The Pakistan & its Cross Border Terrorism - State Responsibility for Acts of Terrorism

The Pakistan & its Cross Border Terrorism 

The Core Issue :- 

State Responsibility for Acts of Terrorism

I. Introduction:-

 The Enduring Scourge of Cross-Border Terrorism

1.  For decades, India has been the target of relentless terrorist attacks, meticulously planned, financed, and executed by organizations whose very existence and operational capabilities are inextricably linked to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter "Pakistan"). 

This submission will demonstrate, through compelling facts and established legal principles, that Pakistan has breached its fundamental obligations by failing to prevent its territory from being used as a launchpad for terrorism against India, thereby incurring state responsibility for the immense suffering caused.

II. A Chronicle of Terror:-

 The Evidentiary Tapestry

2.  The tragic history of cross-border terrorism targeting India is not a series of isolated incidents, but rather a sustained campaign, each thread leading back to Pakistan. 

 The following illustrative examples, forming a clear and undeniable pattern:

 A]. The Audacity of Mumbai (2008):-

The meticulously planned and executed attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, orchestrated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, left an indelible scar. The investigation and subsequent evidence, including digital communications and the capture of a surviving terrorist, unequivocally traced the planning, training, and logistical support directly to Pakistan.

B]. The Attack on Sovereignty (2001):-

The brazen attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, aimed at the very heart of India’s democracy, was perpetrated by terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, organizations openly operating within Pakistan.

C]. The Breach of Security (2016):-

 The assault on the Pathankot airbase in January 2016, carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed operatives, further demonstrated the continued ability of Pakistan-based terrorist groups to strike deep within Indian territory.

D]. The Carnage in Uri (2016):-

The deadly attack on the Indian Army base in Uri in September 2016, attributed to Jaish-e-Mohammed, once again highlighted the direct link between terrorist violence in India and organizations thriving within Pakistan.

E]. The Recent Outrage (2025):-

The Pahalgam attack of April 22, 2025, the immediate aftermath of which yielded digital evidence pointing towards Pakistan-based handlers and networks, underscores the ongoing nature of this grave issue.

3.  Beyond these specific atrocities, It rests on a robust and multi-layered body of evidence:

A]. The Digital Realm as a Conduit of Terror:-

 Intercepted communications, digital footprints meticulously traced to Pakistan-based servers and individuals, and the unashamed claims of responsibility by Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist organizations, paint a clear picture of the digital infrastructure facilitating these crimes.

B]. The Testimony of Experience:-

 The harrowing accounts and confessions of captured terrorists, detailing their radicalization, training within identifiable camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and the logistical support provided within Pakistani territory, offer irrefutable first hand evidence.

C]. The Flow of Illicit Funds:-

 Investigations into the financing of terrorism targeting India consistently reveal financial trails originating within Pakistan, utilizing both formal and informal channels, directly supporting terrorist operations. Pakistan’s persistent presence on the FATF grey list speaks volumes about its systemic deficiencies in combating this illicit flow.

D]. .The Unseen Eye Geospatial Intelligence:-

 Satellite imagery and  corroborated intelligence reports have consistently identified the long-standing presence of terrorist training facilities and operational hubs within Pakistan’s territory, their very existence a testament to Pakistan’s failure to exercise effective control.

III. Legal Foundations: Pakistan’s Breach of International Law:-

4.  The Pakistan’s actions and inactions constitute a clear and persistent breach of fundamental principles and binding obligations under international law:-

A.]. The Sacrosanct Duty of Due Diligence:-

Customary international law enshrines the duty of every state to exercise due diligence in preventing its territory from being used to cause harm to other states. In the context of the uniquely destructive nature of terrorism, this duty demands vigilance and effective action. Pakistan has manifestly failed to uphold this fundamental obligation. The sustained and widespread nature of terrorism emanating from its territory and targeting India, spanning decades and numerous attacks, demonstrates a systemic and egregious breach of its duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent such harm.

B].The Binding Mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001):-

 This pivotal resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposes unequivocal obligations on all UN member states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, to criminalize terrorist acts, and to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to terrorist entities. Pakistan’s continued failure to effectively dismantle the operational and financial networks of UN-designated terrorist organizations operating openly within its territory, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (listed as a terrorist entity under UNSC Resolution 1267) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (also UNSC-designated), constitutes a direct and ongoing violation of these binding obligations. The international community’s repeated concerns, evidenced by Pakistan’s prolonged scrutiny under the FATF framework, further underscore this failure.  

C]. The Imperative of International Conventions:-

 Pakistan is a State Party to key international conventions aimed at the suppression of terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Article 2 of this Convention obligates states to criminalize and prevent the financing of terrorism. Pakistan’s documented deficiencies in effectively preventing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations targeting India, and its insufficient prosecution of those involved in such financing within its jurisdiction, represent a clear failure to meet its treaty obligations.

D]. State Responsibility for the Inaction and Tolerance of Terrorism:- While the immediate perpetrators of terrorist acts are non-state actors, Pakistan’s state responsibility is engaged through its prolonged and egregious failure to prevent these acts from being planned, organized, and executed from its territory. The sustained operational capability and the public presence of leaders of UN-designated terrorist organizations within Pakistan, coupled with a conspicuous lack of effective legal action against them,and on the other hand , strongly  supporting them clearly suggest a deliberate policy of support, thus triggering Pakistan’s responsibility under international law. 

