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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

Saturday, May 10, 2025

The Pakistan & its Cross Border Terrorism - State Responsibility for Acts of Terrorism



The Pakistan & its Cross Border Terrorism 


The Core Issue :- 

State Responsibility for Acts of Terrorism


I. Introduction:-

 The Enduring Scourge of Cross-Border Terrorism


1.  For decades, India has been the target of relentless terrorist attacks, meticulously planned, financed, and executed by organizations whose very existence and operational capabilities are inextricably linked to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter "Pakistan"). 

This submission will demonstrate, through compelling facts and established legal principles, that Pakistan has breached its fundamental obligations by failing to prevent its territory from being used as a launchpad for terrorism against India, thereby incurring state responsibility for the immense suffering caused.


II. A Chronicle of Terror:-

 The Evidentiary Tapestry


2.  The tragic history of cross-border terrorism targeting India is not a series of isolated incidents, but rather a sustained campaign, each thread leading back to Pakistan. 

 The following illustrative examples, forming a clear and undeniable pattern:

 A]. The Audacity of Mumbai (2008):-

The meticulously planned and executed attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, orchestrated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, left an indelible scar. The investigation and subsequent evidence, including digital communications and the capture of a surviving terrorist, unequivocally traced the planning, training, and logistical support directly to Pakistan.

B]. The Attack on Sovereignty (2001):-

The brazen attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, aimed at the very heart of India’s democracy, was perpetrated by terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, organizations openly operating within Pakistan.

C]. The Breach of Security (2016):-

 The assault on the Pathankot airbase in January 2016, carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed operatives, further demonstrated the continued ability of Pakistan-based terrorist groups to strike deep within Indian territory.

D]. The Carnage in Uri (2016):-

The deadly attack on the Indian Army base in Uri in September 2016, attributed to Jaish-e-Mohammed, once again highlighted the direct link between terrorist violence in India and organizations thriving within Pakistan.

E]. The Recent Outrage (2025):-

The Pahalgam attack of April 22, 2025, the immediate aftermath of which yielded digital evidence pointing towards Pakistan-based handlers and networks, underscores the ongoing nature of this grave issue.


3.  Beyond these specific atrocities, It rests on a robust and multi-layered body of evidence:

A]. The Digital Realm as a Conduit of Terror:-

 Intercepted communications, digital footprints meticulously traced to Pakistan-based servers and individuals, and the unashamed claims of responsibility by Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist organizations, paint a clear picture of the digital infrastructure facilitating these crimes.

B]. The Testimony of Experience:-

 The harrowing accounts and confessions of captured terrorists, detailing their radicalization, training within identifiable camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and the logistical support provided within Pakistani territory, offer irrefutable first hand evidence.

C]. The Flow of Illicit Funds:-

 Investigations into the financing of terrorism targeting India consistently reveal financial trails originating within Pakistan, utilizing both formal and informal channels, directly supporting terrorist operations. Pakistan’s persistent presence on the FATF grey list speaks volumes about its systemic deficiencies in combating this illicit flow.

D]. .The Unseen Eye Geospatial Intelligence:-

 Satellite imagery and  corroborated intelligence reports have consistently identified the long-standing presence of terrorist training facilities and operational hubs within Pakistan’s territory, their very existence a testament to Pakistan’s failure to exercise effective control.


III. Legal Foundations: Pakistan’s Breach of International Law:-

4.  The Pakistan’s actions and inactions constitute a clear and persistent breach of fundamental principles and binding obligations under international law:-

A.]. The Sacrosanct Duty of Due Diligence:-

Customary international law enshrines the duty of every state to exercise due diligence in preventing its territory from being used to cause harm to other states. In the context of the uniquely destructive nature of terrorism, this duty demands vigilance and effective action. Pakistan has manifestly failed to uphold this fundamental obligation. The sustained and widespread nature of terrorism emanating from its territory and targeting India, spanning decades and numerous attacks, demonstrates a systemic and egregious breach of its duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent such harm.

B].The Binding Mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001):-

 This pivotal resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposes unequivocal obligations on all UN member states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, to criminalize terrorist acts, and to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to terrorist entities. Pakistan’s continued failure to effectively dismantle the operational and financial networks of UN-designated terrorist organizations operating openly within its territory, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (listed as a terrorist entity under UNSC Resolution 1267) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (also UNSC-designated), constitutes a direct and ongoing violation of these binding obligations. The international community’s repeated concerns, evidenced by Pakistan’s prolonged scrutiny under the FATF framework, further underscore this failure.  

C]. The Imperative of International Conventions:-

 Pakistan is a State Party to key international conventions aimed at the suppression of terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Article 2 of this Convention obligates states to criminalize and prevent the financing of terrorism. Pakistan’s documented deficiencies in effectively preventing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations targeting India, and its insufficient prosecution of those involved in such financing within its jurisdiction, represent a clear failure to meet its treaty obligations.

D]. State Responsibility for the Inaction and Tolerance of Terrorism:- While the immediate perpetrators of terrorist acts are non-state actors, Pakistan’s state responsibility is engaged through its prolonged and egregious failure to prevent these acts from being planned, organized, and executed from its territory. The sustained operational capability and the public presence of leaders of UN-designated terrorist organizations within Pakistan, coupled with a conspicuous lack of effective legal action against them,and on the other hand , strongly  supporting them clearly suggest a deliberate policy of support, thus triggering Pakistan’s responsibility under international law. 

E]. The Unfulfilled Obligation to  Prosecute  and handing over UN-Designated Terrorist Organizations:-

International law unequivocally obligates states to thoroughly investigate and prosecute individuals within their jurisdiction credibly accused of involvement in terrorism, especially when such acts target other sovereign nations. Pakistan’s persistent failure to bring to justice the known leaders and key operatives of UN-designated terrorist organizations responsible for countless attacks in India represents a clear dereliction of this fundamental obligation.

F]. The Weight of Evidence Meets the Standard of Proof:-

The comprehensive and consistent body of evidence , encompassing digital intelligence, testimonial accounts, financial trails, and geospatial confirmation, meets the requisite standard of proof before any Court. The cumulative impact of this evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, Pakistan’s sustained and egregious failure to meet its international legal obligations to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism against India.

IV. conclusion :- 

Therefore the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has violated its obligations under international law by failing to exercise due diligence to prevent its territory from being used for terrorist acts against the Republic of India, and by failing to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions and international conventions on terrorism and on the other hand itself joinded hands with Terrorists Organizations - the Pakistan is liable to be boycotted socially and econimically by the entire world - Golabal Boycott


Sunday, April 20, 2025

declare the selection of 7th respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th respondent, as illegal and arbitrary

 declare the selection of 7th respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th respondent, as illegal and arbitrary


IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

Between:

1. K N V RATNA BABU, S/O LAKSHMI NANCHARAIAH, AGED

ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O H.NO.1-204, KALEKHAN PETA,

MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT

... PETITIONER

AND

1. UNION OF INDIA, REP BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS, SASTHRY BHAVAN, NEW

DELHI AND 5 OTHERS.

... RESPONDENTS

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 17.04.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the order? : Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of order may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to

see the fair copy of the order? : Yes/No

___________________________

JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

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* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

+ WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

% 17.04.2025

WRIT PETITION No.31158 of 2024

Between:

1. K N V RATNA BABU, S/O LAKSHMI NANCHARAIAH, AGED

ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O H.NO.1-204, KALEKHAN PETA,

MACHILIPATNAM, KRISHNA DISTRICT

... PETITIONER

AND

1. UNION OF INDIA, REP BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS, SASTHRY BHAVAN, NEW

DELHI AND 5 OTHERS.

... RESPONDENTS

! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri Subba Rao Korrapati

^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri P.Shreyas Reddy

 Learned AGP for Revenue

 Sri A.S.C.Bose

 Sri N.Ashwani Kumar

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1) (2017) 9 SCC 340

2) (2021) 14 SCC 211 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 951

3) (2000) 7 SCC 552

This Court made the following:

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APHC010597662024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3331]

THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

WRIT PETITION NO: 31158/2024

Between:

K N V Ratna Babu ...PETITIONER

AND

Union Of India and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:

1.SUBBA RAO KORRAPATI

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.A S C BOSE

2.A S C BOSE (SC FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AP)

3.SHREYAS REDDY

4.ALEKHYA TADASINA(CENTRAL GOVT COUNSEL)

The Court made the following:

ORDER

The above Writ Petition is filed to declare the selection of 7th

respondent as Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer for the

premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem,

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Machilipatnam, in pursuance of the notification dated 28.06.2023, and

the No Objection Certificate dated 29.11.2024 issued by the 5th

respondent, as illegal and arbitrary.

