

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 = Since there was a petition under sec.14 , pending simultaneously filing Crl.M.P. is not maintainable as there was an interim orders = there was resistance to delivery of possession, the petitioner company lodged a FIR against the Director of the second respondent company under Sections 323 and 447 IPC. Simultaneously, it filed Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015 before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, taking recourse to Section 14 of the Act of 2002, which enables a secured creditor to avail the assistance of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate concerned to take possession of the secured asset. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, thereupon passed order dated 15.04.2015 appointing an Advocate-Commissioner, the seventh respondent, and directed him to assist the petitioner company in taking possession of the secured asset. While so, the second respondent company filed Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015 in Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015 seeking dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner company under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. Thereupon, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, passed order dated 13.05.2015 restraining the seventh respondent from proceeding further till examination of the application. Hence, this writ petition.= We are informed that S.A.No.71 of 2013 has already been preferred by the second respondent company before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad, and that it is pending consideration. This being the lawful and proper remedy for the second respondent company, its parallel attempt to thwart the order dated 15.04.2015 by practically seeking review thereof cannot be countenanced. It is therefore left open to the second respondent company to pursue its lawful remedies in accordance with law. We reiterate that we have not ventured into the merits of the contentions raised by the second respondent company vis--vis the order dated 15.04.2015 and all such issues are left open. The writ petition is accordingly allowed setting aside the order dated 13.05.2015 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015 in Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015. We further hold that the said criminal miscellaneous petition is not maintainable in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, is directed to take steps accordingly. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, is also directed to take necessary consequential steps pursuant to the order dated 15.04.2015 passed in Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015, subject to orders, if any, in S.A.No.71 of 2013.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR AND THE HONBLE DR.JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO          

WRIT PETITION NO.25645 OF 2015    

24-06-2016

M/s. Phoenix Arc Private LimitedPetitioner.. Petitioner

The Court of the Honble Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Metropolitan  Criminal
Courts, Red Hills, Hyderabad and othersRespondents  

Counsel for petitioner: Sri P. Sri Ram
                                               
Counsel for respondent No.1:  --
Counsel for respondent No.2:  Sri B.Srinivasa Reddy
Counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 6 :  --
Counsel for respondent No.7:  Sri M. Hamsa Raj

<Gist:

>Head Note:    


? CASES REFERRED:    

1.  (2013) 9 SCC 620
2.  2016 (2) ALT 226 (F.B.)
3.  (2012) 7 SCC 200
4.  (2016) 3 SCC 762
5.  (2012) 7 SCC 200

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        
AND
THE HONBLE DR.JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO          

WRIT PETITION NO.25645 OF 2015    

O R D E R
(Per Honble Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar)
       