E]. The Unfulfilled Obligation to  Prosecute  and handing over UN-Designated Terrorist Organizations:-

International law unequivocally obligates states to thoroughly investigate and prosecute individuals within their jurisdiction credibly accused of involvement in terrorism, especially when such acts target other sovereign nations. Pakistan’s persistent failure to bring to justice the known leaders and key operatives of UN-designated terrorist organizations responsible for countless attacks in India represents a clear dereliction of this fundamental obligation.

F]. The Weight of Evidence Meets the Standard of Proof:-

The comprehensive and consistent body of evidence , encompassing digital intelligence, testimonial accounts, financial trails, and geospatial confirmation, meets the requisite standard of proof before any Court. The cumulative impact of this evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, Pakistan’s sustained and egregious failure to meet its international legal obligations to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism against India.

IV. conclusion :- 

Therefore the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has violated its obligations under international law by failing to exercise due diligence to prevent its territory from being used for terrorist acts against the Republic of India, and by failing to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions and international conventions on terrorism and on the other hand itself joinded hands with Terrorists Organizations - the Pakistan is liable to be boycotted socially and econimically by the entire world - Golabal Boycott

declare the selection of 7th respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th respondent, as illegal and arbitrary

 declare the selection of 7th respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th respondent, as illegal and arbitrary

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

Between:

1. K N V RATNA BABU, S/O LAKSHMI NANCHARAIAH, AGED

ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O H.NO.1-204, KALEKHAN PETA,

MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT

... PETITIONER

AND

1. UNION OF INDIA, REP BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS, SASTHRY BHAVAN, NEW

DELHI AND 5 OTHERS.

... RESPONDENTS

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 17.04.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the order? : Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of order may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to

see the fair copy of the order? : Yes/No

___________________________

JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

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* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

+ WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

% 17.04.2025

WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

Between:

1. K N V RATNA BABU, S/O LAKSHMI NANCHARAIAH, AGED

ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O H.NO.1-204, KALEKHAN PETA,

MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT

... PETITIONER

AND

1. UNION OF INDIA, REP BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS, SASTHRY BHAVAN, NEW

DELHI AND 5 OTHERS.

... RESPONDENTS

! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri Subba Rao Korrapati

^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri P.Shreyas Reddy

 Learned AGP for Revenue

 Sri A.S.C.Bose

 Sri N.Ashwani Kumar

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1) (2017) 9 SCC 340

2) (2021) 14 SCC 211 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 951

3) (2000) 7 SCC 552

This Court made the following:

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APHC010597662024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3331]

THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

WRIT PETITION NO: 31158/2024

Between:

K N V Ratna Babu ...PETITIONER

AND

Union Of India and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:

1.SUBBA RAO KORRAPATI

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.A S C BOSE

2.A S C BOSE (SC FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AP)

3.SHREYAS REDDY

4.ALEKHYA TADASINA(CENTRAL GOVT COUNSEL)

The Court made the following:

ORDER

The above Writ Petition is filed to declare the selection of 7th

respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the

premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem,

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Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and

the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th

respondent, as illegal and arbitrary.

2. a) Averments, in the affidavit, in brief, are that the 2nd respondent

issued notification dated 28.06.2023 (Ex.P1) calling applications from the

eligible candidates, in the places notified by them for Petroleum Filling

Station/Retail Outlets. In the said notification, S.No.303 is in

Machilipatnam Municipal Limits, but not on State Highway and National

Highway. The 7th respondent applied to the dealership at the land in

D.No.29/428 located in NH-216. The petitioner made application to the

2

nd respondent under Right to Information Act, however the office of 2nd

respondent did not furnish a proper reply. The petitioner came to know

that one P.Ruparani made an application to the Executive Engineer, R &

B, Machilipatnam on 02.11.2023 requesting to furnish certain information

regarding control over the road running from Harsha College to

Kalekanpeta (via) Vallandapael, Zilla Parishan Centre, Chilakalpudi

Centre etc. The Assistant Engineer, South Section, Machilipatnam-cumPublic Information Officer furnished information vide letter dated

15.11.2023 (Ex.P4), wherein it was mentioned that the said places come

under the jurisdiction of National Highway Department.

b) The respondents 2 and 3 selected the 7th respondent at

D.No.29/428 for the land in prohibited areas and contrary to the

notification dated 28.06.2023. The said P.Ruparani made another

application under Right to Information Act to the Project Director,

Implementation Unit, Machilipatnam, Ministry of Road, Transport and

Highway, Machilipatnam to furnish certain information about notifying the

road from Harsha College to Kalekhanpeta as National Highway. The

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Project Director vide a letter dated 27.05.2024 (Ex.P5) informed that the

road leading to Challapalli from Harsha College is notified as National

Highway. The 5th respondent also issued NOC to the 7th respondent

dated 29.11.2024 (Ex.P6) for establishment of retail outlet. The other

statutory authorities also issued respective NOCs. With these averments,

the above writ petition is filed.

3. a) Counter affidavit and vacate stay petition was filed on behalf of

respondents 2 and 3. It was contended, interalia, that the 2nd respondent

issued notification dated 28.06.2023 for appointment of dealership for

retail outlet in various locations in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Serial

No.303 of the notification specifies that the location required for the retail

outlet to be “Within Machilipatnam Municipal Limited not on SH/NH”. The

7

th respondent made an application under Group-I. In the draw of the

lots, the 7th respondent was selected on 05.12.2023 and thereafter, letter

of intent was issued in favour of 7th respondent on 05.08.2024. The 7th

respondent offered his land covered under D.No.29/428, Municipal Ward

No.29, Inugudurupeta of Machilipatnam Municipality. The site offered by

the 7th respondent falls within Machilipatnam Municipality and it is not

adjacent to either to a National Highway of any State Highway.