2. a) Averments, in the affidavit, in brief, are that the 2nd respondent

issued notification dated 28.06.2023 (Ex.P1) calling applications from the

eligible candidates, in the places notified by them for Petroleum Filling

Station/Retail Outlets. In the said notification, S.No.303 is in

Machilipatnam Municipal Limits, but not on State Highway and National

Highway. The 7th respondent applied to the dealership at the land in

D.No.29/428 located in NH-216. The petitioner made application to the

2

nd respondent under Right to Information Act, however the office of 2nd

respondent did not furnish a proper reply. The petitioner came to know

that one P.Ruparani made an application to the Executive Engineer, R &

B, Machilipatnam on 02.11.2023 requesting to furnish certain information

regarding control over the road running from Harsha College to

Kalekanpeta (via) Vallandapael, Zilla Parishan Centre, Chilakalpudi

Centre etc. The Assistant Engineer, South Section, Machilipatnam-cumPublic Information Officer furnished information vide letter dated

15.11.2023 (Ex.P4), wherein it was mentioned that the said places come

under the jurisdiction of National Highway Department.

b) The respondents 2 and 3 selected the 7th respondent at

D.No.29/428 for the land in prohibited areas and contrary to the

notification dated 28.06.2023. The said P.Ruparani made another

application under Right to Information Act to the Project Director,

Implementation Unit, Machilipatnam, Ministry of Road, Transport and

Highway, Machilipatnam to furnish certain information about notifying the

road from Harsha College to Kalekhanpeta as National Highway. The

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Project Director vide a letter dated 27.05.2024 (Ex.P5) informed that the

road leading to Challapalli from Harsha College is notified as National

Highway. The 5th respondent also issued NOC to the 7th respondent

dated 29.11.2024 (Ex.P6) for establishment of retail outlet. The other

statutory authorities also issued respective NOCs. With these averments,

the above writ petition is filed.

3. a) Counter affidavit and vacate stay petition was filed on behalf of

respondents 2 and 3. It was contended, interalia, that the 2nd respondent

issued notification dated 28.06.2023 for appointment of dealership for

retail outlet in various locations in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Serial

No.303 of the notification specifies that the location required for the retail

outlet to be “Within Machilipatnam Municipal Limited not on SH/NH”. The

7

th respondent made an application under Group-I. In the draw of the

lots, the 7th respondent was selected on 05.12.2023 and thereafter, letter

of intent was issued in favour of 7th respondent on 05.08.2024. The 7th

respondent offered his land covered under D.No.29/428, Municipal Ward

No.29, Inugudurupeta of Machilipatnam Municipality. The site offered by

the 7th respondent falls within Machilipatnam Municipality and it is not

adjacent to either to a National Highway of any State Highway.

b) Earlier, another writ petition No.20919 of 2024 was filed,

however no interim order was granted. The petitioners are Retail Outlet

Dealers from other petroleum corporations and the writ petitions was filed

only to thwart competition. The petitioner has no locus standi to file the

writ petition.

c) The BPCL authorities have provided the location details, Google

Map and the geo-coordinates of the location. The BPCL authorities

again addressed letter dated 07.05.2024 (Ex.R4) to the Project Director,

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PIU, Machilipatnam, who, in turn, gave reply to BPCL that the site is

located on old NH-216, which used to pass through the Machilipatnam

town and is no longer considered to be a National Highway after the

construction of a bypass, as it was handed back to the State Government

on 24.02.2020 itself (Ex.R5). The respondents provided information to

the petitioner under Right to Information Act. The petitioner has

purposefully withheld the details in the annexure provided by the NHAI

authorities to Ruparani vide Ex.P5.

d) Within 400 meters from the subject site, there is another

Petroleum Retail Outlet belonged to Indian Oil Corporation Limited. The

subject site is not located in the designated residential area of a local

body nor within the prohibited distance from schools or hospitals. The

subject site wherein the RO site is situated is a mixed-use area with

many commercial establishments. The location of the subject site does

not contravene any of the guidelines issued by various statutory bodies.

The authorities followed the guidelines and policies in vogue. The

company is developing the Retail Outlet under the Corpus scheme,

which is specifically designed to support SC category applicants by

providing financial assistance, including working capital and eventually,

prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

4. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of 6th respondent-Municipal

Corporation. It was contended, interalia, that the 6th respondent

submitted remarks to the 4th respondent vide office letter

Roc.No.3662/2024/G2, dated 06.09.2024 stating that as per the report of

the Town Surveyor, the proposed site falls in survey Ward No.1 in

Revenue Ward No.29, near S.F. No.177, which is in un-surveyed portion

as per the R.S.R Record, within an extent of 880 sq. yards. The

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proposed site satisfies the norms for the establishment of a new retail

outlet.

5. a) The 7th respondent filed separate counter. It was contended that

pursuant to the application made by the petitioner, acting upon a

complaint, the Territory Manager of the 2nd respondent-company

addressed letter dated 21.03.2024 to the Project Director, PIU,

Machilipatnam to clarify whether the property offered by the 7th

respondent for setting up a retail outlet is on road abutting the National

Highway or not. The Project Director, PIU, in turn, requested L.N. Malviya

Infra Projects Limited to furnish the said information. It was clarified in the

letter dated 14.06.2024 that the subject property is abutting NH-214A in

Machilipatnam Town limits and was handed over to the Government of

Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the said stretch does not fall under the

jurisdiction of the Ministry of Road, Transport & Highways.

b) Basing on the information furnished, the Project Director, PIU

issued a letter dated 17.06.2024 o the 2nd respondent (Ex.R5). After

receiving the NOC, the 2nd respondent-company issued a Public Notice

through paper publication dated 30.11.2024 inviting objections, however,

no objections were received by the 2nd respondent and thus, the 7th

respondent started construction work, and the works were almost

completed.

c) One V.Sonibabu and Ganjala Ramprasad filed W.P.No.20919 of

2024 and the said writ petition is pending, and no interim order was

granted. Suppressing filing of other writ petition on the very same cause

of action, the present writ petition is filed. The material relied upon in both

the writ petitions is identical. The petitioner lacks locus to file the writ

petition and eventually prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

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6. Heard Sri Subbarao Korrapati, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri

P.Shreyas Reddy, learned counsel for respondents 2 & 3, learned

Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue for respondents 4 & 5 and

Sri A.S.C.Bose, learned standing counsel for 6th respondent-corporation

and Sri N.Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for 5th respondent.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the averments

in the writ affidavit, would further contend that the site identified for

establishing retail outlet is in National Highway, opposite to petitioner‟s

outlet. He would further submit that issuing letter of intent to the 7th

respondent to establish a retail outlet at D.No.29/428, of Inagudurupeta,

Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, is contrary to the notification.

8. Learned standing counsel for respondents 2 & 3 and the learned

counsel for 7th respondent would contend that the petitioner lacks locus

standi to file the writ petition. The petitioner a rival trader, and nonapplicant, cannot maintain the writ petition. They would also contend that

the right, if any, guaranteed to the petitioner under Part-III of the

Constitution of India, has not been violated. The petitioner mainly relied

upon the material secured by another individual.

9. Now, the points for consideration are:

1) Whether issuing a letter of intent to the 7th respondent to

establish Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet dealer at

the premises bearing D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta,

Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam, is in violation of

notification issued by the 2nd respondent?

2) Whether the petitioner got locus standi to file the writ

petition?

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10. Shorn of all details, there is no dispute regarding the

advertisement, letter of intent in favour of 7th respondent to establish

Petroleum Filling Station/Retail Outlet at the premises bearing

D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam. The

facts narrated supra would indicate the granting of permissions from

different statutory authorities.

11. In Paragraph-6 of the writ affidavit, it was pleaded that selecting 7th

respondent as retail outlet dealer and the consequential NOC issued by

the 5th respondent, is arbitrary, illegal, for extraneous consideration and

also contrary to the notification dated 28.06.2023 of the 2nd respondent

and thus, it is violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India;

that the petitioner is having petroleum outlet in the vicinity and when the

petitioner established the outlet, there was no restriction in the

notification and that the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and great

hardship, due to establishment of new retail outlet by the 7th respondent

at the premises D.No.29/428.

12. Thus, as seen from the averments in Paragraph-6 of the affidavit,

the petitioner is neither a competitor nor his speaks about alleged

infringement of rights, if any under Part-III of the Constitution of India to

invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

13. The petitioner is mainly canvassing that the selection of 7th

respondent, for establishing retail outlet at the premises D.No.29/428 is

in violation of the notification dated 28.06.2023.

14. In the notification, about location it was shown as “Within

Machilipatnam Municipal Limited not on SH/NH”. Unless, the petitioner

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establishes beyond cavil of doubt, the infringement of right if any under

Part-III or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India or any other statutory

violation, affecting his, he cannot maintain the writ petition. The

petitioner must demonstrate that the location is part of SH/NH.

15. The term „locus standi‟ is a Latin term, the general meaning of

which is „place of standing‟. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th

Edition, defines the term “locus standi” as the right or capacity to bring an

action or to appear in the court. The traditional view of “locus standi” has

been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing

before the court that is to say he only has a right to move the court for

seeking justice. In Black's Law Dictionary, the meaning assigned to the

term “locus standi” is “the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given

forum”.

16. In Ratanlal Vs. Prahlad Jat 1

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court while

considering the term „locus standi‟ observed thus:

“8. … The traditional view of locus standi has been that the person

who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before the court, that

is to say, he only has a right to move the court for seeking justice.

The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a

person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the

development of constitutional law in India and the constitutional

courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the

cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical

grounds. It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not

merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non-suited on the

ground of his not having locus standi.”


1

(2017) 9 SCC 340

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17. In Tej Bahadur Vs. Narendra Modi 2

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court,

while considering the maintainability of an election petition qua locus,

observed at Paragraph-24 as follows:

“24. We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the

appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is

settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to

support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The

entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action.”

The Hon‟ble Apex Court relied upon the judgment in [T.

Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein Justice

V.R. Krishna Iyer held that if on a meaningful-not formal — reading of the

plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not

disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first

hearing.

18. Keeping in view the expressions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court

regarding the locus standi, it is appropriate at this juncture to consider the

locus of the petitioner to file the writ petition and the violation of any rights

of the petitioner.