      The petitioner is a securitisation and reconstruction company
registered under Section 3 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(for brevity, the Act of 2002). It is a secured creditor as defined
under Section 2(zd) thereof. By way of this writ petition, it challenges
the order dated 13.05.2015 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015 in Crl.M.P.No.904
of 2015. A consequential direction is sought to the Advocate-
Commissioner appointed by the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, to execute the warrant of possession.
      The petitioner company acquired a financial asset, being the
loan given by the Central Bank of India to the second respondent
company, under Assignment Agreement dated 28.03.2014. Even  
before acquisition of this financial asset by the petitioner company,
the Central Bank of India had classified the loan account of the
second respondent company as a non-performing asset and issued it
demand notice dated 20.08.2013 under Section 13(2) of the Act of
2002. The outstanding dues mentioned therein aggregated to
Rs.37,84,33,827/-. The objections raised in response thereto, under
Section 13(3A) of the Act of 2002, were considered by the Central
Bank of India and rejected under reply dated 21.10.2013.
      After acquisition of this financial asset, the petitioner company
initiated further measures for enforcement of the security interest
created by the second respondent company in relation thereto. This
security interest was the land admeasuring 6020 square yards and
the buildings thereon along with plant and machinery situated at
Sarojini Devi Road, Secunderabad. Proceedings under Section 13(4)
of the Act of 2002 were initiated by issuance of a possession notice
on 09.12.2014 under Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement)
Rules, 2002. However, as there was resistance to delivery of
possession, the petitioner company lodged a FIR against the Director
of the second respondent company under Sections 323 and 447 IPC.  
Simultaneously, it filed Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015 before the learned
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, taking recourse to Section
14 of the Act of 2002, which enables a secured creditor to avail the
assistance of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate
concerned to take possession of the secured asset. The learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, thereupon passed order dated
15.04.2015 appointing an Advocate-Commissioner, the seventh  
respondent, and directed him to assist the petitioner company in
taking possession of the secured asset.
      While so, the second respondent company filed
Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015 in Crl.M.P.No.904 of 2015 seeking dismissal
of the application filed by the petitioner company under Section 14 of
the Act of 2002. Thereupon, the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, passed order dated 13.05.2015 restraining
the seventh respondent from proceeding further till examination of
the application. Hence, this writ petition.
      Heard Sri P. Sriraghuram, learned senior counsel representing
Sri P.Sri Ram, learned counsel for the petitioner company, Sri Gopal
Rao Amancherla, learned counsel representing Sri B.Sreenivasa
Reddy, learned counsel for the second respondent company, and Sri
M.Hamsa Raj, learned counsel for the seventh respondent.
      The question raised before us is whether the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, has jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act
of 2002 to examine the objections raised by the second respondent
company in its application, Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015. Though Sri
Gopal Rao Amancherla, learned counsel, would strive to raise various
contentions as regards the alleged failure on the part of the petitioner
company in taking steps under the Act of 2002, we are of the opinion
that without addressing the preliminary issue as to maintainability of
Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015, the second respondent company cannot   
expect this Court to examine on merits the contentions urged by it in
Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015.
      Primarily, the scope of the power of a Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate/District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act of 2002
falls for determination.
      Section 14(1) of the Act of 2002 broadly provides to the effect
that where the possession of a secured asset is required to be taken
by a secured creditor or if a secured asset is required to be sold or
transferred by a secured creditor, such secured creditor may, for the
purpose of taking possession or control of such asset, request, in
writing, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate
within whose jurisdiction such secured asset is situated to take
possession thereof and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the
District Magistrate shall, on such request being made to him, take
possession of and forward such asset to the secured creditor.  The
first proviso thereto states that any application by the secured
creditor in this regard shall be accompanied by an affidavit, duly
affirmed by the authorized officer of the secured creditor, and such
affidavit shall be in conformity with the declarations stipulated under
Clauses (i) to (ix) thereunder.  The second proviso to Section 14 states
that on receipt of such an affidavit from the authorized officer, the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case
may be, shall, after satisfying the contents of the affidavit, pass
suitable orders for the purpose of taking possession of the secured
asset.  Section 14(1A) empowers the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or
District Magistrate to authorize any officer subordinate to him to take
possession and forward such asset to the secured creditor.  Sub-
section (2) of Section 14 empowers the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
or District Magistrate to take or cause to be taken such steps and use
or cause to be used such force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary,
for securing compliance with the provisions of Section 14(1).
      The scope and nature of the jurisdiction of a Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate/District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act of 2002
fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK V/s. V.NOBLE KUMAR .  The Supreme Court           
observed therein that the satisfaction of the Magistrate contemplated
under the second proviso to Section 14(1) necessarily requires the
Magistrate to examine the factual correctness of the assertions made
in such an affidavit but not the legal niceties of the transaction.
Again, in HARSHAD GOVARDHAN SONDAGAR V/s.           
INTERNATIONAL ASSETS RECONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. , the           
Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the scope of the power
exercised by a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate
under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and observed that when a
secured creditor seeks assistance to take possession of a secured
asset thereunder and a lessee of a mortgagor/borrower is in actual