b) Earlier, another writ petition No.20919 of 2024 was filed,

however no interim order was granted. The petitioners are Retail Outlet

Dealers from other petroleum corporations and the writ petitions was filed

only to thwart competition. The petitioner has no locus standi to file the

writ petition.

c) The BPCL authorities have provided the location details, Google

Map and the geo-coordinates of the location. The BPCL authorities

again addressed letter dated 07.05.2024 (Ex.R4) to the Project Director,

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PIU, Machilipatnam, who, in turn, gave reply to BPCL that the site is

located on old NH-216, which used to pass through the Machilipatnam

town and is no longer considered to be a National Highway after the

construction of a bypass, as it was handed back to the State Government

on 24.02.2020 itself (Ex.R5). The respondents provided information to

the petitioner under Right to Information Act. The petitioner has

purposefully withheld the details in the annexure provided by the NHAI

authorities to Ruparani vide Ex.P5.

d) Within 400 meters from the subject site, there is another

Petroleum Retail Outlet belonged to Indian Oil Corporation Limited. The

subject site is not located in the designated residential area of a local

body nor within the prohibited distance from schools or hospitals. The

subject site wherein the RO site is situated is a mixed-use area with

many commercial establishments. The location of the subject site does

not contravene any of the guidelines issued by various statutory bodies.

The authorities followed the guidelines and policies in vogue. The

company is developing the Retail Outlet under the Corpus scheme,

which is specifically designed to support SC category applicants by

providing financial assistance, including working capital and eventually,

prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

4. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of 6th respondent-Municipal

Corporation. It was contended, interalia, that the 6th respondent

submitted remarks to the 4th respondent vide office letter

Roc.No.3662/2024/G2, dated 06.09.2024 stating that as per the report of

the Town Surveyor, the proposed site falls in survey Ward No.1 in

Revenue Ward No.29, near S.F. No.177, which is in un-surveyed portion

as per the R.S.R Record, within an extent of 880 sq. yards. The

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proposed site satisfies the norms for the establishment of a new retail

outlet.

5. a) The 7th respondent filed separate counter. It was contended that

pursuant to the application made by the petitioner, acting upon a

complaint, the Territory Manager of the 2nd respondent-company

addressed letter dated 21.03.2024 to the Project Director, PIU,

Machilipatnam to clarify whether the property offered by the 7th

respondent for setting up a retail outlet is on road abutting the National

Highway or not. The Project Director, PIU, in turn, requested L.N. Malviya

Infra Projects Limited to furnish the said information. It was clarified in the

letter dated 14.06.2024 that the subject property is abutting NH-214A in

Machilipatnam Town limits and was handed over to the Government of

Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the said stretch does not fall under the

jurisdiction of the Ministry of Road, Transport & Highways.

b) Basing on the information furnished, the Project Director, PIU

issued a letter dated 17.06.2024 o the 2nd respondent (Ex.R5). After

receiving the NOC, the 2nd respondent-company issued a Public Notice

through paper publication dated 30.11.2024 inviting objections, however,

no objections were received by the 2nd respondent and thus, the 7th

respondent started construction work, and the works were almost

completed.

c) One V.Sonibabu and Ganjala Ramprasad filed W.P.No.20919 of

2024 and the said writ petition is pending, and no interim order was

granted. Suppressing filing of other writ petition on the very same cause

of action, the present writ petition is filed. The material relied upon in both

the writ petitions is identical. The petitioner lacks locus to file the writ

petition and eventually prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

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6. Heard Sri Subbarao Korrapati, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri

P.Shreyas Reddy, learned counsel for respondents 2 & 3, learned

Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue for respondents 4 & 5 and

Sri A.S.C.Bose, learned standing counsel for 6th respondent-corporation

and Sri N.Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for 5th respondent.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the averments

in the writ affidavit, would further contend that the site identified for

establishing retail outlet is in National Highway, opposite to petitioner‟s

outlet. He would further submit that issuing letter of intent to the 7th

respondent to establish a retail outlet at D.No.29/428, of Inagudurupeta,

Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, is contrary to the notification.

8. Learned standing counsel for respondents 2 & 3 and the learned

counsel for 7th respondent would contend that the petitioner lacks locus

standi to file the writ petition. The petitioner a rival trader, and nonapplicant, cannot maintain the writ petition. They would also contend that

the right, if any, guaranteed to the petitioner under Part-III of the

Constitution of India, has not been violated. The petitioner mainly relied

upon the material secured by another individual.

9. Now, the points for consideration are:

1) Whether issuing a letter of intent to the 7th respondent to

establish Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer at

the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta,

Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, is in violation of

notification issued by the 2nd respondent?

2) Whether the petitioner got locus standi to file the writ

petition?

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10. Shorn of all details, there is no dispute regarding the

advertisement, letter of intent in favour of 7th respondent to establish

Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet at the premises bearing

D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam. The

facts narrated supra would indicate the granting of permissions from

different statutory authorities.

11. In Paragraph-6 of the writ affidavit, it was pleaded that selecting 7th

respondent as retail outlet dealer and the consequential NOC issued by

the 5th respondent, is arbitrary, illegal, for extraneous consideration and

also contrary to the notification dated 28.06.2023 of the 2nd respondent

and thus, it is violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India;

that the petitioner is having petroleum outlet in the vicinity and when the

petitioner established the outlet, there was no restriction in the

notification and that the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and great

hardship, due to establishment of new retail outlet by the 7th respondent

at the premises D.No.29/428.