19. As narrated supra, the petitioner, a rival trader, filed the above writ

petition. Nowhere in the writ affidavit was it pleaded about infringement of

right either under Part-III or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The

grievance of the petitioner, as can be seen from the affidavit, is that the

authorities violated the notification and selected the place contrary to the

notification. The petitioner mainly relied upon Ex.P4 letter addressed by

the Assistant Engineer, South Section, Machilipatnam to P.Ruparani and


2

(2021) 14 SCC 211 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 951

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Ex.P8 letter addressed by the Executive Engineer, R&B, Machilipatnam

to the Collector & District Magistrate, Krishna.

20. Ex.P4 letter, except for the information furnished to P.Ruparani,

the letter addressed by P.Ruparani under Right to Information Act was

not placed before this Court. In Ex.P4, it was mentioned that “the road

stretch from Harsha College to Kalekhanpeta (via) (Valandapalem, Zilla

Parishad centre, Chilakalapudi centre, Parasupeta, R.K. Mess,

Buttaipeta centre, Javvarupeta centre, Chintakuntapalem centre) towards

Challapalli comes under the jurisdiction of National Highway Department

(NH). It is pertinent to mention here that Ex.P4 does not indicate that

D.No.29/428 of Inagudurupeta, Chintaguntapalem, Machilipatnam is on

the National Highway. In Ex.P8, a letter addressed by the Executive

Engineer, R&B, Machilipatnam, to the Collector & District Magistrate,

Krishna, regarding the NOC to establish the outlet, it was mentioned as

follows:

“In connection to reference 1st and 2nd cited, and reported by Dy.Executive

Engineer R&B Sub-Division, Machilipatnam vide reference 3rd cited, and it

is to submit that the proposed retail outlet of Bharat Petroleum corporation

Ltd., Vijayawada is situated at Sy.No.29/428, Inaguduru, Machilipatnam

Mandal, Krishna District is located at Km.93/2 left side of bypassed

stretched of NH 216, Machilipatnam town limits for petroleum product at

Km.93/2 bypassed stretch of NH 216 Machilipatnam town limits. The

proposed site dimensions are 32.90 M X 22.30 M. In this regard, I submit

that the proposed unit maybe located at a distance of 7.00M from centre

line of existing BT road as shown in enclosed drawings. No HT Electrical

lines are passing through this site. Thus, there is no objection for the

vehicular traffic and the details are clearly marked in the enclosed plan.”

21. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in Ex.P8

letter it was mentioned that Sy.No.29/428 is located at Km.93/2 left side

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of bypassed stretch of NH 216 would mean that Sy.No.29/428 is part of

National Highway, in the considered opinion of this court, is

misconceived. The authority is referring to Km.93/2, left side of the

bypass road, which would indicate land, but not land as part of the

National Highway. In fact, upon receipt of complaints by the Corporation

about the location, the corporation sought information from the Ministry of

Road, Transport & National Highways. The Project Director, Ministry of

Road, Transport & National Highways, in its letter dated 17.06.2024

(Ex.R5) stated as follows:

“This has reference to the letter 1st cited above vide which it has

been requested to clarify whether the plot at Survey No.29/428 at

Machilipatnam Municipality, Krishna District is abutting NH-216.

2. In this connection, it I sto inform you that the above said survey

number is abutting the old NH-216 which used to pass through

Machilipatnam town. A bypass was constructed for Machilipatnam town

and therefore, the existing road is no longer considered to be a National

Highway. It was handed over to the State Government vide letter dated

24.02.2020 and has been under the control of the State Government since

then.”

22. Thus, Ex.R5 makes the things more discernible that the plot at

S.No.29/428 of Machilipatnam town is not part of NH-216.

23. Since the plot at S.No.29/428 of Machilipatnam town is not part of

NH-216, the Letter of Intent to establish the retail outlet is not contrary to

the notification. If the Letter of Intent is not contrary to the notification, the

petitioner cannot maintain the writ petition on, violation of a clause in the

notification.

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24. It is also pertinent to mention here that the petitioner is not

espousing public interest and in fact, he is alleging irreparable loss. The

petitioner, a rival trader approaching this Court by way of writ petition

without there being any infringement of his right guaranteed under Part-III

or Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

25. The petitioner mainly relied upon Exs.P4 and P8, which do not

help the petitioner qua the alleged violation. The petitioner also sought

information just before the filing of the writ petition from the BPCL

authorities, and the same was filed as Ex.P3. The information sought by

the petitioner from the BPCL authorities relates to the applications

received, selected candidates, basis for selection, and the guidelines to

be followed for National Highway and Municipal limits while giving

advertisement and the stage of the selected site. Thus, the information

sought by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act also

demonstrates that the writ petition is engineered at the behest of a third

party.

26. The judgment cited by M.S.Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise,

Kerala and others3

, has no application to the facts in this case, in the

context of locus standi.

27. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any merit in

this writ petition. The petitioner lacks locus to file the writ petition. Neither

the right guaranteed under Part-III and Article 300-A of the Constitution of

India nor any clauses in the tender have been violated. The writ petition

is a clear abuse of the process of law and hence, it is liable to be

dismissed with costs.


3

(2000) 7 SCC 552

2025:APHC:15156

Page 15 of 15

28. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs of

Rs.10,000/- payable by the petitioner to the A.P. State Legal Services

Authority, Amaravati, within four weeks from the date of this order. If the

petitioner fails to pay the costs, the authority shall recover the costs as

per the Rules in vogue.

Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the petitioner as

well the A.P. State Legal Services Authority, Amaravati.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand

closed.

__________________________

JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

Note: LR Copy to be Marked.

 B/O

 PVD

2025:APHC:15156

(1) Whether each purchase of the cake alleged in the plaint is an independent contract, or whether they are all part of the same contract as alleged in the plaint? (2) Whether the stipulation in the confirmation note is the essence of the contract as alleged in the plaint? (3) Whether the alleged telegram, dated 26.12.1984 said to have been given by M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras, is true and binds the defendants? 2025:APHC:15018 (4) Whether the plaintiffs failed to supply the cake during the months stipulated in the confirmation note, and if so whether it amounted to termination of the contract? (5) Whether the plaintiffs failure to supply the cake in time resulted in any loss to defendants, and if so how much loss was causes and whether the plaintiffs have to compensate the defendants for the said loss? (6) Whether the plaintiffs failed to stick on the terms of the confirmation note with regard to gunny bags and what is the loss sustained by the defendants on account of it and whether the plaintiffs have to reimburse the same to the defendants? (7) At what price or prices the plaintiffs are entitled to claim value of the cake? (8) Whether the plaintiffs supplied the entire quantity of case stipulated and whether the alleged deficiency in the supply resulted in any loss to the defendants, and if so, how much amount and whether the plaintiffs are therefore liable to compensate the defendants? (9) Whether the account of the defendants with the plaintiffs is a running account and whether the suit claim of the plaintiffs is in time? (10) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any interest on the suit claim and if so, at what rate and from which date? (11) To what relief?

APHC010387982002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3397]

THURSDAY ,THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA

KRISHNA RAO

FIRST APPEAL NO: 2305/2002

Between:

Indian Oils And Fertiliser Corporation and Others ...APPELLANT(S)

AND

M/s Sikalollu Subba Rao Co and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Appellant(S):

1..

2.T SREEDHAR

3.K KOUTILYA

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.P NAGENDRA REDDY

The Court made the following:

JUDGMENT: -

This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short

‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants challenging the decree and judgment,

dated 25.09.2002 in O.S.No.32 of 1989, on the file of Senior Civil Judge,

Kandukur [for short ‘the trial Court’].

2025:APHC:15018

2. The appellant Nos.1 to 7 herein are the defendant Nos.1 to 7;

respondent Nos.1 to 8 herein are the plaintiffs and respondent Nos.9 and 10

herein are the defendant Nos.8 and 9 in O.S.No.32 of 1989.

During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent Nos.2 and 4 died

and their legal representative was already on record as 8th respondent.

3. The plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of Rs.69,534/- due under the

suit transaction and to grant future interest thereon and for costs.

4. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed

before the trial Court.

5. The brief averments of the plaint in O.S.No.32 of 1989 are as under:

(i) The 1st plaintiff firm is a trading firm and doing business in

manufacture of oils and oil cakes at Singarayakonda and the plaintiffs 2 to 5

are its partners. The 1st defendant firm is a manufacturer and exporter of deoiled rice bran, de-oiled cakes and oils and is situated at Nellore and the

defendant Nos.2 to 9 are its partners. The 1st plaintiff firm is doing business in

manufacture of oils and oil cakes and are supplying the same to the

defendants and others through the orders booked by the brokers and

commission agents. As per the orders of the brokers and commission agents,

the 1st plaintiff firm used to supply goods to the purchasers according to the

terms and conditions enumerated in the confirmation note. The 1st defendant

is having running katha with the 1st plaintiff. During the business transactions,

M/s. Krishna & Company, who are brokers and commission agents at Madras

sent an order under confirmation Note No.168, dated 02.02.1984 to the 1st

plaintiff firm to supply to the 1st defendant tobacco seed cake 10 lorries, each

lorry weighing about 10 M.T. F.O.L. delivery at Singarayakonda at the rate of

Rs.75/- per bag weighing 70 Kgs. including gunny and sales tax to be supplied

in the months of April, May and June of the year 1984. In pursuance thereof,

the 1st defendant firm vide T.S.C./84-85, dated 30.03.1984 confirmed the said

2025:APHC:15018

order of its agents M/s. Krishna & Company, dated 02.02.1984. The 1st

plaintiff firm was waiting for the communication from the above said brokers,

Krishna & Company to dispatch the goods under order to the 1st defendant

firm. On 26.12.1984 the said M/s. Krishna & Company sent a telegram asking

the plaintiff firm to load goods under confirmation No.168 to the 1st defendant

firm.