possession, the secured creditor must state so in the affidavit filed
along with the application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and
also as to which class the lease in question falls under, that is, as to
whether it was created before the mortgage, or, after the mortgage
but before issuance of the demand notice under Section 13(2) of the
Act of 2002, or lastly, if it was created after issuance of the demand
notice under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002. Once this aspect is
brought out in the affidavit filed by the secured creditor, the Supreme
Court held that the Magistrate would have to give notice and
opportunity of hearing to the lessee in possession of the secured
asset, falling under either the first class or the second class of leases
but not the last class, along with the secured creditor, in consistency
with the principles of natural justice, and then take a decision. If the
Magistrate is satisfied that there is a valid lease created before the
mortgage or prior to receipt of the notice under Section 13(2) of the
Act of 2002, he cannot pass an order for delivering possession of the
secured asset. In such cases, when the lessee makes out a case that 
his lease falls under either of the first two classes of leases specified
above, the actual possession cannot be delivered to the secured
creditor until the lease is validly determined in accordance with law.
      Relying on the aforestated judgments of the Supreme Court, a
Full Bench of this Court in T.R.JEWELLERY V/s. STATE BANK OF    
INDIA, VEDAYAPALEM BRANCH, NELLORE  held that a Magistrate        
is empowered under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 to authorize a
subordinate official to take possession of the asset after examining
the factual correctness of the assertions made in the affidavit and
therefore, it could be said without any shadow of doubt that the
assistance taken under this provision is only procedural in nature
and no adjudication is involved.  The Full Bench observed that use of
the word order in Section 14 is only a reference to an administrative
order made for taking possession of the secured asset if all other
conditions are fulfilled.  The Full Bench confirmed that the power
exercised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate
was synonymous and that it was not adjudicatory in nature.
      It may be noticed that in VISHAL N.KALSARIA V/s. BANK OF
INDIA , clarifying the law laid down in HARSHAD GOVARDHAN  
SONDAGAR2, the Supreme Court stated that even if no registered  
lease deed exists, then such tenants who are required to prove that
they have been in occupation of the premises as tenants may be
permitted to produce such evidence in proceedings under Section 14
of the Act of 2002 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District
Magistrate. This decision was rendered in relation to protected
tenants under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The
applicability of the ratio of this judgment in the States of Telangana
and Andhra Pradesh is however open to question in the light of the
amendment effected in the year 1999 to the Registration Act, 1908, in
so far as it applies to the erstwhile combined State of Andhra
Pradesh, making lease deeds in respect of leases even for a period of
less than one year compulsorily registrable under Section 17 thereof.
Significantly, there is no such requirement in Maharashtra.
      In any event, the aforestated case law makes it crystal clear
that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate, in
exercise of power under Section 14 of the Act of 2002, is only
required to undertake a factual examination of the entitlement of a
secured creditor to take possession in terms of Section 14(1)(b)(viii),
by ascertaining the factum of actual possession. Beyond determining
this fact on the basis of a hearing and the documents placed on
record, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate is not
empowered to undertake any sort of adjudicatory process.
      This being the settled legal position, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, was only empowered to examine the
assertions made in the affidavit filed by the petitioner company and
upon being satisfied therewith, to the extent indicated in the
aforestated decisions, pass an appropriate order. This exercise
already culminated in the order dated 15.04.2015. Being an
administrative functionary in the scheme of Section 14 of the Act of
2002, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, had no power of
reviewing the order dated 15.04.2015, as no such power is conferred
upon him under the Act of 2002.  Well settled is the legal proposition
that unless the power of review is specifically conferred by the statute
itself, an administrative authority acting in furtherance of the power
conferred by such statute cannot assume unto itself such power of
review (See HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT          
CORPORATION LIMITED V/s. MAWASI ). In the event an erroneous    
order is passed by a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District
Magistrate in exercise of the administrative power conferred by
Section 14 of the Act of 2002, the borrowers remedy against the
same, as pointed out in STANDARD CHARTERED BANK1, is by way      
of an application under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 to the Debts
Recovery Tribunal concerned. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad, therefore had no right to keep further proceedings
pursuant to the order dated 15.04.2015 in abeyance while seeking to
exercise the power of review upon the application in Crl.M.P.No.1250
of 2015 filed by the second respondent company.
      We are informed that S.A.No.71 of 2013 has already been
preferred by the second respondent company before the Debts 
Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad, and that it is pending consideration.
This being the lawful and proper remedy for the second respondent
company, its parallel attempt to thwart the order dated 15.04.2015
by practically seeking review thereof cannot be countenanced. It is
therefore left open to the second respondent company to pursue its
lawful remedies in accordance with law. We reiterate that we have not
ventured into the merits of the contentions raised by the second
respondent company vis--vis the order dated 15.04.2015 and all
such issues are left open.
      The writ petition is accordingly allowed setting aside the order
dated 13.05.2015 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No.1250 of 2015 in Crl.M.P.No.904
of 2015. We further hold that the said criminal miscellaneous petition
is not maintainable in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and the
learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, is directed to take
steps accordingly. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad, is also directed to take necessary consequential steps
pursuant to the order dated 15.04.2015 passed in Crl.M.P.No.904 of
2015, subject to orders, if any, in S.A.No.71 of 2013. Pending
miscellaneous petitions shall stand closed in the light of this final
order.  No order as to costs.
______________________  
SANJAY KUMAR, J  
_______________________________    
DR.B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, J    
24th JUNE, 2016