12. Thus, as seen from the averments in Paragraph-6 of the affidavit,

the petitioner is neither a competitor nor his speaks about alleged

infringement of rights, if any under Part-III of the Constitution of India to

invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

13. The petitioner is mainly canvassing that the selection of 7th

respondent, for establishing retail outlet at the premises D.No.29/428 is

in violation of the notification dated 28.06.2023.

14. In the notification, about location it was shown as “Within

Machilipatnam Municipal Limited not on SH/NH”. Unless, the petitioner

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establishes beyond cavil of doubt, the infringement of right if any under

Part-III or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India or any other statutory

violation, affecting his, he cannot maintain the writ petition. The

petitioner must demonstrate that the location is part of SH/NH.

15. The term „locus standi‟ is a Latin term, the general meaning of

which is „place of standing‟. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th

Edition, defines the term “locus standi” as the right or capacity to bring an

action or to appear in the court. The traditional view of “locus standi” has

been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing

before the court that is to say he only has a right to move the court for

seeking justice. In Black's Law Dictionary, the meaning assigned to the

term “locus standi” is “the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given

forum”.

16. In Ratanlal Vs. Prahlad Jat 1

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court while

considering the term „locus standi‟ observed thus:

“8. … The traditional view of locus standi has been that the person

who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before the court, that

is to say, he only has a right to move the court for seeking justice.

The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a

person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the

development of constitutional law in India and the constitutional

courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the

cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical

grounds. It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not

merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non-suited on the

ground of his not having locus standi.”

1

(2017) 9 SCC 340

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17. In Tej Bahadur Vs. Narendra Modi 2

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court,

while considering the maintainability of an election petition qua locus,

observed at Paragraph-24 as follows:

“24. We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the

appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is

settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to

support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The

entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action.”

The Hon‟ble Apex Court relied upon the judgment in [T.

Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein Justice

V.R. Krishna Iyer held that if on a meaningful-not formal — reading of the

plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not

disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first

hearing.

18. Keeping in view the expressions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court

regarding the locus standi, it is appropriate at this juncture to consider the

locus of the petitioner to file the writ petition and the violation of any rights

of the petitioner.

19. As narrated supra, the petitioner, a rival trader, filed the above writ

petition. Nowhere in the writ affidavit was it pleaded about infringement of

right either under Part-III or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The

grievance of the petitioner, as can be seen from the affidavit, is that the

authorities violated the notification and selected the place contrary to the

notification. The petitioner mainly relied upon Ex.P4 letter addressed by

the Assistant Engineer, South Section, Machilipatnam to P.Ruparani and

2

(2021) 14 SCC 211 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 951

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Ex.P8 letter addressed by the Executive Engineer, R&B, Machilipatnam

to the Collector & District Magistrate, Krishna.

20. Ex.P4 letter, except for the information furnished to P.Ruparani,

the letter addressed by P.Ruparani under Right to Information Act was

not placed before this Court. In Ex.P4, it was mentioned that “the road

stretch from Harsha College to Kalekhanpeta (via) (Valandapalem, Zilla

Parishad centre, Chilakalapudi centre, Parasupeta, R.K. Mess,

Buttaipeta centre, Javvarupeta centre, Chintakuntapalem centre) towards

Challapalli comes under the jurisdiction of National Highway Department

(NH). It is pertinent to mention here that Ex.P4 does not indicate that

D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam is on

the National Highway. In Ex.P8, a letter addressed by the Executive

Engineer, R&B, Machilipatnam, to the Collector & District Magistrate,

Krishna, regarding the NOC to establish the outlet, it was mentioned as

follows:

“In connection to reference 1st and 2nd cited, and reported by Dy.Executive

Engineer R&B Sub-Division, Machilipatnam vide reference 3rd cited, and it

is to submit that the proposed retail outlet of Bharat Petroleum corporation

Ltd., Vijayawada is situated at Sy.No.29/428, Inaguduru, Machilipatnam

Mandal, Krishna District is located at Km.93/2 left side of bypassed

stretched of NH 216, Machilipatnam town limits for petroleum product at

Km.93/2 bypassed stretch of NH 216 Machilipatnam town limits. The

proposed site dimensions are 32.90 M X 22.30 M. In this regard, I submit

that the proposed unit maybe located at a distance of 7.00M from centre

line of existing BT road as shown in enclosed drawings. No HT Electrical

lines are passing through this site. Thus, there is no objection for the

vehicular traffic and the details are clearly marked in the enclosed plan.”

21. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in Ex.P8

letter it was mentioned that Sy.No.29/428 is located at Km.93/2 left side

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of bypassed stretch of NH 216 would mean that Sy.No.29/428 is part of

National Highway, in the considered opinion of this court, is

misconceived. The authority is referring to Km.93/2, left side of the

bypass road, which would indicate land, but not land as part of the

National Highway. In fact, upon receipt of complaints by the Corporation

about the location, the corporation sought information from the Ministry of

Road, Transport & National Highways. The Project Director, Ministry of

Road, Transport & National Highways, in its letter dated 17.06.2024

(Ex.R5) stated as follows:

“This has reference to the letter 1st cited above vide which it has

been requested to clarify whether the plot at Survey No.29/428 at

Machilipatnam Municipality, Krishna District is abutting NH-216.

2. In this connection, it I sto inform you that the above said survey

number is abutting the old NH-216 which used to pass through

Machilipatnam town. A bypass was constructed for Machilipatnam town

and therefore, the existing road is no longer considered to be a National

Highway. It was handed over to the State Government vide letter dated

24.02.2020 and has been under the control of the State Government since

then.”

22. Thus, Ex.R5 makes the things more discernible that the plot at

S.No.29/428 of Machilipatnam town is not part of NH-216.