(ii) As per the contract in accordance with both the credit bills, the total

value comes to Rs.2,55,737-70 ps. The total amount sent under various drafts

to the 1st plaintiff firm on various dates comes to Rs.2,26,145-95 ps. The 1st

defendant is still due an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. As per the ledger

account for the year 1986-87 at page 96, the 1st defendant firm sent a letter,

dated 02.08.1986 along with a demand draft for Rs.1,145-95 ps. drawn on the

Andhra Bank, Singarayakonda and the same was received by the 1st plaintiff

on 04.08.1986 stating that the amount sent is towards full and final settlement

of the account. The letter, dated 02.08.1986 amounts to acknowledgement of

the liability. The calculation arrived at by the 1st defendant firm is wrong and

as against the amount due to Rs.30,737-70 ps. The 1st defendant firm sent

only Rs.1,145-95 ps. alleging that it is for full and final settlement of the

account. In the account statement, the 1st defendant firm has shown some

amounts as difference in price and debited the amounts unilaterally without

any approval of the 1st plaintiff firm which is false to the knowledge of the 1st

plaintiff firm. The 1st plaintiff demanded several times to pay the balance

amount found due in terms of the credit invoice deducting the amount paid by

way of draft, dated 02.08.1986, by the 1st defendant firm, but they did not give

proper reply. Therefore, the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit.

6. The 1st defendant firm filed written statement before the trial Court

denying the allegations in the plaint which was adopted by the other defendant

Nos.2 to 7. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows:

(i) The 1st plaintiff is not a registered firm and the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are not

its partners. The defendant Nos.8 and 9 retired from the plaintiff firm as early

2025:APHC:15018

as on 01.01.1983, 1st defendant firm was dissolved on 30.03.1987 itself. The

1

st defendant has never had any running khata with the 1

st plaintiff firm and

the account filed by the plaintiffs in the suit is not running khata. The time was

essence of the suit contract. The said contract was also confirmed by the 1st

defendant as admitted by the 1st plaintiff in the plaint. There was absolutely

no necessity or conditions requiring any further communication or permission

either from the brokers or from the 1st defendant to dispatch the goods

covered under the contract. The necessity for any such communication

pleaded in the plaint is false, unwarranted and untenable. The 1st defendant

denies knowledge of any telegrams mentioned in the plaint said to have been

issued by the brokers M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras on 26.12.1984. The

failure on the part of the plaintiffs to supply the cake during the months of

April, May and June, 1984 automatically brought the contract to an end and

the said contract ceased to be in force after June, 1984.

(ii) The total number of bags to be supplied under this contract were

1430 and the defendants suffered a loss of Rs.14,300/- under this contract.

The 1st defendant was not aware of any such telegram surprisingly without

any demand or request from the 1st defendant. Mr. S. Venkateswarulu, the

brother of the 2nd plaintiff and father of plaintiffs 4 and 5, who manages

plaintiffs’ business was contacted immediately and it was made clear to him

that the 1st defendant would take delivery if only the value to be paid was at

the then prevailing market rate of Rs.55/- per bag of 70 kgs. The 1st plaintiff

firm failed to supply the entire quantity of 20 lorry loads as the prices of the

cake have started to raise once again. Only 19 lorries were supplied in an

extended period of March and April, 1985. The 1st defendant had suffered

losses once again on account of plaintiffs failure to supply the entire stock

within the stipulated time.

(iii) At every stage, the plaintiffs sole aim and attempt was to exploit the

defendants to the maximum extent on some pretext or the other. On account

of increasing the number of gunny bags, the 1st defendant had suffered loss of

2025:APHC:15018

cake of an equal weight, a total of 4500 gunny bags were used as per the

bills. Out of them, 391 gunny bags were said to be extra and total amount of

Rs.977-50 ps. was debited against the defendants under two contracts at the

rate of Rs.2-50 per gunny. Taking average prices of the cake at Rs.1,100/- per

M.T. on at the then prevailing market, the 1st defendant finalized the account

of the plaintiffs as per the letter, dated 02.08.1986 and paid the entire balance

amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of a demand draft towards full and final

settlement of their account. The plaintiffs received the draft along with the

account copy enclosed with the letter, dated 02.08.1986 and accepted it. They

did not raise any protest or any claim either immediately or within a

reasonable time, or at any time thereafter before filing the suit. It is, therefore,

evident that the plaintiffs have accepted the payment towards full and final

settlement of their claim and they are now stopped from making any such

further claims. The plaintiffs claim is clearly barred by time. The suit is clearly

barred by limitation and it was not filed within the period of limitation either

from the respective dates of the contracts or the credit bills. The letter, dated

02.08.1986 enclosing the account of the plaintiffs by the defendants is not as

acknowledgment of any debt.

7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following

issues:

(1) Whether each purchase of the cake alleged in the plaint is an

independent contract, or whether they are all part of the same

contract as alleged in the plaint?

(2) Whether the stipulation in the confirmation note is the essence of the

contract as alleged in the plaint?

(3) Whether the alleged telegram, dated 26.12.1984 said to have been

given by M/s. Krishna & Company, Madras, is true and binds the

defendants?

2025:APHC:15018

(4) Whether the plaintiffs failed to supply the cake during the months

stipulated in the confirmation note, and if so whether it amounted to

termination of the contract?

(5) Whether the plaintiffs failure to supply the cake in time resulted in

any loss to defendants, and if so how much loss was causes and

whether the plaintiffs have to compensate the defendants for the

said loss?

(6) Whether the plaintiffs failed to stick on the terms of the confirmation

note with regard to gunny bags and what is the loss sustained by the

defendants on account of it and whether the plaintiffs have to

reimburse the same to the defendants?

(7) At what price or prices the plaintiffs are entitled to claim value of the

cake?

(8) Whether the plaintiffs supplied the entire quantity of case stipulated

and whether the alleged deficiency in the supply resulted in any loss

to the defendants, and if so, how much amount and whether the

plaintiffs are therefore liable to compensate the defendants?

(9) Whether the account of the defendants with the plaintiffs is a running

account and whether the suit claim of the plaintiffs is in time?

(10) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any interest on the suit

claim and if so, at what rate and from which date?

(11) To what relief?

8. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiffs,

PW1 was examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A36 were marked. On behalf of the

Defendants, DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B14 were marked.

2025:APHC:15018

9. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides,

the trial Court decreed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 25.09.2002,

against which the present appeal is preferred by the unsuccessful defendant

Nos.1 to 7 in the suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial

Court.

10. Heard Smt. S. Rajani learned counsel, representing Sri T. Sreedhar,

learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri P. Nagendra Reddy, learned

counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 8.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the decree

and judgment passed by the trial court is contrary to law, weight of evidence

and probabilities of the case. She would further contend that the trial Court

erred in came to a conclusion and decreed the suit though the appellants

discharged the amount due to the plaintiffs by way of demand draft towards

full and final settlement of the debt. She would further contend that the appeal

may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the

learned trial Judge.


12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 8 would

contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial

Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding

given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed by

confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.

13. Now the points for determination in the first appeal are:

1) Whether the alleged discharge of amount to the plaintiffs as

pleaded by the appellants is true and proved by the appellants?

2) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

14. Point Nos.1 and 2:

2025:APHC:15018

The case of the plaintiffs is that the 1st plaintiff firm is a trading firm and

doing business in manufacture of oils and oil cakes at Singarayakonda and

the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are its partners and the 1st defendant firm is a

manufacturer and exporter of de-oiled rice bran, de-oiled cakes and oils and is

situated at Nellore. The plaintiffs further pleaded that the defendant Nos.2 to

9 are the partners of the firm of the 1st defendant and the 1st plaintiff firm doing

business in manufacture of oils and oil cakes and they supplying the same to

the defendants and others through the orders booked by the brokers and

commission agents and M/s. Krishna & Company is the broker between the

plaintiffs and defendants for doing business. The plaintiffs further pleaded that

as per the contract in accordance with both the credit bills, the total value goes

to Rs.2,55,737-70 ps. and the total amount sent under various drafts to the 1st

plaintiff firm on various dates comes to Rs.2,26,145-95 ps. and the 1st

defendant is still due an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. as per the ledger account

for the year 1986-87 at page 96. The 1st defendant firm sent a letter, dated

02.08.1986 along with a demand draft for Rs.1,145-95 ps. by informing that

the amount is sent towards full and final settlement. The plaintiffs further

pleaded that the defendants failed to discharge the total debt and that the

plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit.

15. In order to prove the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relied on the

evidence of P.W.1 and also relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.36. PW.1 is one of the

partners of the 1st plaintiff firm. Ex.A.2 is the true copy of partnership deed and

Ex.A.1 shows that the 1st plaintiff firm is a registered firm and plaintiffs 2 to 5

are the partners of the 1st plaintiff firm. P.W.1 deposed in his evidence that

one M/s.Krishna & Company, Madras is the broker of 1st defendant and also

to the 1st plaintiff and the said M/s.Krishna & Company placed orders on

behalf of the 1st defendant to the 1st plaintiff to send 10 lorries of tobacco seed

cakes and Ex.A.3 is the order placed by M/s.Krishna & Company and Ex.A.4

is the confirmation letter and the plaintiffs also relied on relevant entries in the

books of account of the plaintiffs.