Mutation of Entries in revenue records - partition deed is not included in Section 120 of the Act, respondent No.2 has no power or authority to demand any duty or surcharge.=Clause (b) of Section 120 of the Act, which is relevant in this context, reads as under: -- 120. Method of assessments of duty on transfers of property:- The duty on transfers of property shall be levied: (a) (b) at such rate as may be fixed by the Government, not exceeding five per centum on the amount specified below against such instrument; Description of instrument Amount on which duty shall be levied (i) Sale of immovable property (ii) Exchange of immovable property (iii) Gift of immovable property (iv) Mortgage with possession of immovable property (v) Lease for a term exceeding one hundred years or in perpetuity of immovable property The amount or value of the consideration for the sale, as set- forth in the instrument or the market value of the property which is the subject matter of the sale whichever is higher. The market value of the property of greater value, which is the subject matter of exchange. The market value of the property which is the subject matter of the gift. The amount secured by the mortgage, as set forth in the instrument. An amount equal to one-sixth of the whole amount or value of the rents which would be paid or delivered in respect of the first fifty years of the lease as set forth in the instrument. A careful perusal of the above reproduced provision would reveal that as many as five kinds of documents have been envisaged for collection of duty/surcharge. These documents do not include partition deeds. The learned standing counsel for the Municipalities (TS) appearing for respondent No.2 has fairly conceded that no provision other than Section 120 of the Act deals with levy of duty/surcharge on the instruments pertaining to immovable property. As the partition deed is not included in Section 120 of the Act, respondent No.2 has no power or authority to demand any duty or surcharge. Therefore, it follows that the impugned notice, by which the petitioners applications were returned for nonpayment of fee of Rs.15,48,078/- is liable to be declared as illegal and arbitrary and accordingly, it is declared as such. The petitioners are permitted to re-submit their applications for mutation. On receipt thereof, respondent No.2 shall consider the same, without insisting on payment of any fee, take an appropriate decision, in accordance with law, and communicate the same to the petitioners, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY          