23. Since the plot at S.No.29/428 of Machilipatnam town is not part of

NH-216, the Letter of Intent to establish the retail outlet is not contrary to

the notification. If the Letter of Intent is not contrary to the notification, the

petitioner cannot maintain the writ petition on, violation of a clause in the

notification.

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24. It is also pertinent to mention here that the petitioner is not

espousing public interest and in fact, he is alleging irreparable loss. The

petitioner, a rival trader approaching this Court by way of writ petition

without there being any infringement of his right guaranteed under Part-III

or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

25. The petitioner mainly relied upon Exs.P4 and P8, which do not

help the petitioner qua the alleged violation. The petitioner also sought

information just before the filing of the writ petition from the BPCL

authorities, and the same was filed as Ex.P3. The information sought by

the petitioner from the BPCL authorities relates to the applications

received, selected candidates, basis for selection, and the guidelines to

be followed for National Highway and Municipal limits while giving

advertisement and the stage of the selected site. Thus, the information

sought by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act also

demonstrates that the writ petition is engineered at the behest of a third

party.

26. The judgment cited by M.S.Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise,

Kerala and others3

, has no application to the facts in this case, in the

context of locus standi.

27. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any merit in

this writ petition. The petitioner lacks locus to file the writ petition. Neither

the right guaranteed under Part-III and Article 300-A of the Constitution of

India nor any clauses in the tender have been violated. The writ petition

is a clear abuse of the process of law and hence, it is liable to be

dismissed with costs.

3

(2000) 7 SCC 552

2025:APHC:15156

Page 15 of 15

28. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs of

Rs.10,000/- payable by the petitioner to the A.P. State Legal Services

Authority, Amaravati, within four weeks from the date of this order. If the

petitioner fails to pay the costs, the authority shall recover the costs as

per the Rules in vogue.

Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the petitioner as

well the A.P. State Legal Services Authority, Amaravati.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand

closed.

__________________________

JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

Note: LR Copy to be Marked.

 B/O

 PVD

2025:APHC:15156

(1) Whether each purchase of the cake alleged in the plaint is an independent contract, or whether they are all part of the same contract as alleged in the plaint? (2) Whether the stipulation in the confirmation note is the essence of the contract as alleged in the plaint? (3) Whether the alleged telegram, dated 26.12.1984 said to have been given by M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras, is true and binds the defendants? 2025:APHC:15018 (4) Whether the plaintiffs failed to supply the cake during the months stipulated in the confirmation note, and if so whether it amounted to termination of the contract? (5) Whether the plaintiffs failure to supply the cake in time resulted in any loss to defendants, and if so how much loss was causes and whether the plaintiffs have to compensate the defendants for the said loss? (6) Whether the plaintiffs failed to stick on the terms of the confirmation note with regard to gunny bags and what is the loss sustained by the defendants on account of it and whether the plaintiffs have to reimburse the same to the defendants? (7) At what price or prices the plaintiffs are entitled to claim value of the cake? (8) Whether the plaintiffs supplied the entire quantity of case stipulated and whether the alleged deficiency in the supply resulted in any loss to the defendants, and if so, how much amount and whether the plaintiffs are therefore liable to compensate the defendants? (9) Whether the account of the defendants with the plaintiffs is a running account and whether the suit claim of the plaintiffs is in time? (10) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any interest on the suit claim and if so, at what rate and from which date? (11) To what relief?

APHC010387982002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3397]

THURSDAY ,THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA

KRISHNA RAO

FIRST APPEAL NO: 2305/2002

Between:

Indian Oils And Fertiliser Corporation and Others ...APPELLANT(S)

AND

M/s Sikalollu Subba Rao Co and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Appellant(S):

1..

2.T SREEDHAR

3.K KOUTILYA

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.P NAGENDRA REDDY

The Court made the following:

JUDGMENT: -

This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short

‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants challenging the decree and judgment,

dated 25.09.2002 in O.S.No.32 of 1989, on the file of Senior Civil Judge,

Kandukur [for short ‘the trial Court’].

2025:APHC:15018

2. The appellant Nos.1 to 7 herein are the defendant Nos.1 to 7;

respondent Nos.1 to 8 herein are the plaintiffs and respondent Nos.9 and 10

herein are the defendant Nos.8 and 9 in O.S.No.32 of 1989.

During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent Nos.2 and 4 died

and their legal representative was already on record as 8th respondent.

3. The plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of Rs.69,534/- due under the

suit transaction and to grant future interest thereon and for costs.

4. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed

before the trial Court.

5. The brief averments of the plaint in O.S.No.32 of 1989 are as under:

(i) The 1st plaintiff firm is a trading firm and doing business in

manufacture of oils and oil cakes at Singarayakonda and the plaintiffs 2 to 5

are its partners. The 1st defendant firm is a manufacturer and exporter of deoiled rice bran, de-oiled cakes and oils and is situated at Nellore and the

defendant Nos.2 to 9 are its partners. The 1st plaintiff firm is doing business in

manufacture of oils and oil cakes and are supplying the same to the

defendants and others through the orders booked by the brokers and

commission agents. As per the orders of the brokers and commission agents,

the 1st plaintiff firm used to supply goods to the purchasers according to the

terms and conditions enumerated in the confirmation note. The 1st defendant

is having running katha with the 1st plaintiff. During the business transactions,

M/s. Krishna & Company, who are brokers and commission agents at Madras

sent an order under confirmation Note No.168, dated 02.02.1984 to the 1st

plaintiff firm to supply to the 1st defendant tobacco seed cake 10 lorries, each

lorry weighing about 10 M.T. F.O.L. delivery at Singarayakonda at the rate of

Rs.75/- per bag weighing 70 Kgs. including gunny and sales tax to be supplied

in the months of April, May and June of the year 1984. In pursuance thereof,

the 1st defendant firm vide T.S.C./84-85, dated 30.03.1984 confirmed the said

2025:APHC:15018

order of its agents M/s. Krishna & Company, dated 02.02.1984. The 1st

plaintiff firm was waiting for the communication from the above said brokers,

Krishna & Company to dispatch the goods under order to the 1st defendant

firm. On 26.12.1984 the said M/s. Krishna & Company sent a telegram asking

the plaintiff firm to load goods under confirmation No.168 to the 1st defendant

firm.