2025:APHC:15018

16. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.36 as stated supra. Ex.A.2 is

the partnership deed and Ex.A.1 is the acknowledgement of firm and Ex.A.5 is

the telegram issued by M/s.Krishna & Company who is the broker and

commission agent between the parties. As per Ex.A.5, the goods have to be

supplied during the month of April, May and June, 1984. Ex.A.15 is

confirmation letter issued by M/s.Krishna & Company to dispatch the goods in

the month of March, 1984 and the 1st defendant also issued another

confirmation letter under Ex.A.4 Ex.A.18 is the telegram issued for not send

the goods. Ex.A.19 is another telegram to send the goods from 25th March,

1985 onwards. P.W.1 deposed in his evidence in view of Ex.A.18 telegram

they have stopped to send TS cakes and later after receipt of Ex.A.19

telegram, they sent TS cakes to the 1st defendant. As per the own case of the

defendants, they have not issued any notice to the plaintiffs stating that they

have sent the cakes subsequent to the credit period and that they have not

accepting the same. As per the evidence of D.W.1, he kept the goods aside

without entering into the ledger and contacting father of P.W.1 by name

Venkateswarulu and father of P.W.1 agreed to reduce the cakes price from

Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show

that the defendants contacted the father of P.W.1 and father of P.W.1 reduced

the price of cakes from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. In fact, Venkateswarlu i.e.,

father of P.W.1 is no way concerned with the 1st plaintiff firm either he is not a

partner of the firm or he is not having any capacity in the 1st plaintiff firm. The

plaintiffs seriously contended that father of P.W.1 is no way connected with

the plaintiff partnership firm. The suit is filed in the year 1989.

17. The contention of the appellants is that they sent an amount of

Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft towards full and final settlement

along with Ex.B.11 letter on 02.08.1986 and the same is received by the

plaintiffs without protest and all of a sudden, the plaintiffs filed the suit in the

year 1989. Admittedly, the suit is filed on 02.08.1989, the 1st defendant sent

an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft on 02.06.1986. The

2025:APHC:15018

appellants contended that the said amount is sent towards full and final

satisfaction. The contention of the plaintiffs is that they made a phone call to

the defendants subsequently by narrating the facts and demanding to pay the

remaining amount. The contention of the appellants is that Ex.A.3 and Ex.B.7

shows that the stock has to be dispatched by April, May and June, 1984 and

agreed price is Rs.75/- per bag and since the price is increased, they did not

supply the goods, as the plaintiffs sent goods subsequent to the period of

June, 1984, the 1st defendant firm refused to receive the stock. The

contention of the plaintiffs is that as per Ex.A.18 telegram, dated 13.03.1985,

the 1st plaintiff firm did not dispatch the TS cakes to the defendants, soon after

receiving another telegram under Ex.A.19, dated 23.03.1985 from M/s.Krishna

& Company, the 1st plaintiff firm dispatched TS cakes and the defendants

received the same. The contention of the appellants is that the 1st plaintiff firm

did not raise any objection for the same at the time of encashment of the

demand draft. As per the admission of D.W.1, they have not sent the

demanded amount at Rs.75/- per bag. The contention of the appellants is that

the father of P.W.1 reduced the price from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag. It is a

fact that father of P.W.1 is not either Managing Partner of the 1st plaintiff firm

or Partner of the firm. The plaintiffs seriously contended that the father of

P.W.1 is no way connected with the 1st plaintiff business, therefore, it is for the

defendants to summon the father of P.W.1 to discharge their burden, but they

failed to do so. As per the case of the defendants, they have sent an amount

of Rs.1,145-95 ps. by way of demand draft on 02.08.1986 towards full

payment of debt. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the said amount is not

towards full and final settlement and the defendants have to discharge some

more amount as per ledger books produced by the plaintiffs and they have

also made a phone call to the defendants by narrating the entire facts. In order

to establish the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relied on documentary

evidence apart from the evidence of P.W.1. The evidence on record coupled

with the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs supports the case of

the plaintiffs.

2025:APHC:15018

18. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the 1st

plaintiff firm did not raise any objection for the same at the time of encashment

of demand draft given towards full and final settlement, for non-supply of

goods from April to June, 1984, they have sustained loss of Rs.14,300/- and

after deducting the same, they sent Rs.1,145-95 ps. But, in order to prove the

said defence, the defendants did not adduce any evidence. It was contended

by the defendants, they have not sent any telegram and they have not

instructed M/s.Krishna & Company to issue telegram to the plaintiffs for

stoppage of TS cakes and also issuance of another telegram to dispatch TS

cakes and the plaintiffs have to prove the same by examining the employee in

M/s.Krishna & Company. It is the case of the appellants that they have

discharged the amount to the plaintiffs towards full and final satisfaction of the

debt, therefore, the entire burden is on the appellants to prove that they have

sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt. As per

the case of both parties, M/s.Krishna & Company is the commission agent to

both the parties but the appellants failed to prove the same to show that they

sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt. The

plaintiffs relied on oral and documentary evidence to prove the claim of the

plaintiffs. The alleged discharge towards full satisfaction of the amount and

alleged negotiations in between D.W.1 and Venkateswarlu about reducing

price of TS cakes from Rs.75/- to Rs.55/- per bag as pleaded is not proved by

the defendants. It is for the appellants to prove the same but the appellants

failed to prove the same.

19. The evidence on record clearly proves that the defendants have to

pay an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. as on the date of 02.08.1986 after

deducting an amount of Rs.1,145-95 ps. which was sent by the defendants by

way of demand draft and the same was encashed by the plaintiffs. But the

appellants failed to prove the same that they sent an amount of Rs.1,145-95

ps. towards full satisfaction of the debt to the plaintiffs. The contention of the

plaintiffs is that the defendants have to pay the total amount due with interest

2025:APHC:15018

at 18% per annum. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the

learned trial Judge awarded interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till

the date of decree and further awarded subsequent interest at 6% per annum

from the date of decree till the date of realization. Therefore, I do not found

any reason to interfere with the said finding of the learned trial Judge in

granting interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree

and subsequent interest at 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date

of realization, but the plaintiffs are not entitled any interest on Rs.29,591-75

ps. till the date of filing of suit, since the plaintiffs have not issued any legal

notice prior to filing of the suit and they waited on the last date of limitation and

filed the suit and that the plaintiffs are not entitled interest at 18% per annum

on the date of finalization of the accounts till the date of filing of the suit.

20. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed by modifying the decree

and judgment, dated 25.09.2002, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kandukur,

as the plaintiffs 1, 3 to 8 are entitled an amount of Rs.29,591-75 ps. with

interest at 10% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree and

further awarded subsequent interest at 6% per annum from the date of decree

till the date of realization. Considering the facts and circumstances of the

case, each party do bear their own costs in the first appeal.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall

stand closed.

_________________________

V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J

Date: 17.04.2025

PGR

2025:APHC:15018

Wednesday, May 15, 2024

In the result, the appeal is allowed, enhancing the compensation from a sum of Rs.2,05,000/-(Rupees Two lakhs Five thousand only) to Rs.6,08,552/- (Rupees Six lakhs Eight thousand Five hundred and Fifty Two only) with interest @ 7.5% per annum and costs from the date of the petition till the date of realization, payable by the respondents 1 and 2 jointly and severally.

As per the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India

in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others10, under the

provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no restriction

that the compensation could be awarded only upto the amount

claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the

evidence brought on record, if Tribunal/Court considers that

claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the

Tribunal may pass such an award. There is no embargo to

award compensation more than that claimed by the claimant.

Rather it is obligatory for the Tribunal and Court to award “just

compensation”, even if it is in the excess of the amount claimed

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI

****

M.A.C.M.A.No. 1566 of 2006

Between:

Chinna Obaiahgari Mohan Reddy,

S/o.Venkata Rami Reddy, Aged 35 years, Agriculturist,

R/o.Koilkuntla Village and Mandal, Kurnool District.

 ... Appellant

And

1. S.Madduleti Reddy,

S/o.Madduleti Reddy, Rig Owner,

R/o.T.B.Road, Allagadda, Kurnool District.

2. The New India Assurance Company Limited,

Rep.by its Divisional Manager, Kurnool. ... Respondents

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 18.01.2023

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the judgment? No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes

3. Whether His Lordship wish to

see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes

DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA, J

2023:APHC:937

2

* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

+ M.A.C.M.A.No.1566 of 2006

% 18.01.2023

Between:

Chinna Obaiahgari Mohan Reddy,

S/o.Venkata Rami Reddy, Aged 35 years, Agriculturist,

R/o.Koilkuntla Village and Mandal, Kurnool District.

 ... Appellant

And

1. S.Madduleti Reddy,

S/o.Madduleti Reddy, Rig Owner,

R/o.T.B.Road, Allagadda, Kurnool District.