WRIT PETITION No.38121 of 2015  

19-01-2016

Shyamsundar Agarwal and others  .. Petitioners    

The State of Telangana,  represented by its Principal Secretary, Municipal
Administration and Urban Development Department, Hyderabad and another ..
Respondent s

Counsel for the petitioners: Mr.P.Lakshma Reddy

Counsel for respondent No.1: Assistant Government Pleader for
                              Municipal Administration and Urban Development
(TS)
Counsel for respondent No.2: --

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY          
               
WRIT PETITION No.38121 of 2015  

19.01.2016


The Court made the following:

ORDER:                                                
        This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to set aside notice in File
No.A1/728/2015, dated 22.09.2015, of respondent No.2.

        The petitioners pleaded that petitioner No.1 and his brothers and
sisters along with their parents have acquired various properties with the
joint family funds in the name of different members of the joint family.
That on 08.06.1995, the father of petitioner No.1 died intestate and on
09.10.2011, his mother also died intestate, that on 11.05.2015, the
petitioners along with other family members have partitioned the joint family
properties under a registered partition deed, bearing document No.5590 of
2015, and that on 15.07.2015, the petitioners have made applications to
respondent No.2 seeking mutation of their names in the property register in
respect of the properties, which have fallen to their respective shares. That
under the impugned notice, dated 22.09.2015, the Commissioner of
respondent No.2 has returned the said applications by informing that if the
petitioners pay fee in respect of each of the items of the properties, for
which mutation is sought, totalling Rs.15,49,078/-, their request will be
reconsidered.  Feeling aggrieved by this action on the part of respondent
No.2, the petitioners filed this writ petition.

        Mr.P.Lakshma Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted
that none of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965
(for short the Act), authorizes respondent No.2 to collect any fee for
mutation of the names of the owners of the properties based on the deed of
partition and that therefore, the action of respondent No.2 in returning the
applications of the petitioners for nonpayment of fee and demanding the
aforesaid sum as purported fee for mutation is wholly illegal and arbitrary.

      This Court has adjourned the case on 24.11.2015 for filing
counter-affidavit.  Today, at the hearing, Mr.N.Praveen Kumar, learned
standing counsel for the Municipalities (TS) appearing for respondent No.2,
submitted that as respondent No.2 has not furnished instructions,
counter-affidavit is not prepared.

        I have carefully examined the case with reference to the pleadings
and the provisions of the Act.  The relevant provision, which deals with levy
of duty by way of surcharge on transfer of property, is Section 120 of the
Act.  The said provision envisages description of instrument and the amount
on which duty shall be levied.  Clause (b) of Section 120 of the Act, which is
relevant in this context, reads as under: --
        120. Method of assessments of duty on transfers of
property:- The duty on transfers of property shall be levied:
       (a) 
       (b) at such rate as may be fixed by the Government, not
exceeding five per centum on the amount specified below against
such instrument;
Description of instrument
Amount on which duty shall be 
levied
(i) Sale of immovable
property





(ii) Exchange of immovable
property


(iii) Gift of immovable
property


(iv) Mortgage with
possession of immovable 
property


(v) Lease for a term
exceeding one hundred 
years or in perpetuity of
immovable property 
The amount or value of the
consideration for the sale, as set-
forth in the instrument or the
market value of the property
which is the subject matter of the
sale whichever is higher.

The market value of the property
of greater value, which is the
subject matter of exchange.

The market value of the property
which is the subject matter of the
gift.

The amount secured by the 
mortgage, as set forth in the
instrument.

An amount equal to one-sixth of
the whole amount or value of the
rents which would be paid or
delivered in respect of the first
fifty years of the lease as set forth
in the instrument.
        A careful perusal of the above reproduced provision would reveal that
as many as five kinds of documents have been envisaged for collection of
duty/surcharge.  These documents do not include partition deeds.
The learned standing counsel for the Municipalities (TS) appearing for
respondent No.2 has fairly conceded that no provision other than Section
120 of the Act deals with levy of duty/surcharge on the instruments
pertaining to immovable property.  As the partition deed is not included in
Section 120 of the Act, respondent No.2 has no power or authority to
demand any duty or surcharge.  Therefore, it follows that the impugned
notice, by which the petitioners applications were returned for nonpayment
of fee of Rs.15,48,078/- is liable to be declared as illegal and arbitrary and
accordingly, it is declared as such.  The petitioners are permitted to
re-submit their applications for mutation.  On receipt thereof, respondent
No.2 shall consider the same, without insisting on payment of any fee, take
an appropriate decision, in accordance with law, and communicate the same 
to the petitioners, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.