(ii) As per the contract in accordance with both the credit bills, the total

value comes to Rs.2,55,737-70 ps. The total amount sent under various drafts

to the 1st plaintiff firm on various dates comes to Rs.2,26,145-95 ps. The 1st

defendant is still due an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. As per the ledger

account for the year 1986-87 at page 96, the 1st defendant firm sent a letter,

dated 02.08.1986 along with a demand draft for Rs.1,145-95 ps. drawn on the

Andhra Bank, Singarayakonda and the same was received by the 1st plaintiff

on 04.08.1986 stating that the amount sent is towards full and final settlement

of the account. The letter, dated 02.08.1986 amounts to acknowledgement of

the liability. The calculation arrived at by the 1st defendant firm is wrong and

as against the amount due to Rs.30,737-70 ps. The 1st defendant firm sent

only Rs.1,145-95 ps. alleging that it is for full and final settlement of the

account. In the account statement, the 1st defendant firm has shown some

amounts as difference in price and debited the amounts unilaterally without

any approval of the 1st plaintiff firm which is false to the knowledge of the 1st

plaintiff firm. The 1st plaintiff demanded several times to pay the balance

amount found due in terms of the credit invoice deducting the amount paid by

way of draft, dated 02.08.1986, by the 1st defendant firm, but they did not give

proper reply. Therefore, the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit.

6. The 1st defendant firm filed written statement before the trial Court

denying the allegations in the plaint which was adopted by the other defendant

Nos.2 to 7. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows:

(i) The 1st plaintiff is not a registered firm and the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are not

its partners. The defendant Nos.8 and 9 retired from the plaintiff firm as early

2025:APHC:15018

as on 01.01.1983, 1st defendant firm was dissolved on 30.03.1987 itself. The

1

st defendant has never had any running khata with the 1

st plaintiff firm and

the account filed by the plaintiffs in the suit is not running khata. The time was

essence of the suit contract. The said contract was also confirmed by the 1st

defendant as admitted by the 1st plaintiff in the plaint. There was absolutely

no necessity or conditions requiring any further communication or permission

either from the brokers or from the 1st defendant to dispatch the goods

covered under the contract. The necessity for any such communication

pleaded in the plaint is false, unwarranted and untenable. The 1st defendant

denies knowledge of any telegrams mentioned in the plaint said to have been

issued by the brokers M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras on 26.12.1984. The

failure on the part of the plaintiffs to supply the cake during the months of

April, May and June, 1984 automatically brought the contract to an end and

the said contract ceased to be in force after June, 1984.

(ii) The total number of bags to be supplied under this contract were

1430 and the defendants suffered a loss of Rs.14,300/- under this contract.

The 1st defendant was not aware of any such telegram surprisingly without

any demand or request from the 1st defendant. Mr. S. Venkateswarulu, the

brother of the 2nd plaintiff and father of plaintiffs 4 and 5, who manages

plaintiffs’ business was contacted immediately and it was made clear to him

that the 1st defendant would take delivery if only the value to be paid was at

the then prevailing market rate of Rs.55/- per bag of 70 kgs. The 1st plaintiff

firm failed to supply the entire quantity of 20 lorry loads as the prices of the

cake have started to raise once again. Only 19 lorries were supplied in an

extended period of March and April, 1985. The 1st defendant had suffered

losses once again on account of plaintiffs failure to supply the entire stock

within the stipulated time.

(iii) At every stage, the plaintiffs sole aim and attempt was to exploit the

defendants to the maximum extent on some pretext or the other. On account

of increasing the number of gunny bags, the 1st defendant had suffered loss of

2025:APHC:15018

cake of an equal weight, a total of 4500 gunny bags were used as per the

bills. Out of them, 391 gunny bags were said to be extra and total amount of

Rs.977-50 ps. was debited against the defendants under two contracts at the

rate of Rs.2-50 per gunny. Taking average prices of the cake at Rs.1,100/- per

M.T. on at the then prevailing market, the 1st defendant finalized the account

of the plaintiffs as per the letter, dated 02.08.1986 and paid the entire balance

amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of a demand draft towards full and final

settlement of their account. The plaintiffs received the draft along with the

account copy enclosed with the letter, dated 02.08.1986 and accepted it. They

did not raise any protest or any claim either immediately or within a

reasonable time, or at any time thereafter before filing the suit. It is, therefore,

evident that the plaintiffs have accepted the payment towards full and final

settlement of their claim and they are now stopped from making any such

further claims. The plaintiffs claim is clearly barred by time. The suit is clearly

barred by limitation and it was not filed within the period of limitation either

from the respective dates of the contracts or the credit bills. The letter, dated

02.08.1986 enclosing the account of the plaintiffs by the defendants is not as

acknowledgment of any debt.

7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following

issues:

(1) Whether each purchase of the cake alleged in the plaint is an

independent contract, or whether they are all part of the same

contract as alleged in the plaint?