2. The New India Assurance Company Limited,

Rep.by its Divisional Manager, Kurnool. ... Respondents

! Counsel for Appellant : Sri A.Jaya Sankara Reddy

^ Counsel for 2nd Respondent : Sri G.Vasantha Rayudu

 Ms.T.V.Sridevi

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. (2022) 1 SCC 317

2. (2020) ACJ 1042 (SC)

3. (1879) LR 5 QBD 78

4. 1963 2 WLR 1359

5. (1965) 1 ALL ER 563

6. 2012 ACJ 2694 (SC)

7. 2022 ACJ 2122

8. 2011 ACJ 1 (SC)

9. 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC)

10. (2003) 2 SCC 274

This Court made the following:

2023:APHC:937

3

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

M.A.C.M.A.No.1566 of 2006

JUDGMENT:

This appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act

(for short “the Act”) has been preferred by the appellantclaimant, challenging the Award dated 22.02.2006, in

M.V.O.P.No.575 of 2003 delivered by the Motor Accidents Claims

Tribunal –cum- V Additional District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal

(for short „the Tribunal”), granting compensation of

Rs.2,05,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum thereon,

from the date of the petition till the date of realization, to the

petitioner-injured against the 1st & 2nd respondents jointly and

severally, on account of the injuries sustained in a road traffic

accident at Koilkuntla Town.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as

they are arrayed before the Tribunal.

3. The factual context of the case is as under:

a) A 43-year-old Chinna Obaiahgari Mohan Reddy was a

Commission Agent and landlord. At the time of the accident, the

claimant was getting an annual income of more than

Rs.1,00,000/-, as per the income tax returns filed before the

Income Tax Department. On 27.02.2003 at about 3.00 p.m.,

2023:APHC:937

4

while the petitioner was returning to his house on a motorcycle

bearing No.AP 21 D 8729, after attending a function, and when

he reached near the bus stand at Koilkuntla Town, the offending

vehicle (Jeep) bearing No.AP 21 D 8999 belongs to the 1st

respondent driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner,

and hit on the rear side of his motorcycle, as a result, the

petitioner-claimant fell down and sustained a fracture of the left

posterior i.e., left side of the hip. Immediately, he was shifted to

Balaji Nursing Home, Kurnool for treatment. The matter was

reported to the Police alleging that the accident took place as a

result of rash and negligent driving of the said Jeep and based

on the complaint lodged by the petitioner-claimant, Koilkuntla

Police, registered a case in Crime No.16 of 2003 for the offence

under Section 337 IPC and issued F.I.R and after completion of

investigation of the case, a charge sheet was submitted against

the accused driver for having committed an offence punishable

under Section 338 IPC and Section 134 (a) & (b) read with 187 of

M.V.Act and the claimant Ch.Mohan Reddy filed an application

claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.4,75,000/-, but restricted

the claim to Rs.3,00,000/- before the Tribunal, on account of

the injuries sustained by him in the said road traffic accident.

2023:APHC:937

5

b) The 1st respondent, who is the owner of the offending

vehicle, did not contest the matter.

c) The 2nd respondent-Insurance Company filed a counter

contending inter alia that the accident did not take place near

the bus stand at Koilkuntla and it took place somewhere in

Kurnool Town, due to the hit by an unidentified vehicle. It is

further contended that the driver of the offending vehicle was

not having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the

accident. It is further contended that the offending vehicle was

not having a valid permit and violated the policy conditions. It is

further contended that this respondent is not at all responsible

for the alleged accident and is not liable to pay the compensation

and prayed to dismiss the petition.

d) Based on the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed the

following issues:

1) Whether the accident occurred due to rash and

negligent driving of the jeep bearing No.AP 21 D 8999

resulting in injuries to the petitioner?

2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation?

And if so, to what amount and from which of the

respondents?

3) To what relief?

2023:APHC:937

6

e) During the trial, in order to establish his claim, the

injured-claimant was examined himself as P.W.1, Dr.B.V.Subba

Reddy, Dr.Jai Ramachandra Pingle, who treated and operated

for replacement of the hip, were examined as P.Ws.2 and 3

respectively and C.Obula Reddy, who shifted the injured to the

hospital for treatment, was examined as P.W.4 besides marking

Exs.A.1 to A.8 and Exs.X.1 to X.3 on behalf of the petitioner.

K.Prabhakara Rao, who was the Branch Manager of the 2nd

respondent-Insurance Company, was examined as R.W.1, and

Ex.B.1 was got marked.

(f) The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire evidence of P.Ws.1

to 4 and Exs.A.1 to A.8, Exs.X.1 to X.3, and Ex.B1, came to the

conclusion that the accident occurred due to the rash and

negligent driving of the offending vehicle (Jeep) bearing No.AP 21

D 8999 by its driver and passed the impugned Award granting

compensation of Rs.2,05,000/- with interest at 7.5% per annum

and with proportionate costs to be paid by the 2nd respondentInsurance Company.

g) On appreciation of evidence, the following compensation

was awarded by the Tribunal by applying multiplier „15‟.

2023:APHC:937

7

S.No. Heads of compensation Amount of

compensation awarded

1 Loss of Income for six months Rs.20,000/-

2 Compensation for pain and

suffering

Rs.20,000/-

3 Medical and Transport

expenses

Rs.75,000/-

4 Permanent disability and loss

of future income

Rs.90,000/-

Total Rs.2,05,000/-

(h) Aggrieved by, and dissatisfied with the said award, the

injured/claimant, being the appellant, preferred the present

appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant-claimant would submit

that, considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal ought to

have awarded higher compensation. It was further submitted

that the income of the injured was taken on the lower side by

the Tribunal which ultimately resulted in the grant of lesser

compensation. It is further submitted that the Tribunal ought to

have taken into consideration the income tax returns filed by the

appellant-claimant for the assessment year 2002-03, definitely,

the appellant-claimant would have got more compensation than

the awarded amount by the Tribunal. It was further urged that

the compensation under various conventional heads granted by

the Tribunal is very lesser resulting in prejudice to the case of

the appellant-claimant. Therefore, the figures and multiplier

2023:APHC:937

8

applied by the Tribunal are not justified and warrant the

interference of this Court for enhancement of the compensation.

5. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-Insurance

Company would submit that, on proper appreciation of the

evidence on record, the Tribunal had rightly awarded a just and

fair compensation to the appellant. He would further submit

that the figures and multiplier applied by the Tribunal and the

amount of compensation awarded, were absolutely justified.

Therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal does not warrant

any interference in the appeal. The learned counsel, therefore,

urges the Court for dismissal of the appeal.

6. In the light of the above rival arguments, the point for

determination in this appeal is:

“Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just

 and reasonable, in the facts and circumstances of the case

 or requires enhancement?”

7. POINT: Considering the above submissions of learned

counsels representing the parties, perused and assessed the

entire evidence including the exhibited documents. A perusal of

the impugned award would show that the Tribunal has framed

Issue No.1 as to whether the accident occurred due to rash and

negligent driving of the offending vehicle (jeep) bearing No.AP 21

D 8999 resulting in injuries to the petitioner, to which the

2023:APHC:937

9

Tribunal after considering the evidence of P.W.1, at Para 20 of

the award, held that the accident occurred due to the rash and

negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle (jeep)

bearing No.AP 21 D 8999. Ex.A.4 is the Certified Copy of the

Calendar and Judgment dated 05.04.2003 passed in CC.No.35

of 2003 by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Koilkuntla.

When the trial Court examined the accused (driver of the

offending vehicle) under Section 251 Cr.P.C., as to the

allegations leveled against him in the charge sheet, the accused

admitted the offence voluntarily and pleaded guilty. In view of

the voluntary admission by the accused-driver, the trial Court

convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay a fine of

Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC

and Rs.250/- each for the offence under Sections 134(a) and (b)

read with 187 of M.V.Act, totaling the fine amount of Rs.1,500/-,

in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months

each. In view of the admission made by the accused-driver of the

offending vehicle, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of

the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and

negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle (jeep)

bearing No.AP 21 D 8999. Therefore, I hold that it was only the

driver of the offending vehicle, who was negligent in driving the

2023:APHC:937

10

vehicle and causing the accident. Even assuming that the driver

of the offending vehicle was not possessing a valid driving

licence by the date of the accident, the Insurance Company

cannot escape from its liability in view of the decision of the

Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Kurvan Ansari @ Kurvan Ali

& Another Vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu & Another1, wherein, at

Para No.17, it was held as follows:

“…………..The entire compensation shall be

paid to the appellants by Respondent 2 insurance

company, and we keep it open to the insurance

company to recover the same from Respondent 1

owner of the motorcycle by initiating appropriate

proceedings as the motorcycle was driven by the

driver who was not possessing valid driving licence

on the date of the accident.

18. Accordingly, this civil appeal is allowed

partly with directions as indicated above. No order

as to costs.”

8. Further, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondentinsurance company would submit that the offending vehicle was

not having a valid permit and violated the policy conditions. On

perusal of Ex.B.1-Insurance Policy, the offending vehicle bearing

No.AP 21 D 8999 was covered with the Insurance Policy by the

date of the accident, as the period of insurance was from

01.08.2002 at 12.00 a.m to the midnight of 31.07.2003.


1

 (2022) 1 SCC 317

2023:APHC:937

11

Therefore, the plea taken by the 2nd respondent-Insurance

Company that the offending vehicle does not cover under the

insurance policy as on the date of the accident, is found to be

false. The Policy taken by the 1st respondent was in existence at

the time of the accident and the same has been proved before

the Tribunal by producing Ex.B.1-copy of the Insurance Policy

issued by the 2nd respondent-Insurance Company. Therefore, I

hold that the offending vehicle (jeep) bearing No.AP 21 D 8999

was covered with an insurance policy at the time of the accident

on 27.02.2003 and there was no violation of policy conditions.

9. In so far as the quantum of compensation is concerned,

while determining the compensation for physical injuries, the

head on which the amount of compensation to be determined,

may be of two types, one is pecuniary damages and the other is

non-pecuniary damages.