        The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed.

        As a sequel to allowing the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.49065 of 2015
filed by the petitioners for interim relief shall stand disposed of as
infructuous.
_____________________________    
C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J    
19th January, 2016

SARFAESI Act - not be really necessary for the borrower to liquidate the entire outstanding liability in the loan account and it is enough, if he pays the value fetched at the sale/public auction = where more than one collateral security has been created by the borrower as the security for the loan availed and now only one such security interest has fallen for sale by e-auction mode, the right of the borrower to retrieve that secured asset cannot be denied. For retrieving that particular secured asset, it may not be really necessary for the borrower to liquidate the entire outstanding liability in the loan account and it is enough, if he pays the value fetched at the sale/public auction of that particular secured asset and retrieve it. But, at the same time, the incidental costs, charges and expenses, which the bank may have incurred for undertaking the securitization measures, may also have to be tendered. = Hence, apart from repayment of Rs.3,60,10,000/-, which is the price offered and paid by the 2nd respondent herein for the secured asset, which was sold by the 1st respondent on 23.12.2015, the petitioner shall also pay the securitization expenses incurred by the bank and also such expenses in the form of compensatory costs to the 2nd respondent for the monies deposited by him in the form of interest, not exceeding @ 9% per annum, on or before 09.05.2016. The 1st respondent and/or State Bank of India, Main Branch, Srikakulam, shall not register the Sale Certificate already issued in favour of the 2nd respondent with regard to the secured asset sold on 23.12.2015. Should the petitioner commit any default in paying the aforesaid monies on or before 09.05.2016, the bank would be at perfect liberty to register the Sale Certificate already issued in favour of the 2nd respondent, at his expenses and deliver vacant possession of the secured asset purchased by him. Should the petitioner honour the commitment, which he made to this Court today, it is needless for us to observe that the Sale Certificate issued in favour of the 2nd respondent with regard to the secured asset shall be cancelled and possession of the secured asset should be restored to the writ petitioner.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO AND THE HONBLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SI
WRIT PETITION No.43082 of 2015  

06-04-2016

Mitra Educational and Welfare Society  Petitioner

The Authorised Officer, State Bank of India, Main Branch, GT Road, Srikakulam
and another. Respondents  

Counsel for the petitioner : Sri T. Rajinikanth Reddy

Counsel for Respondents  : Sri B.S.S. Prasad, SC for R.1
                            Sri M.V. Suresh,
                            Senior Counsel for Sri G.V.
                            Srirama Murthy for R.2

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:

1.AIR 1971 SC 310


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
AND
THE HONBLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO        

WRIT PETITION No.43082 of 2015  


ORDER: (per Hon'ble Sri Justice Nooty Ramamohana Rao)  


        The petitioner sought for a Writ of Mandamus for declaring
the action of the 1st respondent, the Authorised Officer of the State
Bank of India, Main Branch, Srikakulam, in issuing e-auction sale
notice dated 16.11.2015 without duly following the procedure
prescribed under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(for brevity the SARFAESI Act), particularly in collusion with the
2nd respondent, as arbitrary and illegal.

2.      Heard Sri C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel on behalf  of
Sri T. Rajinikanth Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and
Sri B.S.S. Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the State Bank of
India; and Sri M.V. Suresh, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of
Sri G.V. Srirama Murthy, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent.

3.      At the very outset, we need to observe that the plea taken by
Sri M.V. Suresh on behalf of the 2nd respondent, that there was an
allegation of collusion between the 2nd respondent and the 1st
respondent is incredulous, appears to be a sound contention. The
fact that the 2nd respondent also purchased the very same property
on a previous occasion when the 1st respondent-Bank conducted
sale and this time also he has emerged as the best bidder does not
necessarily and invariably lead to the conclusion that there was a
collusion between the Authorised Officer of the State Bank of India,
Srikakulam Main Branch, and the 2nd respondent. Fortunately, for
us, Sri C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel has not pressed this
contention beyond this point.