(2) Whether the stipulation in the confirmation note is the essence of the

contract as alleged in the plaint?

(3) Whether the alleged telegram, dated 26.12.1984 said to have been

given by M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras, is true and binds the

defendants?

2025:APHC:15018

(4) Whether the plaintiffs failed to supply the cake during the months

stipulated in the confirmation note, and if so whether it amounted to

termination of the contract?

(5) Whether the plaintiffs failure to supply the cake in time resulted in

any loss to defendants, and if so how much loss was causes and

whether the plaintiffs have to compensate the defendants for the

said loss?

(6) Whether the plaintiffs failed to stick on the terms of the confirmation

note with regard to gunny bags and what is the loss sustained by the

defendants on account of it and whether the plaintiffs have to

reimburse the same to the defendants?

(7) At what price or prices the plaintiffs are entitled to claim value of the

cake?

(8) Whether the plaintiffs supplied the entire quantity of case stipulated

and whether the alleged deficiency in the supply resulted in any loss

to the defendants, and if so, how much amount and whether the

plaintiffs are therefore liable to compensate the defendants?

(9) Whether the account of the defendants with the plaintiffs is a running

account and whether the suit claim of the plaintiffs is in time?

(10) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any interest on the suit

claim and if so, at what rate and from which date?

(11) To what relief?

8. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiffs,

PW1 was examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A36 were marked. On behalf of the

Defendants, DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B14 were marked.

2025:APHC:15018

9. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides,

the trial Court decreed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 25.09.2002,

against which the present appeal is preferred by the unsuccessful defendant

Nos.1 to 7 in the suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial

Court.

10. Heard Smt. S. Rajani learned counsel, representing Sri T. Sreedhar,

learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri P. Nagendra Reddy, learned

counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 8.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the decree

and judgment passed by the trial court is contrary to law, weight of evidence

and probabilities of the case. She would further contend that the trial Court

erred in came to a conclusion and decreed the suit though the appellants

discharged the amount due to the plaintiffs by way of demand draft towards

full and final settlement of the debt. She would further contend that the appeal

may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the

learned trial Judge.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 8 would

contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial

Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding

given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed by

confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.

13. Now the points for determination in the first appeal are:

1) Whether the alleged discharge of amount to the plaintiffs as

pleaded by the appellants is true and proved by the appellants?

2) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

14. Point Nos.1 and 2:

2025:APHC:15018

The case of the plaintiffs is that the 1st plaintiff firm is a trading firm and

doing business in manufacture of oils and oil cakes at Singarayakonda and

the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are its partners and the 1st defendant firm is a

manufacturer and exporter of de-oiled rice bran, de-oiled cakes and oils and is

situated at Nellore. The plaintiffs further pleaded that the defendant Nos.2 to

9 are the partners of the firm of the 1st defendant and the 1st plaintiff firm doing

business in manufacture of oils and oil cakes and they supplying the same to

the defendants and others through the orders booked by the brokers and

commission agents and M/s. Krishna & Company is the broker between the

plaintiffs and defendants for doing business. The plaintiffs further pleaded that

as per the contract in accordance with both the credit bills, the total value goes

to Rs.2,55,737-70 ps. and the total amount sent under various drafts to the 1st

plaintiff firm on various dates comes to Rs.2,26,145-95 ps. and the 1st

defendant is still due an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. as per the ledger account

for the year 1986-87 at page 96. The 1st defendant firm sent a letter, dated

02.08.1986 along with a demand draft for Rs.1,145-95 ps. by informing that

the amount is sent towards full and final settlement. The plaintiffs further

pleaded that the defendants failed to discharge the total debt and that the

plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit.

15. In order to prove the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relied on the

evidence of P.W.1 and also relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.36. PW.1 is one of the

partners of the 1st plaintiff firm. Ex.A.2 is the true copy of partnership deed and

Ex.A.1 shows that the 1st plaintiff firm is a registered firm and plaintiffs 2 to 5

are the partners of the 1st plaintiff firm. P.W.1 deposed in his evidence that

one M/s.Krishna & Company, Madras is the broker of 1st defendant and also

to the 1st plaintiff and the said M/s.Krishna & Company placed orders on

behalf of the 1st defendant to the 1st plaintiff to send 10 lorries of tobacco seed

cakes and Ex.A.3 is the order placed by M/s.Krishna & Company and Ex.A.4

is the confirmation letter and the plaintiffs also relied on relevant entries in the

books of account of the plaintiffs.

2025:APHC:15018

16. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.36 as stated supra. Ex.A.2 is

the partnership deed and Ex.A.1 is the acknowledgement of firm and Ex.A.5 is

the telegram issued by M/s.Krishna & Company who is the broker and

commission agent between the parties. As per Ex.A.5, the goods have to be

supplied during the month of April, May and June, 1984. Ex.A.15 is

confirmation letter issued by M/s.Krishna & Company to dispatch the goods in

the month of March, 1984 and the 1st defendant also issued another

confirmation letter under Ex.A.4 Ex.A.18 is the telegram issued for not send

the goods. Ex.A.19 is another telegram to send the goods from 25th March,

1985 onwards. P.W.1 deposed in his evidence in view of Ex.A.18 telegram

they have stopped to send TS cakes and later after receipt of Ex.A.19

telegram, they sent TS cakes to the 1st defendant. As per the own case of the

defendants, they have not issued any notice to the plaintiffs stating that they

have sent the cakes subsequent to the credit period and that they have not

accepting the same. As per the evidence of D.W.1, he kept the goods aside

without entering into the ledger and contacting father of P.W.1 by name

Venkateswarulu and father of P.W.1 agreed to reduce the cakes price from

Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show

that the defendants contacted the father of P.W.1 and father of P.W.1 reduced

the price of cakes from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. In fact, Venkateswarlu i.e.,

father of P.W.1 is no way concerned with the 1st plaintiff firm either he is not a

partner of the firm or he is not having any capacity in the 1st plaintiff firm. The

plaintiffs seriously contended that father of P.W.1 is no way connected with

the plaintiff partnership firm. The suit is filed in the year 1989.