10. It is not out of place to state that, by making the payment

of compensation for damages would not revive the claimant into

his original physical position. The compensation towards

wrongful act in terms of money though cannot be decided by the

Court, it may be determined as per the recognized principles. In

the said context, some of the English judgments are relevant,

which may specify why the compensation be paid, what should

2023:APHC:937

12

be the basis for determination, and what may be the reason for

awarding such compensation, applying the uniform methodology

for determination of compensation, comparable to the injuries,

thereby a person can lead his life, though his physical frame

cannot be reversed.

11. This Court perused the record and the impugned award,

and finds that the learned Tribunal has not followed the

contours of just compensation in this matter. The Court has to

make a judicious attempt to award damages so that the

claimant or the victim may be compensated for the loss suffered

by him.

12. In the case of Kajal Vs. Jagdish Chand2, wherein, the

Hon‟ble Apex Court has quoted pertinent observations from a

very old case Phillips Vs. London & South Western Railway

Co.,3 as under:

“You cannot put the plaintiff back again into

his original position, but you must bring your

reasonable common sense to bear, and you must

always recollect that this is the only occasion on

which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can

never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to

give him compensation once and for all. He has

done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the

hands of the defendants and you must take care to

give him full fair compensation for that which he

has suffered.” Besides, the Tribunals should


2

 (2020) ACJ 1042 (SC)

3

(1879) LR 5 QBD 78

2023:APHC:937

13

always remember that the measures of damages in

all these cases “should be such as to enable even a

tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his

misadventure.”

13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has further quoted pertinent

observations from the case titled H. West & Son Ltd. vs.

Shephard4 as under:

“Money may be awarded so that something

tangible may be procured to replace something else

of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost.

But money cannot renew a physical frame that has

been battered and shattered. All that Judges and

Courts can do is to award sums which must be

regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the

process there must be endeavour to secure some

uniformity in the general method of approach. By

common assent awards must be reasonable and

must be assessed with moderation. Futhermore, it

is eminently desirable that so far as possible

comparable injuries should be compensated by

comparable awards.

In the same case Lord Devlin observed that the

proper approach to the problem was to adopt a test as to

what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum,

such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head

among his neighbours and say with their approval that he

has done the fair thing", which should be kept in mind by

the court in determining compensation in personal injury

cases.”

14. Lord Denning while speaking for the Court of Appeal in

the case of Ward v. James5, laid down the following three basic

principles to be followed in such like cases:


4

 1963 2 WLR 1359

5

(1965) 1 All ER 563

2023:APHC:937

14

“Firstly, accessibility: In cases of grave injury,

where the body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it

is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in

money, so difficult that the award must

basically be a conventional figure, derived from

experience or from awards in comparable cases.

Secondly, uniformity: There should be some

measure of uniformity in awards so that similar

decisions may be given in similar cases;

otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in

the community and much criticism of the

administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability:

Parties should be able to predict with some

measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to

be awarded in a particular case, for by this

means cases can be settled peaceably and not

brought to court, a thing very much to the public

good.”

15. From a reading of all the above Judgments, it is crystal

clear that, while determining the compensation for physical

injuries, the heads on which the amount of compensation are to

be determined, is an extreme task. What may be the adequate

amount for a wrongful act and can it be compensated by money,

particularly, towards pain and suffering by an arithmetical

calculation, it cannot be decided what may be the extent of the

amount of money, which would represent the pain and suffering

to a person. There has to be a measure of calculated guesswork

and conjecture. An assessment, as best as can, in the

circumstances should be made. The determination of quantum

2023:APHC:937

15

must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb

in a free country in generous scales.

16. In the case of K.Suresh Vs. New India Assurance Co.,

Ltd.,6 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“2...There cannot be actual compensation for

anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations. The

quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation

of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm

of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity „the Act‟)

stipulates that there should be grant of “just

compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a

court of law to determine “just compensation” which

is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and

simultaneously, should not be a pittance.”

17. Applying the aforesaid principles laid down in the abovereferred Judgments, now processed to assess the compensation.

While assessing the compensation by the Court-Tribunal, one of

the factors, which must be careful in a case like the present one,

is that the claim can be awarded only once. The claimant cannot

come back to the Court for enhancement of the award at a later

stage praying that something extra has been spent. Therefore,

the Court should have to take a liberal view of the matter while

awarding compensation.


6

 2012 ACJ 2694 (SC)

2023:APHC:937

16

18. In the instant case, the Tribunal committed an error while

awarding compensation to the claimant by taking the annual

income of the petitioner-injured as Rs.40,000/-. A perusal of

Ex.A.5-Income Tax returns of the petitioner-injured at Column

Nos.23 and 24, would show that the income of the petitioner is

Rs.57,100/- and Rs.62,600/- respectively, and in total

Rs.1,19,700/- per annum. The Tribunal ought to have taken the

annual income of the injured as Rs.1,19,700/-, but committed

an error by taking the annual income as Rs.40,000/-. At least

the Tribunal ought to have taken 60% of the annual income out

of the amount shown in Ex.A.5-Income Tax Returns. It is

relevant to refer to a decision in Royal Sundaram Alliance

Ins.Co.Ltd., Vs. Vinaya Udaybabu Shah and others7 wherein,

at Para-33, held as follows:

“Learned counsel for the appellant during the

course of argument also submitted that learned

Member has wrongly relied upon the income tax

returns for the financial year 2003-04 to assess the

income of deceased. According to learned counsel

the accident in question took place on 23.02.2003

and, therefore, the income taken for assessment of

compensation should have been based on previous

year‟s return.”


7

 2022 ACJ 2122

2023:APHC:937

17

19. According to the above said decision, it is crystal clear that

the income tax returns have to be taken into consideration for

the assessment of compensation, based on the previous year‟s

returns. In the instant case, the petitioner-injured filed income

tax returns for the assessment year 2002-03, and the alleged

accident occurred on 27.02.2003. In view of the above said

decision, the income tax returns filed by the petitioner have to

be taken into consideration, while determining the

compensation. This Court is of the view that 60% of the annual

income shown in Ex.A.5-Income Tax Returns has to be taken

into consideration, which comes to Rs.71,820/- (Rs.1,19,700 x

60%).

20. In the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar8 the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court of India, held as under:

“In Raj Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court has

held that award of compensation should, to the

extent possible, fully and adequately restore the

claimant to the position prior to the accident. A

person is not only to be compensated for the

physical injury, but also for the loss which he

suffered as a result of such injury. This would

include compensation for his inability to lead a full

life, enjoy those normal amenities which he would

have enjoyed but for the injuries, as also his

inability to earn as much as he used to earn or

could have earned. The WP(C) No.7856/2010 Page

5 Supreme Court further laid down the heads under


8

2011 ACJ 1 (SC)

2023:APHC:937

18

which the compensation is to be awarded in

personal injury cases as under:

“(5) The heads under which the compensation is

awarded in personal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary Damages (Special Damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization,

medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and

miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the

injured would have made had he not been injured,

comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on account of

permanent disability.

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General damages):

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a

consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and / or loss of prospects of

marriage)

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal

longevity).

In routine personal injury cases, compensation

will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii) (a) and

(iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where

there is specific medical evidence corroborating the

evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be

granted under any of the heads Iii) (b), (iii), (v) and

(vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of

permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss

of amenities (and / or loss of prospects of

marriage), and loss of expectation of life.”

21. In the light of the above Judgments, it is well settled that

the income on the date of the accident, ought to have been taken

into consideration, after deducting the income tax payable by

the claimant. Admittedly, as the accident occurred on

2023:APHC:937

19

27.02.2003, this Court is of the opinion that the learned

Tribunal was not right in taking into consideration 1/3rd of the

income tax returns of the petitioner for the assessment year

2002-03. At least, the learned Tribunal ought to have taken

60% of the annual income of the claimant under Income Tax

Returns for the assessment year 2002-03.

22. As regards the disability suffered by the petitionerclaimant for his whole life, in view of the evidence of P.W.3-

Dr.Jai Ramachandra Pingle, who treated and operated on the

claimant deposed that he was working as Senior Orthopedic

Surgeon at Apollo Hospital, Hyderabad. The petitioner-injured

was admitted in the hospital on 22.02.2004 due to pain in the

left hip joint, a fracture in the left hip, and that in the year 2003,

he was operated with A O screws and X-ray showed a vascular

nerve of the left hip with orthocities. He further deposed that

the injured was operated on 23.02.2004 and total hip

replacement uncemented was done and the injured was

discharged on 26.02.2004. The injured had severe pain in the

hip and joint defect in the patient, there was a collapse head

femoral due to „AVN‟ femur. The hip joint was replaced. P.W.3

identified Ex.A.8-discharge summary card and he also issued

Ex.X.1-Emergency Certificate. The medicines in Ex.A.6 bills of

2023:APHC:937

20

Apollo Hospital, Hyderabad, were all prescribed by him (P.W.3).

Further, he stated that, as a result of the injuries sustained, an

operation of total hip replacement with an artificial joint was

done. Therefore, the injured has a permanent disability of 30%.

23. Therefore, as per the evidence of P.W.3-Doctor, the

petitioner-claimant sustained permanent disability of 30%. But,

the petitioner did not file the disability certificate issued by the

Medical Board or issued by the Doctor, except the evidence of

P.W.3-Doctor. In the absence of any disability certificate, it

cannot be considered that the petitioner-injured sustained 30%

disability. However, this Court is of the view that 15% of

disability has to be taken, as per Raj Kumar‟s case (supra).