4.      The petitioner herein, an Educational Welfare Society, has
availed certain financial benefits from the State Bank of India,
Main Branch, Srikakulam. It has also provided collateral security
by mortgaging the immovable property in favour of the bank. The
loan account has not been properly cycled, as a consequence, the
loan account came to be classified as a Non-performing Asset (NPA)
and since the petitioner herein answers the description of
borrower as defined under Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act and
also in view of the fact that the State Bank of India answers the
description of bank as defined under Section 2(1)(c) of the
SARFAESI Act and the security interest created by them also
answers the definition contained under Section 2(1)(z)(f) of the
SARFAESI Act, the State Bank of India, the creditor, is entitled to
take measures for securitization of the loan as provided for under
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. Under sub-section (2) of Section
13 of the SARFAESI Act, the secured creditor is required to draw a
demand notice calling upon the defaulting borrower to pay the
entire outstanding liability. Accordingly, a notice was drawn under
sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act on 30.11.2011
calling upon the petitioner herein to liquidate the outstanding
liability of Rs.4,38,47,732/- within a period of 60 days from the
date of receipt of the said notice. It appears that the petitioner paid
certain amount and got the loan account regularized. Once again,
the petitioner has committed default. Hence, the Bank has again
classified the loan account as Non-performing Asset on 19.01.2013
and once again a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the
SARFAESI Act demanding the petitioner to liquidate the entire
outstanding liability has been issued by the Bank. It is the claim of
the petitioner that it has deposited a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- on
09.03.2013, another sum of Rs.30,00,000/- on 31.03.2013, a
further sum of Rs.10,00,000/- on 08.06.2013, and a further sum
of Rs.25,50,000/- subsequently. Since the outstanding liability has
not been cleared, as demanded in the notice issued under sub-
section (2) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the bank has
proceeded in the matter by taking up the follow up action as
contemplated and provided for under sub-section (4) of Section 13
of the SARFAESI Act and has taken possession of the secured
asset on 03.05.2013. For the purpose of realizing the loan amount,
the secured asset was sought to be sold and hence a sale notice as
is required and provided for under Rule 8(6) r/w. Rule 9(1) of the
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for brevity the
Rules)  was issued on 04.12.2013. The same was also got
published in the Newspapers on 05.12.2013. It appears, auction
was conducted and Sale Certificate was also issued in favour of the
purchaser on 07.01.2014. Then the petitioner approached the
Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, and the said Tribunal,
by order dated 12.02.2014 in S.A.No.245 of 2013, set aside the
sale by auction, including the issuance of Sale Certificate. The
Bank has approached the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at
Kolkata, and the appeal preferred by it bearing No.48 of 2014 was
dismissed by order dated 04.12.2014, upholding the view taken by
the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam. That is how, on the
second occasion, the sale by e-auction mode has to be initiated
once again. A sale notice dated 16.11.2015 was issued, it was got
published in Hindu Newspaper of Issue dated 18.11.2015. The
auctions were conducted on 23.12.2015 between 11.30 a.m. to
12.30 p.m. The Reserve Price was fixed as Rs.3.60 Crores and the
Earnest Money required to be deposited was Rs.36,00,000/-, being
10% of the upset price. The bid increment amount was fixed at
Rs.10,000/-. In the auctions so conducted, the 2nd respondent
once again participated and also emerged as the best bidder and
his offer of Rs.3,60,10,000/- was found to be the most responsive
offer, as no other bidder has come forward to purchase the
property. It is this sale notice, which came to be challenged in this
writ petition.