17. The contention of the appellants is that they sent an amount of

Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft towards full and final settlement

along with Ex.B.11 letter on 02.08.1986 and the same is received by the

plaintiffs without protest and all of a sudden, the plaintiffs filed the suit in the

year 1989. Admittedly, the suit is filed on 02.08.1989, the 1st defendant sent

an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft on 02.06.1986. The

2025:APHC:15018

appellants contended that the said amount is sent towards full and final

satisfaction. The contention of the plaintiffs is that they made a phone call to

the defendants subsequently by narrating the facts and demanding to pay the

remaining amount. The contention of the appellants is that Ex.A.3 and Ex.B.7

shows that the stock has to be dispatched by April, May and June, 1984 and

agreed price is Rs.75/- per bag and since the price is increased, they did not

supply the goods, as the plaintiffs sent goods subsequent to the period of

June, 1984, the 1st defendant firm refused to receive the stock. The

contention of the plaintiffs is that as per Ex.A.18 telegram, dated 13.03.1985,

the 1st plaintiff firm did not dispatch the TS cakes to the defendants, soon after

receiving another telegram under Ex.A.19, dated 23.03.1985 from M/s.Krishna

& Company, the 1st plaintiff firm dispatched TS cakes and the defendants

received the same. The contention of the appellants is that the 1st plaintiff firm

did not raise any objection for the same at the time of encashment of the

demand draft. As per the admission of D.W.1, they have not sent the

demanded amount at Rs.75/- per bag. The contention of the appellants is that

the father of P.W.1 reduced the price from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. It is a

fact that father of P.W.1 is not either Managing Partner of the 1st plaintiff firm

or Partner of the firm. The plaintiffs seriously contended that the father of

P.W.1 is no way connected with the 1st plaintiff business, therefore, it is for the

defendants to summon the father of P.W.1 to discharge their burden, but they

failed to do so. As per the case of the defendants, they have sent an amount

of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft on 02.08.1986 towards full

payment of debt. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the said amount is not

towards full and final settlement and the defendants have to discharge some

more amount as per ledger books produced by the plaintiffs and they have

also made a phone call to the defendants by narrating the entire facts. In order

to establish the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relied on documentary

evidence apart from the evidence of P.W.1. The evidence on record coupled

with the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs supports the case of

the plaintiffs.

2025:APHC:15018

18. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the 1st

plaintiff firm did not raise any objection for the same at the time of encashment

of demand draft given towards full and final settlement, for non-supply of

goods from April to June, 1984, they have sustained loss of Rs.14,300/- and

after deducting the same, they sent Rs.1,145-95 ps. But, in order to prove the

said defence, the defendants did not adduce any evidence. It was contended

by the defendants, they have not sent any telegram and they have not

instructed M/s.Krishna & Company to issue telegram to the plaintiffs for

stoppage of TS cakes and also issuance of another telegram to dispatch TS

cakes and the plaintiffs have to prove the same by examining the employee in

M/s.Krishna & Company. It is the case of the appellants that they have

discharged the amount to the plaintiffs towards full and final satisfaction of the

debt, therefore, the entire burden is on the appellants to prove that they have

sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt. As per

the case of both parties, M/s.Krishna & Company is the commission agent to

both the parties but the appellants failed to prove the same to show that they

sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt. The

plaintiffs relied on oral and documentary evidence to prove the claim of the

plaintiffs. The alleged discharge towards full satisfaction of the amount and

alleged negotiations in between D.W.1 and Venkateswarlu about reducing

price of TS cakes from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag as pleaded is not proved by

the defendants. It is for the appellants to prove the same but the appellants

failed to prove the same.

19. The evidence on record clearly proves that the defendants have to

pay an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. as on the date of 02.08.1986 after

deducting an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. which was sent by the defendants by

way of demand draft and the same was encashed by the plaintiffs. But the

appellants failed to prove the same that they sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95

ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt to the plaintiffs. The contention of the

plaintiffs is that the defendants have to pay the total amount due with interest

2025:APHC:15018

at 18% per annum. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the

learned trial Judge awarded interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till

the date of decree and further awarded subsequent interest at 6% per annum

from the date of decree till the date of realization. Therefore, I do not found

any reason to interfere with the said finding of the learned trial Judge in

granting interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree

and subsequent interest at 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date

of realization, but the plaintiffs are not entitled any interest on Rs.29,591-75

ps. till the date of filing of suit, since the plaintiffs have not issued any legal

notice prior to filing of the suit and they waited on the last date of limitation and

filed the suit and that the plaintiffs are not entitled interest at 18% per annum

on the date of finalization of the accounts till the date of filing of the suit.

20. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed by modifying the decree

and judgment, dated 25.09.2002, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kandukur,

as the plaintiffs 1, 3 to 8 are entitled an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. with

interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree and

further awarded subsequent interest at 6% per annum from the date of decree

till the date of realization. Considering the facts and circumstances of the

case, each party do bear their own costs in the first appeal.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall

stand closed.

_________________________

V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J

Date: 17.04.2025

PGR

2025:APHC:15018