24. To award compensation, it is the duty of the Court to

ensure that the petitioner-claimant is paid “just compensation”.

No amount of money can compensate the injured for the injuries

suffered by him. The injured can never be put back to the same

position, however, the compensation has to be determined in

terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Act

refers to the determination of payment of “just compensation” to

the injured.

25. In the facts of this case, looking to the beneficial purpose

of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, and further having

2023:APHC:937

21

regard to the principles laid down in the aforesaid Judgments,

the Tribunal failed to consider the gravity of the injuries

sustained by the petitioner and thereby, committed an illegality

in awarding a meager amount of compensation to the claimant

under the head of “loss of future earnings”.

26. In the case of Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport

Corporation9, while determining the multiplier applicable with

reference to the age of the petitioner-injured, the Hon‟ble Apex

Court, held as follows.

21. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should

be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared

by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and

Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for

the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by

one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30

years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then

reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for

51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65

years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.

27. In Ex.A.5-Income Tax Returns, the total annual income of

the petitioner-injured is Rs.1,19,700/- ( Rs.57,100 + Rs.62,600),

out of which, this Court has taken 60% as his annual income,

which comes to Rs.71,820/- (Rs.1,19,700 x 60%). The

petitioner-injured suffered permanent disability of 30% as stated


9

 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC)

2023:APHC:937

22

supra, but in the absence of a disability certificate, this Court

assessed the loss of earning capacity of the petitioner-injured as

15%. In Ex.A.8-Discharge Summary Card issued by Apollo

Hospital, Hyderabad, the age of the petitioner-injured is „43‟

years at the time of the accident. But, the learned Tribunal

committed an error and illegality in taking the annual income of

the petitioner-injured as Rs.40,000/-, and also in taking 15% of

the annual income i.e., Rs.6,000/-. The Tribunal applied the

multiplier „15‟ for the age group of 41 – 45 years, and awarded

an amount of Rs.90,000/- (Rs.6,000 x 15) towards permanent

disability and loss of future earnings, which is not in accordance

with the proposition laid down by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Sarla

Verma‟s case (supra). In the instant case, the multiplier „14‟

should be applied.

28. In the light of the principles laid down in Raj Kumar‟s case

(supra), the calculation of compensation under the head of loss

of future earnings is as follows:

a) Annual income before the accident : Rs.71,820/-

b) Loss of future earnings per annum

(15% of the prior annual income) : Rs.10,773/-

c) Multiplier applicable with reference

to the age group of 41- 45 years : 14

d) Loss of future earnings

(Rs.10,773 x 14) : Rs.1,50,822/-

2023:APHC:937

23

29. This Court finds that the Tribunal has not awarded

appropriate compensation towards permanent disability and loss

of future earnings. A reading of the Tribunal‟s award, makes it

appear that the Tribunal‟s approach does not accord at all with

current judicial opinion. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a

sum of Rs.1,50,822/- under the head of loss of future earnings.

30. As can be seen from the award passed by the Tribunal, the

petitioner-injured was under medical care from the date of the

accident. Later he was admitted in Apollo Hospital, Hyderabad

on 22.02.2004, and on 23.02.2004 he was operated for total hip

replacement of hip joint and discharged on 26.02.2004.

Considering the nature of the injuries and the period of

treatment undergone by the petitioner-injured, a meager amount

of Rs.20,000 was awarded by the Tribunal towards pain and

suffering. The loss of income of the petitioner-injured from the

date of the accident till the date of hip replacement of left hip

joint operated on 23.02.2004 is for nearly 12 months and after

the hip replacement definitely, he would have lost the income for

at least six months which needs to be just. Therefore, a total

period of 18 months has to be calculated on monthly income.

31. This Court has taken the annual income of the petitionerinjured as Rs.71,820/-, as stated above and the monthly income

2023:APHC:937

24

of the petitioner-injured would be Rs.5,985/- (Rs.71,820/12 =

Rs.5,985/-). Thus, the loss of income for a period of 18 months

would be Rs.1,07,730/-(Rs.5,985 x 18). The Tribunal has

committed an error in awarding an amount of Rs.20,000/-

towards loss of earnings for six months. Therefore, the petitioner

is entitled to a sum of Rs.1,07,730/- under the head of loss of

earnings during the period of treatment i.e., for 18 months.

32. The Tribunal has committed illegality in awarding a

meager amount of Rs.75,000/- towards medical and transport

expenses. Since the petitioner-injured was admitted in Apollo

Hospital, Hyderabad, and was inpatient for four days, and

underwent surgery for hip replacement, definitely, he would

have spent more amount than the amount awarded by the

Tribunal. The petitioner deposed that he spent Rs.1,59,000/-

towards the medical expenditure, he restricted his claim to only

Rs.50,000/- and Rs.25,000/- towards transport expenses, in

total Rs.75,000/-, as observed by the Tribunal in Para No.26 of

the award. The claimant who is not well educated, is not

supposed to be that much of meticulous so as to maintain the

bills for any future use. The claimant has remained in Balaji

Nursing Home, Kurnool and later he was admitted in Apollo

Hospital, Hyderabad, and operated for hip replacement and he

2023:APHC:937

25

must have incurred that much of expenses, and this Court‟s

interference is required on the compensation awarded towards

medical and transport expenses. Therefore, this Court is of the

view that the petitioner is entitled to an amount of

Rs.1,75,000/- under the head of medical and transport

expenses, which is just and reasonable.

33. The Tribunal has committed illegality in awarding a

meager amount of Rs.20,000/- towards pain and suffering. The

petitioner-claimant suffered from pain and suffering for not less

than 18 months from the date of the accident till operated for

hip replacement as stated supra. Taking into consideration of

the pain and suffering already undergone by the petitioner and

to be suffered in the future, mental and physical shock,

hardship, inconvenience, and discomforts due to the hip

replacement, the amount of compensation needs to be enhanced

to Rs.1,50,000/- under the head of pain and suffering.

34. The learned Tribunal has not awarded the amount under

the head of extra-nourishment. When the petitioner-injured

underwent hip replacement, extra nourishment needs to be

provided to the petitioner-injured for a speedy recovery. As such,

an amount of Rs.25,000/- needs to be awarded under the head

of extra-nourishment.

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26

35. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at

providing relief to the claimant. The compensation is only the

means to grant some support for the loss suffered with which he

is expected to live and the amount awarded under the above

heads has to be commensurate with the injury and its impact on

the claimant.

36. In Sarla Verma‟s case (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court,

while elaborating the concept of „just compensation‟ observed as

under:

“Just compensation is adequate compensation which is

fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the

case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the

wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well

settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is

not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of

profit.”

37. On an overall re-appreciation of the pleadings, material on

record, and the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

and this Court in the aforesaid decisions, I am of the definite

opinion that the appellant-claimant is entitled to enhancement

of compensation as modified and re-calculated above and given

in the table below for easy reference.

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27

S.No.

Heads of compensation Amount of

compensation

awarded

1 Loss of future earnings Rs. 1,50,822/-

2 Loss of earnings during the period of

treatment

Rs. 1,07,730/-

3 Medical and Transport expenses Rs. 1,75,000/-

4 Pain and Suffering Rs. 1,50,000/-

5 Extra-nourishment Rs. 25,000/-

Rs. 6,08,552/-

(-) Compensation already awarded by the

Tribunal

Rs. 2,05,000/-

Rs. 4,03,552/-

38. The amount of compensation enhanced by this Court in

appeal shall carry interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of

filing of the claim petition till the realization of the amount.

39. As per the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India

in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others10, under the

provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no restriction

that the compensation could be awarded only upto the amount

claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the

evidence brought on record, if Tribunal/Court considers that

claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the

Tribunal may pass such an award. There is no embargo to

award compensation more than that claimed by the claimant.

Rather it is obligatory for the Tribunal and Court to award “just

compensation”, even if it is in the excess of the amount claimed.


10

 (2003) 2 SCC 274

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28

The Tribunals are expected to make an award by determining

the amount of compensation that should appear to be just and

proper. The compensation as awarded by the Claims Tribunal,

against the background of the facts and circumstances of the

case, is not just and reasonable, and the claimant is entitled to

more compensation, as stated supra, though he might not have

claimed the same at the time of filing of the claim petition.

40. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the award

passed by the Tribunal warrants interference by enhancing the

compensation from Rs.2,05,000/- to Rs.6,08,552/-.

41. In the result, the appeal is allowed, enhancing the

compensation from a sum of Rs.2,05,000/-(Rupees Two lakhs

Five thousand only) to Rs.6,08,552/- (Rupees Six lakhs Eight

thousand Five hundred and Fifty Two only) with interest @ 7.5%

per annum and costs from the date of the petition till the date of

realization, payable by the respondents 1 and 2 jointly and

severally.

(ii) The 2nd respondent is directed to deposit the

compensation amount within two months from the date of this

judgment, failing which execution can be taken out against it.

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29

(iii) The appellant-claimant shall pay the requisite Courtfee in respect of the enhanced amount awarded over and above

the compensation claimed.

(iv) The appellant is permitted to withdraw the entire

amount with accrued interest.

 (v) The impugned award of the learned Tribunal stands

modified to the aforesaid extent and in the terms and directions

as above.

As a sequel, interlocutory application(s) pending for

consideration, if any, shall stand closed.

 JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

Date: 18.01.2023

L.R.Copy to be marked

Dinesh

2023:APHC:937

30

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

M.A.C.M.A.No.1566 OF 2006

18.01.2023

L.R.Copy to be marked

Dinesh

2023:APHC:937