5.      When once the petitioner answers the description of
borrower and the secured creditor answers the description of the
bank as defined in the SARFAESI Act, the measures undertaken
by it for securitization of the loan account under Section 13 of the
SARFAESI Act cannot be faulted. This time around, the sale notice
issued on 16.11.2015 was also published in the newspapers on
18.11.2015 and the e-auctions were conducted on 23.12.2015,
thus maintaining more than 30 days time variation as is required
under Rule 8(6) r/w. Rule 9(1) of the Rules referred to supra. In
principle, therefore, we cannot find fault, in any manner, with the
sale of the secured asset conducted by the 1st respondent-Bank.

6.      However, one submission made by Sri C. Raghu, learned
Senior Counsel, requires to be taken into account and requires
consideration. He would urge that the petitioner has a right to
redeem the mortgaged property by paying the money, which it has
fetched in the e-auction mode.

7.      Since, every mortgager has a right to redeem the mortgaged
immovable property, at any time before the sale of it is held, in
accordance with law, and the title thereof is conveyed to the
purchaser, he can redeem the mortgaged property. This is a settled
principle of law and if one really requires an authority, the ratio
laid down by the Apex Court in MATHURALAL vs. KESHAR BAI    
AND ANOTHER , last 4 lines of para-15, and para-16 is a complete
answer. This apart, the Parliament has also noticed this valuable
right of the mortgager and hence incorporated the same in the
form of sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, which
reads as under:

13. Enforcement of Security Interest :-
(1) to (7) ..

(8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all
costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered
to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for
sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or
transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step
shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured
asset.


8.      Thus, the secured creditor can be tendered the dues any
time before the date fixed for transfer of the secured asset in favour
of the auction purchaser, in such an event, no further steps shall
be taken by the secured creditor for transfer of that secured asset.
In our opinion, the crucial expressions to be noticed, in this
regard, are that secured asset. Therefore, for the whole of the
entire loan transaction availed by a borrower and if he has created
different security interests in different movable/immovable
properties by using the expression that secured asset, an option
has been provided to the borrower to retrieve that particular
secured asset, which is sold by the secured creditor, like in the
instant case, where more than one collateral security has been
created by the borrower as the security for the loan availed and
now only one such security interest has fallen for sale by e-auction
mode, the right of the borrower to retrieve that secured asset
cannot be denied. For retrieving that particular secured asset, it
may not be really necessary for the borrower to liquidate the entire
outstanding liability in the loan account and it is enough, if he
pays the value fetched at the sale/public auction of that particular
secured asset and retrieve it. But, at the same time, the incidental
costs, charges and expenses, which the bank may have incurred  
for undertaking the securitization measures, may also have to be
tendered.

9.      Hence, apart from repayment of Rs.3,60,10,000/-, which is
the price offered and paid by the 2nd respondent herein for the
secured asset, which was sold by the 1st respondent on
23.12.2015, the petitioner shall also pay the securitization
expenses incurred by the bank and also such expenses in the form 
of compensatory costs to the 2nd respondent for the monies
deposited by him in the form of interest, not exceeding @ 9% per
annum, on or before 09.05.2016. The 1st respondent and/or State
Bank of India, Main Branch, Srikakulam, shall not register the
Sale Certificate already issued in favour of the 2nd respondent with
regard to the secured asset sold on 23.12.2015. Should the
petitioner commit any default in paying the aforesaid monies on or
before 09.05.2016, the bank would be at perfect liberty to register
the Sale Certificate already issued in favour of the 2nd respondent,
at his expenses and deliver vacant possession of the secured asset
purchased by him. 

10.     Should the petitioner honour the commitment, which he
made to this Court today, it is needless for us to observe that the
Sale Certificate issued in favour of the 2nd respondent with regard
to the secured asset shall be cancelled and possession of the
secured asset should be restored to the writ petitioner.

11.     Subject to the above direction, the writ petition stands
disposed of. No order as to costs.

12.     As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall
stand closed.

_____________________________________    
JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO          
___________________________________    
Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO      
06.04.2016